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WILLIAM R. BRYAN
The Outlook for Interest Rates
Interest rates are likely to continue to decline for the
near-term future, although the decline will not be
without interruption. More important, over the longer
run there is a good chance of a break in the general
upward movement in rates that has characterized the
past three decades.
The interest rate forecast is spelled out fully in the
next section of this article. Following that, there is a
general discussion of the errors inherent in forecasts of
this sort, even in the unlikely event that they turn out
to be reasonably accurate.
Future Changes in Interest Rates
Interest rates have declined sharply since mid-1984
and have fallen more than 8 full percentage points from
the levels reached in late' 1981. On average, interest
rates have declined 37 basis points per month during
the most recent period of decline. There are at least
two important questions relating to future interest rate
developments. One is concerned with interest rate
changes irj'thenear-terrii future, but the more
important question deals with interest rate trends over
the long run.
What about the near-term future? As a short-hand
way of talking about interest rate developments, it is
useful to regard the level of nominal interest rates as
the sum of a so-called "real" rate and an inflation
premium. By adjusting for expectations regarding
future rates of inflation, the inflation premium serves
to keep rates of return on debt appropriately related to
returns on real assets.
Expectations are not observable, but they may reflect
an accumulation of evidence relating to inflation
experience. In addition, there are those who may be
gifted at interpreting recent or current economic
policies, or in forming insights regarding future
policies. Moreover, there may be analysts who
understand the effects of policy variables on the future
course of events. To the extent that there can be
informed predictions, these too can be brought to bear
on inflationary expectations. But such insights are
beyond the scope of this article.
An extrapolation of inflationary experience over the
past several years suggests that the inflation premium
is about 4 percent. Research evidence relating to the
real rate indicates that it varies between 2 and 4 percent.
In simple-minded fashion, a matrix of possibilities has
been specified within which to talk about prospective
developments during the next six months or so (see the
Table). However, each of the outcomes in the matrix
are not equally plausible. Thus, for example, it is
implausible to believe that the real rate will move to
4 percent in the next year or so. Similarly, it is
implausible to suppose that the inflation premium will
fall to 2 percent. Thus, within the framework of this
mechanistic view, interest rates (as measured by yields
on one-year US Treasury securities) m the next 6 to 12
months will be bounded between 6 and 9 percent. At
this writing, yields on one-year Treasury securities
were fluctuating near the 7.5 percent level—fluctuating
upward.
Table. Future Nominal Interest Rates
Time-Series Analysis
One approach to the analysis of an economic time
series is to decompose it into its constituent elements.
It is common to imagme that an economic time
series—such as industrial output, retail sales,
employment, and so forth—is affected by secular,
cyclical, seasonal, irregular, and random factors.
Secular forces relate to those factors that have exerted
a persistent influence over an extended period of time,
perhaps as long as 20 or 30 years or longer. Cyclical
forces are those associated with what is frequently
referred to as the business cycle. Such forces may last
several years, depending upon the duration of the cycle.
Seasonal forces are those that register a yearly, or
shorter, periodicity. Irregular forces refer to explainable
episodes without definable periodicity—such as
strikes, natural disaster, political decisions, and so on.
Random factors relate to unexplainable variation,
presumably both positive and negative shocks.
There is a widely held view that interest rates show
no seasonal periodicity. That view is not challenged
here. Nor do I make any effort to differentiate between
irregular and random changes. In what follows, I limit
attention to secular and cyclical factors.
Secular Changes in Interest Rates
Using monthly yields on one-year US Treasury
securities of constant maturity, a trend line was fitted
through interest rates for January 1959 to June 1985.
Results show that, on average, interest rates rose about
3 basis points (three-hundredths of one percent) per
month during the period. There is a view that the
upward trend resulted from successive revisions in
expectations regarding inflation.
It could have been very useful for a small number of
people to have possessed that information at the
beginning of, or early on during the 26-year period. If
such knowledge had been in the hands of would-be
borrowers, it would have increased their demands for
borrowed funds. In contrast, if such knowledge had
been in the hands of long-term lenders, they could have
gone out of business. Of course, if everyone had
"known," actual experience would have taken a
different path.
The typical, or standard, deviation in monthly
interest rates on one-year Treasury securities during
the period was 324 basis points. Even after fitting the
trend line through the data, substantial variation
remained. The variation around the trend line averaged
181 basis points, and the range of error (from high to
low) was 1,027 basis points. Measured in terms of
forecasted values, the error averaged more than 26
percent.
In short, even if an individual business or household
had held an accurate view of long-term trends, it would
have found itself ill-prepared for many short- to
intermediate-term decisions.
Cyclical Changes in Interest Rales
There were 1 1 contrasting periods of cyclical change
during the 3 18 months from 1959 to 1985. As it turns
out, there were more periods of rising interest rates
than periods when interest rates were falling. Moreover,
the periods of rising rates were much longer than the
periods of declining rates. Interest rates generally
drifted upward for about three-fourths of the time.
Suppose we had been able to differentiate between
these cyclical episodes. The Chart presents the interest
rate data with lines filled through periods of rising and
falling interest rates. (The time periods were identified
by visual inspection, and the trends were fitted by
least-squares techniques. ) During periods when interest
rates were rising, the average monthly increases ranged
from 18 basis points to less than 1 basis point. By
comparison, during periods when interest rates were
falling, the average monthly declines ranged from more
than 40 basis points to just over 7 basis points.
If the cyclical episodes represented by the fitted lines
constituted the state of knowledge, there would have
been a substantial reduction in unexplained interest
rate movement. The deviation around these cyclical
trend lines averaged 79 basis points.
Concluding Remarks
The short-term interest rate forecast presented in the
first section is essentially a prediction that dominant
forces will not change. Instead, there will be a
continuation in the downward movement in interest
rates that began in late 1981. But the movement will
not continue for much longer. The longer-run interest
rate forecast is a prediction of change. It rests on the
view that there have been important shifts in the
economy.
The second major section of the article warns that
even if the principal forecasts are correct, there is
substantial remaining fluctuation. I have made no
attempt to predict very short-term, reversible
fluctuations. 9
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LEONARD F. HEUMANN
Illinois Housing: An Analysis of
Changing Conditions and Needs
±\ housing needs analysis is a means of identifying
the number and percentage of housing units that are
substandard or overcrowded, those households that
cannot afford decent, safe, and affordable housing on
the private market, and the changes in household
demographics and housing conditions over time that
can aid in the development of future housing policy
and program design. This article reports on such a
housmg needs analysis for Illinois, conducted in 1984
for the Illinois Housing Development Authority. The
full report analyzed over 14 different data sources, for
144 separate areas of the state and employed over 500
variables. The analysis relied on secondary data with
primary emphasis on the US Census. While the results
provide one of the most comprehensive pictures of
housing needs in Illinois history, there are still severe
limitations to the use of secondary data. All the
measures of housing need used have limitations.
Nevertheless, some clear trends and planning
implications emerge. This article will deal primarily
with state-wide data and not the 143 areas of the state
analyzed in the larger study.
The findings will be divided into three major
sections: important housing-related economic and
demographic trends; inadequate housing; and housing
needs resulting from excessive housing costs.
Demographic and Economic Characteristics
Population Characteiistics
Net outmigration was the single most important
population trend in Illinois between 1970 and 1980; its
character has important long-range implications for
housing needs and program priorities. Population
increased 2.8 percent to 1 1 .41 million residents during
the decade, less than one-fourth the national growth
rate and one-third the state rate over the previous 40
years. This is due to the outmigration of 380,687
persons, a rate of 3.4 percent.
Economic Conditions
As a predominantly industrial state, Illinois was hard
hit by the recession of 1980-1982. The average
unemployment in 1979 was 5.5 percent, rising to 11.4
percent in 1983. During the subsequent recovery,
overall unemployment dropped to less than 10 percent
by April 1984, but that was exceeded substantially in
many rural areas and older, industrial cities. The state's
labor force grew by 1 8 percent in the 1 970s, as a result
of "baby boom" children entering the workforce for the
first time and to the increased participation of women.
Were it not for the outmigration of active workers, the
unemployment figures would probably be much higher.
Household Characteristics
The most dramatic shifts occurred in household
statistics. While husband-wife households constitute
60 percent of the total, their number decreased by 2
percent in the 1 970s compared with a national increase
of 10 percent—suggesting an especially high proportion
of young adults delaying marriage or an outmigration
of families. One-person households increased by 49.5
percent and two- and three-person households
increased by 1.2 percent, while four- and five-person
households declined 6.6 percent and larger households
declined 32.5 percent. The average number of persons
per household declined from 3.09 in 1970 to 2.76
persons by 1980. If the trend in smaller households
continues, one strategy may be to build smaller, more
efficient houses for small households.
Elderly Households
These grew substantially during the 1970s. Illinois
was one of only seven states with more than one million
persons over 65 (1,259,296) in 1980. Statewide, 20.5
percent of all units were occupied by a householder
aged 65 or older, while in many counties the figure
ranged as high as 25 to 33 percent. Their numbers will
continue to increase, especially the "old old," aged 75
and older, a group that will double in this quarter
century. New solutions will be required to cope with
the needs of this group because of its health problems,
the survival gap between spouses and a decreasing pool
of children to support elderly parents. One strategy calls
for congregate-care facilities
—
private apartments with
congregate dining, housekeeping, and social
services—to bridge the gap between traditional housing
for the independent elderly and nursing homes.
Female-headed Families
A dramatic 34.7 percent increase in the number of
female-headed families occurred in the 1 970s, bringing
the number of such households with children under 18
and no husband present to 429,143 or 14.6 percent of
the state's households. Most resided in Chicago (44.8
percent) and the larger urban centers. Of those families,
30.8 percent were below the poverty line and comprised
48.7 percent of all families in poverty. They require
safe, affordable housing but are frequently victims of
discrimination and are unable to devote adequate time
to their housing search; they require day care, social
services, and the assistance of governmental transfer
payments.
Rural Net Immigration
Despite the state's net outmigration, there was net
immigration in five suburban SMSA counties, due
essentially to the growing employment base in newer
municipalities surrounding Chicago and to the housing
demand of young families that are economically
upwardly mobile, many buying their first home. There
was also significant growth in non-SMSA rural counties
in the 1970s. This was a new phenomenon that was
reported nationwide. It occurred mainly in the southern
counties of Illinois and occurred without any economic
growth serving as a catalyst, since unemployment
remained high in these counties. This may be
retirement-age households returning to rural areas they
left years ago and urban retirees seeking environmental
amenities in affordable retirement locations. According
to recent national statistics, this phenomenon has
ended. However, there still may be pockets of
fast-growing rural townships in Illinois with very
attractive environments, close to interstate highways,
that provide more land and housing amenities per dollar
than urban areas, especially for lower income retirees.
The Dwindling Housing Supply
One way to measure the state of the housing stock
is the percent of vacant standard units. A vacancy rate
of 2-3 percent for owner-occupied housing and 5-8
percent for rental housing provides adequate choice and
mobility while retaining an adequate sales price and
rent structure. In 1980 the vacancy rates were 1.8 and
7.5 percent, respectively, in Illinois. However, the
market tightened dramatically in the next three years.
In Chicago, for example, the owner vacancy rate was
1.8 percent in 1980 and 0.6 percent in 1983,- rental
vacancy rates were 6.7 percent in 1980, dropping to 1.1
percent in 1983.
Chicago also reflects the changes in housing tenure
throughout the state resulting in decline of rental units.
Rental units in Chicago declined absolutely in the
1970s by 73,300 units or 6.4 percent. Condominium
conversions during the decade increased by 57,400
units or 280 percent. By 1980 condominiums accounted
for 5.3 percent of the occupied housing stock m
Chicago.
There were only 1 76,679 subsidized housing units or
4.4 percent of the total stock in the state at the end of
1983, while 1 1 .3 percent of the state's households had
incomes below the poverty level. Despite the fact that
Chicago had 44.2 percent of all the subsidized units,
only 6.6 percent of all the city's housing was subsidized
at the end of 1983, and most of that was built prior to
1981 with few additions since.
Rising Poverty Levels
In 1980, 40.6 percent of the state's population had
low to moderate incomes (below 80 percent of the
median)—a relative increase of 9.9 percent over 1970.
Of those, 25.5 percent had low incomes (below 50
percent of the median)—a relative increase of 27.9
percent. Far more renter households (21 percent) were
at or below the poverty line in 1980 compared to
homeowners (5.8 percent).
Persons under age 65 were hurt most during the '70s.
By 1980, 20. 7 percent of the nonelderly were in poverty,
an increase of 53.5 percent over 1970. Although the
elderly made some income gains due to increased
eligibility and participation in pensions, social security,
and housing subsidies, 15 percent of this rapidly
growing population were still in poverty.
Inadequate Housing
There are two broad classes of housing need, one
resulting from inadequate housing requiring
rehabilitation or removal of the unit and relocation of
residents to adequate housing, the second overly costly
housing. Inadequate housing from a health and safety
standpoint can result from overcrowded living
conditions, substandard shelter, or substandard
surrounding environment.
Overcrowding
This traditional housing need indicator is rapidly
becoming a nonissue, especially in smaller cities and
non-SMSA counties. This is due to outmigration and
decreasing household size, as more younger persons and
the elderly live alone and younger families have fewer
children. In 1980 there were 158,366 households in
which occupancy exceeded 1.0 1 persons per room, a
decline of 107,088 for the decade. Among rental units,
crowding declined 32.9 percent in the 1970s, from 9.2
percent to 6.2 percent. Among owner-occupied units
the decline was 60.4 percent, from 6.5 percent to 2.6
percent. Almost 53 percent of all overcrowded
households were in the city of Chicago, and 90 percent
in the 29 largest municipalities. Even in Chicago,
crowding occurred in only 9.2 percent of the rental units
and 5.3 percent of the owned units.
Substandard Housing
Since 1 970, the US Census has reUed on the residents
of each housing unit to report on their housing
conditions as opposed to the use of trained enumerators.
Residents cannot evaluate the condition of a structure
and its contents so the census has had to rely on
surrogate measures that the lay public can report
accurately. These are lack of some or all plumbing for
exclusive use of the household, lack of adequate
heating, lack of complete kitchens, and a combination
of the age and value of the structure (useful only for
single family housing). The first of these measures,
lacking plumbing, has been the most reliable over time.
However, even this measure is very unsatisfactory and
variable, depending on local housing age and
conditions, codes, and code enforcement. Today a
housing unit can have complete private plumbing but
the condition of that plumbing, not to mention the
remaining structure and content of the building, can be
wholly inadequate. As a result, the census figures very
likely underestimate actual conditions.
Statewide, between 1970 and 1980, renter households
in units lacking plumbing showed a relative decline of
45.6 percent, from 5.4 to 2.9 percent; among
owner-occupants the relative decline was 65.2 percent,
from 2.5 to 0.9 percent. Fewer units ( 1 .4 percent) lacked
complete kitchens than lacked plumbing for exclusive
use (1.6 percent), and only a fraction more (2 percent)
lacked adequate heating.
Substandard Environments
There is no adequate measure of the amount of
housing, standard or substandard, located in areas
inadequately serviced by public utilities. Similarly, we
know little about areas with dangerously high ground
or air pollution, high crime rates, or any other measure
of a substandard environment.
Excessive Housing Costs
The federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development recently adjusted the threshold of
excessive housing cost up from 25 to 30 percent of gross
yearly household income. Persons paying more than 30
percent are defined as in need of a housing subsidy.
Many economists dislike the use of any measure of
excessive housing cost to determine housing policy and
program priorities. They argue that measures of
substandard units directly indicate a need for a housing
solution, either rehabilitation or replacement, but
excessive housing cost figures do not necessarily
indicate housing solutions because these figures
include households occupying standard units.
Excessive housing costs, they argue should be included
with general income transfer policies and programs. I
do not think most housing analysts would argue with
this logic, and so long as society is politically willing
and economically able to ameliorate poverty with
general transfer payments or other means and also
ameliorates excessive housing costs, there is no
problem. The need for an adequate measure of excessive
housing costs arises from the lack of adequate transfer
payments to ameliorate the housing problems. If we are
going to set targets or priorities on households for
subsidies (be they income or rent subsidies), it may
make sense to identify the poorest households who are
also paying excessive housing costs. So long as society
must, or chooses to, limit and/or target its transfer
payments, for whatever reason, the question is not
whether we analyze excessive housing costs, but what
is a useful and accurate measure.
Thirty percent of gross income for housing without
accounting for total income or household size is a poor
indicator of excessive housing costs, because it lumps
together small households with large incomes paying
30 percent or more of income for housing by choice
with large households with small incomes paying 30
percent or more of income for housing out of necessity.
Ideally, we would like to cross-tabulate income by
household size by percent of income going to housing.
In this way the highest priority need group could be
identified. This is not possible with available census
tables. Instead, two measures were used in this study,
households paying 30 percent and 40 percent or more
of gross yearly income for housing and earning less than
$20,000 in 1979.
The combination of dwindling housing supply and
increasing poverty, documented in previous sections,
has resulted in a large and growing proportion of Illinois
households with excessive housing costs. At the 30
percent threshold, 9.5 percent of owner occupants
(240,324) and more than one-third of the renters
(500,966) had excessive housing costs. At the 40 percent
threshold, 5.6 percent of Illinois home owners and 22.8
percent of renters had excessive housing costs in 1 980.
It was only possible to compare renter occupants paying
35 percent of income for housing between 1970 and
1980. The data showed 31.1 percent of all renters paid
35 percent or more of their income for housing in 1980,
an increase of 24.5 percent of all renters in this
predicament over the decade.
Conclusions
Illinois is experiencing numerous changes in its
population, household structure, and housing stock
that will vary housing use, demand, and need for low
income support over the coming decades. What this
article does not cover is the tremendous variations in
housing statistics and housing need uncovered when
comparing the municipalities over 50,000 population
or the SMSA counties or regions of the state (see the
full report)'. It is at these levels of analysis that many
more planning priorities for the state become apparent.
What is obvious at all levels of analysis is how poor the
census variables are both for measuring the extent of
housing need and cross-tabulating housing need
indicators by key household characteristics necessary
for policy analysis and program planning. State and
local planners need for better assessments of the
housing stock, its condition, and the condition of the
surrounding environment than is possible with existing
secondary data. Even what housing data has been
collected is not reported in fixed table formats that are
useful for housing planning, be it by private or public
developers. Key cross-tabulation of housing condition
by both household income and size are critical for
planning but nonexistent for most planning
jurisdictions. #
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LARRY WHITE
Is Unemployment a Labor Supply Problem?
ll/mployment and unemployment have always been
concerns for economists; but ever since the
unemployment rate reached double digits in 1 982, the
employment and unemployment levels have become
topics of conversation for everyone, regardless of
occupation. Most of these conversations center on why
business and government have not been able to
stimulate the economy enough to provide jobs for
everyone. Many reasons for high unemployment are
cited—ranging from high oil prices and the recession
of the early 1980s to the inability of the president and
Congress to deal with the problem.
Most discussions of high unemployment focus on
explanations relating to the demand side of the labor
market. That is, one usually asks why there are not
more jobs. But by definition, there is unemployment if
the actual labor supplied exceeds the labor demanded.
Hence, the problem has both supply and demand
elements.
Any economics textbook will explain that the
quantity of labor demanded is inversely related to the
wage level while the quantity of labor supplied depends
positively upon the same wage level. These books will
also go on to explain that eventually an equilibrium
wage will be found, where the quantity of labor supplied
and demanded will be equal, and anyone who desires a
higher wage will not be in the labor market. While this
explanation falls short of providing a description of real
labor markets, it illustrates that unemployment is not
merely a matter of not enough jobs to go around, but a
supply phenomenon as well.
The supply of labor is the number of people that
constitute the labor force, and the labor force
participation rate is the percentage of the population in
the labor force. In comparing the changes in the size of
the labor force and the labor force participation over
time, one can trace labor supply patterns and integrate
its importance into a discussion of the unemployment
rate.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the
importance that the quantity of labor supplied has had
on the unemployment problem. To accomplish this
purpose, two areas were studied. The first is a historical
view of the population, the labor force, the level of
employment, and the level of unemployment since
1950. Large changes and trends will be highlighted for
each category as well as for the male and female
components. Second, the results of three labor force
growth simulations are reported. The 1950 labor force
will be taken as given,- the male and female labor forces
will then be forced to evolve in ways that are different
from actual events since 1 950; on these new bases the
unemployment rates will be calculated and presented.
Even though the methodology is quite simple, the study
clearly shows that unemployment levels are supply
oriented as well as demand oriented.
Historical Perspective
The size and growth of the population and labor force
are important to the problem of unemployment. To
maintain its relevence to employment, the population
studied is restricted to noninstitutionalized persons of
at least 16 years of age. The labor force is the sum of
those employed and those unemployed, with the
unemployed defined as those without jobs who are
actively seeking one. The residual of population and
labor force is simply termed "not in the labor force."
It is no surprise that each of the categories has grown
substantially since 1950. It is also no surprise that the
male and female components of each category have
grown as well. President Reagan is fond of documenting
this fact by proclaiming that more people are employed
than ever before. With few exceptions, each president
since Eisenhower could have made the same statement.
What may be surprising to some is the level of growth
in each of the categories. In 1950, there were 106
million people in the United States aged 16 and over,
54 million women and nearly 52 million men. In 1984,
the population was 178 million, with 93 million
women and 85 million men. The total growth in the
1950-1984 period was 68 percent, or 1.53 percent per
year, with the female portion growing slightly faster
than the male portion. The growth of the labor force
was very different. The total labor force grew 82 percent
from 63 million in 1 950 to 1 1 5 million in 1 984. While
the male portion grew only 45 percent from nearly 45
million to 65 million, the female portion nearly tripled
from 18.5 million to nearly 50 million. In another light,
labor force participation rates can be compared. (This
is the size of the labor force divided by the population.)
While the total labor force participation rate grew from
59.7 percent in 1950 to 64.7 percent in 1984, the male
participation rate fell from 86.7 percent to 76.8 percent,
and the female participation rate grew from 33.9
percent to 53.7 percent.
10
Many reasons have been given for the dramatic
increase in the labor force particiption rate of women.
Rising real wages in the 1960s have been cited as one
reason, although this does not explain why the male
participation rate fell over the same period. The rising
real wage argument also does not account for the
continued increase in female participation m the late
1 970s and early 1980s when real wages were no longer
rising. A desire for greater family disposable income is
also cited as a reason to draw the housewife into the
market to supplement her husband's income. The
increase in the number of single parents and the
increasing independence and equality that women have
gained in the past few decades may also be reasons.
Regardless of the reason, the rapid increase of women
in the labor force has had a profound effect on mcreased
employment and unemployment. If adequate job
growth does not accompany labor force growth, higher
unemployment will occur.
The absolute levels of employment and unemploy-
ment have also grown since 1950, but not as
consistently. Employment, which was 60 million in
1950 and 107 million in 1984, grew in all but four years.
These four years of employment decline can each be
linked to a recessionary period. And contrary to what
President Reagan has stated thoughout his presidency,
848 thousand fewer people were employed at the end
of his first term. Large periods of employment growth
can be linked to the recovery periods immediately
following these recessions and during the height of the
Vietnam War. Absolute unemployment has also shown
long-term growth but with many short-term
fluctuations. While more than half of the 35 years since
1950 have had lower unemployment than the previous
year, unemployment has grown from i.i million in
1950 to 3.85 million in 1 960; 4. 1 million in 1 970, and
8.5 million in 1984. The whole range of labor force and
unemployment data is shown on the Chart.
The textbook explanation for unemployment is
chiefly concerned with the failure of the prevailing
wage level to decrease enough to create an equilibrium
of supply and demand in the labor market. The
argument is that because wages are too high more
people want employment than employers are willing
to hire. Social conditions and market inadequacies
prevent this simplistic view from completely
explaining unemployment, but it probably accounts for
some of it. Many are unemployed because a lack of
product demand or surplus product inventories have
lowered the demand for production employees. The
slow downward adjustment of wages accompanying a
decline in labor demand prevents enough people from
joining the "not in the labor force" group to cause
equilibrium in the labor market, or at least lower
unemployment. This is then an over supply of labor.
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Alternative Scenario
The previous section outlined the status of labor
supply in the United States since 1 950. It is clear that
the labor force has grown rapidly, especially the female
portion. In this section, alternative evolutions the of
labor force will be constructed and analyzed. After labor
force growth is artifically altered, it will be compared
to the number of jobs available and an artificial
unemployment level will be computed. Labor force
growth will he restricted to levels lower than those that
prevailed historically. The number of jobs available will
be calculated by adding 5 percent of the labor force to
the number employed each year. Finally, the male and
female portions of each group will be analyzed.
These "what if" scenarios are not designed as realistic
possibilities but rather to highlight the importance
labor force growth has had on the unemployment rate.
Any labor force study suffers from errors in the
collecting and reporting of data, but this study has some
unique imperfections. Restricting the labor force to a
fixed percentage of the population and making a
statement about unemployment assumes that workers
are completely homogeneous and interchangeable,
which is unrealistic. Calculating the number of jobs
available is fairly straightforward. Clearly, one job
exists for each person employed, and five percentage
points of the unemployment rate is often comprised of
people termed frictionally employed—unemployed for
whom jobs exist, but who have not yet found those
jobs. The count of existing jobs, coupled with restricted
participation rates, probably overstates the level of
existing jobs, because part of the employment created
was not independent of the rising labor force
participation rate.
Three different cases were divised. The first
calculated the labor force level that would have
accomodated full employment (five percent
unemployment or the true rate, whichever was less).
The second case fixed the labor force participation rate
for the male and female categories at each's 1950 level.
That is the same as allowing each component of the
labor force to grow at the same rate as its respective
population component. The final case maintained the
male participation rate at its true level and allowed the
female labor force to grow at the same rate as the
population, plus one percent. The results of each case
are documented in the Table.
Calculating the labor force that would be required to
maintain full employment provides a basis for further
study. It is always less than or equal to the existing
labor force, by definition, but its size varies from year
to year. The unemployment level has exceeded full
employment (five percent unemployed) in 22 of the 35
years since 1950. It is only since 1975, however, that
unemployment has reached high levels and not
subsequently declined. In seven of those ten years the
labor force would have had to be more than two million
workers smaller to achieve full employment; in the last
four, it would have had to be at least by 2.9 million
smaller. This difference between the size of the labor
force and the labor force required for full employment
measures the oversupply (or underdemand) of labor. It
is not a trivial amount that can be alievated by simple
solutions.
In an attempt to view unemployment at least
partially as an oversupply, two cases of restricted supply
were created. Because the male participation rate has
declined since 1950 and the female rate increased,
fixing each participation rate at its 1950 level causes
the male labor force to be higher than its true level and
the female labor force to be lower than its true level.
The smaller female labor force dominates the larger
male labor force, producing a net decline in the total
labor force. More important, given the number of jobs
that would exist, a net decline in unemployment would
take place. The decline in unemployment would be so
dramatic that in 1 984 there would have been 1 .3 million
jobs for which there was no employee. Since 1 965, the
unemployment rate would have exceeded three percent
only once and would have been negative (more jobs
than laborers) in five of the seven years between 1978
and 1984. This method of calculating the labor force
and existing jobs in each's male and female components
gives rise to a component unemployment rate that is
interesting, but essentially meaningless, in terms of the
economy. Female unemployment rates are calculated
as negtive since 1955, and male rates are double digits
since 1970. Allowing any worker to work any job,
combines the two levels and recaptures the study's
impact.
The final case focuses on the female labor force. It
also provides for more realistic labor force growth by
women, but growth that is still slower that the true
rate. The results are similar to those of the first case.
Slower growth of the female labor force would have
created a lower overall unemployment rate. The decline
in unemployment would not have been trivial. With
fewer females in the labor force, as many as 5 million
jobs would have been freed for unemployed males to
fill. Often there would not have been enough males to
fill all the positions. Since 1966, unemployment would
have reached the two percent level only in 1 975, when
it would have been an "extreme" 3.12 percent.
From these scenarios, one can conclude that the
increase in unemployment is not just a problem of lack
of demand.
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Table. Actual Labor Force Statistics and Simulation Results, 1950-84
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Conclusions
Since 1 950, periods of relatively high unemployment
have been followed by recovery periods of nearly full
employment. Because the high unemployment of the
1980s has not been decreased to nearly full employ-
ment, many have questioned what characteristics of
this period are different from other periods of high
unemployment. While it can be argued that the
economy's failure to stimulate job growth causes
unemployment, this argument may not totally explain
the entire unemployment situtation today.
In light of labor force growth since 1950, this
explanation may be correct for the period before 1 975,
but not necessarily so since. Instead, another view of
unemployment is that labor supply is too large. Typical
reasons for entering the labor force, such as rising real
wage rates, have not existed, in general, since 1 975, but
the labor force has continued to grow just as it did before
1975.
To highlight the oversupply of labor, two artifical
labor forces have been created that reflect possible ways
that the labor could have evolved since 1950. In both
cases, had the labor force grown at slower rates,
especially the female portion, the level of unemploy-
ment would be much smaller than it is today. It would
be so much smaller in fact, that in some years there
would have been jobs with no workers to fill them.
This study has concentrated on labor force growth,
particularly the growth of women in the labor force.
The conclusion drawn is that if the labor force had not
grown as fast as it did, the unemployment level would
now be much lower. Some may see this as placing the
blame for unemployment on women, but that is neither
the purpose of the study nor a valid conclusion. Instead,
the conclusion simply suggests that the current period
of high unemployment might be better understood if
the increase in the labor force since 1975 could be
adequately explained. #
Illinois Economic Outlook (see facing page)
In the last issue of the Illinois Business Review, we
presented employment forecasts. In revising the Illinois
Econometric Model, lagged average weekly hours have
proven to be a valuable predictor for employment.
Therefore, it is important to have good forecasts of
average weekly hours to drive the employment
forecasts. This month, then, historical average weekly
hours for the United States and Illinois, as well as
Illinois forecasts, are presented.
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Infrastructure Investment in Build Illinois
>3tate government investment in infrastructure is
expected to increase in 1986 and in the three years
following, due mainly to the Governor Thompson's
extensive Build Illinois program. The infrastructure
component of this program provides new or
supplementary funds to four areas of the Illinois
infrastructure: water and sewer treatment grants,
highway systems, rail freight grants, and flood control.
Of these four areas, programs relating to water and
sewers gain the biggest share of the total spending this
year as well as in the subsequent years of the program.
Of $78 million originally proposed in February 1 985 for
infrastructure improvement in fiscal year 1986 (1 July
1985 to 30 June 1986), $68 miUion (87 percent) was
earmarked for sewers and highways. Of this amount,
$50 million went to water and sewer treatment grants.
The final bill signed by Governor Thompson in late
summer differed somewhat from the program as
originally proposed. Furthermore, the bill provides
expenditures of substantially more than the $2.3 billion
total the legislature has approved; because of this the
Governor has appointed a task force headed by
Lieutenant Governor Ryan to review the projects and
to revise the spending total so that it meets the
approved amount.
However, the Governor's office expects the relative
levels of expenditures to remain unchanged from the
original program, even though the dollar amounts on
individual projects may be altered.
The purpose of the planned infrastructure
investment is to enhance the attractiveness of Illinois
communities to new and expanding businesses. It is
argued that adequate sewage facilities, accessibility to
highways and rail lines, and the like, are positive factors
in stimulating new business formation, the expansion
of existing industry, or hopefully, a combination of
both. Because the program would make Illinois
increasingly competitive, the long-run result would
involve additional jobs or retention of existing jobs,
greater state personal and business income, and,
therefore, a better state economic base. Considerations
such as these underlie an emphasis on infrastructure
renovation in Build Illinois. Infrastructure programs get
approximately 57 percent (exclusive of the housing
portion of the program) of the five-year total proposed
outlay. The need for this action at the state level has
been further emphasized because of the reduction of
assistance of this sort from the federal government.
Federal funding has been on the decline since 1981 and
is expected to decline further. Though state funding in
these areas has increased, more effort is required to
finish the needed improvements.
In the area of water and sewer treatment grants, the
FY 85 increases allowed 55 communities to carry on
improvements to comply with clean water standards
or allow for their community's future growth. To begin
similar projects, Build Illinois will grant funds to an
additional 43 communities. For new projects that are
proven to relate to business development in the
community, funding will be administered by the
Department of Commerce and Community Affairs and
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. For such
funding, the community needs to show that new
business formation or expansion is contingent on the
completion of the water/sewage facility and that the
economic development would not take place without
the help of state funds. The program does not provide
for communities getting businesses that are merely
relocating from a different area of the state, since this
just transfers jobs and does not create new ones. In
addition to the emphasis on job creation and economic
development, communities that demonstrate a
willingness and ability to leverage local funds in the
completion of the project will be favored when grant
money is awarded.
A second major part of Illinois' infrastructure
emphasized in Build Illinois is the state highway
system. It was proposed that a total of $372 million be
spent to supplement funds that provide for improve-
ments to US 51, US 36, and Thorndale Avenue in Du
Page County, the development of access roads and new
interchanges for existing highways, and the addition of
three highway rest areas. These measures—which
improve accessibility to labor and product markets,
shipping lanes, and the like—could possibly attract new
businesses to the surrounding areas and, therefore, spur
economic development. In FY 86, $18 million dollars
was proposed to be directed toward these goals to
supplement the more than $650 million invested so far
and the $250 million included in the existing FY86 to
FY89 program administered by the Department of
Transportation.
The state's rail freight system is expected to be
reduced by 1,000 miles by 1990, due in part to the
decline in federal aid. The original Build Illinois
program provided $25 million over its five years ($5
million annually) to help slow the abandonment of rail
lines. The Thompson administration estimates that
1 5,000 to 20,000 jobs will either be created or saved by
the rctcntiun ul tlicsc rail lines. Thought ut in these
terms, the program will cost the state $1,250 to $1,667
per |ob.
The last component of infrastructure investment
included in Build Illinois is flood control. The program
directs $5 million annually for 5 years to the
improvement of levees, deepening of channels, and
modifying of spillways in seven counties, mostly in the
area around Cook County. The administration
estimates that $1.3 million will be saved annually by
these measures, which means that the projects will take
about 19 ($25 million -:- $1.3 million) years to pay for
themselves, not taking any inflation into account.
Economic development and the creation or retention
of jobs has been emphasized time and again in Build
Illinois. How likely are these to occur and when? In the
short run, BuUd Illinois will definitely create jobs. As
spending under the program takes off, construction
workers, engineers, and so on, will be employed to
design and install the new roads, sewers, and improve
the existing rail lines and flood control facilities.
However, the long-run growth in jobs is tied to the
economic development aspect of the program. As was
seen in the much-publicized case of the Saturn plant,
a company thinks and evaluates a long time before
deciding where to locate a new facility. To be sure, the
measures included for infrastructure improvement are
a major consideration for a relocating or expanding firm.
However, it takes time to make the improvements and
time to build plants (both of which, of course, create
jobs) before actual production begins and the permanent
employment can take place. In other words, the
long-run employment prospects associated with Build
Illinois are very tenuous, contingent on many factors.
Further, will the kind of industry Illinois is trying to
attract enjoy long-term growth? These investments
may attract firms that are subject to major cyclical
swings, such firms as are already abundant in the state.
Personal and business income will go up in the short
run also, as the Build Illinois funds are received as
income by businesses making the proposed improve-
ments and their employees. But it is difficult to
estimate how much of that money remains in the state
after the initial spending.
In summary, the Build Illinois program will most
likely help the state in the short run, as the federal
government projects helped the national economy
during the depression. The long-term effects on
employment and economic development, however, are
difficult to forecast because growth or economic
expansion is dependent on many factors other than
sewers and highways. However, infrastructure
investment will not hurt, and it may very possibly help,
in the long run.
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS
HUN Y. PARK
Using Futures Markets to Hedge Interest
Rate Risk: The Search for the Optimal
Hedge Ratio
T h^e value of a mortgage is crucially dependent on
the level of interest rates. The higher the interest rate, i
the less valuable will be the stream of future payments
'
associated with the mortgage and vice versa. For this
reason, the more volatile environment for the interest
rates, the more risky will be activity in the mortgage
industry. Savings and loan associations (S&Ls) make
30-year mortgages at fixed rates; mortgage bankers
make 90-day mortgage rate commitments. The more
uncertain the environment, the riskier is the business
in which these two firms engage. Given that the
interest rates are more unstable than they were 10-15
years ago, many participants in the mortgage market
have done what farmers did long ago—turn to the
futures market to reduce the riskiness of their business.
The risk-reducing strategy employed in the futures
market is quite simple. The investor sells a futures
contract on a particular commodity at the same time
he buys that particular commodity in the spot market
(today's market) and vice versa. For example, an S&.L
that makes a loan today is essentially buying a mortgage
contract at the current market price—the loan minus
points. In return for this single payment the S&L
receives a series of monthly mortgage payments. To
reduce the riskiness of the transaction, the S&L can
sell a futures contract on the same type of mortgage. If
the strategy works perfectly, any decreases in the value
of the mortgage contract owing to higher interest rates
would be offset completely by the increases in the value
of the futures contract.
^
How to Use the Futures Market to
Reduce Interest Rate Risk i
Spot Market Futures Market
Oct. 1
Nov. 1
Issues $100,000, 20-year,
8% mortgage priced at
$86.00 (yield 9.58% I
Price lor mortgage falls
to$84.00|yield9.84%|
Loss: $2,000
Sell .92 GNMA futures
contracts priced at
$86,875 (yield 9.475%)
Price for aGNMA futures
contract falls to $84. 70
1
Gain: .92(86.875-84 7011
= $2,000
I
The preceeding example shows this in increased
detail. On October 1 an S&L issues a $ 1 00,000, 20- year,
8 percent mortgage priced at $86.00 yielding 9.58
percent. To protect itself from a loss due to a rise in
the interest rate, the S&L may sell a .92 December
GNMA futures contract priced at $86,875 (each
contract has a principal value of $100,000). Suppose
that by 1 November interest rates have risen and,
therefore, mortgage value and futures prices have
dropped to $84.00 and $84,701, respectively. At that
point the S&L's futures market account will show a
position balance of $2,000. The loss in the spot market
will have been entirely offset by the gain in the futures
market.
The key to this strategy is a knowledge of what is
called the hedge ratio. The hedge ratio indicates the
number of futures contracts that must be sold per
contract bought in the spot market (that is, mortgages
made) to achieve a complete hedge. As it turns out, the
hedge ratio equals the correlation between spot prices
and futures prices (more correctly, the ratio of changes
in spot prices to changes in futures prices). In the
example just discussed, the hedge ratio is .92 because
it is believed that spot prices will change by only 92
percent of the change in futures possible prices, the case
of an S&L or a mortgage banker needs to sell .92 futures
contracts for each mortgage made.
The exact value of the hedge ratio may not be very
important. A person can pursue sound hedging
strategies regardless of the number. What is crucial is
the stability of the ratio over time. If the relationship
between spot and futures prices is highly volatile, the
investor will need to be continually altering his
holdings of futures contracts. Even then, the volatility
makes it unlikely that the hedge will be perfect.
Several studies have attempted to estimate the
optimal hedge ratio for mortgage interest rates. The
standard procedure entails computing the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimate of the coefficient of the
futures price in a regression with the spot price as the
dependent variable. An excellent example of this
approach is contained in ORER paper #14— "Further
Tests of the Effectiveness of Cross Hedging among
Mortgage and Futures Markets" by George Gau and
John Markese. Unfortunately, one conclusion of this
research is that the OLS estimates are not particularly
stable. Thus, hedging strategies based upon these
estimates will be less than perfect; sometimes too
many futures contracts will be bought and sometimes
too few. Certainly, these strategies will result in a less
risky portfolio than a strategy that does nothing to
reduce mortgage interest rate risk; but they will not
eliminate such risk.
The purpose of this article is to explore the reasons
for this variability in the hedge ratio and to identify
techniques for obtaining improved estimates. Previous
estimation techniques have ignored an important
determinant of futures prices—error-learning behavior.
As a consequence, OLS estimates are likely to be
imprecise. It is also shown that estimates based upon
an alternative technique that takes this error-learning
behavior into account produces more precise estimates
of the hedge ratio. Hence, hedging strategies that make
use of the hedge ratio estimates produced by this
technique are likely to be more successful than those
based on the simpler and less reliable OLS technique.
The next section discusses how forecast errors are
likely to affect the relationship between futures and
spot prices. The third section discusses the alternative
estimation procedure and the results obtained. The
final section briefly summarizes the conclusions of this
article and indicates other problems that still must be
solved before the futures market can be considered to
be a completely successful tool for hedging mortgage
interest rate risk.
The Stability of the Hedge Ratio over Time
The major reason that futures contracts can be used
as a hedging instrument is the fact that the market
perceives futures prices in general as proxies for
expected spot prices in the future. However, effective
use of futures contracts requires an investigation of how
futures prices are formed and how they change over
time.
The market formulates expectations of future
interest rates based on available information. The
market will revise its expectations as new information
becomes available. There is a view that recent
forecasting errors are of major importance in
formulating revisions of expectations. The traditional
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of
interest rates asserts that if the actual rate is higher
than what has been anticipated so that the forecasting
error is positive, the market will revise its expectations
upward. Similarly, if the forecasting error is negative,
the market will revise its expectations downward.
To demonstrate the relevance of this revision
process, the relationship between changes in futures
rate and unanticipated changes in spot interest rate is
explained. Table I summarizes the synchronization of
three-month Treasury bill futures and unanticipated
changes in three-month spot rates classified by
forecasting periods. Settlement prices of cash Treasury
bill and T-bill futures contracts as of Thursday of the
third week of each month are used in order to match
as closely as possible the delivery date for T-bill futures
for the period of June 1976-August 1983. The
forecasting error (that is, unanticipated changes in three
month rates) is calculated by subtracting the
three-month T-bill futures rate from the actual spot
rate (for example, the difference between three-month
T-bill rate at time t and three-month T-bill futures rate
observed at time (-1).
The results in Table 1 suggest that futures rates and
the forecasting error tend to move in the same direction
across forecasting periods. For example, when the
forecasting period is three months, whenever the
forecasting error is negative, the market revises
downward its expectations of future interest rates (12
out of 12). When the forecasting error is positive,
expectations are revised upward 82.4 percent of the
time (14 out of 17). These results, supporting the
conventional expectation hypothesis albeit indirectly,
indicate that changes in futures prices (or rates) depend
on the forecasting error.
What is the implication of this adaptive mechanism
of futures prices to the problem of estimating the hedge
ratio? In the regression-based hedge ratio model, the
historical relationship between changes in cash and
futures prices are assumed stable. For example, an
optimal hedge ratio of .92 means that a $1 change in
the futures price results in a $.92 change in the spot
price. However, if futures prices are not random and
independent of the error term in this regression, then
OLS estimates of the relationship between futures and
cash prices will be biased and imprecise.
This means that investors should be cautious when
they use simple regression to estimate the optimal
hedge ratio. This is particularly true for periods of
volatile interest rates since forecasting errors are likely
to be larger.
An Improved Hedge Ratio
The point of the last section is that OLS estimates
of the hedge ratio may be quite misleading. This does
not mean that futures markets cannot be used; rather,
it means that hedging based upon OLS estimates of the
hedge ratio are likely to be inferior to strategies that
employ estimates obtained using more sophisticated
procedures. This section discusses estimates based
upim an alternative procedure—nonlinear estimation.
The full details of this approach are discussed in a
forthcoming ORER paper; here attention is focused on
the intuition underlying the alternative procedure and
how hedging strategies using estimates based upon this
procedure perform relative to those based upon OLS
estimates.
One way of capturmg the complex relationship
between futures and spot prices noted in the last section
is to investigate whether the relationship between the
changes in the cash and futures prices is nonlinear. The
conventional regression-based hedge ratio may
misrepresent the true ratio when interest rates have
been volatile and generally low or high relative to the
current position.
Chart 1 exemplifies the dissimilar interest rate risk
characteristics. Suppose that the relationship between
the changes in the cash (A5) and futures prices (AF) is
best fitted by a curved line, CC, in Chart Litis easily
noticeable that the optimal hedge ratio depends partly
on where the current position is located. When the
interest rate increases so that the changes in the cash
and futures prices are negative and the current position
is the point y4, the hedge ratio from the linear line [LL'],
if applied to the current position. A, overstates the
interest rate sensitivity of the cash security. That is,
the slope of the curved line at A is lower than the slope
of the linear line and, thus, causes the hedger to short
too many futures contracts. On the other hand, when
the interest rate decreases and the current position is
the point B, the straight line fitting to the point, B,
gives the hedge ratio that understates the interest rate
sensitivity of the cash security relative to the futures
contract and thus causes the hedger to short too few
futures contracts.
Chart 1. Dissimilar Interest Rate Risk
Table 1. Synchronization of Futures Interest Rate and Forecasting Errors Classified by the Forecasting Period*
I when the forecasting error is negative.
Increased 1
Unchanged 1
Decreased 12 10
Tiital 12 12
Number ot times m the ttiture at which futures rate is applicable
9
Chart 2 shows two simplified distributions of hedge
ratios, one on the simple assumption of linearity
between cash and futures prices yielding the hedge ratio
Hj, and the other taking into account the dissimilar
interest rate risk between the two securities yielding
the hedge ratio H, with less uncertainty. Indeed, Chart
2 indicates that a procedure that takes into account
such a changing relationship might do a superior job to
one that does not.
Chart 2. Comparison of Hedge Ratios Based on Linear
and Nonlinear Relationships
Conclusions
Futures markets offer investors an opportunity to
reduce interest rate risk, but the success depends on
the estimate of the hedge ratio, that is, the relationship
between changes in spot and futures prices. Estimates
based upon an alternative procedure are shown to be
more stable over time and more precise. These
estimates will lead to more successful strategies.
This article has focused on one problem associated
with using the futures market—the estimation of the
hedge ratio. Others have not been addressed. Two
others are particularly important. One, there is a "basis
risk" owing to the fact that mortgage contracts are not
all identical, thus the mortgages being hedged may not
be closely aligned with the futures contracts available.
This risk is a direct result of the heterogeneity of
mortgages. Investors must be aware that the success of
a hedging strategy depends on how closely the mortgage
underlying a futures contract—a fixed rate, 30-year
FHA mortgage—matches the type of mortgage being
issued. For example, the basis risk is larger for a
graduated payment mortgage than for a 20-year FFiA
fixed-rate mortgage.
Two, the fact that borrowers can prepay their
mortgages as interest rates decline implies that
investors are not fully protected. In particular, if
interest rates decline and prepayments rise, the value
of the mortgage will not increase by as much as the
futures contract declines. Although some work has
been done to show how other securities such as options
can be used to limit prepayment risk, it is fair to say
that more research in this area is needed. A
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DAVID LEE
Illinois Hospitals
VJenerally, Illinois hospitals conform to national
norms based on such measures as size, concentration,
and use of capacity. At the same time, evidence points
to the fact that Illinois hospitals are operated at greater
cost and receive higher gross revenue than do the
majority of other US hospitals. In fact, this difference
between revenue and cost per patient per day exceeds
the national average by 72 percent. However, increased
competition in the health care industry resultmg from
new developments such as HMOs will probably bring
these costs in line with those in the rest of the country.
The hospital industry in Illinois represents a dynamic
and diverse component of the state economy.
Consisting of more than 279 private and public
institutions, this industry earned more than $24.5
billion in gross revenue in 1983 while treating more
than 1.8 million patients. Moreover, these hospitals
vary greatly in size, concentration, services offered, and
the means of ownership, makmg hospitals unique
among industry groups. This article presents both an
overview of the Illinois hospital industry and a
comparison of hospitals in the state with those across
the nation.
Of the 279 hospitals providing general and other
specific care, only nine are operated by the federal
government. Of the 270 nonfederal hospitals, 19 offer
only psychiatric care, and 6 provide long-term care,
with the remainder falling into the classification of a
community hospital. This category includes any
nonfederal, short-term general hospital, excluding
hospital units of institutions whose services and
facilities are available to the general public. These 24
1
hospitals maintained 57,252 beds, had an average daily
population of 40,322 patients, and treated more than
1.8 million patients in 1983.
However, community hospitals are a diverse group,
varying in a number of important ways. As Table I
indicates, the median size for a community hospital is
between 100 and 200 hundred beds in capacity. Yet
hospitals this size treated only 1 7.9 percent of the total
admissions. Far more important to hospital care are the
larger hospitals that, although fewer in number,
represent the bulk of bed capacity and patient care. For
example, the 45 Illinois hospitals with a bed capacity
in excess of 400 represent only 18.6 percent of the total
number of hospitals, but they account for 45.4 percent
of total bed capacity and 45.5 percent of total
admissions.
Hospitals also vary in the way they are owned and
operated. Of the 241 community hospitals, 189 are
owned by nongovernment, nonprofit organizations
—
usually secular or religious groups. State and local
governments maintain 43 hospitals across the state,
while 9 hospitals are privately owned and operated for
profit. The emergence of the private for-profit hospital
has been one of many changes in the hospital industry
in the state and nationally. While the total number of
community hospitals declined from 285 in 1 979 to 24
1
Table 1. Community Hospitals (1983)
Category Hospitals Beds Admissions Occupancy
Average
Daily
Census
6-24 Beds
25-49
50-99
100-199
200-299
300-399
400-499
500 or more
Total
4
13
49
69
46
15
24
21
241
77
Table 2. Community Hospitals by SMSA (1983)
SMS/l Hospitals Beds Admissions Population
Concent.
Ratio
Noiimciri)polu;in
Mctropiihian
Alton-Granite City
Aurora-Elgin
Bloomington-Normal
Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul
Chicago
Davcnport-Rotk Island-Moline
Decatur
East St Louis-Bclleville
lolict
Kankakee
Lake County
Peoria
Rockford
Springfield
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DAVID MANDY
Small Business: Panacea or Pipedream?
IXe cently, the contribution of small businesses to the
overall health of an economy has been the focus of
much discussion. One finding of investigations is that
small businesses are responsible for creating a large
proportion of new jobs. This is often interpreted as
evidence that state and local governments should
provide additional support for small business.
This article issues a word of caution about the
assumption that the economic well-being of the state
would be served by subsidies in which size is an
important consideration. In order for incentives to be
directed toward the most effective targets, policy-
makers must understand the role of all types of
business. Government should focus attention on those
businesses that yield the greatest return in the form of
increased employment and income per tax dollar of
subsidy. Moreover, it is critically important to measure
this return m terms of employment and income that
would not have existed without government
assistance.
The MIT Program on Neighborhood and Regional
Change has produced large amounts of data on small
businesses. David Birch presents the MIT analysis in
several articles that provide one foundation for the
present inquiry. Other published sources include
"Small Business: Jobs, Ideas and Products" in the March
1985 issue of Illinois Issues. "Tracking fob Growth in
Private Industry" in the September 1982 issue of the
Monthly Labor Review, and the annual Inc. magazine
study on state business climates.
One widely publicized finding of that research relates
to the dominant role small business seems to play in
the process of new job creation. David Birch notes that
67 percent of the new jobs created in their sample were
created by firms with 20 or fewer employees. Firms
with 1 00 or fewer employees account for 80 percent of
new job creation. The magnitude of these figures has
become generally accepted, as other research has drawn
similar conclusions.
Primary and Secondary Firms
It may be helpful to draw distinctions between types
of firms, primary and secondary. Primary firms
constitute the economic base of a state or region. The
demand for their products may arise from a geographic
area different from the actual physical location of the
firm. Hence, such firms can locate in many different
areas nationally and, perhaps, internationally. It can be
argued that their presence creates the need for other
firms. Secondary firms are more local in nature and do
not engage in a large amount of trade outside of their
geographic location. They serve the existing population
and industry.
It is important to understand the difficulty of
categorizing businesses in this way. A fine restaurant,
for example, superficially appears to be a secondary
firm. However, if the restaurant is outstanding in the
quality of its service, the physical location of it may be
relatively unimportant. The restaurant may succeed in
attracting clientele from a large surrounding area solely
on the quality of its product. Alternatively, a restaurant
may fail as a business due to a poor location. Thus, the
categorization of primary and secondary is useful for
expository purposes but ignores some important facts.
The primary firm has a wide range of location options,
however, whereas the secondary firm arises to fill a
need in a particular geographic area.
Supporting the Economic Base
Programs that reduce the cost of conducting business
may serve to expand employment or income in a state
or area. These programs can be tailored to specific types
and sizes of firms. It is our view that firms of a primary
nature hold the greatest promise. Such firms conduct
interstate business, thereby drawing income and
wealth into the state. The secondary firms, which serve
the needs of the area, will arise in an area without
further incentive. Their only prerequisite is that
adequate local demand be present to support them. We
do not mean to imply that any individual firm must
locate in a particular area—only that if the demand for
a local service is sufficient, some firm will arise to fulfill
the need. Hence, support of primary firms yields
multiplied returns as the income imported into the area
is spent locally and the area grows by building on the
11
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DWIGHT R. MCCURDY AND JOHN H. BURDE
Firewood Consumption Survey
More than three-fourths of the families burning wood
said they cut some or all their wood supply. Thirty
percent of the people that burned wood said they
purchased some or all of their firewood. The average
price paid per cord during the 1982-1983 heating season
was $83.
D.uring the 1982-1983 heating season, nearly
one-fourth of the households in Illinois burned more
than 1.7 million cords of wood. (A cord is a stack of
wood 4 feet high, 8 feet wide, 4 feet long). To describe
these firewood consumption patterns, predict future
rates, and analyze the impact on Illinois forests, a
telephone survey was conducted of 7,506 households.
The survey was completed by the Forestry Department,
Southern Illinois University during the spring of 1983.
Illinois Consumption
In 1980 the Bureau of Census estimated there were
approximately four million households in Illinois. As
mentioned, nearly one-fourth of the 7,056 persons
interviewed said their household burned firewood
during the 1982-1983 heating season. Therefore, it is
estimated that more than 900 thousands households
burned firewood.
When spokesmen for the households in which wood
was burned were asked the amount, on the average,
they estimated 1.9 cords annually. (See Table 1.)
Therefore, the estimated total consumption of firewood
in Illinois was approximately 1 .7 million cords of wood.
Table 1. Annual Firewood Consumption Per Household
Consuniption
(Coidsj
Percent of
Households
Less than 1.0
1.0to2.0
2.1 to 5.0
5.1 to 10.0
10.1 ormore
42
34
16
7
1
Consumption Patterns
The two reasons given for burning wood were for
heating and aesthetics, 53 percent and 47 percent of the
households, respectively. However, less than
one-fourth of the spokemen said they used firewood for
more than one-half of their total heat (Table 2). Most
of the households burning firewood had a fireplace;
slightly less than one-fourth had a wood stove. Natural
gas was the major source of energy replaced by firewood,
fdl lowed by electricity and propane. One-half of the
households had begun burning wood in the past five
Table 2.
Source of Firewood
Of the firewood users interviewed, 77 percent
indicated they cut some of the wood they burned.
Nearly 2 milhon cords of firewood were cut or gathered
in Illinois. The amount of wood cut ranged from 1 /lOth
cord to 1 00 cords, with the average being 2.9 cords cut
per individual annually (See Table 4).
Nearly all of the firewood cut was obtained from
private land, either the householders own or other
private lands. Very little wood was obtained from public
land. The firewood obtained from private lands derived
equally from the householder's own land and other
private land such as a friend's property.
Table 4. Quantity of Firewood Cut
Quantity
(Cords)
Percent of Househulds
Cutting Wood
0.1 to 0.9
1.0 to 2.0
2.1 to 5.0
5.1 to 10.0
10,1 to 100.0
31
32
23
11
Statistical Interrelationship of Data
Using stepwise regression analysis, the following
variables were found to be correlated with the amount
of wood burned by households:
1
.
Amount of wood cut—the more wood cut the more
wood burned;
2. The percent of household heat supplied by
wood—the greater percent of heat supplied the more
wood burned;
3. Sex of head of household—males burn more wood
than females;
4. Ownership of land with an available wood
supply—landowners burn more wood than nonland-
owners;
5. The type of fuel replaced by wood— households
using natural gas generally burn less wood than the
average household;
6. The type of burning unit used—households with
stoves burn the most wood;
7. Age of head of household
—
younger people burn
the most firewood;
8. The percent of wood supply purchased—the less
wood purchased the larger amount of wood burned;
9. Household income—the greater the annual income
the more wood burned;
10. Number of people in the household—the larger
the number of people in the household the more wood
burned; and
11. Occupation of head of household—farmers and
operatives burn the most and students and retirees the
least amount of firewood.
The above variables were listed in order of the
strength of the correlation, that is the amount of wood
cut having the strongest correlation with the amount
of wood burned. These factors account for approxi-
mately one-half of the variation in the amount of wood
burned between various households.
The following relationships were found to be
statistically significant at the 99 percent probability
level using analysis of variance and Chi Square test;
1
.
Households that burn the most wood are also the
most apt to cut wood for their own use and, as a result,
are less likely to purchase firewood;
2. Households that depend heavily on firewood for
heat also burn and cut more wood than the average
household that burns firewood;
3. Households that cut or gather the most firewood
also burn the most wood, rely the heaviest on wood for
heat, and are the most apt to have a wood stove rather
than a fireplace;
4. Households with wood stoves burn the most wood,
cut the most wood, rely on wood for a greater percentage
of their heat, and purchase less wood;
5. Households with the lowest annual incomes are
most apt to rely on firewood for a large proportion of
their heat than other households;
6. Farmers, on the average, cut the most firewood; and
7. Households using natural gas for heating rely the
least on firewood for heat—a large proportion of these
households are in the Chicago area.
Dwight McCurdy is a professor and John Burde an associate
professor in the Department of Forestry. Southern Illinois
University at Carhondale.
Work leading to this report was funded by a grant from the
USDA-Forest Service in cooperation with the lUinois Department
of Conservation, Division of Forest Resources and Natural
Heritage.
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DAVID MANDY AND DEBORAH MUSTELL
Cash Flows in the Illinois State Budget General Fund Expenditures (Millions ofChart 2.
Dollars)
FISCAL YEAR 1985
D.'iscussion of the fiscal position of the state
government intensifies during election years as
candidates articulate alternative plans for the state. The
state's general fund is usually at the center of this
discussion, since the general fund finances most state
government operations. This article presents a flow of
funds examination of the Illinois general fund since
fiscal year I97I (FY71).
General Fund Flows in FY85
The first step in charting the state's fiscal progress is
to identify the sources and uses of funds in the state's
general fund. Chart I shows the major sources of
revenue for FY85. Total revenues for each category are
given while numbers in parentheses represent the
percent of total revenues for each category. The largest
revenue categories are the sales and personal income
taxes, with $3,120 million (30.2 percent) and $2,864
million (27.8 percent), respectively, in FY85. Similarly,
Chart 2 depicts the chief spending categories for FY85.
The largest expenditure items are public aid, common
school funds, and personal services with $2,838 million
(28.2 percent), $1,802 million (17.9 percent), and $1,684
million (16.7 percent), respectively, in FY85.
Chart 1 . General Fund Revenues (Millions of Dollars)
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The difference between revenues and expenditures is
graphed at the bottom of Chart 3. This difference is one
measure of whether the state is operatmg a current
surplus or deficit. By this measure, major surplus years
occurred in FY79, FY84, and FY85, while the state
experienced major deficits in FY81 and FY83.
Balanced Budget Defined
One must be cautious in discussing surpluses and
deficits for the state government because there are
several different definitions of the phrase "balanced
budget." State Comptroller Roland W. Burris discusses
these alternative definitions in the June 1985 issue of
the state's Monthly Fiscal Report. Comptroller Burris
refers to the difference between revenues and
expenditures as the "available balance concept." He
argues that this method is flawed because it requires
the state to end the fiscal year with the same balance
on hand as existed at the beginning of the fiscal year
in order for the budget to be balanced, even if the
beginning balance were at record high levels, as was
the case at the beginning of FY86. The state is required
to maintain this record-setting level of cash in order for
the budget to be termed "balanced."
Comptroller Burris notes that this defect is
particularly disturbing because obligations are still
outstanding against any fiscal year's budget after the
fiscal year ends. These obligations are called
lapse-period warrants and are paid out in the lapse
period, the three months following a fiscal year. Hence,
the available balance measure overstates the budget
position.
An alternative definition of a balanced budget, the
"budgetary balance concept," that accounts for
lapse-period warrants is discussed by Comptroller
Burris. It defines the budget as balanced if the
end-of-year balance is greater than the lapse-period
warrants for that year.
The problem with this definition is that it ignores
changes in end-of-year balances that may occur after
lapse-period warrants are accounted for. For example,
if the general funds balance were $100 million on 30
June 1984 and lapse-period warrants for July, August,
and September of 1 984 amounted to $40 million, then
the budgetary balance after all FY84 spending is
subtracted would show a surplus of $60 million. Now
suppose that the general funds balance on 30 June 1 985
were $150 million and that the lapse-period warrants
for FY85 were $100 million. Then the budgetary
balance after all FY85 spending is subtracted would be
$50 million. The budget shows a surplus of $50 million
for FY85 by the budgetary balance method even though
the budgetary balance after all spending is subtracted
out for each year declined by $10 million.
Whether or not this is viewed as a problem depends
on the approach one takes toward the state budget. At
the most basic level, the issue is whether one views
the stock of funds at a point in time or the flow of funds
over time as the most important indicator. The
budgetary balance method argues that the balance the
state has at its disposal is the important indicator of
the state's fiscal health, regardless of whether the state
Chart 4. General Fund (Millions of Dollars)
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is spending more than it is collecting in taxes in any
given year. Alternatively, the available balance method
involves comparing revenues with expenditures in any
given year. Even so, the approaches are not completely
separate. The comparison of flows yields information
concerning the trend in the balance the state has at its
disposal.
One modification of the available balance method
accounts for lapse-period warrants by comparing
end-of-year balances after lapse-period warrants. Chart
4 graphs results from the "modified available balance"
budget balance definition against results obtained by
using the available balance definition. Chart 4 makes
it clear that although the definitions differ, the figures
follow each other closely. But for a given year, FY82 for
example, the two quantities may differ significantly.
According to this definition, the budget has been in
surplus for the past two fiscal years. However, the
surplus in FY85 decreases by the "modified available
balance" method, while the FY85 surplus increases
slightly by the available balance method. This reflects
large lapse-period warrants for FY85 which offset the
large year-end balance.
The outlook for FY86 is less optimistic. At this
writing, the Bureau of the Budget is projecting a
year-end balance of $220 million. The budgetary
balance method therefore implies that if lapse-period
warrants exceed $220 million the state will have
incurred a deficit this year. Based on experience since
FY78, it is unlikely that lapse-period warrants will be
this low. By the available balance method, the $220
million prediction is also pessimistic, since it falls $259
million short of last year's $479 million year-end
balance. Similarly, the modified available balance
method predicts that lapse-period spending must fall
below $ 1 76 million in order for the budget to be
balanced. >
I
Real Budget Flows
Revenues and expenditures in 1967 dollars are
depicted in Chart 5. Here, the surplus year of FY79 is
clearly evident. The effects of the recession in the early
1980s are also dramatically illustrated, as real revenues
and expenditures plunged over 15 percent. The sharp
increase in real revenues in FY84, accompanied by a
similar increase in real expenditures, was a result of
the temporary increase in income tax rates and the
permanent increase in the sales tax rate enacted by the
legislature.
Chart 5. General Fund (Billions of Constant Dollars)
Editor's Note
We are pleased to publish responsible criticism or
oposing opinions of views taken, or implied, in the
Illinois Business Review.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
MARIANNE FERRER
An Ancient Solution to a Modern Problem:
The Procrustean Approach
"I I I I—
I
—
I
—
I
—
I
—
I
—
I
—
1
—
1
—
I
—
I
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
•EXPENDITURES
On 1 July 1 983, the personal income tax withholding
rate was increased from 2.5 to 3.5 percent and the
corporate income tax rate was increased from 4 to 5.6
percent. Then, on 1 January 1 984, the personal income
tax rate was changed to 3.0 percent and the corporate
income tax rate to 4.8 percent. On I July 1984, these
rates returned to 2.5 and 4 percent, respectively.
Further, the sales and use taxes on food and drugs were
reduced in steps from 4 percent to over the period
from 1 January 1984, and the tax on other taxable items
was increased from 4 to 5 percent on 1 January 1984.
Only with these increases did the state return to a
surplus. The slower growth in FY85 reflects the
expiration of the income tax increases, even though real
revenues continued to increase in FY85 due to the
gradual recovery of the Illinois economy. A
The data used to construct Charts 1-5 were provided
by the Comptroller's Office, State of Illinois.
In the February issue of the Illinois Business Review
the question was asked "Is Unemployment a Labor
Supply Problem?" In brief, the author argues that "if
the labor force had not grown as fast as it did, the
unemployment level would now be much lower."
It is of course true that there has been a substantial
increase in the size of the labor force, and it is further
correct that this is primarily so because of the rapid
influx of women into the labor market. But if
unemployment were simply caused by the existence of
a larger labor force, how would one explain the far
higher unemployment rates in the 1930s, when the
labor force was far smaller and when, incidentally, the
vast majority of women were full-time homemakers?
The problem with this approach is that it applies
micro analysis, which assumes that as one variable
changes everything else remains the same, to the labor
market as a whole, where this is entirely unrealistic.
Does anyone really believe that demand for goods and
services, and hence the demand for labor, would be the
same if labor force participation were equal to that in
1950?
There is also a second question that needs to be
raised. Mr. White objects to the view of unemployment
as a sign of not enough jobs to go around, and suggests
that it may just as readily be seen as a case of too many
people wanting jobs. In this instance, he is technically
correct. But is there a substantive case to be made that
when people need or want to work it is just as
acceptable simply to tell them that there is no place
for them, no opportunity for them to be self-supporting,
productive members of society, as it is to make an effort
to improve the functioning of the economy? This is a
view that would have appealed to Procrustes, the
mythical king who stretched short visitors, and cut off
the limbs of tall ones, in order to have them fit the size
of his bed.
Marianne Ferber is a professor of Economics and former
director of the Office of Women's Studies. University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
DOUGLAS B. DIAMOND, JR.
Real Estate Developments: Recent Trends
in Homeownership
Chart 1. Homeownership Rates for All Households
1974-1985
I t currently appears that, for the first time in five
decades, the homeownership rate at the end of this
decade will be lower than at the beginning. As of 1985,
the overall national rate was 63.9 percent, compared
with therateof 65.6percent in 1980 (see Chart 1). The
current rate is a new low for the decade, despite renewed
economic growth and interest rates as low as in 1980.
Moreover, this decline comes in the face of
demographic trends that would have raised the national
average over the period in the absence of other shifts.
Why has this decline occurred? Is it general or is it
focused among certain groups? Will it be reversed by
the recent decline in interest rates? These are important
questions from a social perspective as well as a matter
of concern to real estate professionals. This article
reviews the available data on these and related issues.
The conclusion here is that the decline in those
choosing to own is primarily a response to a major
increase in the relative cost of owning versus renting.
The decline has been concentrated among younger,
married households. In fact, recent ownership rates
among these households are very similar to those of
the early 1970s, when homeownership was also
expensive relative to renting. However, the trend
probably will be reversed by the most recent drop in
interest rates.
The Cost of Owning versus Renting
To understand the recent decline in homeownership,
one must look back almost 1 years. In the late 1 970s,
there was a surprising upward trend in homeownership
rates at a time of rising nominal interest rates. The
explanation seemed to be that housing had become an
investment, that is, expected price appreciation was
being incorporated into the decision to become a
homeowner. The expectation of house price
appreciation due to inflation was more than offsetmg
the rise in interest rates due to inflation. In addition,
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less generally recognized, however, is that the
estimated cost of homeownership has remained (until
recently) in the same range as it was in 1982, despite
the decline of almost 3 percentage points m nominal
interest rates. This result reflects four years of
remarkably slow appreciation in nominal house prices,
an average of 2.8 percent through 1983. Since the
formula used here assumes that people forecast future
appreciation by looking at recent appreciation, the
decline in actual appreciation has set in motion a steady
decline in expected appreciation that has matched the
drop in the nominal interest rate, leaving a real interest
rate in 1985 at about the same level as in 1982 (see
Chart 2).
Presumably, homeownership depends on the relative
cost of owning and renting, not just the cost of owning.
However, the net trend in the ratio of estimated
ownership costs to a series on adjusted gross rents
(Chart 3) is only slightly different from the trend in
ownership costs alone. A steady decline in relative
ownership costs after 1970 terminated in 1978 and
rapidly reversed itself from 1979 to 1982. Our initial
estimates for 1985 are not much different from the 1982
peak. The conclusion stands that ownership in 1985
Chart 2. Real After-Tax Cost of Homeownership
1970-1985 (1970 = 100)
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Note that in this chart the beforc-tax real intciestiatein 198S was about the same as
in 1970, Net ownership costs are higher than in 1970, primarily because of higher house
prices and operating costs.
was probably less attractive than at any time since
1970.
The continued high relative cost of owning, taken by
itself, is enough reason for the generally lagging
behavior of overall ownership rates. However, there are
many further insights to be gained by breaking out the
population into a number of demographic and
socioeconomic components. These insights both
confirm and embellish the basic story and reveal much
about how individuals in different circumstances
respond to a major shift in the cost of renting versus
owning.
Chart 3. Ratio of Homeownership Costs to Adjusted
Gross Rents, 1970-1985 (1970 = 100)
1 1
70 71
Chart 4. Homeownership Rates for Married Couple
Households, 1974-1985.
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SARWAR lAHAN, RANDALL W. JACKSON,
AND WILLIAM M. SYVERSEN
Build Illinois: A Regional Impact Analysis
A,lS a master plan for economic development, "Build
Illinois" has been launched to meet the needs of an
economy that experienced significant growth in high
tech and service industries in recent years. Of the five
areas of the program considered to be of crucial
importance, housing and infrastructure are expected to
receive 43 percent and 33 percent of the 2.3 billion
dollar total, with the remainder allocated to education,
business, and the environment.
The program is expected to affect the economy
significantly in terms of growth and job creation. In
addition to statewide growth, it is also imperative from
a policy perspective to assess the effects of the program
on different regions of the state. Differences in the
structure of regional economies will cause regions to
respond differently to investments in particular sectors.
Hence, an investigation into the impact of specific
activities on a regional economy would allow planners
and policymakers to place regional and sectoral
emphasis in proper perspective.
This article presents the results of an input-output
study on the probable effects of the "Build Illinois"
program on different regions of the state. The study is
based on single-region input-output models that do not
consider interactions between regions. The models,
however, account for leakages out of the regional
economic system and, therefore, do not result in
overestimation of gross output changes.
Illinois Regions
The Department of Commerce and Community
Affairs has divided the state of Illinois into seven
subregions on the basis of the commuting patterns
Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Region 5
Region 6
Region 7
within the state. These regions are shown in the Map.
Tables 1-3 show some regional economic indicators for
those regions. In terms of population, Region 2 (Chicago
region) ranks first with almost seven and half million
people, and it accounts for about 64. ,S percent of the
total population of the state. Region 3 (north central
Illinois) is the only other region that has a population
of over a million (8.76 percent). All other regions
combined account for about 27 percent of the state
population.
The Chicago region's employment is slightly less
than its share. While 64.5 percent of state total
population lives in this region, only 62.9 percent of
employed persons live there. At the same time, the
Chicago region accounts for about 70 percent of the
total manufacturing employment in the state. The
manufacturing base of Region 1 (northwestern Illinois)
is also quite strong, as is evident from the percentage
of manufacturing employment. Although this region
ranks seventh in terms of population and sixth in terms
of total employment, it ranks third in terms of
manufacturing employment. Regions 2 (north central
Illinois), 4 (east central Illinois), and 5 (west central
Illmois) are characterized by a proportionately larger
number of employed persons, while Regions 6
(southwestern Illinois) and 7 (southeastern Illinois)
have less total and manufacturing employment than
their share by population of the state.
In terms of per capita income as well, Chicago is the
leading region in the state, with about 104 percent of
the per capita income for the state. In all other regions,
per capita income is well below the state average and
varies between 71.5 and 87 percent of the state average
with the exception of Region 7, which has the lowest
per capita income in the state ($4,696).
Table 1. Employment by Regions (1985)
Region
Manufacturing
Employment
Percent of
State Total Rank
Total
Employment
Percent of
StateTotal Rank
1
Regional and Sectoral Effects of the Build Illinois
Program
To examine the eventual impact of different types of
government expenditures under the "Build Ilhnois"
program, we have performed some simulations. In these
simulations, four major sectors of the program:
housing, infrastructure, education, and business in each
region were perturbed. The amount of money allocated
to each of these sectors under the program was
distributed among different regions on the basis of
either population or manufacturing employment. In
particular, housing, infrastructure, and education
investments have been distributed on the basis of
population while business investments have been
distributed on the basis of employment. Direct effects
here refer to initial output dollars from various sectors
needed to satisfy the set of direct expenditures. The
extra output needed to satisfy these direct demand
changes will require inputs from other sectors, which,
in turn, will require further inputs and so on. Thus, the
total effects are greater than the direct effect. The
indirect effect is the difference between total and direct
effects.
Table 4 shows the impacts of the program on different
regions. Impacts on output, employment, and income
are greatest in the Chicago region, where the total
increase in output is about 160 percent of the initial
increase (direct effect) while the total increases in
employment and income are 225 percent and 171
percent of the initial increases. Thus, the region has an
output multiplier of 1 .60 and employment and income
multipliers of 2.25 and 1.71. The Chicago region is
followed by west central Illinois. Although west central
Illinois has the lowest level of manufacturing
employment in the state, it is second only to the
Chicago region in per capita income. This may partially
explain the high value of multipliers in this region
compared to other regions. Northwestern Illinois has
the lowest output, employment, and income
multipliers indicating that it has relatively lower
capability for generating economic growth.
Since six of the seven regions are small and do not
compare favorably with Chicago, we have grouped
them together into one region and calculated the
impacts on this basis. The results indicate that Chicago
is still the leading region although the differences have
narrowed. Thus, the output, employment, and income
multipliers for the rest of Illinois are 1 .506, 2.018, and
1.587 as against 1.60, 2.25, and 1.71 for Chicago.
Because of higher productivity levels and higher
concentrations of economic activity, the Chicago
region will benefit most if the expenditures of the
"Build Illinois" program are based on population and
employment distribution. The impact in terms of
increases in outputs, employment, and income in the
rest of Illinois would be lower, although large variations
can be expected across the component regions.
A policy designed to achieve a particular objective
must be based on careful analysis. Since policies are
often designed to affect specific sectors, it is appropriate
to determine the impact of output, employment, and
Table 4.
Region 3
Region 4
Region 5
Region 6
Region 7
Tabic 6 gives employment multipliers for each sector
and region. It is interesting to note that employment
multipliers associated with infrastructure are less than
employment multipliers associated with housing or
business. Thus, the effects of housing and business
sectors on labor-intensive industries are larger than the
effects of infrastructure on these industries.
Interregional comparisons indicate that, as before, the
Chicago region has the highest employment
multipliers while northwestern Illinois has the lowest
in all the sectors. Interregional variations in
employment multipliers are, however, greater than the
interregional variations in output multipliers.
Intersectoral and interregional comparisons of
income multipliers reveal the same patterns as for
employment. Table 7 shows that the income multiplier
for infrastructure is lower than that for housing or
business. Chicago, again, is the leading region followed
by west central Illinois.
Table 8 shows the output, employment, and income
multipliers for the non-Chicago regions when they are
combined into a single region. When Chicago is
compared to this "region," we observe less interregional
variation in sectoral multipliers. In housing for
example, the output multiplier for the rest of Illinois
is about 1 .46 compared to 1.55 for Chicago. For five out
of six regions comprising the rest of Illinois, the output
multiplier is less than 1.46. Similar observations can
be made for employment and income.
As the analysis illustrates, the size of a region is very
important for analytical purposes. If the objective is to
concentrate investments in a small region, selecting a
larger region as the unit of analysis would be
inappropriate as it would give misleading information
about the effects of such investments. The economic
Table 6. Employment Multipliers
Region Housmg Intiastiuctuic Businesi
Table 7. Income Multipliers
Region Huusnig Infrastructure Business
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structure of a region and its relationships with the
outside world are also of crucial importance. Analyses
for regions similar in size but different m economic
structures will yield different results. For example,
northwestern Illinois and west central Illmois are very
close in terms of population size but the output,
employment, and income multipliers associated with
west central Illinois are larger than the multipliers
associated with northwestern Illinois. Appropriate
regionalization is, therefore, a prerequisite for spatial
analysis of development programs.
Policy Implications
Our results indicate that the effects of a particular
policy vary not only across sectors but also across
regions. The main point this study emphasizes is that
the locational aspects of government expenditure
should be given due consideration. It has been observed
that the regions of the state differ greatly in terms of
population, employment, and income. The results
show that the effects of government expenditures on
output, employment, and income in different regions
vary significantly. In the Chicago region, for example,
each dollar of direct government expenditure indirectly
generates 1.59 dollars. In northwestern Illinois, on the
other hand, 1 .33 dollars would be created indirectly for
each dollar of output created directly. The critical
question, therefore, is what criteria should be used for
distributinggovernment expenditures among different
regions.
Calculation of sectoral multipliers in different
regions is a useful way of evaluating policies in terms
of attaining specific economic objectives. Our study
indicates that some sectors exert more influence on
employment than others. There is also regional
variation. In a region with a lower level of employment,
such sectors may be given more emphasis. If the
objective is to increase per capita income more rapidly,
then sectors that have larger income and output
multipliers may be appropriate targets.
The present study is based on single-region
input-output models that do not account for
interactions between and among different regions. In
reality, of course, regional economies are highly
dependent on each other. An interregional input-output
model is, therefore, a better representation of an
economic system. The use of such models will be
helpful in tracing the eventual effects of a program on
all regions, the sum of which will be greater than the
sum of the regional effects calculated in isolation.
Sound policies and programs should stem from a
rigorous conceptual framework. Since the "Build
Illinois" program envisages large expenditures across a
wide variety of industries in the state, careful studies
of alternative expenditures are crucial for the program
to generate maximum benefits. These studies must
concern the implications of sectoral and regional
impact of different policies.
Comprehensive and rigorous analyses are required to
understand the complex interactions within and among
economic regions in order to allocate scarce resources
effectively. Models that quantify the complex
interdependencies in a regional economic system
provide information that can now be used to provide
much-needed policy guidelines for the spatial
distribution of development expenditures. A
Sarwar Jahan is a research associate in the Center for
Governmental Studies at Northern lUinois University.
Randall W. Jackson is a research associate in the Center
for Governmental Studies and assistant professor of
geography at Northern Illinois University. William M.
Syversen is a research associate in the Center for
Governmental Studies at Northern Illinois University.
The regional input-output model used in this study was
developed at the Regional Science Research Institute of
Massachusetts and adapted for use in Illinois at the
Center for Governmental Studies at Northern Illinois
University, which also maintains a multiregional
input-output model for Illinois regions.
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Illinois Business Indexes
B.'cginningin this issue, each Illinois Business Review
will publish several graphs of relevant Illinois data
series. The data graphed will be obtained from data
series currently published in the Illinois Business
Indexes tabic. However, unlike the table, the graphs
will include an entire year of each data series. The
Illinois Business Indexes table will continue to be
published. The presentation of Illinois data series in
graphical form is intended to allow readers the
opportunity to easily follow economic trends and
cycles.
In this issue, six graphs are presented. The coincident
indicator is a composite of other Illinois economic
indicators. Manufacturing accounts for a large
percentage of Illinois employment. Both manufacturing
employment and average weekly earnings for
manufacturing employees is included. Help Wanted
Indexes for Chicago and St. Louis are included. Help
wanted indexes allow comparisons of job opportunities
to be made between different time periods. Estimates
for Illinois' retail sales are also included.
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
Coincident indicator 1 1 969 = 1 00|
Employment-manutacturinglin thousands)"
Average weekly hours-manufacturing"
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Building permits
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Change
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Regulating Noise from Illinois Airports
O-'ver the past 10 to 20 years the environmental
problem of noise—from industrial machinery, motor
vehicles, aircraft and a host of miscellaneous sources
has gamed increasing attention. In responding to one
segment of this problem, the Illinois Attorney General
in February 1977 proposed to the state's Pollution
Control Board a plan to regulate and hmit noise
emissions from the state's public airports. Consistent
with its responsibilities under the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Act, the Board initiated a series of public
hearings, and the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources sponsored technical and economic studies of
probable impact. Over a six-year period ( 1 977 to 1 983),
the Board held a series of 43 hearings (two additional
hearings to update the record were held last September).
As might be expected, attitudes toward the proposed
regulation of the various affected parties differed. It was
generally opposed by the Air Transport Association, the
Illinois Public Airports Association, and the
Department of Aviation of the City of Chicago, and
was generally supported by the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency and by officials and citizens groups
in the suburban communities surrounding O'Hare
Airport.
In April 1986, some nine years after the Attorney
General's initial overture, the Board produced a
proposed regulation. As presently drawn, it provides for
the phasing in of progressively tighter noise standards.
Beginning 1 January 1988 the maximum permissable
level of noise emissions from operations at a public
airport to any Class A or residential land would be 80
Ljn. This would decline to 75 Lj„ on 1 April 1989 and
to 65 Ljn on 1 October 1994. The Lj^ measure, to be
calculated as an annual average, is a weighted average
of daytime and nighttime (10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) noise
levels and incorporates a penalty for nighttime noise,
which is generally found to be more disturbing. A 65
Ljn noise level has come to be widely recognized and
accepted as the maximum level compatible with the
ordinary activities of people in residential areas.
Besides this basic provision, the regulation would
prohibit the construction of a new runway at an airport
if it would create a noise level greater than 65 L^„ on
any class A land. In addition, airports are required to
prepare, through use of a designated Federal Aviation
Agency computer model, noise exposure maps showing
the noise contours for the airport and such other data
as airport boundaries and runways, aircraft flight tracks,
surrounding land uses, and estimates of the number of
dwelling units and persons located within each of the
several contours. Airports with jet operations arc also
required to maintain records of the data needed to
generate the airport's noise contours and to report the
data quarterly to the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency.
There are two circumstances either of which would
relieve the airport proprietor of the obligation to meet
the noise standards: first, if non-Class A land subject
to excess noise is converted to Class A status
subsequent to the preparation and filing of the airport's
noise exposure map; second, if the airport proprietor
has secured a noise easement on Class A land with
noise levels in excess of 65 Lj^,- However, this exception
does not apply to noise levels of 75 Lj„ or greater. The
proprietor of an airport in violation, or contemplated
violation, may also petition for a so-called adjusted
standard that would allow a higher noise level for some
specific period of time. The petition procedure is rather
elaborate and requires, among other things, discussion
and assessment by the airport proprietor of a variety of
possible methods for reducing noise, the presentation
of a plan for reducing the airport's noise impact, and a
schedule for implementing the various elements of the
plan.
The Noise Status of Illinois Airports
There are more than 100 public airports in the State
of Illinois. The technical and economic study
(henceforth Economic Study)' carried out in 1980-81
to assess the impact of the proposed noise regulation
found that 14 of these airports would be in violation.
These airports are identified in the Table, along with
estimates of the number of residential dwellings
located in the designated noise intervals (see the base
case column). All of the airports accommodate jet
aircraft. For Vermillion County, Galesburg, Quincy,
Waukegan, the number of such operations is quite
modest, while for others (Rockford, Peoria, Moline-
Quad City, Midway, O'Hare) it ranges from substantial
to very large. In all cases, these operations contribute
critically to the elevated noise levels. Indeed, the airport
noise problem, in Illinois and elsewhere, is essentially
a jet noise problem.
The Table indicates that statewide approximately
97,000 dwellings are affected by noise levels in excess
of 65 Lj,„ and about 5,200 of these experience noise
levels of more than 75 Lj„. The most serious problems
downstate in terms of dwellings affected are at the
Moline-Quad City and Peoria facilities. For some of the
other downstate airports, such as Champaign-Willard,
Danville-Vermillion County, Galesburg, and Quincy,
the number of affected dwellings is small. The core of
the problem lies at the two Chicago airports. The
O'Hare and Midway environs combined contain just
over 98 percent of the total housing units over 65 L^|,„
with O'Hare alone representing 89 percent. Virtually
all housing units over 75 Lj^ are located at these two
airports. This is not surprising. In downstate areas, with
low population and extensive open land, the forces that
pack people and housing close to airports are much
weaker than in the crowded, land-short areas in and
around a major city.
The figures in the Table are based largely on data
developed or available around 1980. The O'Hare figures
are an exception and relate to 1984. The Noise
Abatement Office at O'Hare reports that between 1979
and 1984 the 65 L^„ contour has contracted, with the
number of dwelling units subjected to noise levels in
excess of 65 Lj^ declining by about 17 percent to the
total in the Table of 86,400. It attributes the
improvement to the changing composition of the air
carrier fleet and, specifically, to the introduction of
more modern, quieter aircraft and the retirement of
some of the older, noisier vehicles. Since 1 980, at other
airports, various changes may well have occurred in the
volume of traffic, in the types of aircraft arriving and
departing, in traffic patterns, in the balance between
day and night operations, and in the development of
residential land. Such changes could, of course, affect
the numbers of dwellings subject to high noise levels.
At Midway airport, the number of air carrier operations
(though not total operations) has increased over the past
several years, and the relative importance of jet
operations apparently has increased. Hence, the 65 Lj^,
contour may have grown. Accordingly, it should be
understood that the figures in the Table may not give
an accurate indication of the current status of
individual airports. At the same time, the general
impression of the extent of the noise problem in the
state and of its relative importance at different locations
remains reasonably reliable.
The Adverse Effects of Noise
Noise as a pollutant, depending on its type and
intensity, can produce various effects on people. In the
case of airport noise, the main effects are recognized to
be speech and sleep interference and annoyance. The
type of noise emanating from airports is typically
variable and intermittent, rather than steady and
continuous. As an aircraft passes overhead, the peak
noise on some properties adjacent to the airport might
average 90-95 dBA outdoors, or 70-75 indoors, rising
to this peak as the aircraft approaches and diminishing
as it moves away. With each flight, the noise pattern
is repeated. For a given residence or group of residences,
flyovers are generally irregular in the course of a day,
with one or more peak periods and intervals of low
activity. There may also be considerable variation
because of shifting wind conditions. Such variation
may also occur because of efforts by the airport tower
to limit the noise impact on a given residential sector.
The resulting Lj^, measure averages the noise levels
over the high or peak periods and the moderate and
quieter periods.
The noise levels caused by aircraft flyovers disrupts
speech and other types of communication. At 90-95
dBA outdoors, speech may be all but impossible for 10
to 20 seconds, and at 70-75 dBA indoors it may be
difficult to talk for 5 to 10 seconds. With each flyover,
the situation is repeated. In testimony at public
hearings before the Pollution Control Board, numerous
citizens living near airports complained of difficulty
conversing with family members, hearing their
televisions or stereos, and using their telephones.
Communications problems arise also for institutions
such as churches, hospitals, and schools located near
airports. In schools, classroom instruction may be
impaired or completely interrupted for 5 to 30 seconds
with each flyover. At an airport like O'Hare, depending
on wind direction and traffic, such flyovers may occur
every minute or two and may continue for a few or
even several hours. The O'Hare Noise Abatement
Office reports that as of 1 984, 93 schools were located
within the 65 Lj^ contour.
Status of Residential Dwellings at Selected Illinois Airports
the same as that expressed in a 1976 FAA statement
on noise abatement policy:
Aircraft noise disturbs the normal activities of airport
neighbors—their conversation, sleep, and relaxation
—
and degrades theirquality of life. Depending on the use
of land contiguous to an airport, noise may also affect
education, health services, and other public activities.
Although there may be indirect and subtle social and
psychological harms, aircraft noise is predominantly an
annoyance prohlem. It does not present any direct
physical health danger to the vast majority of people
exposed (quoted in the Pollution Control Board's
Proposed Opinion and Order, p. 71).
As a corollary it may be noted, that in contrast to many
other pollutants, the effects of noise are transient and
noncumulative. Once the source is removed, there are
no lasting impairments.
The Rights, Wrongs, and Complexities of Airport Noise
Situations of environmental pollution are commonly
thought of as involving two parties, transgressors
(polluters) and victims. The latter are seen to suffer
burdens imposed by the extra-legal or improper actions
of the former, and are accordingly entitled to relief. The
case of airport noise is more complicated.
An airport rec^uires a large amount of flat, open land.
Large expanses of land are ordinarily available only at
the edge, or some distance from, built-up areas. Thus,
when first constructed, an airport may have little or no
housing nearby, and the noise impact from its
operations is small or negligible. Over time, the airport
may grow through physical expansion and an increase
in the number of aircraft operations. Concurrently,
people who seek housing, and the real estate developers
who serve them, are drawn to locations around the
airport. They are attracted by some of the same factors
that earlier attracted the airport—vacant land and good
drainage. They are attracted also by the supplies of
water and power that have become available, by good
access to road and air transportation, and by the
economic activity that the airport supports and
generates. The airport and residential land thus become
juxtaposed, making conflict all but inevitable.
The introduction in 19S8 of the commercial jet
transport, with its substantially increased requirements
for acoustical space, greatly intensified the oppor-
tunities for conflict and increased the scale that conflict
might attain. Land proximate to the larger airports
began to experience significantly elevated noise levels,
and land that earlier had seemed distant from the
airport became subject to disturbing noise levels.
Increasing numbers of households found that, whereas
their residential surroundings previously had been
relatively t]uiet, they now were subject to noisy
overflights.
Interestingly, the initiation and expansion of jet
traffic seemed not to inhibit residential development
around airports. The Pollution Control Board, in issuing
Its recent opinion and order on the proposed regulation,
cited a number of examples of this phenomenon that
had been reported during the lengthy series of hearings.
In Bensenville, a suburban community bordering
O'Hare, the population grew 40 percent from 1960 to
1970, while in nearby Wood Dale the population rose
over 175 percent in the same period. In several other
townships in the area, over 500 single-family dwellings
were built between 1970 and 1978, and over 800
multiple family units were constructed on land with
noise levels of 75 Lj,, or greater. The airport manager
for Springfield Capital reported that the airport
authority had objected to 12 cases of zoning near the
airport and had lost all of them. Other instances of
close-in incompatible development were reported for
the Quad Cities and Decatur airports. These examples
highlight the fact that control of zoning for residential
development and control of the airport and its
development rest with different jurisdictions.
Midway Airport presents a sharply contrasting
situation to those just cited, with changing aircraft
technology playing the central role. The neighborhoods
surrounding the airport were well-established prior to
1960, with less than 15 percent of the housing in the
area being built after that date. The noise from
propeller-driven aircraft was not regarded as a serious
problem. The introduction of jet aircraft raised noise
levels very substantially, and areas previously
comparatively quiet became subject to significant
noise. At certain other airports, simple airport
expansion has produced a similar result. The extension
of a runway or addition of a new runway, possibly
accompanied by increases in traffic, has altered noise
contours, bringing higher noise levels to existing
residential areas. The conflict between airport users and
nearby residents thus results from the intermixture of
several forces. Many of those living in noise-affected
dwellings moved to those dwellings after the airport
and Its noise patterns were established. Some were
attracted by new residential developments whose
location was ill-conceived and improperly controlled.
Others purchased existing properties as they came up
for resale. In both cases, one might reasonably suppose
that the purchasers had some awareness of the nearby
airport and its noise. In contrast, others living near an
airport may be fairly regarded as victims of factors
beyond their control, such as changes in aircraft types
or expansion of the airport and its activities.
Neighborhood amenities such as good schools, good
roads, good police services, and attractive nearby parks
tend to be capitalized into property values. So also do
neighborhood disamenities. Thus, one expects a
property enjoying one or more such amenities to be
worth more, other things equal, than a similar property
without them. By this reckoning, a residential property
burdened by a noise level of, say, 75 Lj„ should be worth
less than a similar property experiencing only 70 Lj^
and still less than one subject to 60 Lj^. Many economic
studies have been made of the relation between aircraft
noise and residential property values. While the results
are not definitive, they suggest, on the average, about
a 0.6 percent decline in property value per decibel
increase in the noise level. The discount represents I.
compensation for the future noise burden a buyer
expects to bear. Alternatively, the same .6 percent per
decibel, if paid to the existing occupants, would
effectively compensate them, in present value terms,
for the future noise burden they would carry. It is
important to bear in mind that from an economic point
of view, appropriate compensation to the bearer of an
environmental burden is, for that person, equivalent to
the elimination of that burden through some suitable
means of abatement. In either case, the individual has
been "made whole" by being restored to his
prepollution level of satisfaction. Against this
backdrop, we can classify noise-affected households
into four broad groups. First, there are homeowners who
came to their locations when these locations were
quiet, either because no airport yet existed or because
the scope of its operations was limited, and who later
became subject to aircraft noise. Second, there are
former homeowners, in all aspects like the preceding
group, except that subsequent to the introduction of
aircraft noise they sold their homes, accepting the
markets discounted value, and moved elsewhere. Both
of these groups are, in a meaningful sense, true victims
of noise pollution. Third, there are homeowners
presently resident in the noise-affected area who
purchased their dwellings at a discount from the second
of the above groups. Fourth, there are the occupants of
rental property in the noise-affected area who, because
of the noise, pay lower rents for their units than the
market would otherwise require. Since both of these
latter groups are compensated for their noise burdens,
neither can properly be viewed as a victim. Renters, it
might further be noted, are a mobile and transient
group. Since the average renter remains in a given
location for a comparatively short period, his noise
exposure tends to be limited.
A final point on property valuation deserves mention.
To the extent that airport noise is reduced, other things
remaining unchanged, the values of properties
surrounding the airport should rise. But it does not
follow from this that the elimination of the airport
would be favorable to the value of these same
properties. The reverse would doubtless result in many
cases. Airports are focuses of economic activity. The
income they generate, the employment opportunities
they provide, and the transportation access they afford
all help to support and enhance the property values of
nearby communities. We do not know the magnitude
of this positive force, but it surely helps to compensate
for, and in some instances may more than offset, the
losses due to noise. The goal of abatement obviously
must be to control and limit the effects of noise without
impairing value-generating airport activities.
Methods of Abatement and Their Implications
There are several methods for reducing aircraft noise
or mitigating its impact. First, a noisy aircraft may be
replaced with a later generation, quieter machine, or
its engines may be replaced or retrofitted to reduce
noise. Second, the manner of operating the aircraft may
be modified. Within limits, its landing and departure
profiles can be changed and selected runways can be
used so as to reduce noise emissions to residential
properties. Third, sound-absorbing earthen berms can
be strategically placed on an airport to reduce the
transmission of engine testing and run-up noise.
Fourth, actions that directly involve the noise receivers
can be taken. Dwellings can be insulated to reduce
noise pass-through, noise emission rights can be
purchased from homeowners, and clear areas can be
established by purchasing and converting or
demolishing residential structures in high noise areas.
Finally, the activity level of an airport can be reduced.
Night flights, which carry a penalty in the Lj^ noise
measure, can be reduced or eliminated, and the number
of day flights can be restricted.
More than a decade ago, the Federal Aviation
Administration prescribed noise standards to be met by
the air carrier fleet and future dates for achieving
compliance. Under those standards, the fleet has
gradually become quieter as new generation aircraft
have been introduced and older aircraft retired or
retrofitted with quieter engines. At present, close to 90
percent of the US fleet has achieved what is called Stage
II compliance, and movement continues toward the
eventual attainment of Stage III compliance.
Opportunities for application of the remaining
abatement methods depend on the conditions at
individual airports. Some of these methods are of
relatively low cost, while others are more expensive.
Changes in aircraft operating methods are generally low
cost and, in some conditions, can yield substantial
reductions in noise levels. The purchase of noise
emission rights, or easements, can entail significant
costs, depending upon the number of dwellings
involved. Such easements may cost from 2.5 percent to
perhaps 17 percent of property value, depending upon
the noise status of the property. The noise insulation
of dwellings is yet more expensive, with the cost, like
easements, also varying with the noise status of the
airport. The Economic Study put the average cost of
insulating a noise-affected dwelling at a downstate
airport at $3,300, compared to an average easement cost
of $1,500. The cost of property acquisition and
demolition, with properties being purchased at their
market values, is of course much higher than either of
these approaches. Cutbacks in the volume of operations
generate complex repercussions, and the costs are not
easily estimated. But such cutbacks are implicitly very
expensive since, depending on their type and extent,
they disrupt and otherwise compromise the air
transportation system.
The Economic Study found for the non-Chicago
airports that changes in aircraft operating procedures
—
the use of preferential runways, modest changes in
climb profiles after takeoff, and adjustments in traffic
patterns for arrival and departure—would be applicable
at Decatur, Peoria, Moline-Quad City and Springfield.
These changes would reduce the total of dwellings at
the non-Chicago airports subject to more than 65 Lj^
by over 70 percent, from 2,575 to 71 7. The outcome is
summarized in the third column of the Table. Overall,
for the 1 2 airports, the remaining problem is nominal.
Over half of the housing over 65 Lj„ is concentrated at
two airports, Peoria and Moline-Quad City, with the
balance scattered among the other 10 facilities.
Compliance with respect to these dwellings might be
achieved by any of the several methods discussed
earlier. The least costly would be the purchase of noise
easements. Alternatively, some combination of
easements and noise insulation might be used, though
at somewhat higher cost. Insulation, it should be noted,
is only a partial remedy, since it has no effect on outdoor
noise levels. Moreover, it is not clear from the proposed
regulation that this approach would constitute an
acceptable method of compliance. The regulation, it
should also be noted, provides that easements are not
an acceptable method of compliance for properties
subject to noise levels of 75 Lj^ or more. For those
properties, acquisition by the airport authority would
presumably be necessary. It is easy to make a case, on
economic grounds, that this provision lacks a rational
basis.
The near-term noise problem at downstate Illinois
airports appears manageable through the application of
one or more of the mitigation methods described,
though in certain instances the airport authorities may
need to request an exemption from the noise limits (as
described later). But a longer-term problem will remain.
Jet traffic at some airports will grow over the coming
years, pushing up the noise level, though this force will
be offset in some degree through a changing fleet mix
that incorporates quieter aircraft. More important, in
the absence of countervailing policy, residential
development around airports, including development
within moderate and even high noise zones, can be
expected to continue. The result will be an intensifica-
tion of present effects or the undoing of favorable effects
from any abatement measures that may have been
taken. The proposed regulation requires that the
proprietors of airports in violation of the standards
make good faith efforts to persuade local zoning
authorities to prevent development on existing or
prospective noise-sensitive lands, and this could have
beneficial consequences. Further, an airport proprietor
is exempt from violation if non-Class A land is
converted to Class A or residential land subsequent to
disclosure, through publication of a noise contour map,
of the noise level on that land.
The situation at the Chicago airports, both for the
near and the longer term, is less tractable. O'Fiare
airport, the busiest such facility in the world, in 1985
supported about 750,000 operations, of which about 1
2
percent were at night. Over 75 percent of these
operations are by large air carrier-type aircraft, and over
95 percent of them are by jet aircraft. About 86,000
housing units are presently contained within the 65 Lj^,
contour. The Economic Study suggested that modified
day and night operating procedures could, by
themselves, bring about a substantial shrinkage in the
noise-affected area and in the number of affected
housing units. The feasibility of these changes remains
to be tested in O'Hare's complex operating environ-
ment. Meanwhile, in 1984 the airport tested a set of
modified procedures for nighttime operations,
involving the use of preferential runways and
preferential flight paths intended to direct more
departing aircraft over nonresidential areas. The results
have not yet been published, but it appears that the
procedures successfully reduced the size of the 75 L^n
contour but not the 65 Lj^ contour. The airport has also
undertaken and partially completed a program of
constructing noise-attenuating earth berms at strategic
locations around the airport, and it has underway a
program for assessing alternative procedures for noise
abatement during aircraft departures. These steps will
doubtless achieve a measure of success, but will still
leave perhaps 50 to 60 thousand dwelling units within
the 65 Ljn contour. As was indicated for the downstate
airports, the least costly method of treating the
remaining dwellings would be through the purchase of
noise easements. The cost for those dwelling units in
the 65-75 Ljn interval might run in the neighborhood
of $100 million to $120 million. The remaining
dwellings might be noise-insulated at appreciably
higher per unit costs (and without any assurance that
this action would bring compliance), for an outlay of
perhaps $75-$85 million. These costs might be
defrayed over, say, a five-year period through an
increase in landing fees charged to airlines or by
passenger ticket surcharges. An alternative approach
for the estimated 3,200 dwellings located above 75 Lj^
would be their purchase by the airport authority. This
approach would be expensive, carrying an aggregate
cost of perhaps $235 million. This cost might be
reduced somewhat through redevelopment of at least
some of the acquired land. However, from an economic
vantage point, property acquisition even with
allowance for a redevelopment offset, is difficult to
justify.
Midway airport currently supports about 190,000
operations per year, or about one-quarter of the number
of its neighbor to the north. The opportunities for noise
abatement at the airport are unfortunately limited by
its size or compactness, its geography and its
constrained pattern of operations, with residential
properties around it to the east, west, and north and,
with a gap, to the south. Because of this residential
pattern and restrictions arising from runway lengths,
there is little opportunity for noise abatement through
the kinds of operational changes considered for O'Hare.
The mitigation options that remain are the relatively
expensive ones of easements, insulation, and property
acquisition. Thus, despite the lesser scale of Midway's
noise problem, the obstacles to achieving compliance
appear fully as great as those at O'Fiare. The problem
could grow in the future since the 1984 master plan
study for the airport projects significantly enlarged
noise contours for 1995.
In its discussion of the proposed regulation, the
Pollution Control Board refers to the noise problems at
O'Hare and Midway as "massive" and recognizes that
a solution is not attainable in the short run. It appears
to acknowledge the limited reach of its own powers, as
well as the powers of airport proprietors, in the
following comment:
This Board by itself cannot solve the noise problem.
Units of federal, state, and local government as well as
the courts, industry, the real estate industry, developers,
proprietors, and potential buyers and sellers of homes
must all participate to some extent if progress is to be
forthcoming. For its part, the Board will establish a noise
standard for public airports and require that certain
information be made available to the public. This action
will make a small, but hopefully significant, dent in a
very large problem. The authority and ability to zone
around airports, develop and purchase quieter aircraft,
alter flight operations, and educate the public about
potential noise problems rests with other entities
[Proposed Opinion and Order, pp. 115-16.)
In anticipation of compliance difficulties, the Board
provides in the regulation, as previously noted, for an
adjusted standard that might be sought by an airport
unable to meet the prescribed noise limits. It is certain
that the two Chicago airports will apply for such a
standard, and it is probable that several non-Chicago
airports will do the same. It is also virtually certain,
based on events to date, that the power of the Board to
adopt the regulation will be challenged in the courts
and that subsequent enforcement actions for violations
will be similarly challenged. Hence litigation is in
prospect for the coming years. Finally, at the political
level, the recent controversy over a proposed regional
airport authority for the Chicago area appears destined
to continue.
' Econormclmpoct of Proposed Noise Regulations. R77-4, Illinois Institute
of Natural Resources (subsequently the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources], 1981, in tour volumes. Volume 1, Technicnl Study of Public
Airports Outside Cliicago. hy Paul Schomer, R. W. Findley, and Marvin
Frankel; Volume 2, Economic Analysis of Public Airports Outside Chicago.
by Marvin Frankel and Lise Zwisler, Volume .3, Technical Study of O Hare
and Midway Airport'i. by Paul Schomer, Volume 4, Economic Analysis of
O'Hare and Midway Airports, by Marvin Frankel and Lise Zwisler.
The author is professor of economics at the University of
lUinois at Urhana-Champaign and was a principal author of
the study cited evahiatmg the economic impact of the state 's
proposal to regulate airport noise.
ARTHUR GETIS
Economic Well-Being
among Chicago's Suburbs
Between 1970 and 1980 the city of Chicago lost over
150,000 manufacturing jobs. During the same period
over 300,000 people left the city . This outmigration is
comparable in absolute terms to the volume of
inmigration around the turn of the century. Contrary
to the views expressed in the popular press, however,
the vast majority of those people migrated not to the
Sunbelt but to Chicago's suburbs. Taking into account
the natural increase in population, the suburbs overall
have grown in population at a slightly slower rate than
the city has declined. The migration to Chicago's 200
suburbs, however, has been uneven. Now after 20 years
of large-scale outward movement, the result is about
30 burgeoning suburbs, with the remainder equally
divided among no-growth and declining municipalities.
In this article, a shortened version of a longer, more
technical research paper to be published in Economic
Geography late in 1986, I will show that growth is
associated with the favorable economic health of
suburban municipalities and that geographic patterns
of well-being imply that poor community health
spreads like a communicable disease. In addition, 1 will
present two rankings of municipal economic well-being
that are used to compare the quality of the current
economic environment and the recent trends in
economic health for 183 suburban communities for
which adequate data are available.
Because of our reliance on census data, we must
restrict our study to the period ending 1980. The
enormous amount of economic activity in the vicinity
of Oak Brook since 1 980 is not considered in this study.
One can discern at least two types of unhealthy
communities: (1) those with unfavorable levels of
important socioeconomic variables (such as low per
capita income and high crime rates) and whose trends
in those variables are either stagnant or negative; and
(2) those communities that are better off in key
variables but whose recent trends are unfavorable. The
healthiest communities have advantageous and
improving levels in such key variables as employment,
unemployment, persons below the poverty level, and
bond rating. The view taken here is that economic
health is best viewed as a function of recent trends in
key variables, except if communities are so well off that
there is "nowhere to go," or if current levels are so
depressed that even a modest positive trend can do little
to improve economic well-being.
Before developing a model of economic health, we
analyzed the relationship between 21 variables for 39
of the largest municipalities in the Chicago Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). The main
purpose was to attempt to identify the motive variables,
that is, the variables that generate trends in other
variables, but that are not generally subject to feedback
effects from the variables they affect (exogenous
variables). We identified two such variables: change in
unemployment and change in employment. Another
purpose was to find the appropriate response variables,
that is, those variables that best reflect the effects of
explanatory variables such as the exogenous variables.
With the use of correlation analysis and factor analysis,
the main response variable—the current proportion of
the population below the poverty level—was chosen as
the best indicator of economic well-being. Chart 1
depicts the series of relationships.
Chart 1. Causal Structure for Municipalities in the
Chicago SMSA Showing Statistically Significant Paths
between Variables
Chart 2. Scores for the Trend Model for Municipalities
in the Chicago SMSA
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Indices of Economic Health
Using this model and a statistical technique known
as the path analysis, it is possible to construct indices
(or scores] of the economic health of a community. The
exact procedure is described fully in the forthcoming
article. Here, attention is focused on the results of the
analysis. Table 1 gives the names of the top and bottom
25 municipalities and the scores associated with their
economic health by level and trend. The scores are
normally distributed with a mean of and a standard
deviation of 0.87. Table 2 focuses upon changes from
1970 to 1980. The following are some conclusions based
on these scores.
(1) The well-to-do North Shore and northwest
suburbs demonstrate high current levels of health, but
they are less highly rated on the trend scale. This is a
function of the "nowhere to go" syndrome that is not
necessarily indicative of favorable economic health.
(2) The old industrial suburbs are at a low level of
current health and show negative economic trends. In
terms of the actual values for each of the variables, the
communities near the bottom of the list are no better
off than if they were located in Third World countries.
(3) Further study shows that the bottom 25 suburbs
in both categories contain most of the black suburban
population. Only in such places as Broadview,
Evanston, and Bellwood are there substantial numbers
of blacks in moderate or well-to-do suburbs. The
outward migration from Chicago has been selective:
the segregation level in the suburbs is among the
highest in the United States.
(4) The top 25 communities on the trend scale contain
8 of the 20 growing suburbs (see Table 2). Population
growth from 1970-1980 correlates with the trend
rankingat the + .42 level. Clearly, this shows that not
only does rapid growth correspond to increases in
employment, but it also correlates with increasing per
capita income and favorable trends in poverty levels.
People who migrate to the suburbs tend to be at a higher
income level than are those who already live there.
Table 2. Fastest Growing Municipalities in the Chicago SMSA from 1970 to 1980
Absolute Increases Percentage Increases
1
Spatial Pattern of Economic Health
The regional map shows the spatial distribution of
the trend scores. An analysis was carried out that
attempts to identify spatial autocorrelations among the
trend scores. High spatial autocorrelation implies that
there is an association among nearby municipalities
because they display similar scores. Our measure of
spatial autocorrelation took into account (controlled
for) the spatial clustering of suburban municipalities.
From the regional map it is clear that there are
pronounced pockets of decline. This shows up in Chart
2 as a consistent, statistically significant, pattern of
negatively associated municipalities.' Unlike
municipalities with positive trends, those with
Chart 3. Differences in Indicator Values [L(d)] between
the Trend Model Results and the Basic Spatial Pattern of
Municipalities by 0.5 Mile Increments
miles 10 15 20
L(d) + 2
+ 1
Trend
Minus
Basic
2
deterioration. Favorable economic health will come to
the city of Chicago and its declining suburbs only when
residents see economic advantages in nonmigratory
behavior. Officials of declining municipalities would
do well to rethink their policies toward those real estate
and business interests that are willing to consider
developing attractive housing and employment centers
closer in.
Our study has highlighted the extreme differences in
trends in the suburbs of a single large metropolis. Even
with many healthy communities, one cannot consider
the Chicago SMSA to be economically sound until the
disparities between communities are brought within
bearable limits. Since the economic well-being of the
municipalities is dependent on their neighbors and on
Chicago, it would be in their best interests to develop
region-wide plans for growth, preservation, and
development.
'The diagram shows values of Lid], a measure o( association among
communities at different distances from one another. Positive values imply
that municipalities with similar high positive scores are spatially related
while negative values mean that municipalities with negative values are
spatially related. Chart 2 shows that the negative values dominate over
short distances |up to 3. 5 miles]. This means that neighboring communities
with strong negative values are spatially related.
Arthur Getis is a professor ofgeography at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This research was sponsored
m part by the Office ofReal Estate Research at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
negative trends are decidedly spatially grouped. An
inference from this is that municipalities with negative
scores, more than those with positive scores, tend to
display epidemiological characteristics.
Conclusion
The city of Chicago has been the great generator of
economic change in its metropolitan area. Although
some communities in the outer suburbs may appear to
be independent of trends in Chicago, many are the
beneficiaries of the city's recent economic decline. The
fastest growing suburbs are now as far as 30 miles from
the Loop. As the number of Chicagoans of middle and
upper income declines, however, the ability of Chicago
to fuel economic advances in the suburbs will
inevitably diminish. It follows that what now are the
outer suburbs will begin to experience the decline now
evident in the inner suburbs. Currently, for middle
income people there is a perceived need to escape
declining communities,- this results in further
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JAMES R. FOLLAIN
Should Real Estate Brokers
Support Tax Reform?
Tihe tax reform movement that began in earnest
nearly two and one-half years ago has gained substantial
momentum in the past month because of the tax reform
plan passed by the Senate Finance Committee (SFC).
The SFC plan represents substantial tax reform and
many groups around the country have joined the tax
reform bandwagon. Senator Packwood, the Chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, was recently quoted
as saying that he has never seen such a broad spectrum
of support for a piece of tax legislation.
It has been claimed by some that the real estate
industry should be less than enthusiastic about the kind
of tax reform represented by the SFC plan. The fear is
that this reform will cause serious damage to the real
estate industry, in general, and the housing market, in
particular. As a result, some organizations that
represent the real estate industry have lobbied against
the SFC plan and urged their members to do so as well.
For the past year I have studied the various proposals
put forth by the Treasury Department, the President,
the House of Representatives, and, now, the Senate
Finance Committee. I have just edited a book that
contains my analysis and that of many others entitled
Tax Reform and Real Estate. An addendum to that book
entitled "The Impact of the Senate Finance
Committee's Plan for Tax Reform on Real Estate" by
Patric Hendershott and me is also available. Based upon
this body of work, I feel much of the concern expressed
by the real estate lobbying organizations is overstated.
Indeed, I would like to argue that tax reform a la the
SFC plan is a good idea for the long-run interests of
both the real estate industry and the real estate
brokerage profession.
There are four reasons why the real estate brokerage
industry should support tax reform. The first and
foremost is that tax reform will result in a more
efficient allocation of our existing capital stock.
Currently, the decision to invest is too heavily
influenced by noneconomic considerations. That is, the
tax consequences of an investment rather than its
economic return often dictate whether an investment
should be undertaken. In the real estate industry, this
has resulted in a huge shift in resources into "tax
driven" real estate deals. Furthermore, these deals too
often are conducted by people expert in the tax
consequences of the investment but unfamiliar with
the economic consequences. Tax reform will force
future investors in real estate to give more weight to
the economics of the investment. In the long run, this
must be good for the real estate industry and the
professional real estate people who serve it.
Second, tax reform means lower interest rates. Each
of the major reform proposals under consideration calls
for substantially lower marginal tax rates. A move to
lower tax rates will almost certainly result in lower
interest rates because the government will no longer
pick up 50 percent of the cost of debt. Exactly how low
interest rates will go depends upon a host of factors,
but a decline of 100 basis points is reasonable. As
everyone in the real estate industry knows, lower
interest rates are good for real estate, especially housing.
Third, tax reform means a higher homeownership
rate. The SFC plan hits rental housing harder than it
does the cost of homeownership for most households.
In fact, if interest rates decline by 1 00 basis points, the
cost of homeownership may actually decline for many
middle-income households. Thus, it seems quite
reasonable to predict that tax reform as the SFC plan
describes will result in a higher aggregate homeowner-
ship rate in this country. Given that the overwhelming
majority of real estate brokers serve the single-family
homeowner market, such an outcome should be
considered highly desirable by the majority of the real
estate brokerage industry. Fourth, tax reform might
mean greater rates of economic growth. The scientific
basis for this statement is less certain than the first
three, and so I could be accused of speaking more from
my heart than my mind. Evidence is available, however,
that suggests that the work effort forthcoming from
many high-income professionals has increased as a
direct consequence of the 1981 cut in the maximum
individual tax rate from 70 to 50 percent. If tax reform
can have this effect on the work effort of professionals
—
for example, people in the real estate brokerage
industry—then tax reform could have a substantial and
positive effect on long-run economic growth in this
country. And, as anyone in the real estate industry will
tell you, economic growth is the single most important
determinant of a strong housing market.
Tax reform is a complex subject. No one who has
studied it can say with certainty its final effects. Also,
there will undoubtedly be some real estate losses in the
short run and a rise in the long-run level of rents on
residential real estate. This is inevitable given the
enormous tax preferences granted to certain types of
real estate earlier in this decade. However, I can say
with confidence that the long-run health of our
economy requires that investment decisions be based
upon sound economic considerations. Given that tax
reform as described in the SFC plan moves strongly in
that direction, I ask that you give it serious
consideration.
Summary of a speech given to the Board of Directors of the
Illinois Association of REALTORS on 4 June 1986 in
Springfield, lames R. Follam is the Director of the Office of
Real Estate Research at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
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Illinois Business Indexes
Tehis issue of the Illinois Business Review highhghts
Illinois' building permit series. On the facing page,
graphs are presented for residential housing units and
the value of residential housing; industrial buildings;
offices, banks, and professional buildings; stores and
other mercantile buildings; and other buildings. None
of the six series has been adjusted for any seasonal
variation. As one would expect, therefore, there are
obvious seasonal trends for all of the series.
Low values for the winter months reflect decreased
construction, while summer months have typically
shown increased activity. The seasonal pattern is
generally true for the residential housing and industrial
buildings series. The other three series exhibit different
behavior. The offices, banks, and professional buildings
series has peaks in December and January along with
troughs in April, May, and June. The stores and other
mercantile buildings series shows an upturn in
December and larger peaks in March, April, and May
much higher than for those of June and July. The other
buildings series rose in December but fell again for
January, February, and March.
Illinois Business Indexes
Percent
Change
May 1985-
Mayl986
May
1986
April
1986
March
1986
Feb
1986
May
1985
April
1985
Coincident Indicator ( 1969 = 100)
Employment-manufacturing |in thousands)'
Average weeltly hours-manufacturing*"
Wee)<ly earnings-manufacturing'
Help wanted advertising-Chicago 1 1969 = 100)'
Help wanted advertising-St. Louis(1969= 100)''
Retail Sales (in millions)*'
Coal production jin thousands of tons)
Petroleum products (in thousands of barrels)'"
Vendor performance*'
Building permits (in thousands)
Residential housing units
Value of residential housing
Value of nonresidential construction
Industrial buildings
Office, banks, and professional buildings
Stores and other mercantile buildings
Other
Consumer price index (December 1977= lOQ)
North Central US'
North Central/population more than 1,250,000'
North Central/population 385,000 to 1 ,250,000'
North Central/population 75,000 to385, 000'
North Central/population less than 75,000'
Chicago (1967 =100)
St. Louis(1967=100)
Personal income (in millions)'' ''
Per capita personal income'''*^'
1.87%
25.00%
126.28 124.70 119.04 119.80 123.96
55.0% 50.0% 50.0% 48.0% 44.0%
122.29
0.84%
1.49%
4.04%
Residential Housing Units Value of Industrial Buildings (thousands of dollars)
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CARLA TIGHE
National Banking Now
O,'n 1 July 1986 Illinois instituted regional interstate
banking. Illinois banks may now be purchased by
out-of-state banks if the home states of the purchasers
have reciprocal laws. The Illinois law permits interstate
banking only within the six-state region surrounding
Illinois.
Of the six contiguous states identified by Illinois law,
Indiana, Michigan and Kentucky have passed
comparable legislation. Similar bills are expected to be
passed in Wisconsin and Missouri. Iowa is not expected
to act on the issue in the near future.
Regional interstate banking will strengthen
midwestern banking. Large banks can take advantage
of economies of scale, making them more efficient and
less likely to fail. However, the reasons justifying
regional interstate banking also hold for national
interstate banking. The Illinois law needs to be
expanded to allow for banks outside the area (in states
having reciprocal laws) to buy Illinois banks.
Furthermore, in order for Illinois to remain competitive,
we need to be among the first to pass legislation that
allows national branch banking.
This brings us to the primary reason for widening the
Illinois law at this time: other states have already done
so. Since the Supreme Court overruled federal laws
prohibiting interstate banking in 1985, many states
have provided for interstate banking on a regional level.
Several have also included a timetable to open the states
to nationwide branch banking.
The Illinois law, on the other hand, contains specific
provisions to keep nonadjacent states' banks out of
Illinois. Provisions to constrain branching to the region
may limit the effectiveness of our law, although
regional interstate banking is expected to make
Chicago into an even greater financial center. The many
corporate headquarters and rapidly growing suburbs
make Chicago an attractive location for out-of-state
banks. However, if surrounding states allow for
nationwide banking before Illinois does, Chicago's
financial growth could be curbed. It is plausible to
imagine that New York banks would merge with banks
in Milwaukee or Indianapolis. After all, these cities also
have important advantages. Illinois banks outside
Chicago should be concerned for two reasons. First,
Illinois banks may find the best merger opportunities
have been lost to banks in states that allowed national
banking earlier. Secondly, the initial merger activity
will have strengthened competitor banks in
surrounding states. In this sense, Illinois banks may
find themselves left behind. Illinois needs to be among
the first who promote growth by opening its doors to
nationwide banking.
Increased Efficiency
There are a number of reasons why growth is
important to the Illinois banking system. First, strong
midwestern banks with interregional branches can
better compete with the giant banks in New York and
on the West Coast. Larger banks can also take advantage
of economies of scale and compete more efficiently.
Merged banks can eliminate duplicative departments.
Combining capital-intensive operations such as data
processing will also help banks to operate more
efficiently. Larger banks are able to raise funds at lower
interest rates.
Considerations such as those outlined above serve to
lower the cost of banking for consumers and to increase
the range of available services. Therefore we would
expect to experience lower service fees, increased loan
availability, and increased convenience. Also, large
national banks can better serve corporate customers
whose executives travel frequently or who have many
nationally dispersed offices or plants. In short, a
national banking system can better serve the
consumers.
Decreased Failures
Promoting growth at the national level is also
justified for the simple reason that stronger banks are
usually less likely to fail. Regional banks in the
Midwest will continue to hold loan and deposit
portfolios that are heavily balanced towards agriculture
and heavy manufacturing. These industries are
experiencing serious problems of their own that feed
back into the local banking system. An Illinois bank
that could also do business in, for example, the
"high-tech" corridors of Boston is more likely to
weather a regional recession. Also, smaller individual
banks may find it more profitable to sell to a national
holding company rather than to face increased
competition, leading banks that might fail on their own
to merge while they are still financially healthy. Thus
national branch banking can increase confidence in
Illinois banks by making them stronger.
Because the argument in favor of national branch
banking is so strong, many analysts view this as the
next step after regional banking becomes common.
However, it is unlikely that the legislation providing
for branch banking will be passed by Congress. Instead,
national banking will spread as individual states pass
reciprocal laws allowing it (as some have already done).
Illinois needs to be among the first to take that next
step by allowing banks outside the Midwest to acquire
Illinois banks if their states have reciprocal laws.
National banking provides increased services more
efficiently and strengthens the banking system. With
the number of bank failures rivaling the number that
occurred during the Great Depression, the benefits of
national banking cannot be taken too lightly. For all
these reasons, Illinois should have national banking
now.
DAVID LEE
Illinois Leading Indicators
X. he outlook for the IlUnois economy is for slow and
steady growth over the next two quarters. This is the
conclusion drawn by the index of leading indicators
recently developed by the Bureau of Economic and
Business Research at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. Of course, no leading indicator
series, including the series constructed for the US
economy, can always make an accurate forecast of
swings in economic activity. However, careful
development of a leading indicator series at the state
level can lead to recognizable patterns in the series
behavior that are able to indicate when the Illinois
economy is about to change direction.
This article begins with a description of the
methodology used to construct a leading economic
indicator for Illinois. Next, adjustments made to the
series based on the concept of a moving average are
described, followed by the development of an algorithm
to determine if the leading indicator series is correctly
predicting turns in state economic activity. Finally, the
performance of the series is reviewed over a recent
24-month period.
Construction of the Leading Indicator Series
The leading economic mdicator is constructed in a
manner similar to that employed by the US Commerce
Department in compiling the national leading indicator
index as described in the Handbook of Cyclical
Indicators. However, state economies are subject to a
number of influences that are not found at the national
level. For example, the Illinois economy has
agricultural activity as a higher percentage of its
economy than does the nation as a whole. For this
reason, the components of a leading economic index
constructed on a statewide basis are necessarily
different from those used in the national tabulation.
Each component of the Illinois leading economic
indicator series was chosen on the basis of two
important factors. The first relates to the speed with
which data pertaining to the series are available; thus,
even if an economic series were to lead economic
activity perfectly, that series would be of little value if
it were available only after a substantial time lag.
Second, each series must lead economic activity both
in theory and by inspection to avoid problems of
spurious correlation. For example, if tuna sales led
Illinois economic activity with a perfect three-period
span, that series would be rejected as a component of
the overall index because there would be no theoretical
justification for its inclusion.
With these considerations in mind, the following
monthly series were selected as the components used
to calculate the leading indicator index for Illinois:
average hours of durable manufacturing employment,
building permits, initial claims for unemployment,
income tax receipts (a proxy for personal income), sales
tax receipts (a proxy for retail sales), Chicago vendor
performance (percent of vendors reporting slower
deliveries), and the help wanted indexes for Chicago
and St. Louis. The data were seasonally adjusted using
the X-Il Arima seasonal adjustment routine and
transformed into an index (1972:1 = 100). After
percentage changes in these indexes were calculated, a
final series of components was generated by dividing
the percent change by the average percentage change
for each series. This was done to avoid series with high
degrees of fluctuation from dominating the overall
index. Finally, a composite index was constructed from
an unweighted average of the eight individual
components. This index and its components are
illustrated in Charts 1-3 for January 1980 through June
1986.
Chart 1.
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Chart 4.
Adjustments to the Series
By comparing the composite index to an index of total
Illinois nonagricultural employment, two observations
can be made (Chart 4). First, as calculated above the
composite index is extremely volatile. Second, this
index does in fact lead the four major turns in the
Illinois economy during the sample period (1972:1-
1 986:6). The economy experienced two peaks ( 1 974: 1
and 1979:8), and two troughs ( 1975: 10 and 1983:8) over
the time frame under study. However, the high degree
of series volatility makes changes in overall trends
difficult to assess. Therefore, the series is adjusted by
performing a three-period moving average in the overall
index. This series represents the final leading economic
indicator series for the Illinois economy (Chart 5).
Identifying Peaks and Troughs
The next step is to specify a rule that allows the
researcher to distinguish between changes in series
trends that are short-lived as opposed to those that
represent a turning point in the overall trend. An
example of rules similar to this but somewhat different
in application are the rules used by analysts who chart
stock market activity. These people recognize that
various patterns in the historical price of a stock can
indicate a major change in the movement in the stock's
price. For instance, the third dip in a stock's price may
signal a prolonged fall in the price while a break through
the 26-week high could signal of a rising price.
Application of these principles to the leading indicator
series represents a method for determinmg changes in
the series overall trend, which in turn will signal major
changes in future economic activity.
. Non-agricultural
Employment Index
Composite Index
Source: Nonagricultural Employment Index—US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and Bureau of Economic and Business Researcfi, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
The methodology for selecting a rule that will
indicate changes in economic activity is based on a
simple statistical property of a moving average.
Specifically, it is a fact that as the number of periods
included in a moving average of an increasing series is
increased, the value of the averaged series relative to
the value of a moving average series with fewer periods
will decrease. Hence, a four-period moving average will
always lie below a two-period moving average for an
increasing series. Similarly, the value of a moving
average series will increase as the number of periods
included in the average increases when the series is
decreasing. Thus, a four-period moving average will lie
above a two-period moving average if the series is in
decline. Finally, Vkflien the series changes direction, it
must be the case that moving averages of different
lengths must cross, and it is the identification of these
crossing points that will constitute the rule for change
in the trend of the series.
Unfortunately, the procedure outlined above is not
so simple if applied to the leading indicator series
because of the fluctuations that remain in the series
even after smoothing with a three-period moving
average. Such variation results in brief periods of time
in which the series is in decline even though the overall
trend of the series is increasing. Furthermore, the series
may increase for a few periods while the general trend
of the series is waning. The problem is that such periods
cause moving averaged series of different duration to
cross even if the overall trend of the series has not
changed. Thus, the task is to determine the number of
periods to include in the moving average so as to
eliminate or minimize the number of false signals
emitted concerning turns in the general trend of the
series.
Chart 6.
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Urbana-Champaign.
After examining numerous combinations of moving
averages, the rule selected for the Illinois leading
economic indicator series is as follows: If the
three-month moving average series rises above or falls
below the six-month moving average series for four
consecutive months, then the leading indicator series
is communicating a major change in economic activity
(Chart 6). This particular rule for determining changes
in economic performance was chosen because it
represents a simple algorithm for determining such
changes, and because it did not send incorrect signals
about up-turns or down-turns in the state economy over
the sample period. However, the accuracy of such a rule
is hindered by the fact that only four turns occurred
during the sample period. With such a low number of
observations, any rule must be suspect.
Behavior of Index: January 1984 to June 1986
The 30-month span from January 1 984 to June 1 986
yields a particularly interesting illustration of the
behavior of the leading economic indicator series (Chart
7). For the first eight months of 1984, the series
continued to increase, corresponding to a simultaneous
increase in the index of nonagricultural employment.
However, the series took a dramatic five-month plunge
beginning in September 1984, indicating that
recessionary pressures were on the horizon for the
IlUnois economy. In April of 1985, this prediction
turned out to be correct as the employment index began
to decline over the next two months. Therefore, the
leading indicator index had correctly anticipated the
economic downturn with a lag of seven months.
The more recent history of the leading economic
indicator series is less certain than that of previous
months. The series increased for the first four months
of 1985, while staying above the six-month moving
average for only three periods, signaling the potential
for an economic upswing. As implied, the economy did
in fact offer a slight rebound beginning in June of 1985.
Unfortunately, the leading economic indicator series
again began to dip in May 1985 and remained below
the six-month moving average for seven months. This
development signals a minor decline in Illinois
economic activity beginning somewhere in the last half
of 1 986. This corresponds to many predictions made by
economists before the drop in oil prices in the first part
of 1986. However, December of 1985 showed a marked
improvement in the index, and a continued increase in
the index for the first six months of 1986 suggests that
the predicted downturn may never materialize. Instead,
the index seems to indicate slow steady growth in
economic activity over the next two quarters.
Conclusion
There are a number of problems with this
formulation of the leading indicator series. First, the
series is constructed on the basis of a simple average
compared to the weighted-average method employed
by the Commerce Department. However, such a
weighting scheme, based on a somewhat arbitrary
method of "scoring" component performance, is not a
major improvement over a method using only a simple
average. A second problem with the leading indicator
series is that the lead times are not very consistent over
the study period. For example, the series leads the
downturn in the economy beginning in 1974:5 by 14
months, yet it leads the recovery which began in
1975:10 by only 6 months. This is a serious problem
that does not have an easy solution. In fact, the
Commerce Department does not indicate the period by
which the US series leads the national economy.
However, the series described here does present a
method of quantifying predicted changes in the state
economy based on the performance of several key
components of the Illinois economy.
JAMES R. FREW and G. DONALD JUD
Real Estate Brokerage Franchises:
What Are Their Value?
In recent years, many real estate brokerage firms have
chosen to affiliate with national or regional franchise
organizations. The Department of Commerce
estimates that there were some 15,413 franchisee-
owned real estate brokerage firms in the United States
in 1 98 1 . Franchise affiliates made up about 30 percent
of all real estate brokerage establishments, and they
had gross commissions totaling more than $3.2 billion
in 1981. Commission income received by franchise
firms grew 15.3 percent during 1981-83, while the
number of franchise brokerage establishments
increased 13.2 percent.
In the brokerage industry as elsewhere, franchising
involves the sharing of intangible capital such as
trademarks and goodwill between the franchisor and
his franchisee. This kind of sharing often evolves
because of a divergence between the scale of operation
most efficient for promoting and advertising a brand or
trademark and the scale of operation most efficient in
the actual production of the product or service.
In the real estate industry, national trademarks or
brand names are useful to consumers because it is
difficult for buyers and sellers who are unfamiliar with
a local housing market to obtain information on the
quality of services available from local brokers. Instead
of trying to gather information on their own, many
buyers and sellers rely on a national trademark as a
guarantee of minimum quality of service.
A survey conducted by the National Association of
Realtors in 1 980 revealed that 78 percent of respondents
felt that "reputation of agent or firm" was very
important in selecting a real estate agent. In contrast,
only 28 percent listed the "commission or fee" charged
by the broker as being very important.
Recognition of the importance of "reputation" to
consumer choice in the brokerage industry suggests
why brokerage trademarks manufactured through
national advertising may yield significant economic
benefits. The National Association of Realtors has for
many years sought to establish "Realtor" as a brokerage
trademark. More recently, as federal antitrust decisions
have curtailed the ability of realtors to continue their
traditionally exclusionary practices, some individual
brokers have formed associations to jointly promote
themselves on a metropolitan or regional basis.
The value of a franchise affiliation or trademark to
an individual real estate broker depends on the quality
it "guarantees" to buyers and sellers. The promise of
quality service to consumers is promoted by the
franchisor through advertising and must be maintained
through proper monitoring of the operations of
franchise affiliates. For a franchise affiliation to have
value over time, the franchisor must continue to
advertise and to police the operations of the franchisees.
When a real estate broker buys into a franchise, he
purchases the promise of the franchisor of the future
value of franchise affiliation. Because future value to
the broker depends on future actions by the franchisor,
the broker (or any franchisee) usually will have a
healthy skepticism about the worth of affiliation. The
franchisor normally will not be able to get the broker
to agree to pay a single, lump sum up front. Instead,
payment for affiliation usually consists of some
up-front charge plus a royalty fee collected as a
percentage of sales. In this way, payments to the
franchisor are linked to the future success of the
franchisee, which in turn depends in part on the actions
of the franchisor. In essence, the broker and the
franchisor become partners in a joint enterprise, and
each shares in the future profits of that enterprise. The
franchisor usually will insist that the royalty fee be
calculated on the basis of sales (or total revenue) rather
than profits. This arrangement gives the broker
(franchisee) the correct incentive to be efficient in the
operation of those aspects of the enterprise that are
under the broker's direct control.
We examined the impact of franchise affiliation on
the operations of real estate brokerage firms in a recent
article in the AREUEA Journal. ("The Value of a Real
Estate Franchise," Vol. 14 (Summer 1986), pp. 374-83.)
The following sections provide a summary of that
article.
Franchise Affiliation is More Prevalent in Areas of
Rapid Growth
A real estate franchise provides assurance of
minimum quality to persons who must operate in a
unfamiliar market setting. The greater the number of
such persons in a local market, the more firms in that
market are likely to choose to be franchise affiliated.
An analogous situation is eating establishments along
an interstate highway. Because most travelers on the
highway are unfamiliar with local restaurants, it is
usually advantageous for a restaurateur to affiliate with
a franchise.
A similar situation exists in the real estate brokerage
industry. In rapidly growing areas of the country, a large
number of home buyers are recent inmigrants from
outside the local area who are generally unfamiliar with
the local housing market and have limited time to
devote to searching because of the pressures of
employment transfer. It is natural for such buyers to
be drawn to a national franchise or trademark, and thus
we can expect franchise affiliation among brokers in
these areas to be more prevalent.
We found this to be the case when we looked at the
fraction of real estate brokerage firms that were
franchise affiliated in each of the 50 states. We found
a significant positive correlation between the fraction
of firms franchise affiliated and the rate of state
population growth. This correlation suggests to us that
franchise affiliation is more profitable for brokerage
firms located in areas of rapid growth, where there is a
substantial influx of buyers from outside the area.
Franchise Members Sell Higher-Priced Listings
If franchise affiliation provides prospective buyers
with quality assurance, member brokers may attract
those who wish to buy higher-priced listings. Of course,
all agencies compete to assist these buyers, and since
brokerage fees are typically a "percentage" of the sales
price, selling more valuable property yields larger sales
commissions. But such sales are particularly desirable
to franchised agencies because association with them
gives tangible support to the "quality image" that
franchise membership is designed to enhance. Thus,
affiliates should be eager to capitalize on any advantage
expensive homebuyers perceive exists in enlisting their
assistance, and greater quality assurance may give them
the competitive edge they need over independent
agencies.
To test this hypothesis, the average asking price of
homes sold by franchise affiliates in Greensboro, North
Carolina in 1979 was compared to that of independents.
The average of 487 franchise sales was $44,152, while
that of 446 independent sales was $41,727. A t-test
revealed that the franchise group's average was
significantly higher at the 95 percent (one-tailed test)
confidence level. To be sure that this indicated a higher
true market value rather than simply higher asking
prices, actual sales prices of the properties sold by the
two groups were also compared. Again, the franchise
average ($43,142) was significantly higher than the
independent's ($40,906) at the 95 percent confidence
level.
These differences indicate to us that franchised firms
attract a somewhat different mix of customers than
nonaffiliated firms. Part of this difference stems from
the fact that franchised firms attract more buyers who
are moving in from out of town. In Greensboro, out of
town homebuyers moving in from the North and East
tend to have higher incomes and to spend more on
housing than do resident buyers.
Franchise Affiliation Increases Brokerage Sales
To quantify the value of franchise membership, we
conducted a survey of brokerage firms in three North
Carolina cities (Charlotte, Greensboro, and Raleigh)
during 1982. Brokers were questioned about the
structure and operation of their businesses and their
attitudes toward real estate franchising.
All agencies in the three cities (that were listed in
the yellow pages) were surveyed, and responses were
obtained from over 50 percent of them, a very high
percentage for a survey requesting information of such
strategic importance to competitors. This high a
response rate minimized one important source of
estimation error: sample bias. To further reduce such
bias, firms who indicated that they did not consider
residential real estate sales their main specialty were
removed from the sample. Eighty-four responses
remained; 21 percent of these (18) reported that they
were affiliated with a franchise.
Comparison of the experience levels between the two
groups revealed little difference, but franchised firms
did have somewhat larger staffs who possessed different
amounts of experience. Large differences were reported
in sales. Franchise affiliates reported an average of $4.5
million in sales.
To determine what portion of the difference in
average sales to attribute to the franchise membership,
rather than differences in other characteristics, a
regression equation was estimated. The regression
equation statistically held constant other factors that
also affect sales, such as, size of the firm's sales force,
broker and staff experience, and so on. The analysis
revealed that brokerage firms affiliated with national
franchises had substantially higher sales than
nonaffiliated firms. For the average firm in the sample,
franchise affiliation appeared to add about $930,000 to
firm sales.
Affiliated Firms Share Gains with National Franchisers
In the brokerage firm survey, franchise firms were
questioned regarding the cost of franchise affiliation.
The 15 firms affiliated with national franchises
reported the following average costs associated with
their franchises:
1. Initial Fee $4,000
2. Royalty on Gross Commissions Earned 3%
3. Advertising Fee, Collected on Gross
Commission 2%
To calculate an average benefit-cost ratio for
franchise membership, information on the average
commission rate charged on home sales and the normal
commission split was required. Talks with local
realtors indicated that the average rate charged on
residential sales was about 6 percent. Of this, there was
usually a 50-50 split between the listing and selling
agents. If the salesperson who sold the property was
employed by the listing agency, he (she) usually
received 25 percent of the total commission, or about
1.5 percent of the sales price.
If the franchise firm is not the listing agency, the firm
would normally receive half of the 6 percent
commission, or 3 percent of the sales price. Of this, the
franchise broker would pay his salesman one-half of
what the firm received, or 1 .5 percent of the sales price
as a sales commission.
Our previous analysis indicated that the average
broker received an additional $930,000 in sales because
of franchise affiliation. Assuming that he is not (also)
the listing agent for these sales, he would retain 1.5
percent of the additional sales, or about $13,950 after
he paid his salesman.
The average firm affiliated with a national franchise
had $5.3 million in sales. The 3 percent royalty fee plus
the 2 percent advertising fee would be collected from
this $5.3 million in sales. Assuming that the franchise
firm was not the listing agency on any of these sales,
the firm would receive gross commissions totaling 3
percent of sales, or some $159,000. Of this the firm
would be required to pay $7,950 in royalty and
advertising fees to the national franchise organization.
The cost of the franchise also includes the interest
on the initial franchise fee. Assuming an interest rate
of 10 percent, this would amount to $400. Adding this
to the annual fees, the total annual cost of franchise
affiliation for the average firm in the sample was
estimated to be $8,350, so the net value ofmembership
was $5,600 (that is, $13,942 - $8,350 = $5,600).
These calculations suggest that the average franchise
broker receives a portion of the profits created by the
national franchise trademark. Because they receive a
net benefit from franchise affiliation, it is to be expected
that franchise affiliates would support the franchise
arrangement. As expected, the survey also found that
opinions of franchising expressed by brokers affiliated
with a national franchise were favorable. Of national
affiliates, 60 percent agreed with the statement that
"franchise affiliation offers greater profit potential."
Ninety-three percent agreed that "franchising enhances
the competitive ability of the firm." Only 13 percent
reported that they planned not to continue their
affiliation with their national franchise.
The opinions of affiliates were found to accord with
other evidence. On balance, franchise affiliation in the
real estate brokerage industry seems to be beneficial
for the average affiliate because the franchisor appears
unable to extract the full value of the additional sales
that accrue to the affiliated broker because of the
franchise trademark.
fames R. Frew is on the faculty of the Department of
Economics. Willamette University, and G. Donald ]ud
teaches in the Department of Finance. University of North
Carolina at Greensboro.
ERRATUM: In the July 1986 Illinois Business Review we
mistakenly listed Arthur Getis's article, "Economic
Well-Being among Chicago's Suburbs, " as research funded by
the Office of Real Estate Research. This was not the case.
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Computer Crime:
The Crime of the Future is Here
O,' n 3 June 1986 the House of Representatives passed
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. This bill
makes the use of computers for certain cases of theft
or fraud a federal felony. It is intended to strengthen
states' efforts in combating computer crime and is
expected to be ratified in the Senate. It should be noted
that this bill comes after a computer crime bill passed
last year that makes it a felony to use a computer in a
way that might harm the national interest. The new
bill is more general.
Computer technology affects nearly everyone. There
are currently more than 200,000 computer centers in
the United States, and we are becoming increasingly
dependent on the computer. Total user spending on
data processing in the United States is expected to
increase from 2. 1 percent of GNP in 1 970 to 13 percent
in 1990.
With the advent of computer technology, there has
been an emergence of computer crime. A South African
jewelry company reported computer-based thefts worth
$3.5 million in August of 1983. A group of youths in
Milwaukee penetrated the computerized radiation-
therapy records of cancer patients m a Manhattan
hospital last summer. When hospital authorities
ordered the youths to stop tampering with their
computer system, one youth responded that he and his
friends "would be stopped in a couple of years by
technological improvements in the computer
systems." Although computer crime is now common,
much remains to be known about the subject. Experts
disagree on many aspects of the issue, ranging from
how to define computer crime to its prevalence.
Defining Computer Crime
Some experts do not think that computer crime
deserves attention as a separate category.
According to this view, computers are merely an
up-dated means to commit old crimes. If someone
steals a personal computer from a university, this crime
can be accurately classified as theft. Misuse of company
funds through the use of a computer can be termed
embezzlement. Hence, some people feel that the term
crime by computer is more appropriate than computer
crime.
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Others suggest that there are a number characteristics
of computer crime that distinguish it from other types
of crime. For example, the losses due to a computer
crime are generally larger than the losses associated
with other crimes. The technology associated with the
computer at present also makes it difficult to detect
most computer crimes. In fact, most computer crimes
are discovered by accident. Even when a computer
crime is detected, it often goes unreported. Figures on
computer crime are understated due to the problem of
detection and a number of other factors. For example,
victims of computer crime often fear a loss of public
confidence. Also, since proof of the crime is difficult to
assemble, there is a heightened risk of false-arrest
charges. Some people also feel that the publicity about
computer crimes will lead others to try similar things.
Another aspect of computer crime that distinguishes it
from other types of crime is the difficulty of
prosecution. Lawmakers in one-half of the states have
only recently enacted laws dealing specifically with
computer crime.
Four major categories of computer crime have been
identified: introduction of fraudulent records or data
into a computer system, unauthorized use of
computer-related facilities, alteration or destruction of
computerized information or files, and theft by
electronic or other means of money, "financial
instruments," such as checks and credit cards, and
"valuable data" such as computer programs in
machine- or human-readable form.
A number of specialists have attempted to examine
the extent of computer crime in our society, but since
the experts do not agree on exactly what computer
crime is, their studies must be interpreted in light of
their varying definitions.
A US General Accounting Office (GAO) study defines
computer-related crimes as "acts of intentionally
caused losses to the Government or personal gains to
individuals related to the design, use or operation of
the system in which they are committed." The GAO
study gathered data from 10 federal investigative
agencies. Sixty-nine cases of computer crime were
uncovered. The average and median loss caused were
found to be $44,110 and $6,749 respectively.
Donn Parker, who conducted a study at Stanford
Research Institute (SRI|, defines computer abuse as
"any incident associated with computer technology in
which a victim suffered or could have suffered loss and
a perpetrator by intention made or could have made
gain." The data for this study were from a variety of
sources, and according to John Taber, only 77 of the
375 cases used in the study were verified. In this study
the average loss due to computer crime was $450,000,
10 times the GAO estimate. The discrepancy could be
a result of the different definitions of computer crime
used in each study and the type of cases analyzed. The
GAO study focused only on computer crime in the
federal government, while the SRI study included the
private sector.
A study by Brandt Allen used a more strict definition
of computer crime than Donn Parker's. In his study, he
divided the SRI data into four groups and estimated the
average loss in each category. The resulting average
losses per category were as follows:
1. Cases committed in corporations $621,000
2. Cases committed in banks and
savings and loans $193,000
3. Cases committed in state and local
government $329,000
4. Cases committed in federal
government $45,000
When the SRI data were divided, losses as a result of
computer crime in the federal government were
consistent with the GAO estimates. It is important to
realize, however, that the results of these studies are
based on data of reported computer crimes. Actual
losses may have been quite different from what these
figures suggest.
Protection against Computer Crime
Increased computer security is one means of
deterring computer crime. In the past, computer
systems were designed for easy use by people with
limited computer experience. Computer systems that
are easily accessible by first-time users are said to be
user-friendly. There is a trade-off between increased
computer security and the degree to which a computer
is user-friendly. In general, if a system is user-friendly
it is also vulnerable to unauthorized use. For example,
computer networks such as Telenet and Tymshare, rent
time on a host computer to numbers of users
throughout the nation, and easy access is a key feature
of the systems. Floyd Trogdan, head of network services
at Telenet states, "We have a public network; it needs
to be user-friendly. Would we consider making it harder
to penetrate ? We might. But you have to recognize that
we provide a service and that the general customer
wants easy access."
The move to increased computer security has lagged
behind the times according to many experts. According
to Geoffrey Goodfellow, a computer security researcher
at SRI, "I don't think that most people are taking
reasonable and prudent measures to protect their
computer systems." Martin Hellman, a computer
scientist at Stanford University, reinforced this belief:
"It's terribly unethical for computer centers and
networks to have the low level of security that they do.
It's like leaving the keys in the ignition of an unlocked
car."
Most cases involving unauthorized access of the
University of Illinois computer (that is, theft of
computer funds) are due to user carelessness, although
the university system has a number of checks and
safeguards to protect computer funds. For example,
audit trails are built into the system. In addition,
whenever anyone uses the computer system a message
appears at the beginning of the computer session giving
the last time he or she used the computer. If the time
given does not seem to be accurate, this could signal
unauthorized use of the system. It is ultimately the
responsibility of the user to attempt to prevent
unauthorized access. The message informing the user
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of the last recorded computer session is useless if
ignored, or if signon information is left in public.
(Signon information consists of an individual's social
security number, their password, and billing
information. This information must be entered on the
computer before using the system.)
Increased computer security is a first step toward
deterrence, but it cannot reduce computer crime to
zero. As Donn Parker puts it, "With even the most
advanced computer systems, there is no known
practical way of protecting user organizations if
penetrators have sufficient skill, knowledge, access,
and resources." Although increased computer security
cannot totally eliminate computer crime, experts have
agreed on a number of steps that can be taken to reduce
the likelihood of its occurrence. Steps identified by the
American Society for Industrial Security are as follows:
1. Separation of knowledge through the division of
responsibilities, job rotation, physical isolation,
controlled access, and logging of stoppages and
interruptions.
2. Written programming instructions with threat
monitoring and audit trails built in.
3. Careful accounting of all input documents.
4. Periodic changes in access codes and passwords.
5. Scramblers and cryptographic applications in data
transmission.
Another means by which computer owners can
protect themselves from losses is through the purchase
of insurance against computer crime. Insurance
provides a very significant risk management option
beyond practicing loss prevention procedures.
Approximately 20 million electronic-crime policies
had been sold as of October 1983. Coverage varies
among insurers. With the increase in cases reported in
the news recently, demand for computer crime
coverage has increased. The dollar amount of policies
is expected to reach 1 00 million in the next three years.
The Need for Computer Crime Legislation
In addition to increased computer security, some
experts feel that special computer crime legislation is
needed to deter would-be computer criminals. Reasons
cited for the need for special computer crime laws
include:
1
.
The current lack of security in computer systems.
2. The difficulty of prosecution under laws that do
not deal specifically with computer crime.
3. The need to alert the general public, and computer
users in particular, to the risks of computer crime and
awaken them from their false sense of security.
One of the difficulties in prosecution under laws not
specifically dealing with computers lies in the
definition of property. For example, in Lund vs.
Commonwealth of Virginia, the Virginia Supreme
Court decided that the taking of computer time and
services in the form of prmtouts did not constitute
larceny. The subject matter of larceny must be goods
and chattels. The court found that computer time and
services were not goods or chattels even though their
taking represented a loss to the rightful owners.
Currently, one half of the states have computer crime
laws. Florida, in 1978, was the first state to adopt this
type of legislation. In 1 979, Illinois joined a number of
other states in enacting a law against computer crime.
According to the Illinois law, a person commits
unlawful use of a computer when he or she:
1
.
Knowingly obtains the use of a computer system,
or any part thereof, without the consent of the owner; or
2. Knowingly alters or destroys computer programs
or data without the consent of the owner; or
3. Knowingly obtains use of, alters or destroys a
computer system, or any part thereof, as part of a
deception for the purpose of obtaining money, property,
or services from the owner of a computer system or any
third party.
The sentences under this law range from a petty
offense to a Class 4 felony, depending on the violation
and the value of the loss incurred. Penalties range from
less than $500 to a maximum of $ 1 0,000 and three years
in jail. The Illinois law, like many other state laws,
does not require that the victim take reasonable care
in protecting their system from harm. A contributory
negligence standard has not been adopted. In addition,
individuals are not required to report a computer crime
that they have witnessed. Thus, reliable data on the
extent of computer crime will still be lacking. As of
the beginning of 1984, no cases were tried under the
Illinois computer crime law in an appellate court. This
is not surprising, however, given that the law has only
been in effect for five years.
State laws do not apply to computer crime offenses
involving interstate and foreign commerce. In these
cases, prosecution under federal law is necessary. A
federal computer crime bill was first introduced in
1977, and since this time it has undergone a number
of revisions.
Conclusion
Experts disagree on whether computer crime is a
serious problem. According to Donn Parker, "the only
safe computer is one that's not used. " In contrast, John
Taber feels that "computer crime is insignificant...
computers should minimize the incidence of crimes
such as fraud and embezzlement". A recent survey by
the American Bar Association, however, lent support
to the belief that computer crime deserves increased
attention. The survey indicated that almost one-half of
the respondents had been victims of electronic
lawlessness in the preceding year. Twenty-five percent
claimed that their losses ranged from $2 to $ 10 million
yearly. In addition, several unique characteristics of
computer crime distinguish it from conventional
crime. Advanced technology has brought the crime of
the future to the present.
Carolyn Woj is a graduate student in economics at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Cbampaign. and is a former
member of the Bureau of Economic and Business Research
staff
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Illinois Business Indexes
T h^is issue of the Illinois Business /Review highhghts
consumer price indexes. Six graphs are presented for
the five North Central US indexes in addition to the
Chicago, lUinois CPI. These six graphs, rather than
showing index levels, shov^f bimonthly percentage
changes except for the Chicago CPI, which shows
monthly percentage changes.
The five North Central indexes show declines for
February and April. The Chicago index also shows a
decline for roughly the same period. Even more
important, these are the first significant monthly
declines in the indexes for several years. For example,
the Chicago and North Central indexes last fell at the
end of 1 984. However, these were very slight declines.
The North Central index (population greater than
1,250,000) last fell in December 1984 but only by .12
percent. In its ten year existence the North Central
index (population 385,000 to 1,250,000) had never
declined prior to August 1985. The North Central index
(population 75,000 to 385,000) had only declined twice
prior to August 1985. The index fell by .48 percent in
December 1984 and by .26 percent in February 1983.
The North Central index (population less than 75,000)
had not fallen significantly since December of 1982
when it fell by 1.4 percent.
Illinois Business Indexes
Changes in Various Consumer Price
Indexes (monthly for Chicago, for all others,
bimonthly)
Chicago (1967 = 100)
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WILLIAM R. BRYAN AND DEBORAH MUSTELL
The Rise and Fall of the Dollar
X he tremendous rise in the value of the dollar in the
early 1980s and its subsequent fall have elicited
consternation from leaders in the United States and
abroad. The dollar's rise began in mid- 1 980 and
continued until 1 985, increasing about 63 percent on a
trade-Vk'eighted basis (see Chart I). Following this
increase, there has been a marked depreciation of the
dollar, a decline of 22 percent.
This article presents a discussion of theory and
contemporary facts relating to exchange-rates. First,
there is a discussion of the theory of exchange rate
determination. Next, the explanatory power of the
theory is evaluated during two recent periods, one when
the dollar was increasing, the other when the dollar
was falling. Following this, the costs of an over-valued
dollar are discussed from the viewpoints of the United
States and of the world. Finally, there is a discussion
of the adverse effects of a "too rapid" fall of the dollar.
Exchange Rate Theory
An exchange rate is simply the price of a foreign
currency. In evaluating the supply and demand factors
affecting the domestic price of a foreign currency, it is
not surprising that important characteristics of a
domestic economy are compared to corresponding
characteristics in foreign economies. The characteris-
tics toward which attention is focused typically include
income growth, money growth, inflation rates, and
interest rates.
Unfortunately, exchange rate theories are not
unambiguous in their specification of the way these
characteristics affect the domestic prices of foreign
currencies. Higher rates of income growth in the United
States could either increase or decrease the value of the
dollar. For example, if US income growth is high,
American investors may tend to retain funds in US
markets to finance expanding expenditures. Otherwise,
those funds might have moved to foreign markets. As
a consequence of the reduced demand for foreign
currencies, the value of the dollar in terms of foreign
currency will tend to increase.
Alternatively, rapid income growth in the US is likely
to induce American consumers and businesses to
demand more goods, including imported goods. Thus,
for example, to pay for Japanese imports we must buy
yen with dollars, thereby decreasing the value of the
dollar relative to the yen.
There is similar ambiguity in the impact of monetary
growth on exchange rates. One view emphasizes the
prompt effect on the domestic price level of higher
domestic money growth. It is argued that rapid
monetary growth will lead—via increased domestic
inflation—to a decreased value of the dollar in terms
of foreign currencies. An alternative view emphasizes
the impact on interest rates of an increase in the money
supply. According to this argument, rapid monetary
expansion will lead to decreases in domestic interest
rates. As a result, higher capital investment will be
fostered. By virtue of increased capital expenditures,
there will be greater productivity, lower domestic
prices, and, at length, a higher dollar. Note that in either
view the effect of money on exchange rates operates
through money's impact on the price level.
Chart 1.
"MERM IS the International Monetary Fund's muiiilateral exchange rate model used
to derive the weights for calculating an effective, oi trade-weighted, exchange rate
Source: International Monetary Fund dati tapes and International Financial Stansttcs,
various issues; University of Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research.
Relative inflation rates, as indicated, are regarded as
a major determinant of the value of a currency.
Importers and exporters maintain a condition referred
to as purchasing power parity. If inflation in the United
States is higher than in a certain given foreign country,
a foreign importer of US goods would find it necessary
to pay more and more to acquire the same quantity of
US goods. If there were no inflation, or slower inflation,
in the foreign country, domestic goods would become
increasingly attractive. They would reduce their
imports. But if the price of the dollar in terms of the
foreign currency depreciated in value equal to the US
inflation rate (or, to be more precise, to the differential
in the inflation rates), prices on foreign goods would
not show a relative decline.
Finally, interest rate differentials are an often-dis-
cussed determinant of exchange rates. It is thought that
the main impact of interest rate differentials is on
financial flows into and out of the United States. If, for
example, the rate on US three-month Treasury Bills is
greater than the rate on comparable securities
denominated in three-month sterling, it might be
advantageous for a British investor to exchange pounds
for dollars and then buy the US T-Bill. Assuming no
change in the pound/dollar exchange rate over the three
months, the British investor could collect interest paid
in dollars, then repatriate to pounds. As long as an
investor need not concern himself with future declines
in the price of dollars in terms of pounds, there is an
incentive to move funds abroad. If the interest rate
differential between the US and Britain is greater than
the expected decline in the pound price of dollars over
the length of the asset, the British investor will choose
the US financial assets.
It is possible to buy and sell foreign currencies for
future delivery. Continuing the example discussed
above, it is possible, and common, for a British investor
to buy pounds (sell dollars] for delivery to him at the
time the US Treasury bills mature. If he does this he
will have locked in the price at which he repatriates
his dollars into pounds. But as more and more British
investors take this precaution, the price of future
pounds is driven higher. As a practical matter, the dollar
price of pounds in the futures market will rise to remove
the advantage to the British investor associated with
the interest rate differential. To the extent that
expected depreciation equals the interest rate
differential, there is covered interest parity.
Theory vs. Evidence
It is of interest to review experience with a view
toward explaining major changes in the price of the
dollar during selected periods from 1975 to mid-1986.
As suggested earlier, two major movements literally
leap out from Chart 1. These consist of the very
Chart 2.
Chart 3.
'In this chart and charts 3-5, the weights were derived by dividing average trade volume
in each country by the total average trade volume of these tive countries- Inflation is
measured by quarterly, year-over-year changes in the Consumer Pnce Index
5outce: International Monetary Fund data tapes and Internationijl Financial Statistics.
various issues; University of Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research.
'Money market rate for France, Germany, Italy, Japan; Treasury bill rate for the United
Kingdom, the United States. These rates were weighted as descnbed for Chan 2.
Source: International Monetary Fund data tapes and International Financial Statistics.
various issues; University of Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research.
substantial upward movement from 1 980 to early 1985,
and the subsequent sharp decline. Each of these periods
is discussed with an eye towards evaluating the
contributions of the quantifiable determinants
discussed above.
Chart 2 shows the inflation rate in the United States
minus the average of inflation rates of the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan (weighted
by each country's proportion of the total average trade
volume of these countries). Beginning in the 1979-1980
period, the differential between US and foreign inflation
began to decline. By mid- 1981, inflation in the US was
lower than the inflation rates of these five countries.
As theory would suggest, the decrease in this
differential was accompanied by an increase in the
value of the dollar (see Chart 1 ). The US inflation rate
differential was at its maximum advantage in early
1983.
The facts relating to inflation rate differentials are
not quite so kind in explaining the abrupt fall in the
value of the dollar in early 1985 nor the continued sharp
decline into early 1986. There was a marked narrowing
in inflation differentials from mid- 1983 to mid- 1984,
but the price of dollars did not begin to decline until
six months later. Inflation in the United States has
remained low relative to the weighted average of these
other economies, and has been stable since 1985. Even
so, the dollar has continued its downward trend. In
short, it is difficult to argue that this variable accounts
for recent changes in the US exchange rate.
Chart 3 shows US short-term interest rates minus
the short-term interest rates of the five countries
studied (weighted as described above). During the
1979-1983 period, the inflation rate was falling relative
to the rates of these major economies. The differential
between US and foreign interest rates remained
generally positive, fluctuating around zero. As a
consequence, the differential between real interest
rates—nominal interest rates minus inflation—rose
from a generally negative position in the 1 978 to early
1980 period to a generally positive position after late
1980. Chart 4 presents this v^^eighted real interest rate
differential. For the 1981-1985 period, real interest
rates in the United States were higher than those
abroad. Such a situation is consistent wfith enhanced
foreign investment in US financial assets and a strong
demand for the dollar. Again, reference to Chart 1
shows that the value of the dollar did increase as our
interest rates (nominal and real) remained relatively
high.
Interest differentials, both nominal and real, have
fluctuated downward since mid- 1984 and mid- 1983,
respectively. Neither of these declines coincides with
the turn-around in US exchange rates.
Finally, beginning with the economic recovery in
1983, real income growth in the United States began
rising relative to that of the five major economies
studied here. Chart 5 presents the change in real GNP
in the United States minus the weighted real growth
rates in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy,
and Japan. The last upswing has been faster and more
sustained than recovery in these countries, as shown
by the positive real growth differentials. Improved
domestic investment opportunities associated with the
higher relative income growth in the United States may
have served to divert funds away from foreign
investment. In addition, foreign investors may have
been attracted to a high-growth US economy. In
combination, such factors contribute to an increase in
the value of the dollar. As will be discussed later, the
shift of funds to the United States on capital account
is necessarily associated with a deterioration of the US
trade balance.
There are determinants of exchange rates that are not
readily quantifiable. During 1984, the value of the
dollar remained high even though most of the
differentials mentioned earlier had fallen. This
Chart 4.
Chart 5.
'Real interest rates were calculated by subtracung inflatiotl las measured lor Chart 21
from the short- term interest rates usedm Chan 3. These were weighted as described
for Chart 2.
Source: IntemationalMonetary Fund dataiape^ and International Financial Statistics.
various issues; University ol Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research-
'Real growth is the quanerly, year-over-year change in real income (1980= 100). GNP
and GNP data are seasonally adiusted annual rates. GNP used for Germany, lapan, and
the United States; GDP for France, Italy, the United Kingdom. These were weighted
as described in Chart 2.
Source: International Monetary Fund data tapes and International Financial Statistics.
various issues; University of Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research.
situation could have resulted from a perception that US
financial assets are less risky than those in other
countries. It is argued that the United States is widely
regarded as a safe haven—a no-risk place to invest funds.
Effects of an Overvalued Dollar
There is a view that the dollar has been overvalued
for many of the past several years. As Chart 6 shows,
US exports minus US imports as a percent of GNP
began falling more steeply after 1983 when the value
of the dollar kept increasing. Even while this was
occurring, it was argued that, at length, the value of the
dollar would fall. Indeed, it was argued that it would
fall as a consequence of this imbalance, thereby
increasing exports and decreasing US import demand.
If so, the process will have been self-correcting.
Nonetheless, there are real costs to our society of this
overvaluation. US industries that depend on foreign
demand or that compete with foreign substitutes—such
as agriculture, forestry products, mining, and many in
manufacturing— have experienced unemployment of
labor and capital equipment. Beyond that, foreign
competition has invaded US markets traditionally
dominated by domestic industry^such as autos. To
reemploy these resources is not costless. It requires
retraining of personnel, relocation of people and
machinery, refitting of equipment (if possible), and
construction of new equipment. The high unemploy-
ment experienced in the "Rust Belt" states of the upper
Midwest may have resulted, in part, from the high value
of the dollar.
There are beneficial aspects of a highly valued dollar.
A movement of funds into the US on capital account
can be diverted to several uses. Foreigners may invest
in short- or long-term financial assets—or, a capital
account inflow can take the form of long-term fixed
Chart 6A-6F.
'Expons, impons, and CNP or GDP are quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual
rates. Nominal GNP used for Germany, fapan, the United States; nominal GDP for
France, Italy, the United Kingdom.
Chart A. United States Chart D. Italy
Chart B. France Chart E. United Kingdom
5
Chart C. Germany
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Chart P. Japan
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investment. Such choices can have an important effect
on the future of the economy.
For example, if Japan uses the dollars it acquires from
its export surplus to build a new automobile plant in
the US, there will be an increase in this nation's
tangible capital stock, plant and equipment, albeit
Source- International Monetary Fund data tapes and International Financial Statistics.
various issues; University of Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research.
owned by foreigners. This will create new jobs to
produce goods, and thus benefit the US economy.
Further, if the Japanese investors decide to leave the
us market, they cannot just move the plant back to
Japan.
But, there is a view that much of the capital inflow
in recent years was used to finance the tederal budget
deficit. Some argue that foreign funds invested in such
debt can lead ultimately to problems. If, en masse,
foreigners subsequently decided they no longer wanted
to hold the Treasury Bills they could sell them in large
blocks, thereby driving the price of the Bills down and
yields up. It is important to point out that such
developments can affect any financial asset—common
stock, government or corporate bonds. Nor does who
does the buying or selling make much, or any,
difference. Any attempt by US citizens or noncitizens
to liquidate holdings of financial assets would have
similar effects on the market— prices would tend to
fall and yields would increase. In the end, all assets are
always held by someone; efforts to shift from them will
tend to drive prices down, and conversely. Regardless
of the source of the liquidation, the resulting increase
in interest rates can have adverse effects on the
economy.
In a somewhat different vein, it is argued that
problems will emerge when (if) the capital inflow slows
or stops. Following such a development, there will need
to be a time of austerity—by both the federal
government and consumers. It will be necessary to
repay the foreigners by exporting more than we are
importing, thereby reducing the future consumable
product of the United States. Presumably, to stretch
out the logic of this argument, we would be better off
to export more currently, thereby reducing the
consumable product now.
From a European or Japanese viewpoint a high dollar
can be regarded as desirable or undesirable, depending
upon the context within which it is considered. Because
more European or Japanese exports are demanded by
the United States, the economies of these countries are
stimulated. But many of their imports (especially
petroleum) are denominated in dollars. If the value of
the dollar is high, they must pay more of their currency
for the oil they import; thus, their inflation rate may
increase.
Effects of a Falling Dollar
Some have defined a "too rapid" fall of the dollar as
more than 10 percent in one year. The dollar has fallen
by about 22 percent on a trade- weighted basis since
early 1985, which worries policymakers in the US and
abroad for a number of reasons. First, a rapid decline in
the dollar could cause investors to lose confidence in
dollar- denominated assets. As discussed above, if that
happened and they sold these financial assets, interest
rates could be driven higher.
Pressing this argument further, it is suggested that
higher interest rates might tend to reduce fixed
investment and consumer demand, possibly
contributing to a recession in the United States.
Whatever the underlying merit of the argument, so far
these developments do not seem to have occurred.
Interest rates in the United States have not risen; they
have declined.
A second line of argument suggests that a rapidly
falling dollar could reignite US inflation as the cost of
imports increases, triggering increases in prices of
domestically produced goods competing with those
imports. This fear, too, does not yet seem to be borne
out. Inflation in the US has remained low.
Finally, and most important from the viewpoint of
our trading partners, a decline in the value of the dollar
is expected to bring about an eventual decrease in
demand for imports into the United States. As our trade
deficit falls—because of declining imports and rising
exports—our trade partners' corresponding trade
surpluses are expected to shrink. US demand for foreign
goods helps to keep the world economy growing, and a
decrease in this demand has a major impact on these
separate economies. Furthermore, many developing
countries have relied on trade surpluses with the
United States to finance external debts. With a fall in
the demand for their exports, these countries could
experience debt crises similar to those experienced by
other developing nations.
There is also a bright side to a lower dollar. As
indicated, it is anticipated that the United States will
import fewer goods and United States consumers will
demand domestically produced substitutes. At the
same time, the United States is expected to export more
as US prices become relatively cheaper to consumers
abroad. Such developments would tend to help national
income and employment. In contrast, protectionist
measures recently discussed in Congress are costly to
US consumers and foreign relations. Hopefully, such
pressures will wane as the dollar moves lower and US
industry becomes increasingly competitive.
Conclusion
This article has discussed alternative theories on the
behavior of exchange rates and has tested the ability of
those theories to explain economic events against the
experience of the 1980s. The exchange rate theory
sketched here is limited in its ability to explain the
empirical experience of the current decade. In part, the
weakness of the theories may lie in their exclusion of
unmeasurable factors affecting the value of the dollar.
Arguments were presented that marked and
sustained movements in exchange rates can be
detrimental to the economy. The transition costs of
pronounced and prolonged movements in exchange
rates force difficult adjustments on various sectors of
the economy. There is a widely held view that more
rapid, self-correcting adjustments would serve to
decrease transition costs. Alas, rapid, self-correcting
adjustments have not occurred. But it is hoped that the
decline in the dollar over the last 18 months will
succeed in reversing the adverse consequences of
previously experienced overvaluation. If so, it can help
the United States and, therefore, the world economy.
It is plausible to hope that the devaluation can bring
the parts of the whole into a better balance, thereby
fostering an increasingly stable situation.
JAMES R. MOORE
Secondary Coal Recovery:
A New and Struggling Industry
Rei.efuse surrounding active and abandoned coal mines
in the state of Illinois contain waste volumes ranging
from a low of 20 tons to a high of 20 million tons.
Collectively, the Illinois coal waste deposits (resulting
from inefficient cleaning methods of the past) contain
an estimated 500 millions tons of refuse. Research
indicates that, on the average, 26 percent of the waste
is coal. Thus, the Illinois deposits contain over 125
million tons of coal, which equals two years of current
Illinois coal production, and, at current prices,
represents a value of $3.2 billion.
Secondary Coal Recovery Prior to 1980
Although major coal companies began recovering
coal fines (28 mesh and below) in the late 1940s, serious
commercial efforts directed at recovering coal from gob
deposits (mine waste containing coal above 28 mesh in
size, rock, pyrite, wood, metal, paper) in the state of
Illinois did not begin until the 1970s. Efforts at that
time were concentrated in the counties of Williamson,
Saline, and Franklin in Southern Illinois. While these
early recovery efforts indicated some opportunities for
handsome profit, operators were plagued with the
crucial problems of inexperience, inadequate funding,
a reduced coal market, inefficient processing
equipment, a lack of planning and marketing
know-how, and meeting the newly imposed permitting
requirements of the "Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977." The pioneering firms in this
new and struggling industry were small and, by and
large, lacked the ability to deal effectively with the
problems. Economic data compiled on the early
secondary coal recovery operations point up the
problems.
Plant Efficiency
In 1979, I surveyed the operating secondary coal
recovery plants in Franklin, Williamson, and Saline
counties under a grant from the Coal Extraction and
Utilization Research Center at Southern Illinois
University. Data in Table 1 highlight efficiencies of the
seven plants. Analysis indicate efficiency yariation
from 33 percent to 80 percent of the possible feed
capacity. Differences are explained by variations in the
feed material, experience of the operators, and the
processing equipment. The average plant was
producing at a rate of about 260,000 tons of clean coal
per year.
Six of the seven operators in the three-county study
used the auger flotation process for separating the coal
from refuse, and one used cyclones. The auger operation
used vibrating screens for drying and the cyclone
products were dried in centrifuges. Reject material from
the auger flotation plants contained 40 percent coal,
most of which was less than 28 mesh, and the cyclone
plants' reject material contained less than 5 percent
coal. The average recovery rate of all plants was 26
percent.
Investment and Operation Cost
Plant investments ranged from $90,000 to $1.2
million, and no correlation exists between investment
and profit margin (see Tables 2 and 3). Royalties paid
on the finished product ranged from $1.50 to $4.00 a
ton, but the higher price was paid between two
companies that were owned by the same principals.
The length of life of a secondary coal recovery plant is
limited because after the gob pile is processed the
operator usually moves on to another site or goes out
of business. Transporting raw materials to a cleaning
plant is normally not economical, although two of the
plants moved their gob eight miles at a cost of $4.50 a
ton. The average length of operation in this survey was
IVi years. One plant operated three shifts, one operated
two, and the other five operated single shifts. The
average crew for a shift comprised three men and a
supervisor, and they lost one hour a shift for repairs. A
crew needed a minimum of one loader-scraper, two end-
loaders, a dozer, and a backhoe to operate a recovery
plant.
Lessons from the 1970s
All gob processing plants constructed during the
decade of the 1970s were either salvaged or abandoned
by 1981. Secondary coal recovery operators learned
several important lessons during this early stage of
experimentation. Market needs should be carefully
analyzed, and the best marketing strategies for
satisfying those needs should be determined.
Technology used for separating coal from other gob
materials was not cost- and quality-efficient. Needs for
operating capital should be determined using
long-range planning techniques. A careful selection of
employees and providing adequate training are
necessary for insuring proper maintenance and
continuous output. Cooperative relations should be
maintained with the Department of Mines and
Minerals and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Secondary Coal Recovery: 1980-1985
Knowledge and experience gained by secondary coal
recovery pioneers of the 1970s ushered in new
investors, more sophisticated technology, and
Table 1.
experienced employees in the 1980s. Three new $1.5
million plants consisting of a combination barrel
washer, multi-stage cyclones, centrifuge dryers, sizing
screens, radial stackers, and computerized control
systems began production durmg the summer of 1982.
The new plants were designed to be cost and quality
efficient. Another similar plant was brought on line in
1984. One new auger flotation plant was completed in
1981, and a new diester plant was completed in 1983.
One of the plants abandoned in 1 980 was modified and
readied for 1 985 production. A new plant incorporating
the most advanced technology is scheduled for
completion this year. The new plant to be located in
Williamson County will use heavy media, multi-stage
cyclones. While this new activity suggests industry
growth, operators continue to be troubled with the
same problems of the 1970s.
A comparison of secondary coal recovery operations
in the 1970s with those of the 1980s show the changes
(see Table 4). Production capacity of the new plants is
12 times that of earlier counterparts. The increased
volume affords owners the opportunity to bid on
larger-size contracts. Because of relatively easy
adjustments through computerized and manual
techniques, the most important characteristic of the
new technology is the ability to produce a more
consistent quality. This attribute overcomes the
buyers' major criticism of earlier operations and should
serve to improve the industry's image. Further analysis
indicates a 5 percent increase in price, a 1 , 1 00 percent
increase in production potential, a 20 percent increase
in costs, a 300 percent increase in investment, and a
100 percent increase in return on investment. One
might conclude that secondary coal recovery is an
attractive investment. However, evidence of the past
suggests that the inexperienced should approach the
industry with extreme caution.
Toward the Future
In 1984, the small and struggling secondary coal
recovery industry accounted for an estimated .003
percent of total US coal production. At that rate, it will
take the industry 500 years to recover the coal from
existing refuse deposits. Growth, and even survival, of
the industry will depend on the operators' ability to
deal with two major obstacles. First, there are the high
and sometimes restrictive entry and exit costs imposed
by federal and state regulations. Second, the mandate
by the government to reclaim all abandoned mine sides.
This program, which is administered by the Abandoned
Mine/Land Reclamation Councils in the respective
states, calls for covering the gob deposits with sufficient
enough dirt for sustaining a permanent vegative cover.
For example, the state of Illinois is spending
approximately $14 million annually. Funding for this
program comes from taxing underground mines 15
cents/ton and surface mines 35 cents/ton. Removing
the dirt will add additional costs to the secondary coal
recovery operation.
Recommendations
Scientific research data is vital to improving
processing efficiencies. Coal recovery from colliery
reject deposits is a new industry and deserves
immediate professional and scientific attention. Land
reclamation, employment opportunities, business
profits, and providing a valuable energy resource are
basic benefits to be derived. Optimum achievement of
these benefits calls for orderly growth and development
of the secondary coal recovery industry.
Specific needs include ( 1 ) the establishment of a
secondary coal recovery council comprised of one
representative from each coal-producing state.
Authority and resources should be given the Council
for awarding research grants, processing and forwarding
small business loan requests to appropriate agencies on
behalf of qualified secondary coal recovery operators,
establishing and maintaining a strong monitoring and
accounting program, and promoting the secondary coal
recovery industry,- (2| initiating product planning
research, which includes marketing, purchasing,
engineering, production, design, and finance expertise;
(3) developing an abandoned mine directory giving
location, owner's name and address, quantity, and
quality of colliery reject; and (4) conducting a market
segmentation study for establishing optimum use and
profit potential for secondary recovered coal.
Cooperative efforts is needed. Major coal companies,
coal research centers, coal associations, and the
Department of Energy are basic constituencies that
must work together toward making secondary coal
recovery a dynamic and successful industry.
fames R. Moore teaches in the Department of
Marl<eting, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale.
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SALIM RASHID, JOHN T. SCOTT, JR., SARWAR JAHAN
The Effects of Size and Tenure
on Farm Efficiency
In the history of agriculture, two issues have cropped
up with considerable regularity, and are still very much
alive today. The first relates to whether large farms or
small farms are more efficient. The second issue
concerns the most productive forms of tenancy, that is
ownership, rental, or share-leasing. This study
addresses these issues in the context of Illinois
agriculture, applying methods established by earlier
researchers to Illinois data.
Two features of the data are distinctive. First, the
data include experience from four years. Such data
permit tests for the stability of established relationships
over time. Second, the data depict experience from a
large sample; in a given year there were over 650 farms
in the data base.
The study is divided into two parts. In the first part,
there is an examination of the efficiency of the sample
Illinois farms across large and small farms and between
different tenure types. In the second part, there is an
investigation of the primary determinants of the
decision to lease land (in or out).
The Data
The data stem from a subset of farms from the Illinois
Farm Business Records. These records are kept in
cooperation with the Illinois Farm Business
Management Association and the Department of
Agricultural Economics at the University of Illinois.
The data are for the years 1980-1983, consisting of
farms with usable records for both the tenant and
landlord. The data are obtained from the farm business
records of about 500 Illinois farms for each of the years.
The farms are located in the counties of Adams, Boone,
Brown, Bureau, Carroll, Cass, Champaign, Clark, and
Coles in northern and central Illinois. These counties
are well dispersed, so we can reasonably hope to average
out local effects. The Farm Business Records data base
is not itself a random sample. Hence, there was no effort
made to pick a sample using randomization procedures.
Instead, the data choice was associated with various
fieldmen who were spread out over North-Central
Illinois.
The farms can be cross-classified according to both
ownership and forms of tenure. There are three
categories of owners; pure owners, who own all the
land they farm; part-owners, who lease part of the lands
they farm; and pure tenants, who lease practically all
the land they farm. The pure owners, who were dropped
from further consideration, formed about 1 5 percent of
the sample. There are various tenure forms, including
mixed arrangements for dairy farming and other types
of livestock farming. To increase homogeneity, the
sample was limited to the records of crop farmers with
crop-sharing (on a 50-50 basis) and cash renting. The
categories consisted of (1) part-owner crop-share, (2)
part owner cash lease, (3) pure tenant crop-share and
(4) pure tenant cash lease.
There was an important study of the relative
efficiency of large versus small farms, as well as the
effect of different leases upon agricultural efficiency
(with emphasis upon the former). This study was based
on data from a sample of Illinois grain farms for the
year 1977. Two tentative conclusions were articulated.
First, it was found that smaller farms did not show
marked signs of inefficiency. Second, it was suggested
that farmers who leased land appeared to be more
efficient than those who did not. The importance of
these findings lends urgency to reexamination of the
issues for a large data base and for an extended period
of years.
The technical aspects of the study are summarized
in the Appendix. We find considerable evidence to
confirm the results discussed above. In particular, there
is little sign of increased efficiency on the part of farms
over 500 acres. However, we find that the superior
efficiency of leasing is visible only for 1 980 (and perhaps
1 98 1 ). It would appear that the considerable economic
distress of the years 1 980- 1 982 served to weed out the
owner-operated farms that were not relatively efficient.
Our results in this area suggest that the earlier work
needs to be modified and reinterpreted.
A book about agriculture in India, PalanpuT, by C.
Bliss and N. Stern provides a useful framework and
starting point for considering the short-run leasing
decision. Bliss and Stern argue that tenancy provides a
way for those with excess (or deficient) land, labor, and
equipment to find mutually advantageous bargains.
Someone who has more power or equipment than can
be used on his own fields will look around for land to
cultivate and those who lack skill or desire to cultivate
their own lands will want to rent out their lands to
such people. Both farming ability and power or
equipment are inputs that can be considered as fixed
in the production process.
The tenancy decision is essentially one of finding the
optimal combination of variable inputs to maximize
profits. In the Indian context, it was relatively easy to
pinpoint the critical fixed inputs. Social norms enforce
the working of the family as a unit. Within this context,
it makes good sense to think of farmers wishing to
cultivate amounts of land that provide employment for
the entire family. By the same token, bullock-power is
a critical source of power, without which successful
cultivation simply cannot go on. To assess by analogy
that similar factors should also count in the United
States perhaps requires no further explanation. The
family may play an equally important role in Illinois
agriculture. Also, in view of the large extent to which
Illinois farms are mechanized, it is clear that successful
cultivation is heavily dependent upon machinery.
The statistical work was designed to test the
following proposition: The amount of farm land leased
is positively related to the capital equipment owned
and the amount of available unpaid labor. But, in
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contrast, the amount of land that is leased is negatively
related to the amount that is owned.
Our expectation was that capital owned would be as
influential in Illinois as it was in Palanpur. This was
confirmed by the statistical work undertaken with data
from all tenure forms. In light of the high degree of
mechanization in Illinois, our second expectation was
that unpaid labor, a proxy for family labor, would be
much less important, or perhaps even insignificant.
Somewhat to our surprise, unpaid labor was almost
always statistically significant. If our results are
substantiated by further research, two interesting
results would follow. First, theorists have long worried
about the theoretical indeterminacy of the amount of
land leased. Our results show that there may indeed be
an "optimal" amount of land to lease. Secondly, we see
no reason to consider sharerenting as being anything
other than a market contract, largely independent of
"stages of development." The results of this study
suggest a much closer parallel between developed and
developing agricultures with regard to the effects of
capital and unpaid labor than hitherto has been
reported.
There are two general points about the market for
farmland that arise from this study. First, leasing is a
valuable means of achieving efficient farm organization.
Second, it would appear that significant indivisibilities
are present in the capital markets. We discuss each in
turn.
Farms that are fully owner-operated give indications
of being inefficient compared to other lease types. If we
examine what has happened in Illinois from the census
data on the different lease types, we find some fairly
dramatic changes that would corroborate our findings
that leasing in some land is more efficient than fully
owning only.
There has been a significant increase in the
proportion of farmers who are renting additional land
(the part-owner operators) from 20.4 percent to 1950 to
36.3 percent in 1 982. The total size of farm they operate
(both rented and owned) land has significantly
increased relative to those who farm only the land they
own (full owners). There has been an increase from 227
acres in 1950 to 468 acres in 1982. Given the finite
nature of available farmland, as farms increase in size,
the expansion must be at the expense of others. Some
of the full owner operators have lost out, but the major
group of losers is the tenant group, the group that rents
all the land they farm.
The full renter is at a distinct disadvantage to the
part-owner who has a secure tenure base of operations
on his own land. The part-owner can wait and observe
when land becomes available for rent and can
aggressively bid in the rental market. However, if a full
tenant loses his lease, he may need to leave the
community to find other land. Alternatively, he may
find it necessary to quit farming. Clearly, based on the
census data, tenants have been quitting farming.
It has not been possible to account for personal
characteristics of the farmers who expand relative to
those who do not. There are substantial differences
among the rates of expansion among farmers even
though they may start out with seemingly the same
assets of labor, training, capital, and level of economic
efficiency.
In measuring economic efficiency, we have made the
usual assumption that the entrepreneur wants to
maximize profits. Our findings are based at least in part
on this assumption. However, some farmers who
speculated on land purchasing rather than on renting
or leasing additional land are now concerned with
current financial problems. If, because of personality or
location within a geographically restrictive leasing and
ownership pattern, a farmer views his expansion
potential as limited, he may not choose the traditional
unrestricted profit maximization approach. Instead,
with his limited fixed resources, he may adopt a cost
minimization or resource conservation approach. Such
constrained behavior will result in inefficiency and may
explain part of the differences in efficiency between the
smaller owner-operated farms and the larger part-owner
farms.
The part-owner farms have been able to expand
because expansion through renting additional land
(where this is geographically possible) is more profitable
for the farmer operator than owning. Such is the case
even though, from the standpoint of the whole
operating unit, it may be more efficient in terms of
variable costs.
A comparison of the rental market for farmland and
the ownership market offers some understanding of the
situation. The annual rent for farmland, contrary to
what we sometimes find with other income-producing
real estate, has nearly always been substantially less
than the cost of owning farmland on a current account
basis. There are several reasons for the willingness of
farmers to pay more for land than the current return
from rent. Reasons include reduction of tenancy risk,
the pure utility of land ownership, and the expectation
of increased rent and increased capital value.
During the stable period from 1 959 through 1 972, the
data show that the cost of ownership was about
one-third to one-half greater than the cost of rental.
During the land boom after 1975, this relationship
became quite different and is only now working back
toward the longer-term relationship. Setting aside the
possibility of a marked and prolonged period of
deflation, it is doubtful, given the desire to own land,
that the cost of ownership will ever be less than rent.
Whether the apparent inefficiency of owned farms
results from the smaller scale at which such farms
operate, or whether the seeming inefficiency is
compensated for by the benefits of ownership are topics
for further consideration.
As suggested, it would appear that there are
significant indivisibilities in the capital market. If
capital markets functioned smoothly, in the textbook
sense of the term, we would not expect capital
possessed to influence leasing significantly. Despite the
existence of some credit organizations specifically
designed to meet the needs of farmers, it would appear
that capital is very much a "lumpy" input. This feature
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obviously influences the manner of analyzing the
Illinois farm economy because it tells us that long-run
equilibria, that is with full adjustment,- are very seldom
reached. It would be useful for policies and prescriptions
relating to the structure of the farm economy to take
this into accoi^nt. Needless to say, this is not a totally
new point, but it bears repetition in light of our findings.
New Publications Soon Available
Appendix
The Garcia, Sonka and Yoo ( 1 982| (GSY) study used a standard profit
function that is linear in logarithms for most variables and is based
on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production fimction. To enhance
the efficiency of estimation, input demand functions are jointly
estimated along with the profit function. To allow for correlated enors
between equations, Zellner's method of seemingly unrelated
estimation is used. The basic idea can be summarized as follows. A
linear regression estimates the variable profit per farm as a function
of the following variables : ( 1 ) a dummy variable for small farms that
should have a zero coefficient if there is no difference in the relative
efficiency of large vs. small farms (700 acre cutoff); (2) the monthly
wage rate for hired labor per farm; (3) total wage bill for hired labor
per farm; (4) cash expenditures for variable inputs per farm; (5) months
of operator and family labor available per farm; (6) value at nonland
capital available per farm; (7) acres per farm; (8) soil productivity index;
(9) ratio of soybean to com acreage; (10) a regional dummy variable;
( 1 1 ) a large farm dummy variable with the same interpretation as ( 1 ).
The justification for including these variables is quite standard and
the reader is referred to GSY for details.
It should be pointed out that, partly for theoretical reasons and
partly for practical ones, some of the variables used in the GSY study
are excluded in our study. A limitation common to both studies lies
in the use of expenditures on variable inputs, a practice that captures
both price and quantity effects. Because price and quantity effects can
offset or even negate each other, the sign of the regression coefficient
on such variables is unclear on a priori grounds. Finally, it should be
noted that tests of efficiency between large and small farms will
obviously be sensitive to the cutoff point chosen between large and
small farms. In the previous study a 700-acre cutoff on the basis of
Wilken and Kesler ( 1978); their hypothesis was tested also for 500 acre
and 400 acre cutoff points. The tests appeared to become sensitive at
the 400 acre mark. As 1980 and 1981 were very difficult years for
farmers it was decided to use 500 acres as the dividing line between
small and large farms. For the sake of completeness the second test
was ran with the 700-acre cutoff point.
Two regressions were run, corresponding to Models I and II from
the GSY previous study. Model I has already been described above.
Model 11 utilizes a method to take account of ownership. The variable
profit per farm is modeled as a function of : ( 1 ) the proportion of farm
income that is obtained from the operator's own farm; (2) variables 2
through 10 from the previous model. The data were initially tested
to see if the profit functions for smaU and large farms differed only
by a multiplicative constant. The data for 1980, 1982 and 1983 passed
this test while that for 1981 did not. Hence 1981 was dropped from
the sample and examined separately. Our fits are generally reasonable
but the sign of Cash Operating Expenses is negative, suggesting that
the price effects have outweighed the quantity effects in producing
this result. We limited ourselves to tests of relative efficiency. These
show that, despite the several adjustments that have been made in
these difficult times, there is no evidence that small farms, whether
taken at the 500-acre or the 700-acre cutoff point are less efficient
than the large farms. The effect of leasing is surprisingly strong in
1980 and 1981 when the t-statistic is highly significant.
A,Lvailable soon from the Bureau of Economic and
Business Research, the 1987 Illinois Economic Outlook
and a new Illinois Statistical Abstract containing
economic data from 1979-1984.
The 1987 Illinois Economic Outlook contains
articles on pertinent components of the Illinois
economy plus quarterly forecasts of employment,
personal income by major sector, and hours worked and
hourly wage paid. Articles include population, financial
services, manufacturing, employment, real estate,
education, transportation, trends in economic
development, state revenues and expenditures, exports,
agriculture, and Illinois econometric forecast. The cost
will be $2.50. The 1986 Illinois Economic Outlook
continues to be available.
The Illinois Statistical Abstract provides over 650
pages of statistics on Personal Income; Transfer
Payments; Farm Income; State Taxes; Banking and
Prices; Manufacturing (with information on large and
small establishments, employers, payroll, production
employees, hours and wages for production employees,
value added by manufacturer, cost of materials, value
of shipments, and new capital expenditures); Service
Industries; Building Permits; Employment; Employ-
ment, Hours, and Earnings; Labor Force Statistics; and
Population. These data will be useful to faculty and
students, newspapers, state and local government
agencies, businessmen, lawyers, accounting firms,
management firms—in short any one seeking market
or location information. The book will be available in
paperback ($25 1, and users with heavier analysis
demands will be able to purchase the book on diskette
($40).
For further information about these publications,
contact the Bureau of Economic and Business Research,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1206
South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820 (217-333-
2330).
Salim Rashid is professor of economics and John T.
Scott, fr. is professor of agricultural economics at the
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Sarwar
fahan is in the Center for Governmental Studies,
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois. This
study was funded in part by the Office ofReal Estate
Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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Illinois Business Indexes
B.beginning in this issue of the Illinois Business
Review, two leading economic indicators will replace
the coincident indicator in the Illinois Business
Indexes. Based on historical evidence, sustained
changes in these indicators anticipate future economic
developments in the Illinois economy. The leading
indicators were developed by the Bureau of Economic
and Business Research and were discussed in the
October issue of the Illinois Business Review. We
provide the leading indicators for Illinois to allow
readers the opportunity to identify significant changes,
thereby providing forecasts of future economic growth
or decline.
The Illinois economy is expected to grow over the
next two quarters. Both leading indicators show an
upturn in mid- 1986 with the three-month moving
average (MA(3)) staying above the six-month moving
average (MA(6)) for most of this period. Retail sales have
leveled off, with only a slight decrease in September.
Personal income for Illinois, both total and per capita,
increased in the second quarter of 1986. Finally,
manufacturing employment and weekly earnings have
remained fairly constant since June 1986, with slight
gains in recent months.
Illinois Business Indexes
Composite Leading Indicators
-— m»(6)
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GREGORY S. CHAUDOIN
Are Credit Card Interest Rates too High?
vJince high inflation began to moderate in 1981, the
prime rate has fallen markedly. It has dropped from 21
percent in 1981 to about 8 percent in 1986. Even so,
during this same period the average interest rate
charged for such cards as Visa and MasterCard has
actually increased from 17.8 percent in 1981 to about
18.6 percent in 1986. Elected officials and consumer
groups have expressed concern that credit card issuers
are making excess profits. Some state and federal
legislators have even threatened to place ceilings on
credit card rates.
This article discusses the credit card market and
whether credit card interest rates are too high. Also,
the two most supported forms of regulation geared
towards lowering interest rates, interest rate ceilings
and disclosure laws, will be presented.
The Credit Card Market
It is estimated that about 79 percent ofUS consumers
own credit cards. The two most commonly held types
of credit cards are retail store cards held by 68 percent
and bank cards held by 57 percent of consumers. The
retail store cards with the widest circulation are the
Sears card with a 5 1 percent ownership rate among US
consumers, and the J. C. Penney card with 35 percent
consumer ownership. Visa (45 percent) and MasterCard
(34 percent) are the two most commonly held bank
cards. These statistics were estimated from a survey
carried out for MONEY Magazine by Lieberman
Research Inc.
The major bank credit cards are issued and
administered by institutions such as banks, savings and
loans, and credit unions that are regional agents for
national credit card plans such as Visa and MasterCard.
These institutions pay franchise fees to the national
plans and, in return, can charge whatever interest rate
they choose. However, these institutions must fully
fund the retail loans and operating expenses associated
with card use.
Bank credit cards differ from retail store cards in that
each bank card issuer sets its own interest rates and
service fees. Retail store card interest rates are set
nationally, with certain local differences arising from
states with usury laws. Also, retail cards usually do not
charge their users service fees. To make up for revenues
lost by not charging service fees, retail card issuers
usually charge interest rates two or three percentage
points above the average rate charged for bank cards.
Even though more people own retail store cards than
bank credit cards, bank credit cards are more widely
accepted by all retailers, including Sears and J. C.
Penney. Hence, bank card issuers have faced greater
pressure to lower their card interest rates than retail
card issuers.
The main bone of contention of the proponents of
interest regulation is that the cost of funds for banks
has diminished over the last five years, yet credit card
interest rates have increased. The components of the
cost of funds for a bank include such expenses as
interest payments on savings deposits and certificates
of deposit and interest payments on loans from other
banks. These payments attract funds to card-issuing
banks, and the banks, in turn, lend these funds out to
credit card users at higher rates of interest.
In 1981, the average cost of funds for card-issuing
banks with deposits over $200 million was 9.5 percent
of each dollar transacted through a bank card, according
to the Federal Reserve's Functional Cost Analysis. By
1 985 the cost of funds had dropped to 7.3 percent. The
cost-of-funds figure should be even lower in 1986,
because of further reductions in the interest rates of
certificates of deposit and interbank lending. So, since
1981 the cost of funds has steadily fallen along with
the prime rate, mortgage rates, and yields on US
Treasury securities.
Most banks and retail stores, however, are reluctant
to lower interest rates. They contend that the cost of
funds is relatively small compared to the expenses
incurred by processing transactions, making monthly
billings, evaluating credit applications, and costs
associated with delinquent account and credit losses.
Because of large administrative and processing costs,
card issuers assert that it is wrong to assume that the
total cost of credit card operations will fall with a
decline in the cost of funds. Therefore, credit card
interest rates are not to be expected to fall automatically
with declining costs of funds.
The cost of funds also accounts for a much smaller
proportion of the total costs of lending for credit card
operations than for commercial lending and mortgage
operations. From 1972 to 1984 the cost of funds of
card-issuing banks averaged only 30 percent of the total
expenses of credit card operations, as reported by the
Functional Cost Analysis. By comparison, the cost of
funds accounted for more than 75 percent of the total
cost of commercial loans, and for nearly 90 percent of
the total cost of mortgage lending. Studies have also
found that funding costs for issuers of retail store cards
are less important than administrative and overhead
costs, said Federal Reserve official Emmet J. Rice.
Thus, credit card operations are unique in that they
have proportionally greater administrative and
processing costs than costs in obtaining funds.
Therefore, if administrative and processing expenses
increase by the same percentage that the cost of funds
decreases, total costs of credit card operations will rise.
For commercial lending and mortgage operations,
however, total costs will fall. The example presented
illustrates why the total cost of credit card operations
need not move with the cost of funds.
Are Credit Card Rates too High?
The best way to judge whether credit card interest
rates are too high is not to look at falling prime or
mortgage rates, but to look at profits from credit card
operations. The accompanying chart presents the
average net earnings after the cost of funds of large
card-issuing banks from 1974 to 1985. These net
earning figures represent the average pre-tax profit rates
from bank credit card operations and were compiled
from editions of tfie Functional Cost Analysis from the
last 12 years.
Net Earnings after the Cost of Funds (percentage)
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Source Federal Reserve, Functional Cost Analysis.
The chart shows that profit rates from credit card
operations (net earnings after the cost of funds) had
increased from 1.3 percent in 1981 to 4.0 percent in
1985. In addition, the 1984 and 1985 net earning rates
are the highest figures over the 12-year span.
Furthermore, the credit card industry in 1986 showed
a 30 percent increase in pre-tax profits over 1 985, said
H. Spencer Nilson, publisher of the Nilson Report.
These findings lend credence to the beliefs of the
consumer advocates who feel that credit card rates have
room to fall, and indeed should fall, while enabling card
issuers to maintain normal returns.
One factor that enables card issuers to maintain high
interest rates and earn high profits is that many card
owners have been somewhat insensitive to the high
rates. About 30 percent of card users do not really worry
about interest rate charges because they consistently
pay their credit card bill within the grace period, which
is usually about 25 days. Full payment within the grace
period is rewarded by no interest charges. For these
prompt bill payers, credit card interest rates of 21
percent are little cause for concern.
Lack of consumer awareness is another cause of
card-owner insensitivity towards high credit card rates.
Fully one-third to one-half of the owners of Visa,
MasterCard, and retail store cards are not aware that
interest will be charged if bills are not paid in full. Only
63 percent of Visa owners, 64 percent of MasterCard
owners, and 50 percent of retail store card owners
surveyed are aware of the correct rate of interest charged
on unpaid outstanding balances on their cards,
according to the Lieberman Research survey for
MONEY Magazine.
Many other bank card holders are not aware that each
issuing bank sets its own interest rate and service fees
and that by shopping around lower financing charges
can be found. Arkansas and Connecticut, for example,
are two states with interest rate ceilings where rates
can found between 11 and 15 percent. In lUinois, the
First National Bank of Lincolnshire offers rates of 15
to 18 percent to its depositors, depending on the size
of deposit in the bank.
The more uninformed that card holders are about
lower interest rate cards from other card issuers, the
less sensitive they will be towards the high interest
rates on their present cards. Thus, uninformed
consumers enable many card issuers to keep their credit
card interest rates up without losing many of their
customers to competitors with lower rates.
Some consumer advocates and legislators contend
that card issuers have too strong an advantage over
uninformed card owners and propose that government
should intervene on behalf of the consumers. One plan
with wide support is to put a ceiling on the maximum
rate that can be charged by card issuers. An alternative
plan is a set of disclosure laws that promotes
competition by increasing the awareness of consumers.
Credit Card Interest Rate Ceilings
Last year about ten bills were introduced in Congress
that would affect credit card rates. Also, 22 states,
including Illinois, had bills filed that would put a ceiling
on card rates. Most of the interest rate ceiling plans call
for a variable interest rate cap that would somehow be
pegged to prime commercial lending rates or yields on
US Treasury securities.
In Congress, a bill introduced by Senator Alfonse
D'Almato (D-New York) would set national credit card
interest rate limits to five percentage points above the
average yield on six-month US Treasury bills
outstanding the previous year. US Representative Frank
Annunzio (D-Illinois) introduced a bill that ties
maximum interest rates to eight points above the yield
on one-year US Treasury securities. A plan from
Senator Paula Hawkins (R-Florida) sets the ceiling at
four percentage points over the rate the Internal
Revenue Service charges on late tax payments (a
compilation of prime interest rates from the previous
six months, recomputed every six months). Based on
current conditions, the national credit card interest
ceilings would be between 12 and 15 percent.
Credit card ceilings would provide benefits for top
credit risk consumers who have credit cards, but there
are also economic costs associated with this regulation.
One such cost is the inefficiency of credit rationing.
When credit card interest rates are forced down by
ceilings, revenue streams from card issuers diminish
and profits fall, and even losses may occur. With lower
profits, card issuers will be more selective in whom
they accept as card holders. Hence, there will be a
margin of consumers who desire credit cards—and
would have credit cards at higher, unregulated
rates—but will not be accepted for cards at ceiling rates.
Another drawback associated with variable interest
rate ceiling plans is that they assume that changes in
the prime rate and yields of US Treasury securities
reflect changes in the cost of funds, which, in turn.
reflects changes in the total cost of credit card
operations. If these assumptions are true, variable
interest rate ceiling plans will limit interest rates and
still enable card issuers to cover costs and make normal
returns. But it has been shown that movements of the
total cost of credit card operations are not strongly tied
to movements of the cost of funds. So variable interest
rate caps may not even allow card issuers a normal
return on operations. For this reason, credit card issuers
strongly oppose variable interest rate ceilings.
The drawbacks generally make federal elected
officials wary of a national credit card interest rate
ceiling. So a national rate ceiling does not appear likely.
However, there is growing momentum for rate ceilings
at the state level.
Here in Illinois, there is strong political pressure for
lowering credit card rates. Illinois House Speaker
Michael Madigan sponsored statewide public hearings
on the issue last fall. State Sen. Vincent Demuzio has
united with state Comptroller Roland Burris to push
for a bill that would limit credit card rates to 7
percentage points above the quarterly average of
three-year US Treasury notes. Perhaps the greatest
pressure to lower rates comes from newly elected State
Treasurer Jerry Cosentino.
Mr. Cosentino has announced that he is withdrawing
state deposits from card-issuing banks that do not
voluntarily lower their interest rates to 3 percentage
points above the prime. Cosentino estimates that at
any given time, $ 100 to $200 million is invested in the
six or seven major banks that offer credit cards in the
state. He started the withdrawal process 22 January
1987 when he withdrew about $220 million from
Illinois' largest credit card issuer, the First National
Bank of Chicago, which charges 19.8 percent credit card
interest.
One reason why credit card ceilings are more likely
to be supported at the state level than at the national
level is that the economic cost to consumers is smaller.
For example, if a rate ceiling in Illinois is placed at, say,
13 percent, the top credit risks will enjoy lower rates
and consumers with marginal credit ratings may not
be issued cards. However, the consumers who are
denied credit cards in Illinois at 13 percent can still be
accepted by card issuers in other states that have no
ceilings. So consumers with high credit ratings are
helped, and those with lower credit ratings are not hurt.
The credit card issuers in Illinois, on the other hand,
would not fair so well. There is still the problem that
variable interest rate caps do not accurately reflect the
total cost of credit card operation. Over time this may
be harmful to the credit card industry in the state. So
credit card interest rate ceilings should be used very
cautiously even at the state level.
Disclosure Laws
Proponents of credit card rate regulation often argue
that the market is not working because card issuers are
taking advantage of an uninformed public. Therefore,
a simpler alternative to lower credit card interest rates
than interest rate ceilings is to increase the information
available to the public. Informing the public could be
done through what are called disclosure laws.
Disclosure laws would require credit card issuers to
prominently display annual finance charges for card use
on all applications, print advertisement, and television
ads and that they be announced in radio ads.
Applications would also be required to list the grace
period, annual fee, and all other fees that can be charged.
Both federal and state support are gaining momentum
for bills that would enact disclosure laws. In the US
Senate, three bills came up for hearings. In Illinois, state
Representative Ellis Levin introduced a disclosure bill
in the state legislature last fall. Also, many of the bills
that sought interest rate ceilings contained disclosure
provisions.
Disclosure laws will increase consumers' awareness
level about their credit cards and the cards from
competing issuers. Higher awareness will give card
owners greater opportunities to shop around for better
rates, which, in turn, will cause card issuers to become
more competitive in their finance charges. The final
result will be lower credit card rates. Thus, disclosure
laws are designed with the goal of lowering credit card
rates by making the market work more efficiently.
The advantage of disclosure laws over interest rate
ceilings is that card issuers, not government, set their
interest rates. Even though rates will fall due to greater
competitive pressures, card issuers will at least have
the opportunity to set rates where normal profits can
be made. So, if policymakers feel that credit card
interest rates need to be regulated, disclosure laws may
be the best answer.
Conclusion
The high profits from credit card operations over the
last three years are evidence that credit card interest
rates are overdue for a fall and that, perhaps, the market
is not working efficiently in the credit card industry.
However, there are signs that rates may fall without
government intervention.
In Illinois, the First National Bank of Lincolnshire
has dropped rates to as low as 15 percent. Elsewhere,
the AFL-CIO has made an agreement with the Bank of
New York for a credit card with rates as low as 14.5
percent. Bank One in Columbus, Ohio offers a lower
rate Visa card to contributors to PTL evangelist Jim
Bakker. And Manufacturers Hanover ofNew York has
added more than a million new accounts since it cut
its rates to 17.8 percent from 19.8 in October of 1985.
Chase Manhattan, the third largest bank card issuer,
followed suit and lowered its rate to 17.5 percent.
Rates are falling across the nation as consumers are
reading more information about interest rate
differences at some competing card issuers. If these
lower interest rate cards show profits for the card
issuers, competitive pressures from the market should
drive rates down without the aid of disclosure laws.
However, if the unregulated credit card market fails to
lower interest rates, there are elected officials in Illinois
and other states who have the power and will to force
them down. So, one way or another, expect credit card
interest rates to fall in Illinois.
DONALD L. BUMPASS
Recent Trends in Foreign Direct
Investment in Illinois
Isuzu of lapan, in cooperation with Fuji Heavy
Industries, will begin building trucks and utility
vehicles in the United States in 1989. Currently, a joint
Isuzu-Fuji committee is investigating possible plant
sites in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and
Tennessee. The $450 million plant initially will
produce 120,000 vehicles annually with a future
capacity to build twice that number. Already in
existence and awaiting production for the 1987 model
year is Diamond-Star Motors located in Bloomington,
Illinois with a plant valued at $500 million. This plant
has a capacity of 180,000 vehicles and will employ
around 2,500 workers.
Why do foreign firms decide to produce in the United
States? What have been the recent trends in foreign
direct investment (FDI)? Finally, does the presence of
these foreign-owned firms create a cause for concern?
What is FDI?
Foreign direct investment occurs when a foreigner
acquires interest of 10 percent or more in a US based
firm. This enterprise is called a US affiliate of the
foreign company. Ownership (or control) of less than
10 percent is defined as indirect or portfolio investment.
The distinction between direct and portfolio centers on
the issue of control. The most obvious example of FDI
occurs when a firm sets up a wholly owned subsidiary
abroad, but FDI may also involve a joint venture
agreement when the foreign-based firm has an
ownership share of more than 10 percent. While a
foreign firm with extensive portfolio interests may have
much greater investment commitments in the United
States than a firm controlling several US affiliates, only
the latter represents FDI.
Table 1. Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States, 1914-1984 (billions of dollars)
Direct Investment
Rate of Growth 1%
I
Year Position' (inconstant $| Position/GNP(%)
1914
Table 4. Employment of Nonbank US Affiliates, State by Country, 1983 (thousands of employees)
Illinois
Indiana
Missouri
Wisconsin
Regional Total
US Total
ANN B. SCHNARE
Chicago's Dubious Achievement
O,'ver 20 years have past since Karl and Alma
Taeuber, the noted sociologists at the University of
Chicago, showed their city to be one of the most
segregated housing markets in the country. Since that
time, fair housing laws have been enacted at all levels
of government, black income has risen relative to the
incomes of whites, and the attitudes of blacks and
whites alike have grown more favorable towards
integration. In Chicago itself, communities like Oak
Park have seen the birth of innovative programs
designed to encourage racial mixing; and the Chicago
Housing Authority, which controls almost six percent
of the city's rental stock, has been brought to court for
its racially discriminatory practices.
What difference, if any, have these developments
made on the spatial concentration of the city's black
population? While some segments of the black
community have moved to racially integrated
neighborhoods, the vast majority of Chicago's blacks
are just as isolated from the white population as in the
past. Recent analysis of national trends in segregation
shows Chicago to be the most segregated metropolitan
area in the country. Unlike preceding decades, which
witnessed a steady increase in the spatial concentration
of the city's blacks, the level of integration experienced
by the average black remained relatively constant in
the 1970s. However, this stability contrasts with more
favorable trends observed elsewhere in the country,
where the majority of blacks and whites experienced
an increase in integration.
These conclusions are based on an analysis of census
tract data for a large sample of metropolitan areas in
1960, 1970, and 1980. (Census tracts are relatively small
geographic areas designed to reflect established
neighborhood boundaries and containing an average of
about 4,000 residents each.) A variety of indexes were
used to measure the extent of segregation. The first two
calculated each group's exposure to members of the
other race. White exposure to blacks was defined to be
the proportion black of the average white's neighbor-
hood. Similarly, black exposure to whites was the
proportion white of the average black's neighborhood.
While exposure rates proxy the level of integration
experienced by the average household, they do not
control for differences in the level of integration that
is possible within a given metropolitan area. Thus, a
third measure of segregation (the so-called exposure
index) compared the exposure rates that occurred in a
given market to the rates that would arise if each
neighborhood had the same mix of blacks and whites.
This latter index was constructed to range from zero to
100, where zero depicts a market in which each
neighborhood has an identical racial composition
(perfect integration) and 100 depicts a market where
neighborhoods are either all white or all black, but
never mixed (complete segregation).
Table 1 compares trends in black and white exposure
rates in the Chicago metropolitan area to trends
observed nationwide. As is evident from the table, black
exposure to whites decreased between 1960 and 1970,
both in Chicago and in the majority of metropolitan
areas throughout the country. A careful analysis of
these data revealed that the decrease was caused by the
peripheral growth of established minority areas. Since
integration was more likely to occur at the boundaries
of such areas, outward expansion of the ghetto induced
a decline in the average black's exposure to whites. The
explanation is geometric: the periphery of a circle or
square grows less rapidly than its interior.
Between 1970 and 1980, however, this tendency
towards the increased isolation of urban blacks was
reversed in most parts of the country. Despite a
continued growth in the size of their black populations,
the overwhelming majority of metropolitan areas
recorded a rise in the average black's exposure to
whites. This development signaled a significant
departure from previous patterns of peripheral growth.
In contrast, black exposure to whites in the Chicago
SMSA remained more or less the same throughout the
decade. While the situation did not deteriorate, the
city's black population did not experience the increases
that were registered by minority populations in other
areas.
Trends in the exposure rates of whites were more
consistent over time and increased throughout the
20-year period, both in Chicago and nationwide. During
the 1960s, when established racial patterns were
Table 1. Black and White Exposure
Table 3. Segregation
ANNE E. WINKLER
Public Aid in Illinois:
A Chance at Welfare Reform?
T h^e State of Illinois' welfare system has been opened
to important prospective change by the announcement
of Project Chance on 12 December 1985, by Governor
James Thompson and Gregory Coler, Director of the
Illinois Department of Public Aid. Project Chance is an
"employment initiative" designed to provide all
welfare recipients access to training, education, work
experience, and aid in job placement. Its goals are to
place 112,500 welfare recipients in unsubsidized,
full-time employment during 1986, I987,and 1988 and
to reduce public assistance expenditures by $40 million
dollars per month.
The first section of this article examines the recent
history of public assistance expenditures from 1976
through 1986. The second section focuses on Project
Chance and its prospects for success.
Sources of Public Aid Expenditures in Illinois
In the state of Illinois, public aid comes in the form
of medical and income assistance. In regard to income
assistance, there are three major sources of expendi-
tures: Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC|; Aid to the
Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD); and General
Assistance (GA).
AFDC-basic payments are made to families with
children needing public assistance due to the absence,
incapacity, or death of one or both parents. AFDC-U
payments are made to families with children needing
public assistance due to the fact the main earner is
unemployed. Funding for AFDC is shared jointly
between the state and federal governments.
AABD payments are fully state-funded supplemental
payments made to the low-income aged, blind, and
disabled who meet eligibility requirements for the
federally funded Supplemental Security Income
Program.
General Assistance is a safety net for those in need
who fail to qualify for these other programs. GA
receives no federal funds. Instead, those local
governments that levy a property tax are entitled to
receive state aid. Other local governments fund General
Assistance fully.
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Medical Assistance (MA) is provided to AFDC and
AABD recipients and to those who would otherwise
qualify for these categories but earn too much, and yet
still cannot pay their medical bills. Payments to these
recipients are shared equally between the state and
federal government. Medical assistance is also available
to GA recipients and the medically indigent, those who
are ineligible forGA as well as jointly funded assistance
but carmot afford to pay their medical bills. These
payments are fully funded by state revenues.
The amount of funds allocated to public assistance
out of general fund revenues depends on several factors.
First of all, the Department of Public Aid must compete
with the demand of other agencies for general funds
monies. As can be seen in Chart 1, public aid
expenditures on operations and awards and grants as a
percentage of total general funds expenditures
decreased, though not steadily, from FY 76 to FY 86.
Public aid expenditures for a given fiscal year also
depend on the fiscal condition of the Illinois economy
and the state budget. During a downturn in the state's
economy, the number of those on welfare rises,
increasing the demand for transfer payments in the
form of public assistance. At the same time, tax receipts
decline. This causes the state budget to tighten, thereby
reducing available funds. For example, from FY 82
through the first part of FY 84, the general funds
monthly available balances were significantly below
the warning zone of $200 million dollars. The general
funds revenue crisis was reflected in limited growth of
the AFDC and MA budgets for this period.
Distribution of Public Aid Expenditures
From 1976 to 1986, general funds expenditures on
operations and awards and grants for public assistance
increased 66.3 percent from $1.9 billion dollars to $3. 1
6
billion dollars (see Chart 2). In terms of the relative
growth of these expenditures, medical assistance
expenditures nearly doubled, rising from $869 million
to $1,723 billion. By comparison, AFDC expenditures
increased only 20 percent, from $731 million to $877
million. GA expenditures increased 100 percent, $120
million to $239 million. Expenditures on AABD in 1 976
were $40 million dollars. Subsequently, they decreased
steadily to $29 million dollars in FY 83. They have since
rebounded reaching $5 1 million dollars in FY 86. Charts
3 and 4 depict the shift in public aid spending towards
medical assistance.
In real terms, these expenditures decreased from 1 976
to 1986. Medical Assistance expenditures, deflated by
Data Resources' Medical Services Price Index, fell 1 7.3
percent. AFDC expenditures, deflated by the Consumer
Price Index, which includes all items for all urban
consumers, fell 38.9 percent. Real GA expenditures fell
during the late 1970s, but by FY 86 they had returned
to their FY 1976 level.
A February 1986 report by the state comptroller
explains the shift of public aid spending towards
medical assistance and away from AFDC by pointing
to the skyrocketing costs of medical services. Also, the
reduced share of AFDC expenditures out of total
spending reflect limits imposed on increases in AFDC
payments.
Chart 1. Illinois Public Aid Expenditures as a Percentage
of Total Expenditure *
Chart 2. Illinois Public Aid Expenditures on Awards and
Grants* (in billions of dollars)
-> u
76 77 78 79
FISCAL YEARS
"Figures include lapse-period spending.
Source: Office of the Comptroller, State of Illinois.
Income Assistance
'Figures include lapse-penod spending.
Source: Office of the Comptroller, Stale of Illinois.
Chart 3. Distribution of Illinois Public Aid Expenditures *
(FY 1976)
AABD& other (2.5%)
GA(6.8%)
MA (49.2%)
AFDC(41.4%)
'Figures include lapse-period spending.
Source: Office of the Comptroller, State of Illinois.
Chart 4. Distribution of Illinois Public Aid Expenditures*
(FY 1986)
AABD& other (2.4%)
GA (8.2%)
AFDC(30.1%)
MA (59.2%)
Figures include lapse-period spending.
Source: Office of the Comptroller, State of Illinois.
Since FY 76, the average number of people per month
receiving pubhc aid in the form of income assistance,
at least partially funded by state revenues, has
fluctuated between 772,000 and 923,000 but has shown
no long-term trend (see Chart 5 ) . From FY 76 to FY 86,
the total number of AFDC recipients (those receiving
basic and unemployment assistance) declined from
800,000 to 741,000. This can be explained by stricter
eligibility requirements for AFDC recipients. There
was a corresponding increase in the number of GA
recipients, the safety net for those who do not otherwise
qualify. From FY 76 to FY 84, the average monthly
number of GA recipients increased from 69,000 to
146,000. The number has since declined to 133,000
recipients in FY 86.
Project Chance as a Long-Term Solution
In recent years, there has been increasing pressure on
the Department of Public Aid to contain costs while
attempting to provide adequate assistance to those in
need. As a long-term solution, the Department of Public
Aid has initiated Project Chance. The intent of Project
Chance is two-fold. It is designed to help recipients
become self-supporting, a socially beneficial goal, in
and of itself. Secondly, it is designed to contain public
aid spending.
As of 30 June 1 985, of 342,002 adults receivingAFDC
and Chicago General Assistance in Illinois, 63.6 percent
had not completed their high school education. Of this
total, 91 percent had completed a high school education
or less. The intent of Project Chance is to improve
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Chart 5. Recipients of Illinois Income Assistance (average
monthly figures, in thousands)
y
4-
FISCAL YEARS
Source Illinois Department of Public Aid
recipients' outside employment opportunities by
providing training, education, work experience, and aid
in job placement. Higher expected wages should
encourage labor force participation. To the extent that
workers enter or reenter the labor force and become
self-supporting, the burden of welfare expenditures on
the state budget will be lowered.
Structure of Project Chance
Although Project Chance was officially armounced
in December 1985, it was unofficially initiated at the
start of FY 86. It combines features of the Massachusetts
Employment and Training Choices Program (ET) and
California's Greater Avenues of Independence (GAIN)
Program. Like these programs, Project Chance offers
welfare recipients training, education, work
experience, and help in finding jobs.
Since January 1986, Project Chance has been
administered by the Office for Employment and Social
Services. All previously existing state employment
programs, like Workfare under GA and WIN under
AFDC, have been combined into a single employment
program under Project Chance.
The basic premise of Project Chance is that all
recipients are employable except those who are
mentally or physically disabled. The program operates
in two stages. The first stage assesses the skills and
education of participants. The second stage provides
training, education, work experience (similar to that
provided under the earlier GA Workfare Program), and
aid in job search. Provision of these services involves
the coordination and interaction of public agencies
including the Department of Public Aid, Department
of Employment Security, Department of Commerce
and Community Affairs, and the State Board of
Education. Project Chance works with private firms as
well. In FY 87, $4.5 million dollars will be awarded in
contracts to private firms to pay for training programs
tied to actual job openings.
Participation in Project Chance is mandatory for
adults receiving Chicago GA and adult AFDC
recipients with children over six, with the exception of
those who are mentally or physically disabled. The
program encourages exempt AFDC recipients, those
with children under 6 to participate as "volunteers" by
offering daycare and transportation. Those near the
poverty line who do not currently receive welfare may
also participate voluntarily.
As of 12 December 1985, the Department of Public
Aid estimated total potential participation in Project
Chance at 280,000. This estimate was computed based
on the combined AFDC caseload of 239,516 and
Chicago GA caseload of 102,486 on 30 June 1985. Of
the potential 280,000 participants, 160,000 must
participate. This figure is primarily comprised of GA
recipients and a much smaller percentage of AFDC
recipients. The remaining 120,000 estimated
participants are volunteers. This figure is approximately
equal to 50 percent of the AFDC caseload, which
consists of individuals with children under six.
By the end of FY 86, approximately 105,000 welfare
recipients had participated in Project Chance. This
figure is comprised of 66,000 AFDC recipients, 35,000
GA recipients, and approximately 4,000 volunteers.
Mandatory participation by AFDC and GA recipients
combined was 59,000 below the Department of Public
Aid's estimate. The 4,000 volunteers out of a potential
120,000 indicates limited participation by aid
recipients with children under six. However, 4,000 is
nearly 3,000 above the number of volunteers in
employment and training programs in FY 85. Reasons
why incentives for participation by this group may be
limited are considered later.
Goals of Project Chance
The goal of Project Chance is to place 1 1 2,500 welfare
recipients in full-time nonsubsidized employment over
the course of 1986, 1987, and 1988. This figure is based
on estimated placements of 35,000, 37,500, and 40,000
recipients, respectively, over the course of these three
fiscal years. In FY 86, the Department of Public Aid
exceeded its employment goal: 36,787 recipients
obtained employment, an increase of 6, 84 1 over FY 85
and 1,787 over the Department of Public Aid's estimate
for FY 86.
From FY 85 to FY 86, the average monthly number
of income recipients directly affected by Project Chance
(AFDC and Chicago GA) fell overall by 4,000. This
decrease was fully realized by a reduction in GA
recipients. While this decrease may be attributed to the
success of Project Chance, it might also be due to the
relative state of the economy.
In regard to cost containment, the Department of
Public Aid estimates the cost saving to be in the order
of $40 million dollars per month. This figure is based
on the estimated cost of maintaining 1 00,000 cases on
welfare for one month. In FY 1 986, $2.91 billion dollars
in expenditures went to public aid awards and grants.
Given this figure, their estimate suggests that Project
Chance is expected to reduce expenditures on awards
and grants by approximately 16 percent.
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Prospects for Success
It seems plausible that the recipients most likely to
obtain unsubsidized, full-time employment initially
are those with relatively more past work experience,
more training, and/or more education. However, given
the fact that over 50 percent of welfare recipients lack
a high school diploma, acquiring education and skills
will take time. Consequently, their placement in
unsubsidized employment cannot be expected in the
very short term.
Even in the long term, optimism about the success
of Project Chance must be guarded. A combination of
education, training, and/or work experience may not
necessarily lead to full-time, unsubsidized employ-
ment. During participation in Project Chance, the
program provides daycare and transportation to allow
recipients with young children to participate. In
addition, these participants are eligible for state or
jointly funded medical assistance. For those recipients
who obtain full-time work that provides sufficient
earnings to make them ineligible for continued state
and/or federal aid, they currently lose the benefits of
subsidized daycare, and, in many cases, medical
assistance. Loss of these benefits may outweigh the
gains of full-time employment and discourage full-time
reentry into the labor market. This clearly represents
the greatest disincentive to AFDC recipients with very
young children.
At present, the Department of Public Aid is seeking
to address this issue. To the extent that this problem
is resolved by continuing medical assistance payments
(to those who no longer qualify for state/federal aid or
do not receive employer-provided medical benefits
during their initial employment period) or by
subsidizing daycare, the $40 million dollar estimated
savings is an overestimate.
Finally, criticism has been levelled against Workfare,
one of the programs of Project Chance. During a
workfare assignment, recipients work for a public or
not-for-profit employer. The number of hours a
recipient can work per month is equal to their grant
divided by the minimum wage. This number is
significantly below 40 hours per week, every week. It
has been argued that such programs may fail to provide
public agencies, for whom recipients work, with
incentives to train workers since recipients do not work
for a particular agency every day for an extended period
of time. Also, workers tend to turn over frequently in
these positions. Moreover, job assignments tend to be
for low skill positions that provide little training to
increase the employability of recipients. The
publication Workfare in Illinois: A Review by the
Legislative Advisory Committee on Public Aid (March
1982) suggests that, at best, such programs improve the
work habits of recipients.
Conclusions
In its Annual Status Report (1986), the Illinois
Department of Public Aid points to the success of
Project Chance in its first year. While the initial figures
of those placed in unsubsidized full-time employment
are promising and exceed the Department of Public
Aid's goal, prospects for success must be carefully
considered.
First of all, changes in expenditures, job placements,
and public aid expenditures attributed to Project
Chance must be isolated from business cycle effects.
In a downturn, the welfare rolls will increase, and it is
quite plausible that the negative cyclical effects on
expenditure and employment figures may overshadow
the positive impact of the employment initiative.
Likewise, a reduction in welfare rolls actually due to
an upturn in the economy may be erroneously pointed
to as evidence of the program's success.
Secondly, while the initial results are promising, the
program must address the issue that approximately 50
percent of the total AFDC caseload consists of a parent
with children under six. Given this fact, unsubsidized,
full-time employment may not be a realistic long-term
goal. To address this issue, the Department of Public
Aid must consider the cost of providing these recipients
with a complete package of income and medical
assistance versus the potential cost of subsidizing
daycare and, in some cases, medical care of these
recipients.
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Illinois Business Indexes
T h^e chart presenting the BEBR leading indicator
series shows that the Illinois economy is expected to
grow over the next two quarters. Both the three-month
(MA 3| and six-month (MA 6) moving average indexes
increase throughout most of 1986. Further, the
three-month moving average remained above the
six-month moving average during the past year with
the exception of January and September. November
1986 showed a larger-than-average increase in the
indexes—a further indication of future growth in the
Illinois economy.
In addition, five other charts are presented. Vendor
performance (representing the percentage of companies
in Chicago receiving slower deliveries) has increased
over 1986. Current levels of vendor performance are
slightly higher than the average of 50 percent
experienced in 1984 and 1985. The increase in vendor
performance implies that the Illinois economy is
improving: when business orders increase past some
point, firms begin to find it difficult to make timely
deliveries. Help wanted advertising indexes for both
Chicago and St. Louis have increased: another
indication of an improvement in the Illinois economy.
The Chicago index has increased fairly consistently
over the year and compares favorably with the
1984-1985 average of 93. While the St. Louis index has
not shown a consistent upward trend, it increased
substantially in November and again compares
favorably with the 1984-1985 average of 60. Coal
production remained fairly constant over most of the
past year, except for decreases of about 20 percent in
July and November. Production of petroleum products
fell substantially in 1986, approximately 25 percent for
the year. The behavior of Illinois production in both
markets is comparable to the sluggish markets
nationwide, reflecting the glut in the energy market.
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ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
Chart 1. Composite Leading Indicators (Average Percent
Change in Base Indexes]
Chart 2. Vendor Performance (percentage of companies
receiving slower deliveries)
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of shipments, and new capital expenditures); Service
Industries; Building Permits; Employment; Employ-
ment, Hours, and Earnings; Labor Force Statistics; and
Population. These data will be useful to scholars and
students, newspapers, state and local government
agencies, businessmen, lawyers, accounting firms,
management firms—in short any one seeking market
or location information. The book will be available in
paperback ($25), and users with heavier analysis needs
will be able to purchase the book on diskette ($40).
Also available is the 1 987 Illinois Economic Outlook.
For further information about these publications,
contact the Bureau of Economic and Business Research,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 428
Commerce West, 1 206 South Sixth Street, Champaign,
IL 61820 (217-333-2330).
' n 4 March 1 987 Illinois Governor James Thompson
unveiled a variety of proposals to increase state tax
revenues. To finance the $22.1 billion budget he
presented to the General Assembly, he called for
additional revenues from four major sources: a higher
personal income tax rate, a sales tax broadened to
include some services, an increased gasoline tax, and
an increase in the automobile license plate fee.
Offsetting these increases would be a one-half percent
reduction in the sales tax rate and an increase in the
personal exemption, which is the amount an individual
can exclude per dependent before paying state income
tax.
The Governor's view—one that is shared by many
others—is that state expenditures must expand if
Illinois is to achieve a variety of goals he and many in
the legislature hope to accomplish. Table 1 gives the
Governor's estimates of revenue gains and losses from
his proposals. In all, he projects a gain of $ 1 .056 billion
in the fiscal year ending June 1988 and $1,596 billion
in fiscal year 1989.
It is not our purpose to argue the relative merits and
pitfalls of raising new revenues for the state
government. We are willing to believe that the case has
been made for a tax increase. Rather, this article
presents an analysis of the implications of the
Governor's proposal and offers alternatives that might
be considered because they take greater advantage of
the recent changes in federal tax laws.
Federal Tax Changes
Prior to 1987, Illinois residents who itemized
deductions on their federal returns could subtract state
and local income, sales, and property taxes from their
taxable income. The saving to each taxpayer depended
on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. For example, if a
person with a marginal tax rate of 40 percent paid
$2,000 in state and local taxes, the deduction lowered
his or her federal tax bill by $800. For all Illinois
taxpayers together, the savings were considerable,
amounting to several billion dollars each year.
Under the new federal law, state and local income
and property taxes remain deductible, but sales taxes
are not. Even though federal tax rates have been
lowered, making all deductions less valuable, the loss
of the sales tax deduction will still be felt by many of
the state's taxpayers.
In addition, state personal income tax collections are
expected to increase as a result of changes in federal
law. This is because the new federal tax law eliminates
a number of tax preferences or "loopholes," making a
greater share of individual income subject to the
federal—and state—tax (because Illinois essentially
follows federal procedures on such matters). While
federal tax rates have been reduced, the Illinois rate has
not. Assuming the rate remains the same, the increased
revenue to the state may be as much as $100 million,
according to the Illinois Economic and Fiscal
Commission.
However, given the new federal law, it would also be
possible for the state to increase its revenues without
significantly increasing the combined federal-state
burden on Illinois taxpayers. Specifically, the state
could reduce the nondeductible sales tax and make up
for the lost revenue by increasing its still deductible
income tax.
A shift from the sales to the income tax would also
make the state's tax system more progressive; that is,
the tax burden would be lessened for those with low to
moderate incomes and increased for those with higher
earnings. This is because the proportion of family
income that goes to pay for sales taxes is usually higher
for low-income individuals and families than for those
with high incomes.
The following analysis details the effects of these
changes on state revenues and individual taxpayers
Table 1. Thompson's Tax Proposals
Revenue
(millions of dollars)
Proposed Change
Table 2. Alternative Proposals
Moreover, even with higher state income tax rates,
and a lower sales tax, the combined state and federal
tax burden for the state's taxpayers need not change.
In short, raising the state income tax rate and lowering
its sales tax rate would not significantly alter the state's
standing as a relatively low-tax state or otherwise
seriously impair its competitive standing. Indeed, there
may well be advantages to a lower sales tax
rate
—
particularly for merchants in border areas—not
to mention the real advantages that low- and
moderate-income families would enjoy under an
adjustment making the state's tax structure less
regressive.
Summary
Illinois public officials are currently debating what
might be done to raise new revenues to support
necessary elements of state government. The new
federal tax laws have eliminated the deductibility of
state sales taxes, providing the state with an
opportunity to make a beneficial adjustment in its tax
system. By lowering or eliminating the sales tax and
modestly raising its income tax, Illinois can capture a
substantial federal subsidy. The windfall can be used
either to lower the real tax burden of Illinois taxpayers
or increase state tax revenues without increasing the
burden to Illinois taxpayers. Our analysis indicates that
the state could generate more than $500 million in
additional money without significantly increasing the
net burden of federal and Illinois taxes on most of the
state's taxpayers. The change in the Illinois tax
structure would also move the state toward a fully
proportional tax system. It would lessen the tax burden
for low- and moderate-income families, while
increasing it for those with incomes above $50,000.
REED OLSEN
Labor Force Developments in Illinois
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Re».ecent labor force disturbances in Illinois are
short-term phenomena that are expected to lead to
long-term growth. Illinois unemployment rates have
been higher than those for the Unites States as a whole
since early 1979. In earlier periods of national economic
weakness, Illinois unemployment rates followed
national trends but remained lower than those for the
nation. Employment ratios for Illinois (the ratio of
employment to population) have recently fallen below
those for the United States, and Illinois has lost
high-paying manufacturing jobs at a faster rate than has
the country as a whole. Illinois manufacturing jobs have
been replaced in part with traditionally lower-paying
service jobs.
These labor force disturbances have been regarded as
evidence of the relative weakness of the Illinois
economy. But in light of the fact that the United States
as a whole is experiencing a shift from a manufacturing
economy to a service economy, it can be argued that
current employment changes in Illinois are the means
of assuring Illinois of a secure position in the future US
economy.
This article presents labor force and employment
data comparing Illinois with the United States and
other states over a period of time. First, there is a
discussion of the methods by which the statistics are
developed; this discussion provides insights into the
strengths and weaknesses of the alternative methods.
Second, historical evidence is presented comparing
labor force developments in Illinois and the United
States. Finally, the view that recent labor force
disturbances in Illinois will lead to a long-term
improvement in the Illinois economy is discussed.
Labor force data from other states are also presented
supporting the view that the Illinois economy will
improve in the long term.
Overview of Methods
Estimates of employment and unemployment in the
US are developed according to three different methods.
Industrial employment is estimated using information
collected directly from firms.' Household survey data
are used for the United States as a whole and for 13
states and regions, including Illinois." Econometric and
statistical techniques are used to estimate the labor
statistics for the remaining states, local areas, and
regions.'
Industrial employment for the US and Illinois is
collected by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
information is collected as a supplement to each
establishment's quarterly unemployment insurance
reports. For an establishment making products in more
than one industry, the entire employment is counted
under the industry of the principal product. The chief
strength of industrial employment statistics is that
they include most establishments in the country.
Those employed consist of workers on payrolls who
received pay for any part of the month in question that
includes the twelfth day of the month. The major
weakness of industrial employment statistics is that
they exclude proprietors, self-employed workers,
unpaid volunteer/family workers, farm workers, and
domestic workers.
As part of its continuing current population survey,
the Bureau of the Census conducts a monthly
household survey. For purposes of the survey, an
individual is placed in one of three categories:
employed; unemployed; or out of the labor force. A
person is considered employed if he or she works as a
paid employee for any time during the week in
question. Also considered as employed are people who
worked 15 hours or more as an unpaid employee for a
family business or who were temporarily absent from
jobs due to sickness, vacation, bad weather, and so on.
A respondent who is not employed is considered as
unemployed if two conditions are met. First, it is
necessary that the person be available for work except
for temporary illness. Second, it is generally necessary
for the person to have made some specific effort to find
employment.
The labor force is defined as the sum of employment
and unemployment. The unemployment rate is derived
from these estimates. It is the ratio of unemployment
to the labor force, and, thus, it has all the weaknesses
of a ratio. It can get larger for several reasons:
unemployment may rise; the labor force may fall;
unemployment may rise more rapidly than the labor
force; or the labor force may fall more rapidly than
unemployment. Any given short-term change in the
unemployment rate can reflect alternative underlying
economic scenarios. Hence, short-term changes in the
unemployment rate may provide a misleading indicator
of the strength or weakness of the economy.
Beyond the ratio problem, there is a view that labor
markets work in a way that can induce other problems
of short-term interpretation. For example, from time to
time unemployment may rise as employment
opportunities improve. People who have been outside
the labor force may be induced to enter it because plenty
of jobs appear to be available. But if they do not find
jobs immediately, the rate of growth in unemployment
can be more rapid than the growth in employment. It
can be argued that such an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate reflects strength in the underlying economy,
not weakness.
Likewise, unemployment may fall as employment
opportunities worsen. People who were in the labor
force, but unemployed, may become discouraged by the
lack of job opportunities and leave the labor force. If
unemployment declines more rapidly than employ-
ment, the unemployment rate will fall. Even so, the
decline reflects underlying weakness in the economy,
not strength.
Employment ratios, defined here as the proportion of
the population employed, are another measure of the
economic situation. But employment ratios do not have
the problems inherent to the unemployment rate. The
two components of the employment ratio, population
and employment, are substantially independent—at
least in the short term. Thus, for example, a short-term
rise in employment would not cause population to rise.
The population of an area changes by virtue of changes
in birth/death rates and through population shifts
among geographic areas. Birth/death rates tend to be
fairly stable over the short term. Thus, short-term
changes in employment ratios tend to reflect
employment changes.
Historical Evidence
Unemployment rates, employment ratios, and
industrial employment statistics, as traditionally
interpreted, suggest that the Illinois economy has
weakened relative to the nation as a whole.
Charts 1 and 2 present US and Illinois unemployment
rates and employment ratios, respectively. Notice that
both series suggest that Illinois, during the 70s, was
relatively better off than the nation as a whole. Illinois
unemployment rates were lower than US unemploy-
ment rates until 1980. Employment ratios were larger
in Illinois than in the United States until 1984.
Comparisons of recent Illinois and US unemploy-
ment rates suggest that the Illinois economy has begun
to fare poorly relative to the country as a whole. Since
1980, Illinois unemployment rates have been 1.3
percent higher, on average, than US rates. While Illinois
employment ratios fell below US ratios in 1984, the
relative decline has been quite small.
Long-term changes in employment ratios for Illinois
reflect, at least in part, the outflow of population from
Illinois. From 1970 to 1985 population growth in the
US was expanding at a 1 .05 percent average annual rate.
Such an increase implied stable birth/death rates.
Moreover, because the US has stringent immigration
laws, there has not been a large influx of people into
the US from abroad. Illinois has had a much lower
growth rate than the nation as a whole. The Illinois
population has grown at a 0.24 percent average annual
rate with some years showing population declines.
Assuming Illinois birth/death rates similar to those in
the country as a whole, population has been leaving
Illinois.
There are two conflicting explanations for the loss of
population in Illinois. First, lack of employment
opportunities and low wages in a geographic area
provide incentives for workers to move from that area.
Moreover, it is the young and highly skilled workers
that are more likely to move from a depressed region.
Younger workers have more time to reap the benefits
of moving than older workers. There is a view that the
older, chronically unemployed workers remain,
thereby weakening the economy further. According to
such considerations, employment ratios in Illinois
would overstate the strength of the Illinois economy.
Another explanation of the outflow of population
from Illinois is that workers' geographic preferences
have changed. Sun states—such as Florida, Texas,
Arizona, and California—have had large increases in
population. From 1970 to 1980 the population of these
four states increased at a 3.6 percent average annual
rate, much higher than the US average during the same
period.
Chart 1. Unemployment Rates (unemployment/labor
force)
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Businesses tend to locate where they can be assured
of a continued supply of skilled workers. As workers
relocate, employment tends to follow. Likewise, if a
region loses skilled workers due to changing geographic
preferences, employment would also be expected to
decrease in the long term. However, although Illinois
has experienced population outflows, employment has
continued to increase. Thus, the increase in Illinois
employment is an indication that the Illinois economy
has been improving.
Charts 3 and 4 present Illinois and US employment
in manufacturing and services as a proportion of total
nonagricultural employment. They show similarities
for the country and Illinois. Manufacturing employ-
ment has decreased sharply while services and trade
employment has increased for both Illinois and the
United States. However, differences in the experience
of Illinois compared with the nation provide insights
in understanding the change in the relative economic
status of Illinois (see Charts 3 and 4).
Even though the Illinois economy has shown the
same trends as the nation as a whole, the deterioration
in Illinois manufacturing has been at a faster rate. US
manufacturmg employment fell from 27.3 percent of
total employment in 1970 to 19.8 percent in 1985, a
decline of 27.5 percent. In Illinois, manufacturing
employment fell from 31.3 percent of the total
employment to 20.6 percent over the same period, a 34
percent decline.
A New Interpretation of Historical Evidence
There is no doubt that the loss of jobs in the
traditionally strong manufacturing sector of the Illinois
economy has contributed to the current relatively high
unemployment rates in Illinois. The traditional
interpretation of such developments, as discussed
earlier, is that high unemployment rates and loss of
manufacturing jobs reflect a weakening of the Illinois
economy. It is important to recognize, however, that a
fundamental change has occurred in the US economy
as a whole. Corresponding changes in the Illinois
economy are necessary for its long-term strength.
The strength of the Illinois economy over much of
the century has been in its manufacturing sector, but
manufacturing has not always been the base of the
Illinois economy. As in the United States as a whole,
agriculture served as the Illinois economy's basic
industry through much of its early history. By moving
earlier to a manufacturing-based economy, Illinois was
assured of a strong economy throughout much of the
twentieth century.
The US economy is again in transition, moving away
from manufacturing toward a services economy. In the
long term, the Illinois economy would be strengthened
by adjusting quickly to the shift. As it turns out, Illinois
has begun to make the transition. As shown in Chart
3, services employment has increased from 15.6 percent
of total nonagricultural employment in 1970 to 23.1
percent in 1 985; an increase of 48 percent. During the
same period, US service employment increased from
16.3 percent of total nonagricultural employment to
22.5 percent, an increase of 38 percent. Although
Illinois started the transition from manufacturing to
services later than the country as a whole, it has been
changing more rapidly. Thus, it is plausible to expect
that Illinois unemployment rates will fall relative to
the US average as the transition is completed.
Data from 13 states, presented in Charts 5, 6, and 7,
substantiate the view that the US economy is in
transition. All the states in the sample have a fairly
large population, and none depends on agriculture as
its basic industry. The states are divided into two basic
types. Type A states either began later or have not yet
begun to move from manufacturing to services and
include Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin. Type B states began the transition from
manufacturing to services fairly early and include
Arizona, California, Florida, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, and Texas.
Chart 5. Industrial Employment for Type A States
(proportion of industry to total nonagricultural)
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same period Type B states have consistently had lower
unemployment rates than the US. However, the gap
between Type A and Type B unemployment rates has
narrowed somewhat in the last two years.
The implication for Illinois is that current high
unemployment rates are short term and are a result of
the transition from a manufacturing to a service-based
economy. If this view is correct, Illinois will be better
off in the long term by encouraging the transition to
occur as quickly as possible.
Notes
'issues of Employment and Earnings, published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, have detailed information on how industrial
establishment data is gathered.
^For detailed information on the estimation of survey labor force
statistics see a current issue of Employment and Earnings
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In addition to the
United States, survey data for the 13 states and regions—New
York, California, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Texas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Florida, Los
Angeles SMSA (standard metropolitan statistical area) and New
York SMSAs, are considered reliable enough to be used directly
from the Current Population Survey.
^Detailed information on the estimation of local area and region
labor force statistics can be found in the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Manual for Developing Local Area Unemployment Statistics.
ROGER E. CANNADAY, EUGENE W. STUNARD, AND
MARK A. SUNDERMAN
Property Tax Assessment: Measures and
Tests of Uniformity Applied to Chicago
Condominiums
A.,.n important issue of concern to taxpayers,
assessors, and others is the uniformity of property tax
assessments. Ideally, for a given class of property in a
particular jurisdiction the assessed value should be the
same fraction of the market value for each such
property. Unfortunately, the achievement of this ideal
is difficult m practice. Indeed, the sheer complexity of
the problem insures that there will be some inequity.
The questions, thus, are what level of inequity is
acceptable and how is the inequity to be measured and
tested.
Several measures and tests have been developed to
address the issue of assessment uniformity. In a recent
study on which this article is based, these measures
and tests were applied to a sample of Chicago
condominiums. The purpose of this article is to
demonstrate the possibility of inconsistent results
when these measures and tests are used.
A key problem in applying measures and tests of
assessment uniformity is to develop estimates of
market value. Most often, actual sales prices are used
as a proxy for market value. There are at least two
potential difficulties with this practice. One difficulty
arises if sales prices are not all adjusted to the date for
which assessed values are estimated. The second
difficulty emerges if the properties that sold during that
year are not representative of all properties in that
jurisdiction (or sub-area being tested in that
jurisdiction).
The use of a price index is a means of overcoming
these difficulties, at least to some extent. With a price
index it is possible to adjust sales prices for date of sale
so that market values are all estimated for the same
date. Further, use of a price index allows sales over a
period of several years to be used, thereby increasing
the probability that the sample of properties is
representative of all properties.
There are two basic types of inequity that may be
present if assessments are not uniform. The first type
IS horizontal inequity, defined as a situation in which
persons having similar properties with the same market
value pay different property taxes because their
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assessed values are not the same. The second type is
vertical inequity, defined as a difference between the
ratios of assessed value to market value that is
systematically related to price level. For example, if
lower-priced properties are systematically assessed at a
higher percentage of market value than are higher-
priced properties, the vertical inequity is characterized
as regressive; the reverse is characterized as progressive.
exact form of this relationship varies by the type of test
used, as can be seen in Table 1. For example, relating
predicted sales prices directly to their corresponding
assessed values is proposed by Paglin and Fogarty.
Statistical techniques may be used to develop estimates
of the parameters bo and b, for Test (1). There is no
vertical inequity if the estimated bo is not significantly
different from zero. Note that if by is not significantly
Table 1. Tests of Vertical Inequity
Test Equation Question Proposed by
ID
developed on the basis of the combined sample for all
three areas. However, it is suspected that each of these
three areas may be a distinct sub-market and a separate
price index for each of the three areas may be more
appropriate. The price index for the Gold Coast area is
based on 109 sales in four buildings located within a
three block area on the west side of North Lake Shore
Drive. The Streeterville area price index is based on 295
sales in three buildings located near the intersection of
Michigan Avenue and Chestnut Street, on the east side
of Michigan Avenue. The Sandburg Village price index
is based on 1 20 sales in four buildings clustered around
the intersection of Schiller Street and Sandburg Terrace.
The Sandburg Village buildings are only about five
blocks west of Lake Shore Drive (the prestige street
address in the Gold Coast area) and were thought to be
a logical choice for units that sell in the lower priced
segment of the market.
Tests for Assessment Uniformity
The two types of inequity that may be present when
assessments are not uniform are horizontal and vertical
inequity. The results reported below indicate the
inconsistencies among three measures of horizontal
inequity and five tests of vertical inequity.
Measures of Horizontal Inequity
As indicated previously, there is horizontal inequity
in the assessment of condominiums in this sample and
the three measures presented in Table 2 provide an
indication of the extent of this inequity. The
coefficients of dispersion are all below 15 percent, so
they meet the standard specified by the lAAO for
residential areas. The horizontal inequity is lowest for
the Sandburg Village area on the basis of all three
measures. However, the measures are not consistent in
ranking the level of horizontal inequity for the other
areas.
Tests of Vertical Inequity
The five tests of vertical inequity presented earlier
in Table 1 were conducted for the entire sample and
for each of the sub-area samples. Tests based on the
entire sample and on the Streeterville sub-area sample
consistently show that there is vertical inequity.
However, the results are mixed for the other two
sub-areas.
For the Gold Coast sub-area sample, opposite
conclusions are reached on the basis of the four more
traditional tests and the Kochin and Parks test. The
four traditional tests consistently indicate that there is
vertical inequity while the Kochin and Parks test
indicates that there is not.
Table 3. Indication of Regressivity
Table 2. Measures of Horizontal Inequity
and Sandburg Village samples. It should be remembered
that these results may be applicable only to this specific
data set. It is not known how representative this data
set is of all the condominium units in the 1 1 buildings
of our sample, in the study area, or in the North
Township.
There are numerous extensions of this study that can
be considered for future research. For example, a similar
study based on 1984 assessed values would be of
particular interest. Cook County is divided into four
quadrants for assessment purposes and each quadrant
is reassessed every four years. The quadrant in which
the current study area is located was assessed in 1980
and reassessed in 1 984. The 1 983 assessed values used
in this study reflect 1980 assessments updated to 1983
by the application of county-wide equalization factors.
In addition, it is understood that the procedures for
estimating assessed values of condominiums were
improved by the Cook County Assessors Office
between 1980 and 1984. A study based on 1984 assessed
values could detect whether there was any improve-
ment in assessment uniformity, at least for our sample.
A second possible extension of this study is to
attempt to resolve the question of which test for
vertical inequity is the most appropriate. It is important
to resolve this question since we reach opposite
conclusions on the basis of the traditional tests and the
Kochin and Parks test for two of our sub-area samples,
just as Kochin and Parks did for their King County,
Washington, sample.
Roger E. Cannadayis an associate professor offinance
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;
Eugene W. Stunard, M.A.I., is president of Appraisal
Research Counselors, Ltd., Chicago; and Mark A.
Sunderman is an assistant professor of finance at the
University of Wyoming, Laramie. This research was
supported by the Office of Real Estate Research at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A more
detailed report of the study on v/hich this article is
based is available from the Office of Real Estate
Research of the University of Illinois as ORER Paper
No. 34.
CARLA TIGHE
Illinois Waterways
Illinois lakes and rivers contribute an important
source of transportation for the state. Illinois has 1,110
miles of navigable waterways and also borders Lake
Michigan for 60 navigable miles, and thus has access
to the South via the Mississippi and to the Atlantic via
the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway system. For this
reason, Illinois has the largest inland commercial
navigation system in the United States. The workings
of this mode of transportation, however, are not widely
understood. This article focuses on these workings,
looking at the extent of the water transport system, the
existing publicly and privately maintained infrastruc-
tures, and the role of Illinois waterways in the state's
economy.
About the System
The chart shows contribution of each Illinois river
to the 1,110 navigable miles in Illinois. The Mississippi,
Illinois, and Ohio rivers constitute 91 percent of the
total Illinois navigable mileage. Most traffic on the Lake
Michigan shore is by what is known as deep-draft
vessels. (Draft is the difference between the water level
and the lowest point of the vessel under water). The
Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway can accommodate
ships having drafts of up to 25.75 feet. But the
maximum draft on the inland waterway system is only
nine feet. Therefore, barges rather than ships are used
on Illinois rivers.
Infrastructure
A water transportation system depends on more than
just river mileage. Also necessary are terminal facilities
providing docks and cargo-handling. Illinois has quite
an adequate supply of such facilities. Of the 102
counties in the state, 43 are located on navigable
waterways, and 37 counties have one or more
terminals. In total, 344 terminals operate in the state,
each having one or more ports. Most terminals act as
intermodal transfer points, where goods are moved
from ships or barges to trucks or rail cars, and vice
versa. Both private and public terminals border the
shores of Illinois waters.
Approximately 75 percent of all of the state's
terminals are privately owned by companies that ship
their own products exclusively. The other 25 percent,
or 86 terminals, are operated as public utilities.
The most active forms of government involvement
in water transportation is achieved through 1 1 port
districts created by the Illinois General Assembly in
order to promote, plan, develop, and operate water
ports. Their purpose is to attract recreational as well as
commercial and industrial projects to Illinois shores.
Port districts operate as separate entities and, for the
most part, are financially independent of the remainder
of the state government.
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Illinois Inland Waterways*
a (.54%)
b (2.16%)
c (1.26%)
d (2.7%)
f (2.7%)
a = Calumet River
b = Cal-Sag Channel (includes Little Calumet River|
c = Chicago River
d = Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal
e = Illinois River (includes Des Plaines River)
f=Kaskaskia River
g=Lake Calumet
h = Mississippi River
i = Ohio River
j = Waukegan Harbor
Source Illinois Depanment oi Transportation
*Lake Michigan not included
Another way in which government affects water
trade is through the use of Foreign Trade Zones.
Authority to operate Foreign Trade Zones is granted to
port districts by the federal government. Foreign Trade
Zones, not considered part of the US, are enclosed
areas located near major ports. Therefore, goods within
the zone are not subject to US Customs laws. Foreign
businesses can use the zones as places to keep
commodities subject to import quotas, to exhibit items
to American investors, or to combine imported and
American goods. Thus the presence of Foreign Trade
Zones in Illinois can attract both export and import
trade by providing cost savings that otherwise would
be foregone. Illinois presently has four Foreign Trade
Zones, in Chicago, Tri-City Harbor (near Granite City),
Peoria, and the Quad Cities. Another zone will open
soon near Lawrenceville.
Barge loadings, in contrast, were of a much greater
order of magnitude, 56.7 million tons. Much of Illinois
exports rely upon barge transport. In 1980, Illinois
waterbome exports and imports combined totalled 65.7
million tons valued at $20.6 billion. Overseas
waterbome exports for the state were 37.2 million tons
worth $9.4 billion. During that same year, the gross
state product for 1980 was $138.5 billion. Hence,
Illinois overseas waterbome exports represented 7
percent of gross state product.
A large proportion of Illinois exports are agricultural
commodities such as com, soybeans, and wheat. In
1980, Illinois was the leading agricultural exporting
state in terms of both tonnage and value. The state was
also the fourth largest manufacturing exporter. Other
goods shipped on the inland waterway system include
coal, chemicals, petroleum, sand, and gravel. The
products shipped on the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence
Seaway system consist primarily of coal, iron ore, and
iron and steel products.
The waterbome commerce system also plays a key
role in distributing imported goods throughout the
state. Illinois imported 28.5 million tons on its
waterways in 1980, valued at $11.3 billion. Not
surprisingly, about 60 percent were petroleum
products, and another 25 percent were manufactured
goods.
Clearly, Illinois waterways provide an important
source of transportation. Barges and ships are used both
to distribute goods within the state and to allow Illinois
to trade with other states and countries. The extensive
navigable mileage, plus a well-organized infrastructure,
provide cheap and efficient means of carrying millions
of tons of cargo each year. These factors make Illinois
waterways the largest inland commercial navigation
system in the country.
Carlo Tighe is a formeigraduate student in the Bureau
of Economic and Business Research. She is presently
teaching at the University of Virginia.
Economic Impact
Clearly, a substantial lake and river network actively
operates within Illinois. But how much does this
system mean to the Illinois economy? The most recent
export and import statistics available are for 1983.
During that year, deep-draft imports totaled 3 million
tons, and deep-draft exports equaled 800,000 tons,
making deep-draft vessels relatively more important for
imports.
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Illinois Business Indexes
Tkhe Illinois economy is expected to continue its
expansion over the next two quarters. As Chart 1
shows, both the three-month (MA3) and six-month
(MA6) moving average indexes increased throughout
most of 1986. Further, the three-month moving average
remained above the six-month moving average during
virtually all of the past year. The indexes continued
their strong upward movement through January 1987,
indicating future growth in the Illinois economy.
Construction activity in Illinois has expanded in the
past year. The expansion in activity (as measured by
building permits) has been widespread, as most sectors
of the Illinois economy have increased substantially
over previous levels. In the past year, monthly building
permits for residential housing units increased an
average of 28 percent over months for the previous year.
The value of residential housing units had an even
larger increase, 49 percent over the previous year. The
value of industrial buildings increased an average of 89
percent over the previous year. In addition, the value
of stores and other mercantile buildings rose 49 percent
over the previous year. The only series that showed
declines on average was the value of office, banks, and
professional buildings. It had an average monthly
decrease of 21 percent for the past year.
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
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JOHN F. DUE
Proposed Application of the Illinois Sales
Tax to Services
i. he issue of the appUcation of the Illinois sales tax
to services, under serious discussion on several
occasions in the past, was revived by Governor
Thompson's Budget Message proposal for the 1 987-88
fiscal year, to extend the sales tax to "include personal,
repair, entertainment, and business services effective 1
January 1988." The issue was also discussed, without
recommendation, in the 25 February 1 987 report of the
Revenue Review Committee, chaired by Douglas L.
Whitley. Because of strong opposition, primarily from
the business community, the governor indicated in
mid-May that he was dropping the proposal; but the
issue is certain to arise again.
The Arguments for the Taxation of Services
Under the usual standards of taxation, there is no
basic reason why sales taxes should be confined to
commodities; the tendency to do so, with minor
exceptions, in Illinois and many states, is more the
product of historical accident than logic. The objective
of a sales tax is to distribute the costs of governmental
services in relation to consumer spending, with the
usual and reasonable assumption that the taxes are
shifted forward by the firms from which the tax is
collected to the consumers of the products. Acquisition
of service by households constitutes consumption
expenditure in the same fashion as the purchase of
commodities; there is no basic difference between the
two that warrants different tax treatment. Consumers
gain satisfaction from services just as they do from
commodities.
Application of sales tax to consumer services offers
several specific advantages. By application of the tax to
services, a given sum of revenue can be raised by a lower
tax rate, thus lessening pressure to evade and to make
purchases outside the state. Discrimination in favor of
persons who spend greater than average percentages of
their incomes on services would be eliminated, as well
as the incentive to spend more on tax-free services and
less on taxable commodities. On services provided by
firms already registered because they make commodity
sales, application of the tax to the services they render
would simphfy both compliance and enforcement since
all their charges would be taxable, instead of only part
of them. The services sector of the economy is growing
more rapidly than other sectors, and thus the elasticity
of revenue relative to changes in total income would
be increased.
It is also comiiionlv argued that the taxation of
services woiiKl make tlie tax less re);iessive or more
progressive, since the portion ol income spent on
services rises as incomes rise. This argument woiilii he
vahil if, in fact, all services coiiUl he taxed, hut some
ot the most progressive ones, relative to income, cannot
be readied: foreign travel, expensive education out of
state, personal/household services, and tlie like.
Various studies suggest that on the whole taxation of
services does not significantly alter the distrihutional
pattern, and taxation of some types v^ill make the tax
more regressive. lUit the other arguments for taxing
services are significant.
Some objections raised against taxing services make
no sense whatever. For example, it is sometimes argued
that since persons pay tax on tlie purchase of a
commodity it is unlau to reipure tiiem to pay for
cleaning or repairing it. There is no logic to such an
argument; expenditures for cleaning and repair are
consumption expenditures, just as those on the original
purchases. Service establishments complain about
potential compliance costs, but at present purely
service establishments are favored over sellers of
commodities.
The Primary Problciii with Genera! Taxation of Services
IX'spite the valid arguments for the taxing of services,
111 doing so one encounters a very basic problem, that
1)1 distinguishing between services rendered to
household consumers and those supplied to business
firms. As noted earlier, the ratu)nale ot sales taxation
is that of distribution of tax burden in relation to
consumer spending, through taxation of sales to
household consumers. To tax business inputs, that is,
purchases tor business use, is contrary to this basic
rationale, and is objectionable in several respects.
First, taxes resting on business inputs, like other
business expenses, are certain, in general, to be passed
forward to the final consumers. This occurs, however,
111 a haphazard and unplanned (ashioii as compareil to
the taxes on consumer expenditures on various goods,
since the ratio of taxable inputs to final sale prices will
vary widely. Secondly, and perhaps most seriously,
taxing inputs places Illinois lirms, particuLuK'
manutacturers, at a competitive disadvantage
compared to those in states or in countries that have
made strong efforts to exclude business inputs from tax.
The European countries particularly have confined the
burden ot their sales taxes—which take the toriii ot
value-added taxes—to sales to final consumers.
Thirdly, taxation of business inputs encourages firms
to produce the inputs themselves or, with services, to
provide the services with their own employees, rather
than aciiuiiiiig them from other firms and paying tax
on their aeqinsition. By diiing so they will pay tax only
on the materials, not on the labor costs involved in
productum. Finally, choice of methods of production
will be altered from the most efficient ones, since some
are likely to he subject to more tax, per unit of final
output, than others.
llliiuns was very slow to recognize the dcsirahilitv of
colli iniiig sales taxes so far as possible to consumption
purchases. There was little clear recognition, especially
in early years of the taxes, of the undesirable
consequences of taxing business inputs, and "taxing
business" always has political appeal, even if it is
illogical. To the lawyers who wrote and interpreted the
law, it appeared perfectly logical to exempt sales for
resale and sales of physical ingredients and parts from
the tax as not being retail sales and yet to apply the tax
to all other sales to business firms. The latter policy is
completely illogical from an economic point of view
and injures Illinois business.
The reluctance ot Illinois and other states to change
policy was, in part, recognition, stressed by tax
administrators, that distinguishing between sales to
consumers and sales for business use is difficult. Many
commodities are used for both consumption and
business use, and the retailer cannot determine use at
the time of sales; even the purchaser may not kni)w.
The same system could be used for all business inputs
as is now used for materials and parts and sales for
resale; the purchaser can be required to present an
exemption certificate to Ins supplier for all purchases
for business use. This method is not foolproof, and some
leakage would undoubtedly result, although West
Virginia, and to a lesser extent Ohio, have used this
system tor decades without serious problems. But it is
concern with the problem of escape that has
particularly deterred Illinois from trying to exclude all
business inputs, even though many business inputs are
not used significantly tor consumption purposes.
Change has tinally occurred in the last two decades by
excluding industrial and farm machinery, items that
are not used at all for consumption purposes, from tax.
Recognition of the undesirability of taxing business
inputs when it is feasible to exclude them strongly
suggests that if the sales tax is applied to services, it
should not be applied to those services rendered
primarily to business firms. For a simple example,
suppose that bookkeeping firms are subject to tax. Their
customers are given a strong incentive to hire
additional staff and perform the bookkeeping within
the firm. The firms most capable of doing so efficiently
are the larger firms; smaller ones will he penalized by
the tax. Similar considerations apply to legal services,
computer systems analysis, and numerous others. Yet
some of the proposals for taxing services make no
distinction between these services rendered primarily
to business and those of primary consumption use.
rhe priiblem remains, however, even it this route is
followed, with services rendered primarily to
households, but in part to business firms, as for
example, repair. So long as no serious effort is made to
exclude all purchases of goods bv business firms, it can
be argued that taxation ot some services rendered to
business firms is tolerable. But it must be recognized
that this is only a second best approach, made necessary
by the difficulty of excluding purchases for business
use of goods and services ot types also purchased for
eonsumption.
In two respects, taxation of services provided to
business firms is more serious than the equivalent
taxation of commodities sold for business use. First, it
is much easier for firms to provide services by their
own eniphiyees iiisteaii of acqiiirinf; them from
iiuiepemient firms than it is to proiiiiee commodities.
It IS relalively simple lor lirms at least larj;et ones to
iituleitake tluii own hooi<keepiiij;, aecoimtinj;, or le>;al
work; it is not nearly as easy for a firm to commence
to produce commodities tiiriiitiire, lor example now
purchaseil.
The second dilterence relates to niteistale
tiansactions. The ehiel source ol leakage ol levi'niie
with the present sales tax is that ot interstate purchases.
With commodities, at least a physical object crosses
the state line, thouKh it may be difliciilt to enloice
payment ol tax on the purchases. lUit with services
perlormcd outside the slate, nothnig tan>;ihle crosses
the border. This situation is not likely to encourage
persons to net haircuts or do household laundry outside
the state, but it is likely to ilo so with other services.
,Su|ipose, lor example, that truck repair is taxable A
truckiii); firm, not wishmj; to do its own repair work,
will have this performed out of state—and there is no
way that Illinois could possibly tax it. Out-of-state
lirmseomiiiK into the state totio repair or cleaning m
theory could be lorced to register and collect Illinois
tax, but many would escape. It an attempt were made
to tax advertising service, including amounts paid for
radio and TV advertising, in areas near state borders, as
tor exam|ile the CJuad cities, the advertisinj; coukl be
done on stations outside the borders. States that have
taxed advcrtisinj;, as tor example Iowa, have found it
so difficult that they have abandoned the attempt.
Florida under its 1^87 law is attempting to tax
nut ol-state atlvertisiiiKon the basis ol the portion that
appears in Florida, but it is dmibitiil that tins nile is
constitutional or enlorccable.
Special problems are raised by professional services.
One maioi set ol these services en.i;iiieerin>;,
consult ill); ol all types, computer work, accounting are
rendered primarily to business firms, and application
ol tax is therefore objectionable. A second set, which
involves a lai>;e portion ot total service expenditures,
consists ol medical, dental, and rclatc(.l hospital
services, legal, and general educational service.
Expenditures on some ol these arc pro>;ressive relative
to inconie. lUit as a matter of general social policy,
governments have been reluctant to tax them. Legal
services, which are related toobtainmg lustue, do not
appear suitable bases lor taxation.
Tax I'rcatnient of Services by Oilier States
When the sales tax was first introduced m the early
UXUlsllnst in Mississippi m l'^*.?!), it was applied (with
the exception ol t wostates| to sales of tangible personal
property, and thus .ill services were free of tax. As in
Illinois, there was no particular logic to the sharp
distinction belweeii physical commodities and
services; to many legislators, however, it appeared
feasible to tax all commodities, but not to tax all
services; thus tor simplicity, none of the latter were
included. Many services, such as medical, appeared to
be unsiiii.ible lor taxation. The other type of reasoning
was illogual but mlluenced legislators: the argument
that a tax on services was essentially a t.ix on the l.iboi
involved in rendering the services
Only two slates initially taxed .ill m viiiu.illy .ill
servici-s rendered to customers, as disiiiut Irom tli.it
piovided by employees to employeis, n.iiiiely ll.iwaii
anil New Mexico, and these states continue to do so.
South Dakota in 1979 broailened the base of its tax to
cover virtually all services. But no other states followed
this path (though it was diseusseil in several) until
I loud. 1 .idiled a very broad coverage ol serviics by
legislation in April 1987.
tiradually, however, as the states sought atldiiion.il
levenue, they brought in a few categories, undei tin-
sales tax or by a separate levy. I ransient aieoiniuod.i
tions (hotels, motels) were ultimately made taxable in
all states, at the state or local level. Public utility
services, at least electricity, gas, water, and telephone,
were made taxable in the majority ot states, rental ot
taxable properly m most, and admissions m a ma|ority.
Ultimately, somi' stales moved beyond these, to
include a small .uKliiinn.il number, and three states
taxed a substaiiti.il laiige, but lar from the general
coverage ot Hawaii, New Mexico, South Dakot.i, .iiul,
since April 1987, llorula.
I'hus as the situation siaiuis as ol this wniiiig, .ill
states and/or local governments tax houl and motel
services; the majority tax rental of tangible peisoii.il
pro|ierty, ami most utility services and .iilmissions.
Fwentythreest.iles t.ix no other services, and two have
added only laundry and dry cleaning; 14 have added a
small number of aililitional services; and three (Iowa,
W.ishiiigton, and West Virginia) a broad range Only
i law. Ill, New Mexico, South I )akota, and Florid. i .ipjily
tax to virtually all services.
These four slates apply the tax by a general provision,
making all services, commercial and professional,
rendered to customers taxable except ones specifically
exem|ited. New Mexico delines taxable gross receipts
lo include the amounts received "from performing
services in New Mexico. " Hawaii applies the tax "upon
every person engaged or continuing within the state
any service business." South Dakota applies the sales
tax "upon the gross receipts of any person from
engaging or continuing in the practice ot any business
in which a service is rendered."
The states that tax a broad, but not general, category
ot services do so by enumeration ot taxable services;
lor example the Iowa law specifics 64 categories similar
to those suggested for consideration in Illinois in the
concluding section of the article, but including some
business services. The states that tax services report no
particular problems in doing so.
Other Problems with the Illinois Sales Tax
The Whitley Commiitec has reviewed the state sales
tax in detail and pointed out features urgently needing
change. Space permits only brief observations here.
The slate has made several changes in the last two
decades in the state-local sales tax picture that have
complicated operation and, in some major instances,
cost substantial revenue. First, the exemption of
nonprescription drugs and medicines was a serious
error, as the experience of other states had long
demonstrated. Exemption of these items greatly
complicated compliance and administration, while the
expenditures on them represent only a small element
in family budgets.
Secondly, the variations in the bases of the local sales
taxes, particularly those arising from state law that
allows them to tax food and farm and industrial
machinery when the state does not tax these items,
causes major unnecessary complications. The problem
of the local taxes has been greatly aggravated by the
action of home rule cities in imposing their own locally
administered sales taxes on top of the state-adminis-
tered local sales taxes. This was a colossal error that
should never have been permitted by the state.
Differences in local sales tax rates, while a source of
nuisance, are tolerable and may be regarded as essential,
but differences in coverage are not. The long-standing
lack of local use taxes except on motor vehicles has
cost revenue and causes possible distortions in buying
patterns.
Beyond these obvious mistakes, serious questions
can be raised about the exemption of food from the
state levy, although politically, reversal is unlikely
(though Washington state did so in 1 982). The objective
of food exemption, highly desirable by usual standards
of equity, was to remove the tax burden from the lowest
income groups. But in doing so, food expenditures of
all families were unnecessarily removed from the
coverage of the tax. If the principle of taxing
consumption is accepted, there is no justification for
exempting all food, when other, simpler and less costly
methods are available to remove the sales tax burden
from the poor, namely a system of credits against state
income tax, refundable when the amount exceeds the
family's state income tax liability.
Conclusions on Services and Recommendations for
Change
The proposal to extend the Illinois sales tax to
services had merit in terms of the principle of sales
taxation although it proposed inclusion of many
business services. The most important rule is that tax
should be confined, so far as possible, to those services
rendered primarily to individual households, and not
applied to services rendered primarily to business firms.
Thus a more logical list would be comparable to that
of Iowa, in terms of major categories, as follows:
Hotel and motel service, preferably to be brought under the
sales tax rather than taxed by a separate levy; repair, cleaning,
storage, and rental of all taxable tangible personal property,
including all work on motor vehicles, taxable or not, and
parking; repair and maintenance of real property, including
such activities as interior decorating, pest control, security
systems, lawn and garden care, well drilling, excavating, house
moving; personal services, including beauty and barber shop
work, massage, tanning and reducing salons, dance schools,
dog training and grooming, flying schools, detective services,
telephone answering; admissions and all commercial
recreation, including golf and country club dues and charges,
campgrounds; photographic work; employment agencies; and
cable TV charges.
While some services to business firms would be
taxed, most of the burden would rest on consumer
services. These services should increase the sales tax
revenue by as much as 10 percent. On the basis of the
Iowa experience, most of the revenue would be yielded
by beauty shops and barber shops, auto repair and
services and other repair work, and admissions. To
apply the tax to all services would risk the same strong
adverse reaction as is occurring in Florida and injure
the business climate of the state.
To meet other problems with the sales tax, several
changes are urgently required, basically along the lines
of the Whitley Committee report; ( 1 ) make nonprescrip-
tion drugs and medicines taxable; (2) require uniformity
of base of the local and state sales taxes, including those
of the home rule cities (the home rule cities would be
allowed to use higher rates; (3| require state
administration of all local sales taxes, including those
of the home rule cities. Another option would be
possible increase in the state sales tax and use tax rate
to 6.25 percent, with allocation of the sales tax portion
on a point-of-sale basis, 1 percent to the municipalities,
.25 percent to the county, with distribution of the
additional state use tax by the state to the local
governments. Local sales and use taxes would end,
except that the home rule cities could levy up to 1
percent tax rates, the tax to be state collected.
These changes would solve the local-use-tax problem
and tremendously simplify the operation of the taxes.
These basic reforms, other than taxing services, would
not significantly increase revenue, unless food were
made taxable. But they would greatly simplify
operation of the taxes. In the process, redrafting of the
cumbersome and obsolete legislation would avoid
confusion.
This article has not sought to consider the basic issue:
should additional tax revenue be gained from extending
the base of the sales tax or by an increase in the state
income tax? The latter approach would be far simpler
in terms of compliance and administration and usual
standard of equity and can be justified on the basis that
the Illinois income tax is one of the lowest in the
country. The apparent shift by the governor in emphasis
from broad taxation of services to this approach in
mid-May has substantial merit.
John Due is a professor emeritus of the Department of
Economics at the University of lUinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
RONALD KRUMM AND NANCY MILLER
Household Savings and Homeownership
Tthe choice of homeownership involves the
investment of an often substantial portion of a
household's accumulated savings in their residence. It
is therefore likely that the decision to become a
homeowner or maintain ownership carries with it a
change in a household's pattern of saving. This study
examines the relationship between a household's
pattern of savings and the homeownership decision.
The issues addressed include the extent to which
savings accumulation may be altered prior to the
attainment of ownership (in an effort, for example, to
build up a sufficient home equity down payment) and
whether or not there is a long-term effect of
homeownership on the level and composition of
savings. We also examine the extent to which increased
home equity, associated with housing price
appreciation, is transferred into nonhousing savings in
order to achieve a more balanced investment portfolio.
Issues
For many households it is likely that the desired
timing of a home purchase does not coincide with that
at which normal household savings would be sufficient
to meet the required home equity down payment. In
the absence of any changes in savings accumulation,
the choice would be either to postpone the home
purchase or to purchase a less expensive home that
would provide fewer amenities. In order to reduce the
loss of homeownership and/or housing consumption
benefits, an alternative response would be to increase
savings in earlier years. To the extent that this occurs,
the savings accumulation of households renting their
residences but planning for ownership in the future will
exceed the savings of similar households not intending
to invest in housing.
Another factor influencmg the differences in savings
accumulation for purposes of homeownership is that
investment of a substantial portion of savings in home
equity is likely to restrict severely the liquidity of the
household's investment portfolio. In order to reduce the
risk of having to liquidate the housing equity in
response to future income shortages or expenditure
needs, a household may indeed, by the time of the home
purchase, accumulate savings beyond the amount
needed to cover the desired equity down payment. This
response would increase differences in savings
accumulation between renters who are and who are not
intending to purchase a home.
The increased savings accumulation up to the time
of a home purchase is different from the optimal pattern
that would occur in the absence of tenure-choice
considerations. Once the home is purchased, one
alternative would then be to return to the optimal
savings pattern by reducing the savings rate thereafter.
In this case, the decline in the rate of savings
accumulation shortly after the initial home purchase
would occur and in the long run would wipe out any
differences in savings accumulation between renters
and owners. As mentioned above, however, investment
of a substantial portion of a household's savings
portfolio in owner-occupied housing is likely to alter
the liquidity of the investment portfolio dramatically.
This could lead to a desired increase in the level of
nonhousing savings as well in order to cover
unanticipated contingencies that might occur during
the desired span of homeownership. While it is clear
that at least the equity portion of the home investment
is required by the time of the purchase, it may very
well be that accumulation of the associated level of
precautionary savings may be extended into the period
of homeownership itself. Under such circumstances,
the level of nonhousing savings after homeownership
would again be built up to serve as a precautionary
reserve. The result would be an increase in total desired
savings of the households throughout the duration of
homeownership.
Any long-lasting effects of homeownership on the
level of household savings may be examined by
evaluating savings patterns of households that switch
from homeownership to renting. A normal relationship
between savings accumulation, income, and
consumption patterns might indeed lead to the case
where the decision to liquidate housing equity is based
on the desire to use accumulated home equity to
support consumption in the retirement years.
Unfortunately, the data used in this analysis are not
rich enough to evaluate such patterns fully. However,
they do allow for analysis of households that switch
from homeownership during earlier periods in the life
cycle. This decision might be made for reasons having
nothing to do with savings accumulation, in which case
the longer term effects of homeownership on total life
savings could be examined. However, it is also possible
that the decision to liquidate the investment in
owner-occupied housing depends on financial
considerations whereby the accumulated savings in the
form of housing equity is required to meet divergences
in consumption and/or earnings not sufficiently
covered by accumulated nonhousing savings. Under
such circumstances partial depletion of total savings
after the switch in tenure status could be expected at
least in the short run. The extent to which this is the
dominant factor involved can be assessed by examining
the difference between the increase in nonhousing
savings after the tenure status change compared with
that which would be implied by the transfer of all of
the home equity into nonhousing savings.
Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of
approximately 4,000 households included in the
University of Michigan Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics. These data provide information on each of
the households for each of the years from 1970 through
1979. The focus of this empirical study is on how
previous tenure patterns affect nonhousing savings as
of 1977, as well as how future (1978 and 1979) tenure
choices affect nonhousing savings accumulation at the
earlier 1 1977) date. Before turning to the results of that
analysis, we examine the relationship between housing
appreciation over time and the corresponding patterns
of home equity to shed light on the extent to which
increases are reflected in equity.
Retention of Housing Price Appreciation Gains in
Home Equity
The table shows the housing values for the 2,106
households owning their residences continually from
at least 1970 through 1977. For these households the
average home value increased from $ 1 8,759 in 1970 to
$37,606 by 1977. If these households did not participate
in the housing market over this period, the 85 percent
increase in house values reflects the extent of nominal
house price appreciation over the period and
corresponds to a 26 percent increase in real terms (above
the increase in overall price levels during this period).
To the extent that some of the households chose to
upgrade their housing either by making improvements
or by moving to a new home, this increase in housing
prices provides an upper bound on the actual rate of
housing appreciation.
Average Housing
that were renters over the same period is estimated to
be about $ 1 6,000. As indicated in the previous section,
on average only as much as $3,300 of this difference
may be attributed to the transfer of past housing
appreciation into nonhousing savings instruments.
Thus, in addition to the value of home equity this
finding suggests that continual homeownership is also
associated v^^ith a higher level of nonhousing savings
compared to households that continually rent their
residence. Any inferences from this result must be
qualified, however, in that many unobserved
conditions facing households that restrict them from
being able to accumulate savings (for example,
unanticipated, extraordinary expenditure required by a
chronic illness in the family) may very well also restrict
their ability to have been homeowners.
Given that many of the households considered were
homeowners for an unobserved length of time prior to
1970, perhaps a more appropriate comparison of
nonhousing savings levels would be between
households that became homeowners only between
1971 and 1976 and continual renters over the entire
period. For households becoming homeowners in 1971
and continuing as such through 1977 compared with
continual renters, the fmdings indicate that the
difference in nonhousing savings in 1977 was only
about $5,300. Even if $3,300 of this was due to a transfer
out of home equity (from housing appreciation) there
still remains a net higher level of accumulated
nonhousing savings and, in conjunction with their
home equity levels, a higher level of total accumulated
savings. Indeed, a similar result is found for households
that started homeownership in 1972, although the
differential is slightly less. As might be expected,
however, for households that started homeownership
only by 1976, the level of nonhousing savings is
estimated to be less than that of continual renters by
about $4,900. The overall results suggest that the levels
of savings accumulated in both nonhousing savings
instruments and in home equity are positively related
to the duration of homeownership, at least for the
period considered here.
Effects of past homeownership on savings of
households that switched from homeownership to
renting are determined by examining savings in
nonhousing instruments for such individuals in 1977
relative to households that never owned over the entire
sample period. Renters as of 1977 who last owned in
1970 are predicted to have about $3,743 more in savings
than comparable households who did not experience
homeownership at least through 1977. This amount
corresponds on average to only 59 percent of the equity
in housing they had in 1970, suggesting a substantial
depletion of the home equity for consumption in the
intervening years. For households last owning in either
1971 or 1972, the savings differential is estimated to be
$2,693 and $1,717, respectively. On the other hand, for
those households having last owned their residence in
1976, the savings differential in 1977 is estimated to be
$9,020, which is only 60 percent of the average 1976
home equity for the same individuals.
The above findings suggest that while households
that did experience homeownership in the past had, on
average, higher levels of nonhousing savings than did
households that had continually rented, the implied
level of nonhousing savings in years after the switch to
rental status was considerably less than the level of
home equity in the last year of homeownership. These
results suggest a liquidation of home equity for
purposes of meeting needed expenditures; perhaps
those that led to the sale of the home to begin with.
However, the results also suggest that there is a
tendency for a further build-up of nonhousing savings
thereafter.
Finally, we examine the effects of nonhousing
savings accumulation in periods prior to the switch
from rental to homeownership. For households renting
through 1977 but choosing to become homeowners in
1978, the estimated value of accumulated nonhousing
savings in 1977 was greater than that of continual
renters by about one-half the value of initial home
equity chosen in 1978. The funds required to meet the
other half of the down payment presumably comes from
depletion of other nonhousing savings accumulated up
through 1977 or increased savings out of income
between 1977 and 1978. For households renting
through 1978 and choosing homeownership only by
1979, nonhousing savings accumulated by 1977 relative
to continual renters is predicted to increase by about
36 percent of the initial home equity down payment
made two years later. These results suggest that a
substantial portion of the home equity down payment
for first-time homeowners is accumulated in years prior
to the change in tenure status above that which would
normally be accumulated. The rapidity of this
accumulation in years prior to the attainment of
homeownership appears neither gradual nor sharp. For
example, using the earlier example of a $15,000 home
equity down payment in either 1978 or 1979, $5,425 of
the $7,520 in additional savings accumulated through
one year prior to the time of the housing investment
would already have been accumulated by two years
before the tenure change. This amounts to a difference
of slightly over $2,000 accumulated in the intervening
year (about 30 percent of the total). This illustration
suggests that the extent of savings increase for the
purpose of homeownership is likely to be highest in
periods close to the time of the home purchase but that
there is a substantial accumulation for the same
purpose in earlier years. An additional implication of
the findings is that the time difference between the
decision to become a homeowner and the actual
purchase is not likely to be trivial, especially given the
impact of such a decision on the need for savings
accumulation for the home equity down payment.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis presented here has focused on the
implications of alternative tenure choice patterns for
the structure of household savings accumulation. The
results often indicate substantial alterations in the
patterns of household savings accumulation as a result
of the decision to invest in owner-occupied housing.
The empirical findings yield information about the
savings patterns of different sets of households involved
at various stages of the homeownership process. The
results indicate patterns of increased savings
accumulation in periods prior to the attainment of
homeownership above that which would normally
occur. The estimates suggest that this may account for
as much as one-half of the initial home equity amount.
At the time of the home purchase, nonhousing savings
are drawn upon substantially in order to meet the
equity down payment but soon after the level of
nonhousing savings is again increased. Thus, having
speeded up savings accumulation in order to attain
homeownership, the new homeowners do not
afterwards adjust the total level of savings in the
direction of becoming the same as that which would
have been made had they not chosen to own their own
homes. In fact, even though housing appreciation for
homeowners leads to future increases in total savings,
our results indicate that the level of nonhousing savings
are also increased compared with households choosing
rental status. The findings for households that were
homeowners for at least all of 1970 to 1977 indeed
suggest that the build up of nonhousing savings may
be substantial. Whether or not preferential tax
treatment of owner-occupied housing is responsible for
this build-up or whether it is due to other savings
portfolio considerations is not addressed, however.
Finally, the decision to change away from homeowner-
ship is found to be intimately tied to a depletion of the
resulting home equity in years prior to as well as at the
time of the home sale. A likely explanation of this
finding is that unanticipated needs or income shortages
lead to the decision to liquidate the home equity
portion of household savings.
Ronald Krumm is an assistant professor and member
of the Committee on Public Policy Studies at the
University of Chicago. Nancy Miller is at the
University of Chicago. This research was supported by
a grant from the Office ofReal Estate Research at the
University of Illinois. The authors would like to thank
R. Bear, /. Follain, M. Myers, and G. Tolley for useful
discussions of the issues involved in the analysis and
for comments on an early draft of this article and thank
A. Kelly for helpful computational assistance. A longer
version of this paper is available in ORER Paper No.
38 and can be obtained by writing to the Office of Real
Estate Research at the University of Illinois.
DAVID F. LINOWES
Is the Merger Mania Good for the Nation?
M.Lcrgers and acquisitions have become of major
concern in Washington and on Wall Street in recent
months, and this concern goes beyond the investiga-
tions of illegal insider trading. Increasingly, voices are
being raised charging that the accumulations of
tremendous pools of stock of major corporations by
manipulators, bankers, and others are having adverse
effects on our economy, and both Congress and the
executive branch seem to be racing to design restrictive
regulations or legislation.
Last year there were 15 mergers per working day,
totalling over 3,000. Twenty-four of those mergers were
for over $1 billion each, totalling over $200 billion.
Since those employed by the 100 largest mergers alone
supported families of 20 million people, obviously the
stakes are high.
Mergers and acquisitions are not new; they have been
taking place since the 1890s. Then, it was largely the
merging of railroads, especially the smaller, weaker
lines, in order to create major stable networks. That
was followed by major merger movements in the 1920s
and 1960s. John D. Rockefeller in his acquisitions of
various oil properties was on a merger binge much of
his life in building Standard Oil; J. P. Morgan, when
putting together US Steel, made many acquisitions.
The present day General Motors is an accumulation of
Chevrolet Corporation, Buick, Oldsmobile, Cadillac,
and others.
Parallel with 1920s
It is not difficult to draw a parallel between some of
today's developments and some of those of the 1920s
that led to the Great Depression of the 1930s and the
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In the 1 920s stock manipulators quietly acquired large
blocks of stock in a company then stimulated buying
by the general public through false rumors and
fictitious trading so that the price of the stock ran up.
Finally, on the sly they would dump their holdings onto
the public at highly inflated prices.
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The basic technique, common then and now,
involves the manipulation and accumulation of a
massive block of stock in a target company and then
cashing in at substantially higher prices. Although the
old practices of creating phony trading transactions and
the spreading of false rumors are illegal today, the same
effect can be created by letting it be known that a target
company is "in play." They do this by announcing their
interest in a company after they have quietly acquired
a large block of stock. As a matter of fact, the SEC
requires such public notice when a 5 percent stake in
a company is acquired.
Causes of Merger Movements
Merger movements are stimulated when one or more
of three basic conditions exist: when there are major
technological breakthroughs; when turbulent
economic conditions result in depressed stock prices;
or when new disruptive international developments
arise.
All three of these elements have converged in recent
years. Technologically, computer, and communications
breakthroughs are revolutionizing economic and
organizational relationships; production processes are
going through dramatic changes; robots are replacing
people; smokestack industries are giving way to service
industries.
On the economic front, stock prices have been so
depressed relative to the values represented that it is
cheaper to take over an entire going business than to
build new plants and break into new markets. Much of
this was caused by the fact that stock prices had not
caught up to the high inflation rates of the past.
Dramatic international developments have been
caused by the explosion of Japanese and West German
industries, seizing important segments of our
automobile, steel, and electronics markets.
In addition to these triggering phenomena, other
factors have contributed in important ways.
High Professional Fees
Of unusual significance are the enormous fees paid
to bankers, lawyers, and accountants in mergers. For
example, in one law firm in New York specializing in
mergers, every partner earned $880,000 last year.
On the cover of the 24 November 1986 issue of
Fortune Magazine, was a picture of a young man from
the Midwest named David Wittig, born in Kansas,
educated at the University of Kansas. At 31, he earns
$500,000 a year working for Kidder- Peabody. His 18
merger deals since joining the firm brought in over $ 1
million in fees. And, Wittig's earnings are not a rarity
on Wall Street. Students out of college with no
experience are paid $100,000 per year.
When questioned about the outlandish earnings of
young people, a chief executive officer in another Wall
Street firm, Frederick H. Joseph of Drexel-Burnham
Company said, "in an environment of phenomenal
profits and unprecedented fees, what difference does it
make. The difference amounts to a rounding error."
David Stockman, with no background on Wall Street,
is reputed to have begun his career at a minimum of
$1 million a year.
What do investment bankers do to earn these kinds
of fees? They birddog potential targets and acquirers,
then layout and help execute scenarios for bringing the
two corporations together, including financing the
package. Most investment banking firms today have in
their computers extensive analyses of most public
corporations to assist in these operations. Obviously,
they get paid well for this service.
For example, in the Revlon takeover, valued at $ 1 .83
billion, investment bankers received over $ 1 00 million
in fees. Drexel-Burnham Lambert, Inc., alone received
$60 million; Morgan Stanley & Co., about $30 million.
It should be born in mind that some of these merger
projects can take as little as six or even three months.
Changed Banking Practices
New fierce competition and loosening of government
regulations have brought many changes in investment
banking and in commercial banking practices and
techniques. Examples are the use of "junk bonds,"
"leveraged buyouts," and "arbitragers." These are not
new, but their widespread use is new. Some of these
techniques have been used by the Pritzker family in
Chicago for three generations.
The "junk bond" is a bond with a high rate of return,
but carrying a low credit rating, generally BBB or lower.
In 1986, about $35 billion worth of junk bonds were
issued ($15 billion by Drexel-Burnham Lambert alone);
presently over $1/4 trillion in junk bonds are
outstanding. Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, has spoken out strongly against them,
as has Flarold Williams, former Chairman of the SEC;
but, from the investor's viewpoint, they are no riskier
than the common stock of the same corporation. From
the corporation's perspective, however, they do create
burdensome obligations for high fixed costs.
Leveraged buyouts occur when the assets of an
acquired company are used to take over the target
corporation itself. This can be accomplished either by
putting the assets up as security for a loan to finance
the transaction or arranging in advance to sell a division
of the target corporation immediately upon the
completion of the transaction.
Arbitragers ( Arbs) have come to play a critical role in
the merger game. The basic original concept of arbitrage
is that if stock is selling at a lower price in one market,
say London, than in another, for example. New York,
the arbitrager buys the stock in London and sells it in
New York.
In the same manner, if someone announces that he
will offer $65 a share at a certain date for a stock and
it is now selling for $60, the arb will buy it at $60 and
wait for that date to arrive to sell it, gambling that the
transaction will be consummated.
The now-discredited Ivan Boesky had acquired
considerable wealth as an arbitrager and a unique
reputation for the uncanny ability to predict a merger,
this, of course, before his exposure for trading on insider
information. Before his fall, Boesky claimed to have had
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an arbitrage fund of $2 billion. T. Boone Pickens is
known to have an cquivalcnt-sizcd fund.
Arbitragers have so extended their tentacles that they
are redefining how to accomplish a takeover. A
potential raider now simply solicits the Arbs and buys
their blocks of stock in his target company, thereby
side-stepping SEC regulations. This is how a Canadian
real estate company, Campeau, took over Allied Stores,
which owns such well-known retailers as Brooks
Brothers and Ann Taylor.
Beatrice Foods in Chicago was taken over by a Wall
Street investment banking firm in the same manner.
Arbs owned 80 percent of the stock and sold it to
Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and Company. The acquirer
then proceeded to dissect the company.
Mergers' "Newspeak"
All this razzle-dazzle in Wall Street has given birth
to a merger "newspeak." The term, "raider," is
self-descriptive: He is the principal player who leads
the charge into what is generally unfriendly territory.
That is how T. Boone Pickens captured Mesa Petroleum
and Carl Icahn took over TWA.
No entrenched executive is going to look kindly at
such an attempt to take over his company. After a
certain amount of huffing and puffing, he may
discretely send an emissary to try to buy the raider off.
In "greenmail" the raider is paid a price by the company
higher than the then current market for the stock. Last
year there were about 50 such greenmail transactions.
Saul Steinberg was bought off from raiding Walt Disney
with greenmail. And thereby incumbent officers
continued to hold onto their jobs.
If the raider cannot be dissuaded by greenmail, then
management may try "shark repellents. "These involve
such tactics as staggering the terms of the members of
the board of directors or the issuance of stock with
disproportionate voting rights.
Or, it takes a "poison pill" such as selling off a highly
desirable division or incurring huge debts. Phillips
Petroleum took a poison pill to fend off T. Boone
Pickens in his attack by incurring debts totaling $4.5
billion. Now, however, analysts wonder whether the
tactic may prove poisonous to Phillips itself and,
therefore, threaten its solvency.
When a management begins to feel that all is lost, it
may decide to relax and enjoy it by use of "golden
parachutes": incumbent executives enter into
contracts with their corporation in which the
corporation agrees to make large severance payments
to the executives in event of a takeover and the loss of
their jobs. Sometimes the amounts are quite startling.
In the Revlon takeover, it is reputed that the golden
parachute for the chief executive officer alone was
about $20 million.
When a takeover by an unfriendly raider appears
inevitable, the incumbent management might peddle
the company to a friendly corporation. This friendly
takeover corporation is called a "White Knight."
Instead of a White Knight, management may bring in
a "White Squire." A White Squire is a friendly investor
who agrees to buy a large block of the target company's
stock, thereby insulating it from the hostile attack. Not
infrequently this tactic backfires, and the White Squire
seizes the company for himself, removing the same
executives who invited him in.
Pros and Cons
All of this activity obviously stirs up strong reactions.
Andrew C. Sigler who is President of the Business
Roundtable, an organization made up of chief
executives of 200 major corporations charges,
"It is nothing but a grubby asset play. They are
acquiring the greatest accumulation of wealth of all
time
—
greater than the Rockefellers or the
Rothschilds—they are doing it by snapping it out of
companies, thus damaging the capability of the
economic system to perform."
In response, T. Boone Pickens, self-appointed
spokesperson for aggressive corporate acquirers,
observed,
"The only real stake that many managers have is
their job. The 200 members of Business Roundtable
own less than three-tenths of one percent of their
companies. Fortune 's survey of May 1 986 showed that
9 percent of Fortune 500 CEO's own no stock in their
companies. No wonder they think like bureaucrats
instead of like entrepreneurs."
Mergers have always had important effects on
companies, their employees, and the communities in
which they are located. In recent years the impact has
been much broader, deeper, and immensely more
significant than in the past, largely because
corporations themselves have changed. Although they
are called by the same name, corporations have taken
on a dramatically different concept. They are now
quasi-public institutions with social responsibilities
along with profit responsibilities. They carry many of
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and they
have become so large and powerful that corporations
often have more significant impact on the lives of more
people than many political jurisdictions.
Arguments against Mergers
There are a number of justified arguments against
this feverish activity. When a merger results in closing
or moving plants or offices, it may disrupt a
community, adversely affecting employees and officers.
Sometimes a new parent company may siphon off
excess cash, making the acquired company more
vulnerable to economic downturns. Management that
spend much of their attention in acquiring other
companies may overemphasize keeping the current
price of the stock high, leading to a concentration on
short-term profits, or to what is delicately called
"imaginative accounting," which could result in
misleading financial reporting. And when large debts
are incurred to effect the merger, the cost of carrying
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that debt could be devastating.
Sometimes a takeover is accomplished through a
leveraged buy out by its own officers. This action
strikes me as inherently wrong. Officers have a
fiduciary responsibility to the stockholders of the
company they manage. If they believe that by taking
certain actions they can increase the value of a
company's stock, then they have a moral (and perhaps
legal) obligation to take such actions on behalf of all
the stockholders.
Arguments Favoring Mergers
On the other hand, there are arguments favoring this
merger activity. Aggressive mergers are the market's
protection against mismanagement. An incumbent
management that is not functioning effectively has no
right to a first claim over corporate resources just
because of incumbency. The assets belong to the
shareholders.
A constructive merger transaction may reinvigorate
drifting management and stimulate dormant resources.
When a stronger company acquires a weaker or smaller
company, new financing is made available, as are wider
distribution facilities and new executive talent.
Through a merger the deadening hand of nepotism can
be removed.
International competition is a powerful force in
today's business environment. Seventy percent of our
products are competing with foreign manufactured
products. In order to achieve the economies of scale so
a company can be competitive, size is often critical.
Conclusion
What does all of this add up to? Obviously, no merger
is neutral. I am convinced that discreet, thoughtful
mergers are an important ingredient of our economy,
keeping it stimulated and ever advancing. It is what a
major figure in 20th century economic thought, Joseph
Schumpeter, described almost a half century ago as
"destructive capitalism." "Creative destruction,"
Schumpeter argued, "gives capitalism its vitality."
It is unmistakable that a constructive, well-planned
merger strengthens a corporate unit and stimulates
renewal, changing yesterday's inertia into fresh
challenges today. I should caution that in evaluating a
merger in today's climate, it is important to keep
separate the process from the fact. Too often the press
and the public do not keep them separate, nor do too
many Congressmen.
Some steps in the process have been abused. Trading
stock on the basis of insider information is not only
illegal, but it distorts the constructive goal a well-
intentioned merger seeks to accomplish. "Greenmail"
cheats the public stockholders.
The role of arbitragers likewise frequently tends to
so manipulate the merger process so as to cast an
unsavory shadow on the function itself, leading to
disruptive practices by both management and acquirer.
In short, it is apparent that the merger process has
been abused, and regulation of that process, therefore,
is justified and necessary. One approach might be to
require a minimum holding period for stock—say six
months—before it could be voted in an acquisition
action.
I want to emphasize that in those situations where
incumbent managements are doing well—both for the
long term and short term—actions by uninvited raiders
without any business purpose other than short-term
personal gain could be harmful to the companies and
our economy.
However, in those situations where managements
have been lethargic and self-serving, there is
justification for change and the implementation of a
fresh approach through the merger route. Therefore,
short of restraint of trade and unfair competition, I
would not recommend regulatory restrictions on the
merger function itself, as distinguished from the
process. Free market forces should be allowed to have
full play.
David Linowes is Boeschenstein Professor of Political
Economy and Public Policy at the University of Illinois
and the author of Managing Growth through
Acquisition. Prior to joining the faculty of his Alma
Mater eleven years ago, he was national founding
partner of a world-wide management consulting and
auditing firm. Professor Linowes has served on the
boards of directors of a number ofmajor corporations
and has been chairman of several Presidential
Commissions.
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Illinois Business Indexes
J. here is increased uncertainty regarding the
economic outlook tor Illinois. The composite leading
indicator depicted m Chart 1 provides mixed signals.
The three-month moving average of the indicator (MA
3) has declined, while the six-month moving average
(MA 6) has risen. MA 3 has edged downward from 14.64
in January to 13.88 in March; MA 6 inched upward
from 11.22 in January to 12.48 in March.
The decline in MA 3 does not necessarily indicate
that the Illinois economy is headed for a downturn.
Instead, it may represent a temporary variation in the
overall upward trend of the series. Stronger evidence of
an impending decline in the state's economy would be
provided by these indicators if the three-month moving
average were to fall below the six-month moving
average and remain there for four consecutive months.
Inflation has accelerated in Chicago and in the North
Central region as a whole. The charts illustrate the
year-to-year percent change in the CPI for Chicago and
for the North Central region. The percent change in the
Chicago CPI of 3.58 percent for the year ending March
1987 represents the largest increase in the last two years
(Chart 2).
For the North Central region as a whole (Chart 3),
the year-to-year increase in prices averaged less than
one percent for the one-year period ending April 1986
through the one-year period ending December 1986.
However, as the chart shows, in February 1 987, prices
in the North Central region increased 1.77 percent over
February 1986. The charts for the North Central region
for various population sizes also depict a similar
acceleration in inflation for the early months of this
year (Charts 4, 5, 6). The CPI's for the coming months
will provide an indication of whether this is a
temporary increase or the beginning of an upward trend
in inflation.
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WILLIAM R. BRYAN
The Federal Budget Turns Restrictive
J_/vidence presented here suggests that fiscal actions
have moved toward restriction in recent years. This
conclusion emerges from a revievk' of federal fiscal
developments during the period since 1980. An analysis
of the period involves the consideration of tvk'o sets of
contrasting forces, one expansive and the other
restrictive. On the one hand, it is clear that the marginal
net tax rate during the period from 1984 to early 1987
is markedly smaller than during the 1980-1983 period.
This means that, given an expansion in income, recent
and current increases in tax revenues net of income
transfers are less than before. In this sense, fiscal actions
are stimulative. But, on the other hand, in successive
recent years there has been a tightening in the fiscal
framework considered as a whole. Increases in
balanced-budget GNP, a meaningful measure of the
overall impact of fiscal actions, slowed markedly in
1985 and 1986.
The first part of this article is a brief review of
traditional theory concerning the way federal fiscal
actions affect the economy. Next, there is a summary
of fiscal developments during the period from 1980 to
1986. Following this, there is a review of the changing
configuration of the current account surpluses serving
to offset the federal deficit. Finally, a set of conclusions
is drawn.
Theory
Changes in the impact of fiscal policy may be judged
by changes in the level of GNP at which the federal
budget would be in balance. Rapid increases in
balanced-budget GNP are conducive to increases in
actual GNP. An expansion in balanced-budget GNP
means that there is an increase in the federal deficit
corresponding to any level of GNP. Thus, any net
surplus (or deficit) position of the nonfederal sectors
leads to a larger flow of GNP. Larger flows of GNP are
brought about in the process by which the federal deficit
(or surplus) is fitted to match the nonfederal sectors'
surplus (or deficit). In contrast, sluggish increases or
declines in balanced-budget GNP exert a restrictive
force upon the economy.
Fiscal policy relates to taxing and spending initiatives
of the federal government. Federal tax receipts result
from a combination of two factors. One factor consists
of the set of rules specifying the process by which
households and economic units calculate their tax
liabilities. Economists often summarize that set of
rules in a tax function. The second factor is really a set
of results, includmg aggregate income, or GNP. If both
the tax function and aggregate income are known, total
tax receipts can be calculated.
Presumably, the size and composition of federal
expenditures are determined by national priorities or
other political considerations. Such expenditures are
unlikely to be strongly related to aggregate income in
the short run. To the extent that there is a relation, it
is probable that federal expenditures will decline as
income increases, chiefly reflecting declines in
unemployment compensation and other cyclically
sensitive transfer payments.
The federal deficit/surplus function is created by
subtracting the expenditures function from the
revenues function. For illustrative purposes, that
function is shown as Sg in Chart 1, and its scale is
shown on the right. The horizontal scale is aggregate
national income. As drawn, the federal budget moves
toward surplus as aggregate income expands.
Chart 1. Federal and Nonfederal Budget Schedules
Gross National Product
GNP,
Similarly, it is possible to specify budget positions
for the nonfederal sectors (households, state and local
governments, and the foreign sector). Although no
supporting evidence is presented, we offer the
conjecture that the nonfederal budget also moves
toward surplus as the economy expands. The
nonfederal budget function is labeled S^f in Chart I
.
Equilibrium income is determined at the point where
the federal deficit/surplus function intersects the
nonfederal budget function. In nonequilibrium
positions, the gap between the functions is closed by
unplarmed inventory changes, so that at all times the
federal deficit (or surplus) just equals the nonfederal
sectors' surplus (or deficit). In Chart I the federal sector
is in deficit and the nonfederal sectors are in offsetting
surplus. Aggregate income is shown as GNPq.
For the federal budget to be in balance, it would be
necessary for aggregate income to reach GNPi (shown
on the top axis). But for that to occur, it would be
necessary for the nonfederal function to shift upward
to the right (to the north-east). Factors that would
contribute to such an upward shift include an
expansion in consumption, a rise in investment, an
increase in state or local govemmem spending
laltemanvely, a cut in state and local taxes', or an
increase in net foreign investment ;a decline in imports
and or a rise m exportsl. The combination of such
factors implies a strongly expanding economy.
A shift or rotation of the Sg schedule to the right (to
the south-east) may also be regarded as expansionary.
Factors contributing to such a shift or rotation would
mclude either mcreases m federal expenditures or
transfers, tax reducuons, or all three. Factors leading to
movements in the S^ schedule also lead to changes in
balanced-budget GNP. E-xpansive fiscal actions serve to
expand balanced-budget GNP Restrictive actions serve
to reduce balanced-budget GNP.
Although specific fiscal policy shifts contribute in a
predictable way to changes in the economy, actualGNP
depends, as indicated, upon both the Sj and S^
schedules. Moreover, because there is a substantial
overlap between the factors that determine the slope
and position of the two schedules, it is unlikely forone
schedule to change without introducing movement
into the other.
The slope of the S^. schedule is a maior determinant
of the impact of fiscal actions. The slope shown in
Chart 1 mdicates that the aggregate of the nonfederal
budget schedules moves toward surplus as income
expands. As drawn, expansive fiscal actions la shift
from Sgo to Sgi in Chart 1 ' result in a rise in income to
GSPi and a movement of the federal budget toward
increased deficit iwith a corresponding increase in the
nonfederal surplus'. In contrast, tax increases or
expenditure cuts lead toward a reduction in income and
a movement toward budget surplus.
In the example discussed earlier and illustrated in
Chart 1, the concomitant shift in the nonfederal
schedule from the change in the federal schedule was
not shov^TL In fact, however, the movement in the
nonfederal schedule tends to offset partially the effect
of shifts in federal fiscal poUcy. Even so, the qualitative
results shown in Chan 1 are not affected.
In short, even though it is useful to pay attention to
shifts in balanced-budget GNP as an indication of the
stimulative or restncnve thrust of fiscal actions, these
shifts yield only limited predictive insights. For the
federal budget schedule, Sg, is only one blade of the
scissors. The other blade consists of the nonfederal
schedule, S^ As indicated, the federal deficit (or
surplusl and the associated level of aggregate income
[GSP^ are forged at the intersection of the federal and
nonfederal budget schedules.
Developments during the 1980s
Rates of growth in balanced-budgetGNP during the
lS>80s have been uneven. From 1980 to 1983 annual
increases in balanced-budget GNP averaged 9.4 percent
isee Chart 21 All of 1980 and 1981, as well as
three-fourths of 1982, reflect the planning of the
administration of President Caner. From 1983 to 1984
there was a 1 7.8 percent lump in balanced-budget GNP,
an extremely expansive shift. Since that time, however,
the growth in balanced-budget GNT has slowed
markedly. Each of the past two years has registered a
tightening compared with its preceding year.
Balanced-budgetGNT rose only 2 percent from 1985 to
1 986. It ism this sense that recent years have witnessed
a progressive fiscal tightening.
Chart 2. Changes in Balanced-Budget GNP
ao-s"
It is necessary" to use words carefully in interpreting
fiscal poUcy in the 1980s. Ccmsidered as a whole, it is
clear that the fiscal settingin recent years is expansive
compared \fith the setting during the 1980-1983
period. In that period, the estimated tax rate net of
transfers averaged 0332, indicating that 33.2 cents was
taxed from incremental dollars. In the last three years
il984—19861, the average net tax rate has fallen, such
that only 21.4 cents net of transfers is taxed from each
dollar. Incommon parlance and with reference to these
two time frames, fiscal policy has eased.
There is no ambiguity regarding what has happened
to the size of the deficit in alKolute dollar magnitudes.
It has grown. In the 1980-1986 period there was a
cumulative deficit of Sl,019 billion isee the Tablet. In
additicm, the business sector incurred a cumulative
deficit of S699.5 billion. TTie sum of these tw o deficits
for the 1980-1986 period was Sl,718.5 billion. The
cumulative offsetting-sector surpluses were generated
by households iSI,009.1 biUion', state and local
governments ($334.8 biUicxi), the foreign sector iS360.5
billion), leaving a discrepancy of SI4.1 billion.
Sector Sorplases
Desirable Fiscal Policy Developments
Federal expenditure and tax developments can be
judged usefully in terms of the extent to which they
contribute to the realization of public policy goals.
Federal expenditures make claims on the use of real
resources. The cost of committing resources to one use
is that they are unavailable for alternative uses.
Presumably, we want the set of federal expenditure
programs that most faithfully reflects the political goals
of the population.
Given the political decisions that define federal
expenditures, what remains is to devise a tax structure
that most contributes to economic or political
objectives. The menu of alternative objectives,
sometimes mutually exclusive, includes price level
stability, high employment (low unemployment),
budget balance, distributional equity, and so forth.
Over the past few years, the issue receiving most
attention has been the federal deficit. There has been
strong public interest in reducing the deficit. Even so,
it is unlikely that the public would support a
deficit-reducing policy that would involve a weakened
economy and increased unemployment. Hence, it is
important to evaluate fiscal policy measures in terms
of their prospective impact on both the federal deficit
and the economy. Two questions are of major
importance: (1) Can a tax increase lead to a smaller
federal deficit without adversely affecting the
economy? (2) Can a tax cut lead both to an expansion
in the economy and toward a smaller federal deficit?
A tax increase sufficient to overcome year-after-year
trends in expenditures growth is likely to lead to
increased revenues and a smaller federal deficit, but it
is also likely to lead to a weakened economy. For a tax
increase to lead both to a smaller federal deficit (or a
surplus) and to an expanded economy, the nonfederal
schedule, whatever its slope, must shift upward. To
lead to an expansion in GNP, all or some combination
of the following would need to occur. Households
would need to increase their consumption; busi-
nesses would need to invest more; households and
businesses would need to import less; and the business
sector would need to export more.
On its face, there is superficial plausibility to the
notion that such beneficial developments would result
from a tax increase. It is popularly believed that an
increase in federal taxes would contribute to interest
rate declines, thereby stimulating investment and
consumption spending. By an extension of that
reasoning, it is possible to imagine that the nation's net
export position would be improved. Even though these
ideas are popularly held, there is essentially no evidence
to support them.
A tax cut is likely to contribute to an expansion in
income but to an enlarged federal deficit. A tax cut can
lead to a smaller federal deficit under two conditions.
One condition relates to the slope of the nonfederal
schedule. If it is upward sloping, a tax cut can lead to
a reduced federal deficit. The other condition relates to
shifts in the nonfederal schedule, explainable on the
basis of traditional doctrine. The Kennedy-Johnson tax
cut m 1964 was based on a combination of such
traditional Keynesian notions. The Reagan tax cuts
were based on a somewhat different set of beliefs (that
is, so-called Supply-Side Economics). As it turns out,
the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut was followed by a
movement of the federal budget into surplus. The
Reagan tax cuts have been followed by larger deficits.
Concluding Remarks
As stated in the outset, recent changes in
balanced-budget GNP show some movement towards
restriction. Even so, the marginal net tax rate continues
to be substantially smaller than during the early 1980s.
Whatever interpretation one may wish to make of our
current fiscal stance, the growing shortfall from
balanced-budget GNP provides evidence that the fiscal
environment has become increasingly inappropriate.
Two points emerge from the foregoing analysis. First,
it is clear that there is no fiscal action that can be
counted on to achieve both high employment and an
improved federal budget position. Second, it is clear
that the impact of fiscal policy is critically dependent
upon the shape of and potential movements in the
nonfederal schedule, not the federal schedule.
Whatever the shape of the federal schedule, what is
needed are strong upward shifts in the nonfederal
schedule. Within the present environment, there are
two meaningful sources of such shifts. One is the
business sector. What is needed is a strong expansion
in business investment in plant and equipment. The
second is the foreign sector. What is needed is a strong
movement toward a net export surplus.
In the near-term future, a strong expansion in
business investment by domestic corporations is
unlikely. Even though tax reform may have a positive
affect on real investment in the long run, its short-term
impact is likely to be adverse. In contrast to domestic
corporations, foreign businessmen are making
important capital investment decisions. They are
shifting their wealth portfolios from dollar-denomi-
nated financial assets into real assets.
Some improvement in this nation's net export
position is a reasonable prospect. There has been a
marked and a sustained weakening in the value of the
dollar. It is important to recognize that the shifts in
currency values have missed important sources of our
trade imbalance, such as Korea. It is also important to
recognize that the declining value of the dollar is a
two-edged sword. It means that absolutely necessary
imports cost us more and that similarly price-inelastic
exports bring us less. Notwithstanding such
considerations, it is plausible to believe that the
changed currency values can result in an expansion in
exports and a slowdown in the growth of imports. The
short-term shift can be important and can convert itself
into a force persisting over several years.
Although minor, such improvements in business
investment and in the nation's net export position have
already begun to drive the federal budget toward
surplus. Even with such small shifts, we can expect
about a $50 billion decline in the federal deficit during
calendar 1987. Such an improvement is likely to go
largely unnoticed. But if such shifts are sustained, the
federal deficit can be effectively erased.
DIXIE M. BLACKLEY
Working Wives and Residential Structure:
Evidence from the Chicago Metropolitan
Area
J. here has been a major change in residential location
patterns over the past four decades. Locational patterns
in the metropolitan US have been characterized by an
historic trend of population redistribution from central
cities to their surrounding urban areas. The proportion
of the US metropolitan population residing within
central city boundaries declined from 57 percent in
1950 to 40 percent in 1980. In Chicago, the central city's
share of the metropolitan population fell from 57
percent in 1960 to 42 percent by 1980.
This shift in residential location has been
accompanied by a major socio-economic change.
Namely, labor force participation rates for married
women have increased dramatically. The participation
rate for married women who are living with their
husbands increased from 23.8 percent in 1950 to 52.1
percent in 1980, with nearly 12percent of the increase
coming in the 1970s.
Most studies explaining why people move to the
suburbs have emphasized the trade-off between access
to central employment in the city versus cheaper
housing services and residential space in the suburbs.
This study shows that the rapid growth of two-earner
families (that is, married women in the work force) and
the decentralization of metropolitan employment are
facts that also need to be considered in analyzing
residential location patterns. Beyond that, this article
specifically considers the interaction between optimal
housing consumption and residence location.
The data and methodology used in this study are
presented in the next section. Following this is a
discussion of the results and implications. The article
concludes with a short review of the findings.
Data and Methodology
The study utilizes a sample of nonelderly, married,
renter households derived from the 1975 metropolitan
Chicago Annual Housing Survey and from its Journey
to Work supplement. Average annual income in the
sample is $18,867 for two-earner households and
$12,750 for one-earner households. A similar income
differential remains even after controlling for residence
and workplace locations. Two-worker households tend
to be younger and more educated than their one-worker
counterparts. About 65 percent of two-earner
households are childless couples. Working wives earn
an average of $6,894, and their husbands earn $1 1,571
.
Working mothers earn lower average annual incomes
than other working wives. Working women travel
shorter distances to work and are more likely to use
public transit than working men.
Before attempting to evaluate housing demand and
residence location, it is necessary to examine the
variation of housing prices in different areas. By
specifying gross rent as a function of dwelling unit,
neighborhood, and locational characteristics, the
relative contribution of a particular housing attribute
to the rental value of a typical dwelling unit can be
identified. The relative contribution of nonlocational
attributes is assumed to be identical for all directions
from the city center while locational effects may vary
with direction. Noncentral employment centers are
identified in five directions from the city center by
examining the distribution of employment in the
Chicago metropolitan area. The intrametropolitan
variation in the price of per unit of housing services is
summarized by comparing the estimated rental value
of a constant quality bundle of housing characteristics
at a reference location with the estimated rental value
of an identical bundle at alternative locations
throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.
As noted, housing price initially declines as distance
from the city center increases, rises as suburban work
places are approached, and declines again thereafter. It
reaches relative minimums to the north, west, and
southwest at about 13 to 15 miles from downtown
Chicago. For the O'Hare airport center to the northwest
and the Lake Calumet industrial area to the south, the
minimum housing price occurs at about seven to eight
miles from the city center.
Like other studies, this article emphasizes the
trade-off between housing expenditures and
commuting costs in residential location decisions. In
terms of economic theory, an optimal location is
achieved if the marginal saving in housing expenditures
(that is, cheaper housing services) associated with a
longer commute is just offset by higher commuting
costs. The household adjusts its residence location and
expenditures to achieve an optimal location. The
adjustments are especially complex if husbands and
wives are employed at different workplaces. In such
circumstances, the relative valuation of the husband's
and wife's commuting time plays an important role in
a household's willingness to reside closer to one
workplace than the other. This study improves on most
of the previous work by considering the interaction
between optimal housing consumption and residence
location, the potential difference between one- and
two-earner households, and the effects of multiple
(rather than just one) employment centers.
Results
The key empirical results for housing demand and
residence location are reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
Results are reported in terms of elasticities, the percent
change in quantities sold of a variable divided by the
percent change in its price or some other relevant
variable. For example, Table 1 indicates that the price
elasticity of housing demand is -0.305. This means that
each 10 percent increase in housing price results in a
3.05 percent decrease in housing demand.
Housmg demand for a one-earner household is
relatively unresponsive to changes in price or current
income (see left hand column of Table 1). The price
elasticity of housing demand is -0.305; while the
elasticity of demand with respect to changes in the
husband's income is 0.264. Other income and the
husband's commuting distance have a negligible
impact on housing demand. Not shown in Table 1 are
results relating to commuting cost variables associated
with the distance and mode of travel to work or
demographic variables reflecting family size and
composition. None of these variables exerted a
statistically significant effect on housing demand.
The two-earner results (right hand column) indicate
that housing demand for renter households is less
responsive to changes in price and income from
alternative sources than for one-earner households. The
price elasticity of housing demand equals -0.171, and
the husband's earned income elasticity equals 0.137.
The working wife's earnings have no systematic
influence on housing consumption. Such a finding
suggests that the contributions of a wife to household
income may be viewed as transitory. As with
one-earner households, housing demand of two-earner
households is generally unresponsive to household
commuting costs and demographic characteristics.
Results relating to residence location for one-earner
households indicate that a 1 percent increase in earned
income is associated with an increase in commuting
distance of 0.437 percent. This suggests that the
beneficial aspects of housing consumption at a distant
location outweigh the adverse effects of added
commuting. The mode of travel to work and
demographic variables also included to represent
commuting costs do not show a strong association with
commuting distance.
Many studies have also found a positive relationship
between income and residence distance from the city
center. However, there is little evidence regarding the
relationship between residence distance to the city
center and workplace distance to the city center. That
is, do households who work farther from the city center
have shorter or longer commutes than those who work
in the city center? Theory is ambiguous. On the one
hand, the benefits of a longer commute to a suburban
worker are less than those to a city worker because the
housing price gradient is flatter for suburban workers.
On the other hand, the cost of travel may be less in the
suburbs because suburbs tend to be less congested. The
evidence in this study indicates that suburban workers
tend to have longer commutes than city workers. More
precisely, commuting distance for one-earner
Table 1. Impact of Selected Variables on Housing
Consumption
Percentage Response in
Housing Consumption"
commuting behavior. Hence, it is not the earning power
of a wife that draws a household to a specific location.
Rather, the overall results are consistent with the view
that residence location is chosen relative to the
husband's workplace; subsequently, his wife finds a job
nearby.
A working wife's commuting distance varies directly
with her own earnings but is not significantly affected
by her husband's earnings or by the presence of
children. Such findings are inconsistent with evidence
from other studies suggesting that a wife's labor force
behavior is influenced by these factors. Working wives
employed in the central city commute roughly three
times as far as otherwise similar women employed in
the suburbs. Presumably, more centrally located jobs
offer higher wages, thereby enticing the wife to endure
a longer commute. Because housing costs rise as the
center of the city is approached, a household's
willingness or ability to favor the wife's workplace in
its residence location choice (already weak, at best)
diminishes further as she is more centrally employed.
Dixie Blackley teaches in the Department of
Economics, Le Moyne College, Syracuse, NY. The
analysis discussed in this paper was conducted for her
Ph.D. dissertation, "Housing Demand and Residential
Location in the Chicago SMSA: One- and Two-Worker
Households in a Multicentric Model," at Syracuse
University, lames Follain. Jan Ondrich, and Paul
Blackley provided many helpful suggestions and
comments on this research.
Summary
The increase of wives entering the labor force and
development of suburban employment centers have
changed the way people choose a house and its location.
This article shows that income levels remain the key
variable in the choice between central city and
suburban living and documents the impact of suburban
employment on the price of housing services. In
addition, this study indicates that the work location of
a working wife has relatively little influence on her
family's housing consumption and residence location
choice. Thus, the empirical evidence for the Chicago
metropolitan area generally does not support the
argument that the increase in the number of two-earner
households will play a major role in the revitalization
of the central city.
More specifically, the study finds: (1) that income
increases are associated with increases in both
commuting distance and the consumption of housing
services. These results suggest that as income rises, the
increase in marginal benefits associated with greater
housing consumption more than offsets the increase in
marginal costs associated with higher commuting time
costs. As a consequence, both one- and two-earner
households are induced to choose less central locations.
(2) that the work location of working wives has
relatively little influence on their families' housing
consumption and residence location choice. (3) that
Chicago housing prices, standardized for housing
services provided, reflect the distance from the central
business district and suburban work places. Previous
studies have incorrectly ignored the effect of more than
one business district. In the Chicago metropolitan area,
the price of housing services declines as the distance
from the city center increases, but rises as suburban
work places are approached; then declines again
thereafter.
ANNE E. WINKLER
Job Growth: Which States Have a
Comparative Advantage and Why
I ob growth in a state is a consequence of the unique
economic climate present in the state. Those
characteristics expected to lead to greater job growth
are typically regarded as favorable. The first section of
this article estimates the comparative advantage of
each state using data from the period 1980 to 1985. In
particular, the focus will be on the East North Central
states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin. The second section of the article identifies
factors that enhance a state's comparative advantage in
employment. The final section provides estimates of
the contribution of each of the identified factors to job
gains (losses) in the state of Illinois.
Identifying a State's Comparative Advantage
State employment gains in a particular industry can
be attributed to three factors: employment gains related
to the growth of the US economy; gains related to
differential employment growth among industries; and
gains related to differential employment growth among
states. The last component, which is the focus of this
article, indicates a state's comparative advantage, that
is, the number of additional jobs in a particular industry
the state can provide relative to the US average. In the
regional analysis literature, this type of decomposition
is referred to as the shift-share technique.
These compositional effects can be illustrated by
examinmg employment changes in Illinois manufactur-
ing. From 1 980 to 1 985, Illinois lost a total of 227,000
manufacturing jobs, a decline of 18.8 percent. US
manufacturing employment fell 5.25 percent over the
same period. The greater decline in Illinois manufactur-
ing employment relative to the United States signals
the state's weak economic position and translates into
a loss of 163,000 Illinois jobs. (See Table 1 ) At the same
time, total US employment increased 7.6 percent,
providing 92,530 additional jobs for Illinois. Finally, the
slower growth of US manufacturing employment
relative to total US employment growth, contributed
to the loss of 1 56,000 jobs. The loss of 1 63,000 jobs due
to Illinois' comparative disadvantage, the gain of 92,530
jobs due to growth in US total employment, and the
loss of 1 56,000 jobs due to a shift in the industrial mix
of US employment add up to a total loss of 227,000
manufacturing jobs over the period 1980 to 1985.
Table 1 provides a similar breakdown for job gains in
total and services employment. The remainder of this
article will focus solely on employment change due to
each state's comparative advantage.
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Table 1. Decomposition of Job Gains and Losses for
Illinois, 1980-1985 (in thousands of jobs)
Total
Employment Manufacturing Services
Total gain or loss
Table 3.
Factors Affecting a State's Comparative Advantage
State-specific characteristics affect a state's ability to
provide jobs. Following the lead of an article by William
Kahley published in the May 1986 issue of Economic
Review (a publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta), this section examines factors that are
expected to contribute to a state's comparative
advantage.
Factors that are thought to contribute to a state's
comparative advantage include the skill level of the
workforce. A skilled workforce might be valuable to
employers and enhance a state's comparative advantage
in providing jobs. It also seems reasonable to
hypothesize that location of a state would be an
important contributor. One would expect the sunbelt
states to have a comparative advantage over states with
a relatively harsher climate. Another factor is the
average wage level in a given state. Wages represent a
cost to employers and higher than average wages are
expected to reduce a state's comparative advantage in
providing jobs.
Comparative advantage may also be influenced by
per capita state taxes. Higher per capita taxes may
provide a comparative disadvantage because taxes
represent a cost or burden. However, higher taxes
provide the means to fund public services and may
represent a state benefit. An additional factor is the
number of union workers in a state as a percentage of
all workers. A less-unionized workforce is expected to
improve a state's comparative advantage. Finally,
average energy prices in a state may be important.
Higher prices are expected to affect a state's position
negatively.
Regression analysis was used to determine the
statistical relationship between the identified factors
and a given state's comparative advantage in providing
jobs in terms of total employment, services, and
manufacturing employment. Comparative advantage
was measured as in Table 3 using population-adjusted
figures to permit cross-state analysis.
Factors Found to Be Important Contributors
This section examines factors contributing to job
growth in total manufacturing, and services
employment. In terms of total job creation, average
state wages, the severity of a state's climate, skill level
(measured as the percentage of the population with a
college education), and state per capita tax burden affect
a states' comparative advantage (see Table 4). As
expected, average wages, measured by average hourly
wages of production workers on manufacturing
payrolls, have a negative and statistically significant
effect on a state's comparative ability to provide total
jobs. Other things equal, a ten-cent decrease in Illinois
average manufacturing wages in 1980 from $8.02 to
$7.92 per hour would generate 13,282 additional jobs
over the subsequent five-year period.
Skill level, as measured by the percentage of the
population over 25 years of age with a college education,
was found to have a positive and statistically significant
effect on a state's relative ability to provide total jobs.
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In 1 980, the percentage of Illinois' population over age
25 with a college education was 16.2 percent, identical
to the US average. All else equal, a 1 percent increase
in Illinois' college educated population, equal to an
additional 10,820 people, would generate 9,237
additional jobs in total Illinois employment during the
subsequent five-year period.
Table 4. Factors That Would Enhance Illinois'
Comparative Advantage in Providing Jobs
Given: Number of Jobs Created 1980-1985
Total
Employment Manufacturing Services
10 cent decrease in
average manufacturing
wagesinIL 13,282* 3,099* 2,841*
1% decrease in severity
of Illinois' climate 5,058* 991* 1,027*
1% increase in IL
population over 25
with a college
education
( = 10,820 people) 9,237* 219-' 1,446*
1% increase in IL
population over 25
with a high school
education, ( = 44,000
people) 2,959^ 2,921* NA
1% decrease in per
capita tax burden
I
= $4.44) 1,730 (102)= 163=
1% decrease in
unionized workforce
in IL
I
=14,870
workers) 362= 973 NA
Notes: This table is based on data for 1980 and 1985. The changes in the
factors are based on their values in 1980.
"indicates that the factor was not retained in the final equation.
'means that the coefficient used to compute the results was statistically
signficant at conventional levels.
Data sources; US Statistical Abstract, 1986, Employment and Earnings.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, various issues; Historical Climatology Series,
5-1, State, Regional and National Monthly Seasonal Degree Days Weighted
by Population, 1980, State Energy Price and Expenditure Report.
Department of Energy, 1970-1981; and State Government Collections,
1980.
As expected, the severity of a state 's physical climate
was found to have a statistically significant adverse
effect on a state's ability to provide jobs in total
employment. Severity of climate was measured by the
sum of heating and cooling degree days in 1980 (the
number of degrees by which the average temperature
on a given day deviates from the norm of 65). The "sun
states, " California, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Arizona,
Georgia, and South Carolina are at a comparative
advantage while northern states like North Dakota,
Minnesota, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire,
Wisconsin, and Montana are at a comparative
disadvantage. For Illinois, all else equal, a 1 percent
decrease in the severity of Illinois' climate would lead
to an increase of 5,058 jobs in total employment over
a five-year period.
Per capita taxes as measured by the sum of state
corporate income, personal income, and general sales
taxes divided by state population, were found to have
a negative but statistically insignificant effect (at
conventional levels) on a state's comparative advantage
in providing total employment. Despite this factor's
statistical insignificance, it was retained in the final
analysis. All else equal, a 1 percent reduction in 1980
Illinois per capita taxes, equal to a decrease of $4.44,
would increase total employment by 1,730 jobs over
the five-year period.
With respect to total employment, three additional
factors were examined but not included in the final
analysis (see Table 4 notes). These factors consist of
skill level measured as the percentage of population
with a high school education, percentage of workforce
in a union, and average state energy prices. The first
two factors were each examined in conjunction with
average wages, percentage of the population with a
college education, state climate, and per capita tax
burden. While each was found to have a statistically
insignificant effect on a state's comparative advantage,
they did affect a state's comparative advantage as
anticipated. An increase in a state's high school
educated population was found to enhance the state's
comparative advantage, while an increase in the
unionized workforce was found to affect the state's
competitive position adversely. Neither factor was
retained in the final analysis.
Finally, state energy prices as measured in average
price per million BTU, were expected to negatively
affect a state's position and play an important role in
determining a state's comparative advantage. However,
this result did not turn out in the case of total,
manufacturing, or services employment, and so this
factor was eliminated from further analysis.
Table 4 also indicates important factors that
contribute to a state's comparative advantage in
manufacturing and services employment. Factors
found to be important to job growth in total
employment are found to be important in these sectors
as well. In particular, average wages, physical climate,
and skill level were found to have a statistically
significant effect. However, the two measures of skill
affected states' comparative advantage in providing
employment in these sectors differently. Skill level, as
measured by the college educated population, was
found to have a statistically significant effect on
services, signalling that a more highly educated
population enhances a state's competitive position in
providing service employment. This is a result similar
to that found for total employment. Other things equal,
a 1 percent increase in the college educated population
as of 1980 would create 1,446 jobs over a five-year
period.
However, in the case of states' comparative
advantage in manufacturing, skill level as defined by
the high school educated population was found to be
statistically important. As Table 4 shows, other things
equal, a 1 percent increase in the high school educated
population would create 2,921 jobs during the
subsequent five-year period. When college educated
population was included as well as high school
educated population (and the remaining factors, see
Table 4), this factor had a positive but insignificant
effect.
In terms of manufacturing, an additional factor, the
percentage of unionized workers in a state was
examined. The analysis shows a negative but
statistically insignificant relationship between the
percentage of workers unionized in a state and a given
state's comparative advantage. However, this factor
was retained in the final results due to its theoretical
importance. Other things equal, a 1 percent decrease in
the number of union workers in Illinois in 1980, equal
to 14,870 workers, would generate 973 additional jobs
over the subsequent five year-period.
Per capita taxes were not found to enhance or
diminish a state's comparative advantage consistently
for total, manufacturing, and services employment.
Instead, the results indicate that per capita taxes
diminish a state's comparative advantage in providing
jobs in total employment (as previously discussed) and
services but enhance a state's comparative advantage
in providing manufacturing jobs. However, for all three
cases, these relationships are found to be statistically
insignificant.
Conclusion
During the period 1980toI985,aswellasduring the
preceding five years, growth in Illinois' employment
greatly lagged behind the US average. This slower
growth is made evident by Illinois' rank of 48th, 51st
(out of 50 states and D.C.) and 32nd (out of 44 states)
in terms of the state's relative ability to provide jobs in
total, manufacturing, and services employment,
respectively. Important contributors to Illinois'
comparative disadvantage were found to be higher than
average hourly manufacturing wages in 1980 and the
relative severity of Illinois' climate. While it is clearly
impossible for Illinois to relocate to the sunbelt, the
evidence suggests that Illinois' competitive position
can be improved by a decrease in average wages, relative
to other states. Another means to enhance Illinois'
comparative advantage is by having an increasingly
educated population, relative to the US average. In 1980
the percentage of Illinois' population with a high school
education and the percentage with a college education
were on par with the US average. The findings with
respect to taxes do not offer clear guidance for Illinois
tax policy.
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Illinois Business Indexes
J. he BEBR's leading indicator continues to provide
evidence that Ilhnois may be headed for an economic
downturn. As Chart 1 shows, the three-month moving
average (MA 3) fell below the six-month moving
average (MA 6) in April and remained below in May. If
the MA 3 index remains below theMA 6 index during
the months of June and July, the four-month trend will
signal that there will be a downturn in the Illinois
economy beginning within the next few quarters.
However, the actual turning point in economic activity
cannot be predicted with certainty.
Growth in Illinois retail sales from one year prior has
significantly outpaced inflation as measured by the
Chicago CPI, indicating the current strength of the
Illinois economy. As Chart 2 shows, retail sales
increased 10.7 percent from April 1986 to April 1987.
At the same time, as Chart 5 shows, inflation grew at
4.4 percent, producing real growth of 6.3 percent.
The Chicago help-wanted advertising index (see
Chart 3|, which measures the volume of classified ads
in major Chicago newspapers, grew 29.1 percent from
May 1986 to May 1987 providing further evidence of
the strength of the Illinois economy. However, the St.
Louis index (see Chart 4) has not shown such positive
signs. During the period July 1986 to May 1987, with
the exception of November 1986, the help-wanted
advertising index for St. Louis declined from its value
one year prior.
Finally, Charts 5 and 6 indicate that inflation in April
and May has continued the pace set in March. Prices
grew 4.4 percent in Chicago and 3.74 percent in St.
Louis over the period May 1986 to May 1987.
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
Chart 1. Composite Leading Indicator (average percent
change in base indexes)
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X he secondary mortgage market in the United States
began in the 1930s with the creation of the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA). A restructur-
ing ofFNMA in 1968, the creation of the Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA) in 1968, and
the establishment of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) in 1970 are also important
dates in the history of the secondary mortgage market
in the United States. Since a somevi'hat modest
beginning, the secondary mortgage market has evolved
into a large and sophisticated enterprise. The amount
of new mortgage-backed securities issued in 1986
exceeded the total amount outstanding at the end of
1983, and the total dollar volume of mortgage-backed
securities traded in 1986 nearly surpassed 3 trillion
dollars—an amount in excess of the dollar volume of
equities traded in the major American stock exchanges.
Three main reasons were usually cited as the basis
for the creation of an secondary mortgage market in the
United States:
(1) The secondary mortgage market improves the
geographic match between the demand for mortgages
and the supply of household deposits. The market
allows areas with excess deposits to purchase
mortgages from areas with an excess demand for
mortgages.
(2) An opportunity for the federal government to
manage the housing cycle better. Throughout the 1 960s
and 1 970s many argued that the regulations on financial
institutions that limited the interest that lenders could
pay for savings (Reg Q) resulted in unnecessary
volatility of the business cycle. As market interest rates
rose above ceiling rates, savers withdrew funds from
the traditional suppliers of mortgage funds—the
savings and loan associations (S&Ls|—thus reducing
the supply of mortgage credit and bringing housing
construction to a sudden halt. The secondary mortgage
market was able to reduce some of this cyclicality in
housing by purchasing more mortgages during periods
of high rates of interest, thus increasing the supply of
mortgage credit.
(3) The secondary mortgage market provides an
opportunity for lenders to reduce their interest rate risk.
A portfolio of fixed-rate mortgages and short-run
liabilities can be quite sensitive to changes in the level
of interest rates. The secondary mortgage market
reduces some of this risk in that it allows lenders to
reduce their holdings of fixed-rate mortgages by selling
them in the market. This is a relatively new benefit
brought about by the increased volatihty of interest
rates in the 1970s and 1980s. Other reasons have been
cited |7), but these three were the most important.
A common thread among the three factors is the
regulation of Savings and Loans in the United States.
With the deregulation of the S&L industry, one might
have thought—and many did—that the growth in the
secondary mortgage market would decline. Deregula-
tion brought with it the end of regulated deposit rates,
a move to national banking and the end of geographical
segmentation, and the authority to issue new types of
mortgages less sensitive to interest rate risk, that is,
the adjustable-rate mortgage. Surprisingly, perhaps,
these changes did not slow the growth in the secondary
mortgage market. Indeed, since deregulation began in
1981, the growth has been greater than at any other
time in the history of the secondary mortgage market.
The growth in the issuance of mortgage-backed
securities is depicted in the chart. About $ 1 4 billion in
mortgage-backed securities were issued in 1970, and
this amount rose to over $71.9 billion in 1979. The
share of these instruments secured by conventional
mortgages also grew substantially. As large as this
growth was, it was modest in comparison to the growth
during the 1980s, especially 1986 16]. The issuance of
mortgage-backed securities in 1986 equalled
approximately $262.3 billion, more than the total
amount of mortgage-backed debt outstanding at the end
of 1983, though some of this growth was due to the
inflation of housing prices. Also, 1986 was marked by
the greatest surge in refinancing ever and a restructuring
of FNMA's portfolio—less buy-and-hold and more
mortgage-backed securities. Thus, the 1986 growth in
the secondary mortgage-market per se is overstated.
However, a good portion is directly linked to the
long-run growth of the secondary mortgage market.
Volume of Mortgage-Backed Securities Issued from
1970-1986
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
The purpose of this article is to focus upon the
question of why growth has been so substantial in the
recent past. It is argued that the original basis for a
secondary mortgage market was largely unique to the
US financial system and that the secondary mortgage
market did not represent a desirable aspect of a
thoroughly modern financial system. It was simply a
way of improving the workings of a highly regulated
system during periods of volatile interest rates. This is
not so of the growth since deregulation. It appears now
that the cost of raising funds for mortgages via the
secondary mortgage market in a deregulated
environment marked by volatile interest rates and
blessed with computer technology is likely to be
comparable to, and possibly less than, the cost of raising
funds by traditional methods—that is, household
deposits. The growth in the secondary mortgage
markets suggests that any differential that may have
existed has certainly narrowed. Some of the factors that
have produced a decline in the cost of raising funds in
the capital market and an increase in the cost of raising
funds via traditional methods are explored here.
Reasons for the Recent Rise in the Secondary
Mortgage Market
For years S&Ls enjoyed a variety of benefits that
guaranteed that they would be the lowest-cost producer
of mortgages. These included preferential tax
treatment, regulated deposit rates that helped S&Ls at
the expense of banks, regulated markets that limited
nationwide banking and, most important, deposit
insurance. FNMA, Freddie Mac, and GNMA also had
an advantage relative to private conduits in that they
had the benefit of a federal guarantee. Most observers
felt that in the 1970s the advantages to the S&Ls
outweighed the advantages to the three main issuers of
mortgage-based securities. However, recent changes in
technology, the economic environment, and the
regulatory structure have reduced, and possibly
eliminated, the advantage of the S&Ls over the
competition in the secondary mortgage market.
A number of factors are responsible for the reduction
in the advantage of the S&Ls. Some have served to
reduce the cost of funds to the secondary mortgage
market. These include: computer technology;
standardization of the mortgage contract and process;
a large increase in the demand for long-term financial
assets by institutional investors; and an increase in the
desire by a variety of financial institutions to
restructure portfolios. Other factors, especially those
related to deregulation of financial institutions, have
increased the cost of funds to S&Ls, thus further
reducing their comparative advantage.
Computer Technology
An interesting discussion of the actual and potential
future impact of computer technology is presented by
Kevin E. Villani |8]. In brief, he argues that computer
technology offers substantial opportunities to the
secondary mortgage market and that the future will see
a rapid increase in its use. Ultimately, Villani believes,
the computer will cut the average time from application
to funding from six weeks to one week.
One area in which the computer will likely help the
secondary mortgage market is mortgage origination.
Several new firms have already been created that allow
consumers to shop via computer for the cheapest
mortgage, for example, Shelternet. So far, it appears
they have met with only limited success. It seems that
consumers are not quite ready to forsake the personal
touch offered by the traditional system. However, as
consumers become more familiar with computers, they
should become comfortable with a computer search of
a mortgage menu.
Another area already affected by computer
technology is the transmittal of loan data between
lenders and the organizations purchasing the
mortgages. MIDANET—Freddie Mac's Mortgage
Information Direct Access Network—"eliminates the
two most time consuming steps in an secondary
mortgage market transaction; the transfer of data from
a lender's computer onto paper and the subsequent
transfer of the data from paper back to the computer at
Freddie Mac" |8|.
A third area in which the computer will help the
secondary mortgage market involves the trading of
securities, not just whole loans. One particular problem
in this area is that some transactions fail because of
improper paperwork. To reduce this problem, Freddie
Mac has developed a book-entry system in which the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York serves as a registrar.
This will eliminate some paperwork, the need for
couriers, and float. FNMA and GNMA are developing
similar systems [3|.
It should be noted that the impact of computer
technology to date has been a little slower and different
from what some expected. For example, many agree
that the computer-based search for mortgages has not
yet grown to some initial expectations. Also, Warren
Lasko of the Mortgage Bankers Association points out
that many believed computer technology would lead to
a greater concentration of loan servicing firms than has
occurred. Despite the fact that computer technology
has not transformed the industry as fast as some
expected, its introduction has almost certainly tipped
the scales away from the traditional S&.L approach,
which is based upon face-to-face contact and extensive
"bricks and mortar."
Standardization of the Mortgage Process
One of the difficulties in the marketing of mortgages
is the uncertainty on the part of the investor regarding
the mortgage being purchased. Granted, the 30-year
mortgage has been around for a long time, but there
can be wide variations in the underwriting process and
the kinds of supporting documents associated with the
mortgage. Gradually, the three major institutions in the
US have worked to standardize the underwriting and
record-keeping process. FNMA and Freddie Mac now
have widely accepted underwriting criteria, appraisal
practices, and forms. These improvements have led to
the standardization of the process surrounding the
fixed-rate mortgage.
One example of the standardization process concerns
the adjustable-rate mortgage. The introduction of the
generic, adjustable-rate mortgage brought with it many
different varieties. It became clear, however, that some
standardization would be necessary, and the efforts of
Freddie Mac would play a major role in the reduction
of the number of adjustable-rate mortgages on the
market from well over 100 to 5 or less. A similar result
occurred in the private mortgage insurance industry.
This industry is subject to a variety of state regulations;
however, the dominance of the agencies in the
secondary mortgage market has led to a more standard
set of regulations for mortgage insurers. Indeed, some
have called Freddie Mac the "de facto" regulator of this
industry.
An Increase in the Demand for Long-Term Assets by
Large Institutional Investors
The amount of funds available to large institutional
investors has grown substantially in recent years. Part
of this is due to demographic factors—baby-boomers
are saving for retirement—and some is due to the fact
that insurance companies as well as other types of
investors have been able to attract a large volume of
funds for investment. The complete set of factors
underlying this growth is open to debate, but the fact
of the growth is not.
One consequence of this growth is that institutional
investors are willing to purchase long-term assets like
mortgages to diversify their portfolios. In the words of
Lewis S. Ranieri of Salomon Brothers, one of the people
from Wall Street responsible for the growth of the
secondary mortgage market, "the astounding growth of
dollars for investment in the hands of portfolio
managers of all types
—
pension funds, state and local
retirement systems, insurance companies, bank trust
departments and thrift institutions" led to the growth
in the demand for assets that the secondary mortgage
market was able to meet [ 1 1. Not only did the secondary
mortgage market satisfy this demand, it also produced
a wide variety of adaptations of the traditional 30-year
mortgage to make it considerably more attractive to
the institutional investor. One example of this is the
collateralized mortgage obligation.
Portfolio Restructuring
Portfolio restructuring refers to the actions taken by
a portfolio manager to update the amount and
composition of the portfolio assets. One motive
underlying such restructuring is to ensure that the
interest rate exposure of the portfolio's assets is in line
with the interest rate exposure of its liabilities (that is,
match the durations of a portfolio's assets and
liabilities). Portfolio restructuring for this purpose is
occurring more often because of the increased volatility
of interest rates and the increased sophistication of
financial economists and analysts. This restructuring
increases the demand for assets that can be easily
bought and sold. As a result, the demand for
mortgage-backed securities has increased relative to
less liquid mortgage loans. Another consequence is the
' introduction of new derivatives of the mortgage-backed
securities that cater to the diverse demands of pension
fund managers. For example, STRIPS—mortgage pools
in which the interest and principal payments are sold
separately
—
produce two separate products: one for
those who are looking for substantial protection from
interest rate risk and another for those willing to accept
substantial interest risk.
Another motive underlying portfolio restructuring is
the desire to generate arbitrage profits. Arbitrage profits
can be earned by purchasing assets that are undervalued
and selling (go short) assets that are overvalued. If this
is done and the opinions of the investor are correct,
then profits can be made. It is quite common for the
major brokerage houses to advertise their strategies for
this type of arbitrage with mortgage-backed securities
of different age, coupon, and so on. Such activities are
beneficial to the health of the economy because they
produce lower mortgage interest rates. They also ensure
that capital flows into those sectors in which the
returns are highest and, as a result, the marginal
productivity of capital is greatest.
Deregulation
The Congress passed historic legislation in 1 980 that
deregulated the rates S&Ls could pay on their deposits.
The pressure to do so came from many different
quarters, including small savers who felt cheated by
artificially low rates. The legislation led to an increase
in the cost of funds to the S&Ls and reduced the
advantage of S&Ls over other kinds of institutions
making mortgage loans. It did not completely eliminate
their advantage because S&Ls still had something
nonfinancial institutions did not have—access to
underpriced deposit insurance for deposits up to
$100,000 through the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
The combination of higher deposit costs and
relatively fixed returns on its long-term mortgage assets
caused a serious squeeze for many S&.Ls. Since then,
many S&Ls have gone out of business. Others have
speculated on very risky projects, some of which have
gone sour. These failures have placed tremendous
pressure on the FSLIC. According to very recent reports,
the FSLIC has potential liabilities amounting to well
over $20 billion and assets of less than $ I billion. The
result is additional upward pressure on the cost of funds
to the S&.LS because it increases the riskiness of
deposits in such a system. Although the new banking
bill passed in August will relieve some of this pressure,
it is too early to tell if it is enough.
long-term housing mortgages. This is a dramatic change
from the traditional S&.L system in which the
mobilization and lending functions of the housing
finance system were conducted by the same
institution—the S&L. The future will no longer require
that these functions be carried on by the same
organization. Indeed, it is likely that the two functions
will become increasingly separate in the future. S&Ls
and mortgage bankers will probably specialize in
origination, a process that is likely to become even
more computerized. S&Ls may get more involved in
nonstandardized segments of the market, such as
development and joint ventures, thus becoming less
housing oriented. Mobilization, on the other hand, will
become increasingly the domain of the major federal
agencies or the domain of the large private Wall Street
brokerage firms who become expert in the issuance of
real estate mortgage investment conduits. Although
these developments will reduce the role of the S&Ls,
they will also be likely to produce lower mortgage
interest rates—something most participants in the
housing market welcome enthusiastically.
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By most standards the economic situation in
southern Illinois is anemic. Per capita income in recent
years averaged about 20 percent lower than in the rest
of the state. While the income gap between the region
and the rest of the state narrowed in the 1970s, the
income convergence stalled in the early 1980s.
Moreover, unemployment levels in southern Illinois
have averaged higher than in the rest of the state.
It is not surprising that programs to stimulate
economic growth have been a high priority to the people
of the region. The purpose of this article is to examine
the economic performance of the region by industry for
clues that may shed light on future prospects for growth
of the region.
The data used for this analysis are prepared by the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Regional
Economic Measurement Division. The county data
used to estimate employment and wages and salaries
are largely obtained from reports made by firms covered
by unemployment insurance. Adjustments are made by
the BEA to these wages and salaries to reflect
noncovered employment.
The Region's Competitive Position
An examination of the performance of the southern
Illinois economy relative to the performance of the
Illinois economy can be based on employment or wages
and salaries. In this section we examine employment
changes in II industrial groups between 1970 and 1984.
For the 1 5-year period, employment in southern Illinois
increased by 61,500 or 14 percent. Nearly two-thirds of
this net increase occurred in firms and establishments
classified as service industries. The service sector
includes personal (for example, laundry and repair),
business (for example, employment and data
processing), recreation, health, and educational
services. Smaller but substantial employment gains
occurred in the mining, retail, and finance sectors.
Significant declines occurred in manufacturing,
farming, and transportation (Table I).
In order to determine the region's competitive
position, we estimated employment in southern
Illinois assuming the region had the same industrial
makeup and the same industry employment growth
rates as the state as a whole. If the economic structure
and growth rates had mirrored the state, employment
would have grown by 48,900 (487,700 - 438,800) or
only 1 1 percent. Thus the region's performance as
measured by employment was better than would have
occurred if its employment experience had been the
same as in the state as a whole. It created 1 2,600 more
jobs (500,300 - 487,700) than could have been expected
if it had performed in the same fashion as did each of
the state's mdustries during this period. This difference
is identified as the region's relative competitive
position. In Table I it is shown as an index that was
computed by dividing actual employment by expected
employment in 1984.
If this performance could continue, it would, of
course, be a hopeful sign for employment levels in
southern Illinois compared to the state. However, the
performance of the state's economy has not been
particularly strong, especially in the latter years of the
study period. Hence, the relative position of the region
does not portend a strong regional growth rate in
absolute terms.
Despite this caveat, there are a number of related
questions that can be profitably explored if we are to
understand the region's past economic growth and
future potential. Some of these questions include: (1)
Has the competitive position of the region changed
through time? (2) Which industries within the region
are most (least) competitive? (3) Where are the
competitive industries located? and (4) Are the
conclusions concerning the region the same if the
region's competitiveness is based upon income instead
of employment? Each of these questions is discussed
in this article.
Relative Competitiveness of the Region's Industries
It is useful to compare actual employment changes
in the region's industries to the change in employment
that would have occurred if these industries had grown
at the state's rate. Such a comparison yields insights
concerning the relative competitiveness of the 1
1
industries. The index of relative competitiveness helps
identify which industries account for the change in the
region's competitiveness between 1970 and 1984. For
example, during the period four of the eleven industries
(wholesale, mining, construction, and finance)
registered a positive competitive position of more than
5 percent. In contrast, three industries performed less
well than the same industry for the state as a whole
(Table 1). The weakest sectors were agricultural
services, transportation, and service industries with
indexes of 78, 84, and 98, respectively.
It may seem incongruous that the largest actual gain
in regional employment occurred in the service
industry, yet this sector showed a competitive
disadvantage relative to the state. As it turns out, if the
service sector in the region had grown at the same rate
as in the state, employment in the sector would have
been even larger. Specifically, it would have employed
1,700 more persons than it actually did. For the eight
industries that have a relative competitiveness index
of more than 100, actual employment increased more
or declined less than occurred in employment in those
industries in the state.
Changes in the Competitiveness of the Region
through Time
We also examined the region's competitiveness for
the five-year period, 1979-1984. The decade of the
1970s was generally one in which basic commodity-
producing industries in Illinois were prosperous and
growing. The natural resource sectors of farming and
mining were especially strong. The manufacturing
sector of the state's economy had grown in the early
1 970s but by the latter years of the decade had stagnated
and then declined, as was true of manufacturing in
Table 1. Employment in
other midwest states. After 1979, the natural resource
industries weakened considerably, and the secular
dechne in manufacturing deepened. Illinois lost 260
thousand jobs in manufacturing between 1979 and
1984. Employment in these basic goods-producing
industries account for 25 percent of the region's total
employment. Trends in these base sectors were
expected to have an impact on residentiary industries
such as service, retailing, finance, and so on and, hence,
could be expected to affect the region's competitiveness.
Total employment in southern Illinois increased by
2 percent between 1970 and 1984. As before, we
estimated employment growth in southern Illinois
assuming the region had the same industry makeup and
the same industry growth rates in this period as
occurred for the state. Under this assumption
employment in southern Illinois would have increased
somewhat more than was actually observed. Thus, the
competitive advantage observed over the long period,
1970-1984, disappeared in the 1 979- 1 984 period (Table
2). In the latter period the region's competitive loss was
about 6,400 jobs for a relative loss of 1 percent.
The relative competitiveness of the region's
industries was somewhat different in 1979-1984 from
that observed during the entire 15 year period. From
1979 to 1984, when the overall competitiveness of the
region disappeared, only two (mining and manufactur-
ing) of the eleven industries registered competitive
position vis-a-vis the state, of 5 percent or more. The
favorable competitive position of manufacturing
occurred even though actual employment declined by
16,100 between 1979 and 1984. Had the sector's
employment performance been the same as that of the
state as a whole, employment would have declined even
more.
Even though these two competitive strong
sectors—mining and manufacturing—accounted for
less than one-fifth of the region's total employment in
1984, performance in these base industries can be
expected to have a multiple effect on the region's
overall economy. This may account for the relatively
favorable indexes of competitiveness for the
construction, retail, and finance industries (Table 2).
Location of Industries Showing Relative
Competitiveness in Southern lUinois
The southern Illinois counties posting the strongest
competitive position between 1970-1984 were
Effingham, Jackson, Jefferson, Monroe, Randolph, and
Williamson. In these counties seven or more industries
registered actual employment levels that were more
than 5 percent above the expected level in those
industries in the state. That is, those industries had
employment levels in 1984 that were above levels that
would have been expected had employment in the
county's industry changed by the same rate as in the
state. On the other hand, 10 counties had three or fewer
industries registering employment levels of 5 percent
or more above the expected level in those industries in
the state. Seven of these counties were located in the
southern portion of the region (see the map).
The Region 's Competitiveness as Measured by Income
Alternatively, the region's relative competitiveness
could be measured by income rather than employment.
Perhaps the first thing to observe is that personal
income per employee in southern Illinois averages less
than 80 percent of the level received in the rest of the
state. Income per employee in southern Illinois
averaged lower in virtually all industries and for all
three years except in mining (Table 3). In that industry,
income per employee in 1979 and 1984 in southern
Illinois averaged 1 2 and 25 percent, respectively, above
the industry average for the rest of the state. Income
per employee in the manufacturing and government
sectors of southern Illinois, while below the rest of the
state, ranked second and third behind mining in 1984.
Income per employee in the agriculturally related
groups of industries in southern Illinois was
comparable to that industry's average compensation in
the rest of the state in 1970 but in latter years turned
unfavorable.
Sectors in which income per employee was especially
low relative to the rest of the state included farming,
wholesale trade, finance, and the service establish-
ments. In 1 984 income per employee in these southern
Illinois industries averaged about two-thirds or less of
the amount received by employees in these industries
located elsewhere in the state.
Lower average income per employee in southern
Illinois than in the rest of the state means that a given
increase in employment in southern Illinois is not
Location of Industries Having a Relative Advantage in
Southern Illinois
Number of Industries In
County Showing a Relative
Competitive Advantage
1 7 or more
[XWl 4 to
L H 3 or less
Table 2. Employment in
Conclusions and Implications
Based on employment and income, the southern
Illinois economy showed favorable growth in the
1970-1984 period relative to the rest of the state.
However, in the 1979-1984 period this competitive
edge disappeared. Strong competitive sectors, whether
measured by employment or income, in the more
recent period include mining, manufacturing, and
government. These three sectors also have the highest
average relative wages and salaries per person. We
conclude that in the near term, developments in these
three sectors will substantially affect the economic
growth of the region.
The low average level of income per employee in
southern Illinois relative to the rest of the state
indicates that increasing employment, as important as
that might be, might not lead to gains in economic
welfare that many expect. While efforts to boost the
region's employment must continue, especially in the
three sectors identified as being most competitive, one
should not lose sight of long-run benefits accruing from
improving the skills and abilities of the labor force.
Such a strategy improves the capabilities of the labor
force and can help attract higher paying industries.
Roger Beck and William Hen are members of the
Department of Agribusiness Economics at Southern
Illinois University, Carbondale.
FOLKE DOVRING
By Faith and Credit: Economic Growth in
the 1980s
XZ/conomic growth in the 1 980s has been uneven and,
on the whole, sluggish. This is the apparent outcome
of economic policies that aimed at rapid growth and
that have used deficit financing on a large scale to avoid
high federal income taxes, which were expected to have
a depressing effect on the economy. The federal budget
deficit has parallels in two other deficits: a shortfall in
export income over payments for imports and a
continuing and worsening backlog of environmental
disutilities. Analysis of the economic policy that has
been followed since 1981 should consider all three
deficits.
Growth of National Product and Employment
In the 1980s, the national product of the United
States has grown at an apparent rate slightly below that
prevailing since early in the century. Based on
Historical Statistics of the United States up to 1960
and thereafter on recent issues of Survey of Current
Business, the following are the compound rates for
annual growth of real GNP, by sub-periods reflecting
presidential terms: 1909-1952, 2.9 percent; 1953-1960,
2.7 percent; 1961-1968, 4.5 percent; 1969-1976, 2.3
percent; 1977-1980, 3.0 percent; and 1981-1986 2.4
percent.
In total, real GNP rose by over 40 percent in the
1961-1968 period, by just under 20 percent in the period
1969-1976, by nearly 13 percent during the 1977-1980
period, and by over 15 percent 1981-1986. Hence, by
conventional criteria, the current administration has
not done particularly well by the national economy. It
is true that GNP statistics contain large difficulties of
concept and measurement that are by no means
resolved, so we should be cautious about concluding
that the economy has slowed down. The contrast with
the 1960s is, in any event, large enough that it must be
real to some extent. The 1980s cannot on any tenable
grounds be said to have done better than the sluggish
growth of the 1970s.
Population growth is nearly 1 percent per year, hence
the rate of improvement in per capita income in the
1980s has been barely 11/2 percent annually. With
increasing inequality of income, large numbers of the
poor and lower middle classes have actually become
worse off in recent times.
Wage employment has increased at nearly the same
rate as GNP, at least since 1 968. The last six years have
seen the employed civilian labor force increase by over
10
11 million, compared with 10 1/2 million in the
preceding four years and almost 1 1 million in the eight
years before that. Such increases reflect increasing
participation of women in the labor force, and they also
include the result of the increasing preponderance of
service activities over goods production in the US
economy. Wage employment in goods production fell
by about 3/4 million in the last six years; it rose by
over 2 million in the preceding four years and fell by
less than half a million in the period from 1 960 to 1 976.
Service occupations thus mcreased more than did total
employment in 198 1-1986 and in 1969-1976, but less
so in 1977-1980. The subcategory "services" (without
further description) represented half the employment
increase 198 1-1986 against much lesser fractions in the
preceding periods.
Gross wages per hour or per week culminated in
1977-1978 and are now lower (in constant dollars) by
5 percent (hourly) or 10 percent (weekly); the difference
between these reflects a decline in the length of the
average work week. In part, the shortening in the
average work week reflects the fact that there is
substantial part-time employment in the services.
All of this deals with economic activity as
encompassed by official statistics. The "second" or
"underground" economy is not included. This
exclusion may cloud the precise meaning of some of
these data.
There has been much interest in the increasing
preponderance of services in the US economy. This is
more evident in current data than in those measured
in money of constant purchasing power. In current
terms, production of goods declined from over 46
percent of the national product in the late 1960s to only
about 40 percent recently. In constant-term data, the
change is less apparent. In such terms, goods and
services matched closely from the late 1960s to the late
1970s, and only since 1980 has the service category
begun to exceed goods production; in 1986, goods were
worth 80 percent of the services in current terms and
90 percent in constant dollars.
Growth of the labor force nearly matching that in
national product gives no indication of much change
in productivity, a problematic concept 1 shall not try
to explain here.
Investment and Saving
Before the 1980s, investment in the US economy was
roughly in step with savings. In the 1980s the gap has
widened. The following gives percentages of GNP,
average per year:
Gross Gross Private
Investment Savings
1969-76 15.5 15.5
1977-80 16.3 16.0
1981-86 15.4 13.8
Therefore:
But the second statement is a non sequitur. If it were
true that more inequahty of income always leads to
higher savings rates, then the highest savings rate in
the world would be found in Latin America. That region
has the largest inequalities of income. But this is far
from being so. Savings rates in Latin America are not
particularly high. The expectation that larger
disposable incomes, especially among higher incomes,
would lead to higher savings rates was really without
foundation. In the dynamic sense, the second statement
is a fallacy.
How the propensity to save may react to changes in
the level and distribution of income is not a matter on
which economic theory can throw much light. Rather,
we should look to socio-cultural explanations such as
those proposed by Thorstein Veblen almost a century
ago. Snob effect, status symbols, and other nonproduc-
tive ways of spending may indeed come into a different
degree of prominence when the social and economic
climate changes. In the case of the United States in the
1980s, it may be plausible to suggest that the general
atmosphere of optimism encouraged by the current
administration may have generated a lower sense of
responsibility for the use of private money.
The Federal Budget Deficit
The federal government deficit is not necessarily
comparable to a deficit in budgets at the state, local, or
private levels. The reason is that the national
government alone has the power to make new money
and does so in more or less reasoned proportion to the
need for more money as the economy expands. A recent
analysis by T.M. Holloway in Survey of Current
Business (March 1 986| pointed to the relation between
national debt and national product as the logical basis
for evaluating federal budget policy. That proportion
had been as high as over 55 percent in the mid 1950s
and had since fallen almost continuously until the mid
1970s, when it stabilized at about 26—27 percent.
Beginning in 1982, the percentage turned upward again
and reached over 37 percent in the fourth quarter of
1985. According to Holloway, a falling percentage
means that the budget is in a real sense over-balanced;
only a rising percentage makes the budget under-ba-
lanced in a real sense. In 1981, the falling proportion
of the national debt to the national product, he felt,
contributed to the recession. By the same token, the
boom in 1983 was set off by the rising deficit—
a
standard Keynesian remedy, and we have had only
sluggish growth in 1985 and 1986. According to the
Holloway analysis, a budget deficit of $48 billion would
mean a balanced budget in real terms. Thus, if
Gramm-Rudman fails to balance the budget in
conventional terms, no great harm may follow. But if
the deficits continue as large as they are, the result will
be either recession or inflation, depending on which
monetary solution is adopted.
The budget deficit would, in itself, have a stimulus
effect on the economy because a large part of it is used
by the military, a sector that responds to politico-
administrative imperatives rather than market forces.
It is of some interest to note the relation between
defense expenditures for durable goods (mainly
weapons and ships) to the deficit in external payments.
The Trade Deficit
The deficit in foreign merchandise trade is, above all,
one of trade in durable goods. Over the years 1 983-1 986,
the annual trade deficit has risen from $5 billion in
1983 to $149 billion in 1986, for a four-year total of
$336 billion. In the same years, the total of
durable-goods imports over exports of the same group
of goods went from $29 billion in 1 983 to $ 103 billion
in 1986, totaling $271 billion in four years, or more
than 80 percent of the trade deficit in those years. In
1986, the durable-goods deficit was 69 percent of the
total trade deficit.
This commodity composition of the trade deficit is
noteworthy because durable goods have been a weak
subsector in the US economy in the 1980s, with a
slower growth rate than all goods production. This
weakness in the production of durable goods is related
to the relatively weak performance in investment
despite the influx of foreign funds into the US
investment market. The 1986 net imports of durable
goods represents 1 /7 part of all civilian demand for such
goods (for investment and consumption) and is
somewhat larger than the federal government's
purchases of durable goods for the Defense Department.
Such a weakness in durable goods production and
trade is further evidence of the relative weakness of
economic growth in the 1 980s. With defense purchases
in the range of 10-11 percent of all durable goods
produced in the country, the sector has received
considerable stimulus financed by the federal deficit.
This stimulus should have extended to the willingness
of the defense contracting industries to invest, given
the often long-term nature of defense procurement
contracts. It is plausible that without this deficit-
financed expansion of defense procurements, growth in
heavy industry would have been even weaker, and so
would investment.
The increasing flow of foreign investments into the
United States has also had the consequence of changing
the sign of the national-account item called "factor
income from abroad," which is now negative after
having been positive for many years. This change
renders the credit that the economy can take from its
rate of growth one shade weaker.
The Deficit on Environmental Disutilites
The deficit in environmental quality is long standing.
It exists and keeps mounting because we are enjoying
many industrial products without paying the full cost
of their production. Here, as in the case of petroleum
and some other natural resources, we are "living off the
capital" with insufficient provision for eventual
replacement.
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Only intermittently do the news media mention that
current policy in Washmgton downplays environmen-
tal protection even more than was done in previous
years. Toxic dumps are largely left unreclaimed,
making the hazards more deepseated and the eventual
cleanup more expensive. On acid rain, Canada calls for
action, and the United States promises research. Large
parts of the country have streams and ground water of
impaired quality. The replacement in bottled water
counts as an addition to national product without
counting the negative entries of the water that became
undrinkable. The southwestern quadrant of the United
States keeps overusing scarce water, with creeping
desertification as a consequence.
A pervasive thought underlying such a policy toward
environmental degradation is the notion that the
environment is somehow less important than
marketable goods and services. We are often told that
cleaning up the poison dumpsites cannot be done
because "it costs too much." At the same time,
expanding production of market goods and services is
hailed as a good thing because it creates jobs and
incomes.
It is an elementary fact of national accounting that
anything that costs money also creates jobs and
incomes, and vice versa. It is true that cleaning up
dumpsites and reversing the consequences of acid rain
costs money, but these activities also employ people
and generate measurable additions to national product.
And while the manufacturing of Cadillacs and
cosmetics creates jobs and generates income, it also
necessitates expenditures on the part of whoever is to
use them. The two faces of national accounts, the
product and the expenditure side, have to match; only
temporarily can they diverge in a country that affords
itself the luxury of a large deficit in foreign account.
The difference between market production and
environmental protection is not in the concepts of costs
and values, but in uses—for individual consumption or
for collective consumption. Collective consumption is
more difficult to visualize, essential as it may be.
Pollution does not always come to the same people who
enjoy the market production. Industrialists whose
factories and power stations produce poison dumps and
acid rain often can afford to live far away from the
pollution. In contrast, those who live on a dump or
under the acid rain may not be able to afford all the
luxuries for the sake of which the pollution was
generated. This difference in the incidence of pollution
is one more point where economic inequality has been
increasing in recent times.
Favoring current consumption at the expense of
squandering long-term assets is a policy that caters to
the short-sighted wishes of people whose horizons will
only include the remote future if they are so educated.
As current politics, the emphasis on market goods is
the easy way out. The regime that takes a public stance
that neglecting the overhead is all right will eventually
have to answer for the consequences of leading public
opinion in the wrong direction.
The deficit in overhead capital of environmental
quality cannot be estimated in hard statistical terms.
Intuitively, it seems certain that it is far greater than
either the federal budget deficit or the foreign-trade
deficit.
If matters such as poison dumpsites, acid rain,
ground water quality, and desertification were to be
addressed on a scale that would yield sizeable results,
then one of two things would need to be done. Either
income taxes would have to be raised or the federal
budget deficit would need to become even larger.
Conclusions
Examining the record of six years of ostensibly
conservative economic policy, the results are far from
reassuring. The policy in place has emphasized faith in
the government and the solidity of credit at both the
fiscal and the national-account levels. The results are
so far below what had been hoped for that they may
well be more than balanced by the continuing deficit
in overhead capital such as natural resources and
environmental quality. The policy of the 1980s has not
safely guarded the nation's future.
The general impression is of an economic system that
may not be making any real progress in the total
balance. This is rendered even more problematic by the
signs of increasing economic inequality as evidenced
by the data on part-time employment and falling
weekly average wages. Lowering the standard of living
of the poor is not just something that should offend the
human heart. It also tends to impair the nation's human
capital and to render it more difficult to mobilize all
its resources.
Economic policy needs thorough reevaluation. We
must avoid the mistake of relying on simplistic theory
and the record of the past. There must be more attention
to what really goes on in the economic system.
Folke Dovhng, a former United Nations official, taught
land economics and economic development in the
University of Illinois Department of Agricultural
Economics, 1960—1987. His writing on macro
economic subjects include three recent books. Riches
to Rags (1984), Land Economics (1987), and
Productivity and Value (1987).
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Illinois Business Indexes
Rerecessionary pressures continue to build in the
Illinois economy. Since April, the composite leading
indicator has followed a downward trend, indicating a
slowdown in economic activity. As chart 1 shows, the
three-month moving average (MA3) has been below the
six-month moving average (MA6) for four consecutive
months. Although timing of the actual downturn
cannot be predicted, the composite leading indicator
series has historically led the downturn by 7-14
months.
In contrast to the composite leading indicator series,
individual indicators continue to send mixed signals
about the health of the state's economy. Since April,
the number of residential housing permits issued has
consistently been below the number issued in 1986
(Chart 2). Also, the value of industrial buildings was 52
percent lower in July 1987 than in July 1987. In contrast,
professional and mercantile buildings have shown
marked increases over last year. Furthermore, as shown
in Chart 3, real retail sales rebounded in June. For two
Illinois industries, coal and petroleum, output levels
remain below 1986 levels (Chart 4). In contrast, the
manufacturing sector remains strong. Both employ-
ment and average weekly hours worked increased in
July over a year ago. Also in July, the Chicago help
wanted index was 16.5 percent higher than its
year-earlier level, while the St. Louis help wanted index
decreased.
Inflation has continued at a modest rate. The July
1986-July 1 987 change in the CPI for the north central
US was 3.58 percent—down from May's yearly rate of
3.78 percent but higher than the 1986 rate of 0.8
percent. Two trends continue: growth in manufacturing
earnings has kept pace with inflation (Chart 5) and St.
Louis inflation has remained below Chicago's (Chart 6).
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
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X he federal debt has risen substantially during the
period since 1974, having reached nearly $2.4 trillion
by the end of the fiscal year just completed. The series
of very large deficits since 1974 has added just under
$2 trillion to the federal debt. In popular discussions of
these deficits, it has become common to observe that
they exceed the cumulative deficits of the preceding
183 years of the nation's history.
The purpose of this article is to place the recent
growth of the federal debt into historical perspective.
Although there can be no doubt about the facts relating
to the federal debt, there is considerable question about
what those facts mean. It is of interest, for example, to
question whether the experience of the current decade
is unusual. Is it unprecedented? Does it represent a
marked departure from historical trends?
Deficits and Debt
A deficit or surplus emerges by virtue of a difference
between spending and income during some period of
time. To the extent that spending exceeds income,
there is a deficit; to the extent that income exceeds
spending, there is a surplus.
The concepts of debt and deficit are related. One
means by which a household, business firm, or
government is able to finance a deficit is by borrowing.
That is, it exchanges a promise to pay for the means of
payment needed to finance its deficit. In the process,
depending upon the nature of the expenditure being
financed, there can be a decline in the net worth of the
entity involved. If the deficit emerges by virtue of the
purchase of an asset, net worth may not be impaired.
If consumption is financed, net worth declines.
There is an important point to be made. Namely, in
dealing with individuals and business firms there is no
unambiguous interpretation that can be placed on the
expansion or contraction of the quantity of their
outstanding debt. An expanding debt may reflect
persistent deficits, or it may reflect a rearrangement in,
or an expansion of, assets.
In their accounting practices, private businesses seek
to recognize this distinction. Even though they may
make very large outlays on building or other capital
equipment during a year, they do not show all of those
expenses on their books during that year. Instead, on
their balance sheet they show increases in both their
assets and their liabilities. Subsequently, on their
income statement they allocate those expenses over
many years as the capital depreciates.
Not so for the federal government. The United States
government records all of its expenses for capital
expenditures in the year during which the actual
outlays occur. Thus, for example, if the US Navy takes
delivery of an aircraft carrier during the fiscal year
ending in 1988, all the expenses for that carrier are
shown on the books of the government during that
single year—even though the carrier may be in the fleet
for thirty years. Consequently, for the most part the
federal debt is the year-after-year accumulation of
current account deficits and surpluses.
There are other important alternatives among
current account budget concepts. One way of defining
federal budget outlays and receipts, referred to as the
total budget, places emphasis upon being all-embracmg.
Outlays are defined as including transfer payments and
lending, in addition to expenditures for currently
produced goods and services. Receipts within this
framework include loan repayments, social security
contributions, as well as tax revenues. In contrast, the
national income accounts budget uses a second way of
defining federal outlays and receipts. Federal
expenditures are limited to expenditures for goods and
services; receipts are limited to tax revenues from
current income.
Differences between annual deficits measured within
these alternative budget concepts can be quite large, or
quite small. In fiscal 1980 the total budget deficit was
46.4 percent larger than the national income accounts
measure, $73.8 billion compared with $50.4 billion. By
comparison, the total deficit in fiscal 1986 was only 4.7
percent larger than the income accounts budget.
Moreover, the total deficit may be smaller than the
national income accounts deficit. For example, in fiscal
1987 the total deficit was $ 12.7 billion smaller than the
income accounts deficit, according to the available
estimates at this writing. Indeed, it is possible for one
measure to be in deficit while the other is in surplus.
History of the Debt
Arguments relating to deficits and debt have
persisted throughout the nation's history. A major issue
associated with the ratification of the Constitution was
whether the debt connected with financing the
Revolution would be paid by the new central
government. At length, the debt was "funded."
Chart 1 shows the outstanding federal debt for the
period from 1 800 to 1 986. The vertical axis of Chart 1
is scaled logarithmically. With such a scale, identical
percentage increases show identical vertical
movements, even though absolute amounts may be
quite different. On such a chart, an increase from 5 to
1 would look to be the same size as an increase from
50 to I00or500to 1,000. Such a representation of data
is generally considered to be appropriate for viewing
developments relating to growth over long periods of
time.
The nation came into being with a debt of $75.5
million. Indebtedness moved irregularly downward
until the War of 1812, then rose again. Following the
war, steady progress was made toward repaying the
debt. With the election of Andrew Jackson, debt
repayment efforts intensified. Indeed, by 1835 the
Chart 1. Public Debt of the Federal Government: 1791-1986
Billions of Dollars Billions ol Dollars
1.000.0
500.0
1,000.0
500.0
Note: For period 1791 to 18.S2 the statistics represent the total public debt, the formal funded debt of the federal government (including some obligations
that bear no interest and matured debt upon which interest had ceased) After 1 852, noninterest-bearing debt and matured debt are removed from the series.
The public debt includes a small amount of obligation not subiect to the statutory debt ceiling, thereby differing from the legally defined gross federal debt.
For 1791 to 1842 the statistics relate to [anuary 1; from 1842 to 1976 they relate to June 30^ beginning in 1977 the fiscal year ends September 30.
United States was essentially out of debt.
There have been large increases in debt associated
with each, or nearly each, of the nation's wars (see
shaded areas of Chart 1|. During and immediately
followmg the Civil War, the debt rose from $64.7
million in 1860 to $2.2 billion in 1866, an increase of
3,350 percent. Never before had federal indebtedness
come remotely close to $1 billion. As Chart I
illustrates, the Civil War experience constituted a
major change in the position of federal indebtedness.
Additional imagery is provided by Chart 2A. The total
indebtedness from 1791 to 1860 is shown in the shaded
area. In the following six years the debt exploded.
Thereafter, indebtedness tended to move downward,
reaching a low of $581 million in 1892.
There was another major upsurge in federal
indebtedness as a consequence of World War I. In 1916,
prior to US entrance into hostilities, the federal debt
stood at $973.6 million, having been cut nearly 60
percent below its Civil War peak. But during the next
three years, the federal debt surged to $25.2 billion, an
increase of nearly 2,400 percent (Chart 1). Here again,
financial markets accommodated a major increase in
quantities of debt issues by the US Treasury. Chart 2B
suggests that the World War I experience was similar
to experience during the Civil War. The accumulation
of debt from 1 79 1 to 1 9 1 6 constituted only 2.4 percent
of the 1919 debt level. After the war, there were
substantial debt reductions. By 1 930 the debt had fallen
more than one-third, reaching $15.9 billion just prior
to the Great Depression.
During the 1930s the debt expanded rapidly (at a 10.3
percent average annual rate), reaching $42.4 billion in
1940.
World War II was accompanied by a huge increase in
the federal debt, if viewed within ordinary terms of
reference. Roughly $230 billion were added to federal
indebtedness from 1940 to 1946, more than a fivefold
Chart 2. Debt Accumulations
Chart 2A. Civil War
1791-1866
1791-1861 (2.5%)
Chart 28. World War I
1791-1919
1791-1916(2.4%)
Chart 2C. World War II Chart 2D. Since 1974
1941 (3.0-b)
1942 (4 5%)
expansion. Thus, even though Chart 1 suggests that the
increase was not as large as during the Civil War and
World War I, it was substantially larger in dollar
amounts.
The World War II experience again illustrates a
persistent problem in interpreting the impact of change
on, or within, a growing organization. Following World
War II, it was possible to observe that the accumulation
of debt during the preceding six years was massively in
excess of the total indebtedness that had accumulated
during the preceding 155 years of the nation's history.
In fact, it was five times greater. Although such a
statement has a dramatic impact, it is not really
extraordinary, as mdicated by comparing Chart 2C with
2A and 2B. Following World War I it could be said that
the preceding three years had witnessed a growth in
debt that was nearly 25 times greater than had been
accumulated m the preceding 1 28 years of the nation's
history. Following the Civil War, it could be said that
the preceding six years had witnessed a growth in debt
that was nearly 35 times greater than had been
accumulated during the preceding 75 years of the
nation's history.
Since the end of World War II, the federal debt has
moved steadily upward, registering only five small
reductions after 1946. The postwar period can be
divided meaningfully into two subperiods. The first
period consists of the 28 years from 1946 to 1974. In
terms of absolute amounts, the federal debt rose from
$268. 1 billion to $532. 1 billion, an average annual rate
of increase of 2.48 percent.
The second period runs from 1 974 to the present. The
federal debt has expanded $1.9 trillion, having risen
more than 400 percent (an annual rate of growth of 13.2
percent). As indicated, the accumulation of debt in the
past 13 years has surpassed the debt increases of the
preceding 183 years (Chart 2D).
For those interested in political comparisons, it turns
out that the first seven years of the Reagan Administra-
tion have been impressive in terms of its ability to
generate debt. Beginning with a debt of $996.5 billion
at the end of fiscal 198 1, the debt has more than doubled
(see the table). In the four-year Carter Administration
the debt rose by more than one-third, and in the
Nixon-Ford Administrations the debt nearly doubled.
The doubling period, the period of time required for
anything to double (see insert), has shortened in each
of the preceding three administrations. From 8. 1 years
in the Nixon-Ford Administrations, it fell to 7.8 years
in the Carter Administration. In the Reagan
Administration it has shortened to 5.6 years (see the
table).
Experience during these administrations was
markedly different from that in earlier administrations.
At the rate of debt growth during the Eisenhower era,
it would have taken 70 years for the debt to double.
The doubling period was 26.7 years during the
Kennedy-Johnson period (see the table).
Other Measures of the Size of the Debt
It is of interest to compare the debt with other
relevant variables. There is a view that it is relevant to
Debt Growth during Presidential Administrations
debt and federal receipts. A second measure is the ratio
of debt to gross national product (GNP).
Each measure tells the same story. The burden of the
debt reached its peak during World War II, then drifted
downward through much of the 1970s (see Chart 3).
The debt burden has risen during the 1980s.
There are no magic numbers to indicate the point at
which the burden of the debt begins to inhibit the
economy. In World War II the size of the debt exceeded
GNP by one-fifth and exceeded federal receipts by a
multiple of six. For the bulk of the next four decades
the debt burden declined. By 1 980, the ratio of debt to
GNP had fallen to less than one-third; the debt relative
to federal receipts had declined to a multiple of 1 .6 to 1
.
Concluding Remarks
The federal debt has risen more rapidly during the
period since 1974 than during other peacetime periods
of this century. It has expanded particularly rapidly
since the early 1980s. An aspect of the accelerated
growth in debt is that the doubling period has shortened
markedly.
Even so, there is no reason to regard the decade of
the 1 980s as a disturbingly marked departure from the
nation's history. There is every reasonable presumption
that the recent and current growth in the federal debt
will be accommodated into investor portfolios without
difficulties. After all, there have been many episodes
during which rapid debt accelerations have been
handled without memorable strain. Moreover,
although the burden of the debt has increased
moderately during the 1980s, there is no reason to
suppose that the current burden is uncomfortable.
Nor should we be distracted by observations to the
effect that there has been an explosion in debt. We need
not be concerned by the fact that some desirable, or
undesirable, variable has doubled in the recent past.
One of the troublesome concomitants of inflation is
that there is an abundance of nonsmall rates of growth
in magnitudes measured in dollars. As a consequence,
doubling periods shorten substantially. Unless there is
a return to rates of inflation that had characterized the
1950—1970 period, as the world unfolds over the next
several decades we will again be in a position to look
back and observe that the recent past has duplicated all
of the nation's history. Such a state of affairs enables
us to persist in the impression that the cutting edge of
life experience through which we are moving is
characterized by unprecedented change. It freshens the
illusion that we are special. And in many ways it is
always true.
Chart 3. Measures of Debt Burden
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Japan, USA: The Impact of the Diamond
Star Plant on the Bloomington-Normal
Economy and Housing Market
Rerecently, several Japanese corporations have elected
to manufacture and/or assemble products in the United
States. The impact of these decisions has been a subject
of considerable interest, especially in view of the
financial incentives many state and local governments
have extended to the Japanese firms. An opportunity to
study selected economic effects of what Business Week
recently called the "Japan USA" phenomenon arose
after April 1985, when Chrysler Corporation and
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation jointly agreed to build
an automobile plant in the United States. On 7 October
1985, Bloomington-Normal, Illinois was officially
announced as the plant site for the new Diamond Star
Motors.
Although Bloomington-Normal itself has enjoyed a
relatively stable economy, much of Central Illinois has
experienced high unemployment and declining growth
in recent years. Many saw the Diamond Star plant as
the beginning of an economic renaissance, and Chrysler
and Mitsubishi officials actively promoted that belief.
Initially, they announced that the plant would have a
capacity of 180,000 cars annually, produced by 2,500
workers. Even before the groundbreaking ceremony in
April 1986, the announced annual capacity was
increased to 240,000 cars, to be produced by 2,900
workers. The plant has a projected cost of $700 million,
of which $100 million are to be paid as wages during
construction.
State and local government officials echoed the belief
that the plant would be of significant economic benefit
to the area. In fact, governmental units provided $88.2
million in financial incentives to Chrysler and
Mitsubishi to lure the Diamond Star plant to Illinois.
Such incentives included investment tax credits, state
sales tax credits, income tax deductions, reductions in
local tax obligations, reductions in filing and permit
fees, and subsidies for land purchase and building
demolition. The Diamond Star plant will receive these
benefits for 10 years.
In response to charges by some taxpayers that the
incentives were too generous, government officials
justified their actions with consultants' projections
that the new plant would result in substantial
economic and financial development in the community
and surrounding areas. Estimates of up to 8,500 new
jobs, accompanied by increases in personal income,
when the plant reaches full capacity have been widely
quoted. Local officials stressed the "just-in-time"
inventory-management practices of Japanese
manufacturers and predicted that most suppliers for the
plant would be located within a few miles of
Bloomington-Normal.'
Measuring the Economic Impact
The purpose of our research was to begin analyzing
trends in housing values, employment by sector,
income, population, and other variables to determine
whether the projected economic benefits of the
Diamond Star plant have begun to be realized. The
findings reported here are based on data spanning the
period January 1982 through early 1987, representing
two phases in Diamond Star history: a 3- 1 /2 year period
before the Diamond Star announcement (1982 to late
1985) and the period following the announcement of
the plant in which construction of the plant and hiring
of workers began (late 1985 to early 1987). All
conclusions drawn are preliminary, of course, because
the full economic significance of the Chrysler-Mit-
subishi investment will not be apparent for some time.
The long-run research plan includes a comparison of
economic conditions during the construction and
initial operating stages (late 1985-1990) with the
economic data gathered for the earlier period.
To assess the condition of the residential real estate
market, monthly data on residential property sales and
building permits were obtained. In addition, with the
financial assistance of the Office of Real Estate
Research at the University of Illinois and the
cooperation of the Bloomington/Normal Board of
Realtors, Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data on over
1,600 single-family home sales in the Diamond Star
area were collected. To assess other economic
conditions, data were gathered on unemployment rates,
employment in manufacturing, construction, service
and other nonagricultural jobs in both the public and
private sectors, commercial bank deposits and loans,
and state sales tax receipts.
An effort was made to control for external influences,
such as changes in the state economy or other sources
of growth or decline in the local economy. Unfortu-
nately, of course, a clear separation of Diamond Star
from other events is impossible. But reasonable control
was accomplished by collecting data on another region
for comparison. Thus, all comparable data were
gathered for Champaign County, and most were also
gathered for the state as a whole. The Champaign-Ur-
bana area represents an excellent comparison to
McLean County and Bloomington-Normal because of
the similar size, location, and employment mix.
For each category of data, relative ratios and/or
percentage changes over time were constructed. For
example, McLean County construction employment
was expressed as a percentage of total construction
employment in the state of Illinois, and as a percentage
of construction employment in the Champaign/Urbana
area. The trend in each McLean County ratio before
and after several key dates in Diamond Star history was
examined to reveal whether any impact on the McLean
County economy has yet been realized.
Findings
Results of the analyses are presented first for
residential housing price indexes in Bloomington-Nor-
mal and Champaign-Urbana over the period
1982-1986, and then for other economic variables.
Residential Housing Prices
To assess conditions in the real estate market, a
semi-annual housing price index for each area was
constructed. The McLean County data consisted of a
random sample of 1,619 single-family home sales
reported in the annual sales book of the local Multiple
Listing Service (MLS) during a five-year period from
January 1982 to December 1986. The data for
Champaign were drawn from house sales in the
southwest quadrant of the city, with a total sample of
480 sales over the same five-year period.
The results of the regression analysis are illustrated
in Chart 1. A comparison of housing price indexes for
the two counties over the period 1982-1986 reveals
that, although the relationship is unstable during the
early part of the period, an upward trend began in the
first half of 1 985 and continued uninterrupted through
year-end 1986. These results do not point to a definite
conclusion that the new automobile plant has had a
relatively positive impact on the Bloomington-Normal
real estate market, although they are suggestive. The
full impact of the Diamond Star plant on the local
housing market will not be determined until the plant
begins operating at full capacity in 1990.
Chart 1. Ratio of Housing Price Index (Bloomington
over Champaign]
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Chart 2. Building Permits (quarterly totals)
Other Economic Variables
Analyses of relative ratios and percentage changes for
other economic variables suggest trends.
Building Permits. Chart 2 shows the ratio of quarterly
totals for one-to-four family building permits in the
Bloomington-Normal area to quarterly totals in the
Champaign-Urbana area plotted over time. Over the
period of study, the number of l-to-4 family building
permits issued in Bloomington-Normal relative to
those issued in Champaign-Urbana increased. This
strengthening in Bloomington-Normal building
permits coincided with the upward trend found in
Bloomington-Normal 's relative housing price index. In
contrast, the Bloomington-Normal ratio of permits for
five-or-more family units, not shown here, did not
increase, nor did quarterly percentage changes in
building permits issued over the period.
Employment by Sector. Because many of the
economic benefits of the Diamond Star plant are
projected to be the result of increased employment
opportunities, considerable effort was devoted to
analyzing employment by sector in Bloomington-Nor-
mal relative to that in the Champaign-Urbana and in
the state of Illinois.
One would not expect large increases in manufactur-
ing employment at this stage of the Diamond Star
project, although increases in construction, wholesale,
and retail employment might plausibly have already
occurred as a result of plant construction. The ratios of
construction jobs in Bloomington-Normal to those in
Champaign-Urbana and to those in Illinois however,
do not reveal any apparent changes following the
Diamond Star announcement. A comparison of the
difference in the quarterly rate of change in
construction jobs between McLean County and
Champaign County does indicate a slight upward trend
in McLean County although the trend began before the
Diamond Star announcement.
Wholesale employment in Bloomington-Normal
declined considerably relative to that in Champaign-Ur-
bana over the 1982-1986 period, and declined slightly
compared to wholesale employment in the state of
Illinois. Chart 3 shows, however, that quarterly
percentage changes in wholesale jobs were greater in
Bloomington-Normal toward the end of the period than
in Champaign-Urbana. The upward trend begins in late
1985 and is consistent with the hypothesis that the
Diamond Star construction has in fact stimulated
business in the wholesale sector of the Bloomington-
Normal economy. (Chart 3 plots the difference between
Bloomington-Normal percentage changes and
Champaign-Urbana percentage changes. Thus, values
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Chart 3. Wholesale Jobs (quarterly percent change)
greater than indicate greater rates of change in B/U
than in Champaign-Urbana.)
Trends in retail employment are almost exactly
opposite those in wholesale employment. While retail
employment in Bloomington-Normal increased
relative to that in Champaign-Urbana and in Illinois,
the percentage changes were relatively lower in
Bloomington-Normal following the Diamond Star
announcement. The projected impact of the Diamond
Star construction payroll had not translated into
additional retail jobs by the end of 1986.
Unemployment. Although the Bloomington-Normal
unemployment rate declined relative to Champaign-Ur-
bana over the period 1982-1986, the decline does not
coincide with the Diamond Star announcement. When
compared to employment in the state, the Bloomington-
Normal rate also declined slightly over the period. It is
too early to tell, but late 1985 may have marked the
beginning of a more pronounced decline in
Bloomington-Normal's rate. This variable should be
closely monitored in the future as the Diamond Star
work force is brought up to full capacity.
Commercial Bank Data. Other economic variables
that could potentially reveal economic changes as a
result of the Diamond Star plant are total commercial
bank deposits and IPC (individual, partnership, and
corporate) deposits in McLean County, compared to
those in Champaign County and in the state. Because
data on personal income are not currently, and will
probably never be, available, bank deposit data serve as
reasonable proxies. Data for each six-month period
from June 1982 to December 1986 indicate that both
total and IPC deposits in the Diamond Star area
declined over the period, despite the advent of plant
construction in the latter periods.
Other banking data reveal a declining trend for total
loans at commercial banks in McLean County versus
those in Champaign County and in the state. After
December 1985, however, the end of the six-month
period in which the Diamond Star plant was
announced, the declining trend in commercial and
industrial loans compared to the Champaign-Urbana
area was reversed. It is possible that this reversal
reflects plans for business expansion and expectations
of increased economic activity in the Diamond Star
region following the plant announcement. Again, this
variable should be monitored closely in subsequent
periods.
Sales Tax Receipts. The final data set examined was
quarterly sales tax receipts for McLean County and
Champaign County from January 1983 through
September 1986. To ensure comparability of tax rates
over the entire period, amounts collected as a result of
municipal or county taxes were omitted. The data
shows an increasing trend in McLean County relative
to Champaign County, although it appears to have
begun before the third quarter of 1985 and, thus, may
not be attributable to activities surrounding the
Diamond Star plant.
Future Directions
Of course, a complete assessment of the financial
impact of the Diamond Star joint venture compared to
the incentives extended by governmental units must
await completion and full operation of the plant. It also
must include analysis of additional variables such as
property tax data that are not yet available.
Nonetheless, this study provided an important
opportunity to examine several highly visible markets
with potential impact on a large number of financial
decision-makers. Ultimately, the results may have
implications for state and local financial incentive
plans, as well as for business people, home buyers,
home sellers, real estate investors, the real estate
industry, and financial institutions in affected
communities.
At this point, the period following the Diamond Star
announcement appears to be accompanied by increases
in the prices of single family housing, one-to-four
family unit building permits, wholesale employment,
and commercial and industrial loans in the
Bloomington-Normal/McLean County area relative to
the Champaign-Urbana/Champaign County area. In
addition, the rate of unemployment may be decreasing
relative to that in the state of Illinois, and state sales
tax receipts may be increasing relative to Champaign
County, although these trends began before the
Diamond Star announcement. However, it is too early
to measure the full impact of the plant on any of these
economic variables. This is particularly true because
the real estate market is traditionally considered to
have a relatively slow reaction to economic changes
and to new information. It is hoped that collection and
analysis of data can be continued at least through 1990.
Note
'Subsequent events have revealed that the "just-in-
time" system in the United States may be implemented
somewhat differently from the way it is practiced in
Japan. By the time the Diamond Star suppliers had been
announced m mid- 1987, only lOof 50 were located in
Illinois. Others were as far as 400 miles from
Bloomington-Normal.
MARTIN DWYER
Job Growth: A Look at Illinois and Its
Counties
The authors are all facultymembers in the Department
of Finance, Illinois State University. This research was
supported by a grant from the Office of Real Estate
Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. T>here is a view that Illinois has been lagging behind
other states in its ability to increase employment in
manufacturing or through attracting new business.
With this in mind, it would be of interest to examine
the recent history of Illinois employment. Such an
examination may help to explain Illinois' lack of
growth. In particular, it would be useful to identify the
industries that have excelled in Illinois during this
period, along with the regions that have grown most
rapidly or deteriorated most drastically. It is also
important to identify the factors that have been
prominent in affecting the employment growth in
particular regions.
The regional breakdown considered here involves
separating the state of Illinois into counties. Once
employment growth has been broken down to this
regional level using the shift-share technique, factors
contributing to each county's ability to increase
employment are considered.
The first section presents a brief explanation of the
shift-share technique. The second analyzes growth
across certain manufacturing and service industries.
The third examines the regional breakdown by county,
setting forth a ranking of counties in terms of their
"comparative advantage" in increasing employment.
The fourth section identifies factors contributing to a
county's comparative advantage. The analysis covers
data spanning 1976-1983, sufficiently large to
encompass a complete Illinois business cycle.
Conclusions are presented in the final section.
The Shift-Share Technique
Shift-share analysis is a widely used technique by
which employment gains or losses may be analyzed.
Within the framework of this analysis, regional
employment changes can be attributed to three distinct
components. The first relates to the overall growth in
the state; a second concerns differential growth rates
across industries; and the third may be attributed to a
unique set of characteristics possessed by that region.
This third component of growth has come to be known
as the region's "comparative advantage."
The shift-share technique can be illustrated by an
example. Consider Peoria County located in Central
Illinois. The breakdown of the employment gain for
Peoria County from 1976 to 1983 is given in Table 1.
Peoria County lost a total of 11,610 jobs due to its
comparative (dis)advantage. However, the overall
Illinois employment growth of 1.28 percent provided
for an additional 1,360 jobs to be generated in the
county. Manufacturing and services employment are
shown in order to identify the amount of employment
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Gain |or loss) due to:
Table 3. County Ranking by Comparative Advantage (pet 1,000 people), 1976-1983
County Total Services
Manufac-
turing County Total Services
Manufac-
turing
DuPage
unavailable in counties such as Schuyler County in
Central Illinois. The second approximation used for
local infrastructure is the proportion of the county
population employed in the agricultural sector. Because
much of agricultural production is exported,
employment in that sector is tied closely to national
and international activity. Agricultural activity would
be expected to offset losses in a county due to weakness
in other industries.
Local market strength, or purchasing power, is
measured by per capita personal income. Because a
higher level of per capita personal income in an area
would mean that the average consumer had a larger
purchasing power, it is expected that an increase in a
county's per capita personal income in 1976 would
attract producers to lucrative markets, causing
production and employment in the area to rise.
As the transportation and utilities expenses become
higher in a given region. They are expected to act as a
deterrent to production and, therefore, job growth. As
a measure of transportation and utilities expense, the
per capita transportation and utilities earnings is used.
Results of the Analysis
The analysis was carried out at a number of levels.
First, all 102 counties were considered as a whole.
Because this type of analysis might overshadow the
differences between those counties with a comparative
advantage and those with a comparative disadvantage,
these two groups of counties were analyzed separately.
The analysis was also extended to identify the factors
contributing to a county's comparative advantage in
services and manufacturing.
For the analysis of all counties grouped together, the
findings are consistent with hypotheses relating to skill
level and government policy.
However, the results of the analysis are not
statistically significant. For the analysis of the counties
as a total group, the results concerning factors
contributing to service sector comparative advantage
are more conclusive than those for total comparative
advantage. Results relating to the skill level are
statistically significant.The findings show that a 10
percent increase in this factor leads to an increase of
5.8 jobs in the service sector per 1,000 people in each
county. In manufacturing, results relating to skill level
and employment growth do not show an acceptable
level of statistical significance.
Significant results emerge in the analysis separately
carried out for manufacturing. Contrary to previous
suggestions, the relationship between per capita direct
government expenditure and manufacturing
employment growth is found to be negative (and
statistically significant).
Also, there was statistically significant difference in
manufacturing employment growth between those
counties in SMSAs and those that are not. If the county
was in a SMSA, it could be expected to lose eight more
jobs (per 100 people) than in the non-SMSA counties.
The additional losses reflect the comparative
disadvantage in manufacturing.
In order to extract additional information about job
growth in Illinois, the counties with above-average
performance were analyzed separately. In terms of total
comparative advantage for these counties, per capita
personal income was found to have a statistically
significant positive influence on employment growth.
A $ 1 increase in per capita personal income was found
to lead to an increase of 20 jobs per 1,000 of population.
Such results are consistent with the view that a
county's purchasing power is positively related to its
overall employment growth. In terms of service sector
comparative advantage for these counties, the most
striking result was a statistically significant positive
relationship between per capita direct government
expenditure and job growth. An increase of $ 10 in this
factor was found to lead to an increase of one job for
every 2,500 people in the service sector. A significant
relationship was also found between service sector
comparative advantage and the labor skill level. Such
results are consistent with those found in the overall
analysis. The infrastructure, as measured by the per
capita farm employment, was found to be a statistically
significant positive influence on employment growth.
The positive influence of per capita farm employment
is due to the fact that the agricultural sector grew
nationwide at a rate faster than did the overall economy
of the state.
In terms of manufacturing employment growth for
those counties with a comparative advantage, the
negative relationship between job growth and
government expenditure was again found. There was
also a statistically significant relationship between
manufacturing job growth and per capita personal
income. As was the case with services, in manufactur-
ing there was a strong negative relationship between
job growth and location in a SMSA. Location in an
SMSA was associated with a loss of an additional 20
jobs per 100 people, compared with non-SMSA
counties.
Among those counties at a comparative disadvantage,
the attempts to estimate factors influencing
employment growth were unsuccessful. Although the
influences of factors follow the patterns indicated
earlier, the only significant results are those relating to
per capita personal income and per capita farm
employment. Both factors exert positive influences
comparable to those discussed earlier. It is expected
that the counties with a comparative disadvantage have
been subject to individual problems, less systematic
and, therefore, less explainable by the analysis used
here.
Conclusions
Employment growth in Illinois is substantially
slower than in most other states. The present study
presents a ranking of Illinois counties in terms of their
economic performance. The measures used to rank the
counties here were based on examining the
employment growth in a county due to a set of
characteristics unique to that county. The results of
the analysis indicate that differences among Illinois
counties in employment growth rates relate to such
factors as labor skill level, local purchasing power, and
per capita government expenditure.
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Illinois Business Indexes
T,he underlying strength of the Illinois economy is
uncertain. As shown in Chart 1, the current indicator
rose above the trend indicator in August, but resumed
its downward path in September. The current indicator
is an average of the composite leading indicator series
for the past three months. The trend indicator is the
average of the composite leading indicator for the past
six months. When the three month average is below
the six month average, it indicates that the leading
indicator series is experiencing a downward movement.
Movement is considered meaningful if it lasts for four
or more months.
Of the 1 1 components of the composite leading
indicator series, five are illustrated in Charts 2 through
6. Vendor performance (Chart 2) measures the percent
of businesses reporting late deliveries. As the economy
moves towards full capacity, suppliers find it
increasingly difficult to make timely deliveries. An
upward moving trend, therefore, would indicate the
economy is moving towards full capacity. As illustrated
in Chart 2, there has been an upward trend since
February. Real Illinois sales tax receipts and real Illinois
persona] income tax receipts are proxies for real retail
sales and real personal income respectively. As shown
in Charts 3 and 4, both these components have
remained fairly stable for the past year. Total
nonagricultural employment (Chart 5) fell in
September after increasing for the previous five
months. Housing permits issued (Chart 6) also
continued its general decline.
These series do not include October. Hence, they do
not reflect the economic uncertainty that has followed
the stock market crash. The future direction of the
Illinois economy greatly depends upon the health of the
national economy. If the national economy moves into
a recessionary phase, the Illinois economy will follow.
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
chart 1. Composite Leading Indicator (Average Percent
Change in Base Indexes)
Chart 2. Vendor Performance (Seasonally Adjusted)
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Chart 6. Housing Permits (Seasonally Adjusted)
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Rk.Lal estate markets have become increasingly
complex in recent years. Some of the reasons for this
trend include the changmg taxation of real estate, the
securitization of real estate for sale to investors, nevi'
methods of real estate finance, and the ever present
problem of developing sound governmental policies for
the housing market. One consequence of the trend is
an increase in the demand for personnel with expertise
in real estate finance and economics; indeed, students
have responded to this demand by enrolling in real
estate courses in record numbers. Another consequence
is the demand for research about real estate markets,
especially research that makes use of the tools of
modern finance and economics. The State of Illinois
responded to these changes in 1 980 by establishing the
Office of Real Estate Research (ORER), a unit within
the College of Commerce and Business Administration
at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
(UIUC). The Illinois Association of Realtors^ and the
Real Estate Education Fund of Illinois (REEF) played a
major role in the establishment of ORER.
The objective of ORER is to maintain an ongoing real
estate research and education program centered at the
UIUC campus. UIUC was chosen because of its
preeminent position among public universities within
the state and its long and excellent tradition in the field
of real estate. Real estate courses have been offered
within the College of Commerce and Business
Administration at UIUC since 1955.
In some previous years, ORER has produced a booklet
describing its purpose and activities. A different
approach is used this year to convey some of the
exciting developments at ORER; an issue of the Illinois
Business Review devoted entirely to real estate. This
introductory article reviews the structure of ORER and
reports on its activities during 1987. The four articles
that follow are specific research papers that provide a
good flavor of the kind of work ORER supports. We
hope you like it.
Structure of ORER
ORER is led by the Director, James R. Follain, a
Professor in the Finance Department. The director
reports to Associate Dean for Academic Affairs of the
College of Commerce and Business Administration,
Jane Leuthold. In addition he works closely with the
ORER Advisory Committee. The members of the 1 987
ORER Advisory Committee include:
William R. Bryan, Chair of the Department of
Finance at UIUC.
Gary Clayton, Executive Vice President, Illinois
Association of Realtors®.
Peter Colwell, ORER Professor of Real Estate and
Professor of Finance at UIUC.
Robert E. Cook of Cook-Witter, Inc.
Lydia Franz, Koenig &. Strey Realtors.
John Hamer, President, Hamer Holding Group.
Charles Hill, Executive Vice President, Federal
Home Loan Bank of Chicago.
Jane Leuthold, Associate Dean of the College of
Commerce and Business Administration, UIUC.
Terry Lutes, Illinois Association of Realtors ".
David Rittmiller, Sales Associate, Traders Realty
Corp. and President of the Real Estate Education
Foundation.
Ronald See, State of Illinois Real Estate Commis-
sioner.
Several UIUC faculty are affiliated with ORER.
Jan K. Brueckner, Professor of Economics
Roger E. Cannaday, Associate Professor of Finance
Peter F. Colwell, ORER Professor
Philip J. Rushing, Adjunct Professor of Finance
Carl Webber, Adjunct Professor of Finance
ORER also employs several research assistants.
The principal financial support for ORER comes from
the state's Real Estate Research and Education Fund
(REREF). Revenues to REREF have been around
$175,000 per year. These come from two sources:
interest from the Real Estate Recovery Fund (roughly
two-thirds of the revenue) and fees for real estate broker
and salesperson licenses ($4 per new license or
reinstatement). Revenues can vary depending upon
interest rates and the number of new licensees.
ORER expenditures can be divided into three main
categories: personnel, research dissemination, and
research awards. Personnel expenditures include
compensation for the director, the ORER Professor, the
ORER secretary, and research assistants. Research
dissemination expenditures include the cost of
producing and distributing research papers and outlays
for various seminars offered. Research awards to UIUC
faculty and to other scholars, both in Illinois and around
the nation comprise the remaining portion of the
budget. The outlook for future budgets is discussed later
in this article.
Research in 1987
The primary activity of ORER is research, especially
research that analyzes the economic and financial
aspects of real estate markets. Much of the research is
done by academics and is ultimately published in
academic and professional journals. However, a
substantial effort is made to produce papers for the
wider audience of real estate professionals within
Illinois.
There are two main outlets for ORER research. The
first is the ORER Paper Series begun in 1 985. Since the
inception of the series, 54 papers have been produced.
Papers for 1987 include:
#41 "A Note on REITs: A Contingent Claim Analysis" by Hun
Y. Park and Philip J. Rushing.
#42 "Assumption Financing: Theory and An Empirical Test"
by Mark A. Sunderman, Roger E. Cannaday, and Peter F.
Colwell.
#43 "Do Prices Reflect Market Fundamentals in Real Estate
Markets'" by Louis O. Scott
#44 "Occupational Change and Sex Integration in Real Estate
Sales Occupations" by Barbara J. Thomas and Barbara F.
Reskin.
#45 "Intrajurisdictional Tax/Benefit Capitalization:
Neighborhood Effects" by Kalman Goldberg and Robert C.
Scott.
#46 "Understanding the Real Estate Provisions of Tax Reform:
Motivation and Impact" by James R. Follain, Patric
Hendershott, and David C. Ling.
#47 "Notre Dame Avenue Apartments" by Philip ]. Rushing.
#48 "Hedgmg Commercial Adjustable Rate Mortgages with
Treasury Bond Put Options" by Richard Garrigan and Carl
Luft.
#49 "Improving the Odds: Effective Salesperson Selection Via
Profiling" by Mary Coveny.
#50 "The Experience of the US Secondary Mortgage Market:
Born in a Regulated Environment but Flourishing in a
Competitive One" by James R. Follain.
#5 1 "The Economics of Shopping Centers: A Literature Survey"
by Kangoh Lee.
#52 "Why Do Home Ownership Rates Vary among
Metropolitan Areas'" by Dixie M. Blackley and James R.
Follain.
#53 "Residential Investment and Mortgage Markets" by Yoon
Dokko, Robert Edelstein, and E. Scott Urdang.
#54 "Japan, USA: The Impact of the Diamond Star Plant on the
Bloommgton-Normal Economy and Housing Market" by
Mona J. Gardner, Han Bin Kang, and Dixie L. Mills.
The second major outlet for research results is the
Illinois Business Review, which publishes an article
contributed by ORER in each issue. Most are produced
as the result of ORER research awards and, as
summaries of longer papers, are designed to be
nontechnical presentations of interest to a wide
audience within the real estate industry. ORER
publications can be obtained by writing to the Office
of Real Estate Research.
As noted earlier, ORER regularly awards research
grants to academics and other researchers. Proposals
are reviewed three times a year, in September, January,
and May. Typical awards are about $5,000. Further
information regarding proposals can be obtained by
writing to the Director.
Highlights of 1987
Several new programs, projects, and changes occurred
in 1987. This section highlights some of them.
ORER Lettei.
ORER is always seeking new ways to inform the real
estate community of the research being conducted. A
new venture was launched this year to aid in this
endeavor. The first of a series of ORER Letters was
published in October. This eight-page publication
contains a summary of an ORER research paper, an
interview with Carl Webber, a new faculty member,
and a variety of information about ORER and its
research activities. We intend to produce several issues
per year. Those wishing to be on the mailing list should
write to the ORER secretary.
Gifts to ORER
Sheldon Good of Sheldon Good and Company in
Chicago joined the UI Foundation's President's Council
in November 1987 and designated that his $10,000 gift
be used by the Office of Real Estate Research. Sheldon
Good graduated from the real estate program at UlUC
in 1955 and is best known for his innovations in the
area of real estate auctions. Indeed, Fortune featured
his firm in the 12 October 1987 issue.
ORER also received a $.S,000 gift from the Rosenberg
Real Estate Equity Fund (REEF) in December 1987.
REEF is one of the largest and most respected real estate
investment firms in the country. Its clients include
large pension funds who desire to include real estate in
their portfolios. REEF also provides a $5,000 Fellowship
for graduate students interested in real estate.
Other gifts in 1987 were received from Dr. and Mrs.
A. Van Tienhoven in honor of Mr. and Mrs. C. B.
Younger and from Robert Levin of Wolin-Levin, Inc.
Alumni Luncheons
Two luncheons for UIUC alumni in the field of real
estate were held in Chicago, one in April and one in
November. At the Spring meeting, Sheldon Good spoke
about real estate auctions, and Donald Rundblom, class
of 1975, of Morgan Stanley in New York spoke at the
Fall luncheon about Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securities. We plan to have two luncheons in 1988.
Further information on luncheons and the real estate
alumni mailing list should be directed to ORER.
Course Curriculum
The student demand for real estate courses remains
strong. In addition to two survey courses, one at the
undergraduate and one at the graduate level, courses
are offered in the areas of appraisal, investment,
finance, urban economics, and law. Typical enrollment
in these upper-level courses is 30 or more. The
University offers a B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in
finance with a concentration in real estate.
Rho Epsilon and fob Candidates
Professor Roger Cannaday and the members of the
Rho Epsilon Fraternity—an organization of students
interested in real estate—have developed a brochure
that contains biographical information about students
soon to graduate. Most of these students have had
several real estate courses. The majority of students
will graduate in May with a B.S. in finance with a
concentration in real estate, although a substantial
number will be receiving an M.S. in finance or an MBA.
The brochure is available upon request from ORER.
New Offices for ORER
Faculty and staff affiliated with ORER moved to a
new suite of offices in 304 David Kinley Hall in August.
The suite includes offices for the director, the ORER
secretary, and Professors Cannaday, Colwell, Rushing,
and Webber. In addition, a conference room is available.
Previously, faculty associated with ORER were located
throughout David Kinley Hall and Commerce West.
The new arrangement clearly identifies ORER to other
faculty and, especially, to students. We are very excited
about the change.
Award to Robert E. Cook
One of the people most responsible for the
establishment of ORER is Robert E. Cook, currently
president of Cook-Witter, Inc. Bob Cook initiated the
movement to establish ORER while he was the
Executive Vice President of the Illinois Association of
Realtors" in the late 1970s. He served on the ORER
Advisory Committee from its inception until October
1987. On 30 October 1987, Dean John Hogan of The
College of Commerce and Business Administration
presented Bob with a plaque in appreciation of his
outstanding service to ORER.
Strategic Planning Process
The major highlight of 1987 was the Strategic
Planning Conference held at the Allerton Conference
Center on 20 and 2 1 August 1 987. The conference was
attended by the ORER Faculty, the Advisory
Committee, and several invited guests, including
Richard Arnould, Professor of Economics at UIUC;
Terry Hendrickson, Vice President, Ticor Title
Insurance; Ralph Martin, President, William L. Kunkel
& Co.; Chester Moskel, President of the Home Builders
Association of Greater Chicago; Jack Seymour, Savings
and Loan Commissioner for the State of Illinois; George
Shapland, owner, Flo-Con Corporation; Arlen
Speckman, President, Speckman & Co.; and Howard
Thomas, James Towey Distinguished Professor of
Business Administration at UIUC. Professor Thomas
served as the Strategic Planning Coordinator for the
conference.
The purpose of the meeting was to assess the
accomplishments of ORER during its first eight years
of operation and to lay the foundation for its future
development. One product of the process is a strategic
planning document, which will soon be available. What
follows is a summary of the most important questions
raised during the process and the consensus of the
people involved.
Real Estate as a Profession Is Changing. Is ORER in
the Proper Niche
(
The real estate profession is becoming more and more
sophisticated; furthermore, it is a very heterogeneous
profession encompassing the fields of finance,
economics, planning, marketing, architecture,
psychology, and many more. ORER has focused upon
the economic and financial aspects of real estate and
its approach has been rather academic and theoretical.
Is this the proper approach? Should a broader approach
be taken or should it continue to build upon the
strength of the UIUC faculty?
The consensus of the conference is that ORER should
continue to do what it does best, which is to produce
high quality research that focuses upon the economic
and financial aspects of real estate markets. However,
a much greater effort must be made to market ORER's
products. The effort should include improved
advertising and packaging of the various publications.
Also essential is an increase in the percentage of papers
that have direct relevance to real estate professionals.
Real Estate as a Field of University Study Is
Changing. Should the UIUC Real Estate Program
Changed
Many colleges and universities have responded to the
increased demand for real estate courses by introducing
real estate curricula. Some are in business schools, like
UIUC, but many others are in urban planning
departments and architecture schools. Indeed, several
schools have introduced programs that encompass
more than one college,- for example, MIT has an M.S.
Program in Real Estate Development in which students
take courses in economics, finance, management,
marketing, planning, architecture, and engineering.
Should UIUC take this route or should it continue to
focus on the economic and financial aspects of real
estate?
UIUC is one of the iew universities in the country
that can provide a comprehensive real estate education
because of its strength in the major disciplines relevant
to real estate. Currently, however, students are merely
encouraged to choose courses from the different
colleges and departments. A long-range plan should
include the possibility of introducing a formal
interdisciplinary program in real estate. However, there
are other, more pressing, short-run needs given the
growth in the demand for training in the economic and
financial aspects of real estate. Furthermore, many of
the conference participants feel that teaching
something as amorphous as "real estate development"
is likely to be very difficult. Thus, the consensus was
reached to maintain and improve upon the existing
program while we continue to give thought to an
interdisciplinary program. Also, a concentration in real
estate for the MBA Program is being considered.
The ORER Budget Is Such that Our Base of Support
Must Be Expanded if It Is to Continue to Grow. How
Should This Be Donel
Historically, $25,000 to $50,000 has been available
to support outside research awards. Unfortunately, the
1987-1988 budget has little discretionary money
available to support new ORER Research Awards. The
main reason is that revenues have remained relatively
constant while expenses have continued to grow.
Unless new sources of support are found, the research
agenda will have to be cut and become increasingly
dependent upon the interests and expertise of the
immediate ORER staff.
All conferees agreed that the base of support for
ORER should be enlarged. Specifically, it was suggested
that the ORER Advisory Committee be expanded to
include a wider range of real estate professionals. In
addition, the support of other associations and large
corporations will be solicited. It is hoped that added
representation on the ORER Advisory Committee will
bring increased awareness of ORER activities and
thereby lead to additional financial support. Efforts are
already underway to implement this stage of the plan.
Final Thoughts
1987 was an exciting year for ORER. We have seen
once again how the academic and business com-
munities can work together to produce valuable
research and outstanding students. In 1988 we hope to
build upon the momentum and ideas generated by the
recent Strategic Planning process. Decisions will be
made regarding new research directions, the size and
composition of the Advisory Committee, and efforts to
obtain additional financial support. As always, we are
interested in the advice and opinions of the
professionals within the Illinois real estate community,
especially our alumni.
The Office of Real Estate Research (ORER)
encourages all interested persons to contact the
ORER office:
Office of Real Estate Research
304 David Kinley Hall
1407 West Gregory Drive
Urbana, Illinois 61801
with any questions or comments about this
article or any article in this issue or to obtain
copies of working papers, ORER Letters, the
Rho Epsilon bulletin of upcoming graduates, or
information on research awards through ORER
or the Alumni Luncheons and alumni mailing
list. ORER welcomes any questions,
comments, or suggestions regarding the Office
and its programs.
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THOMAS S. ULEN
The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain
O,' nc of the guiding tenets of the law of real property
IS that an individual property owner is entitled to do
whatever he chooses with his property so long as he
does not unduly interfere with a like liherty of other
property owners. Among other things, this allows the
private owner to sell or give his property to whomever
he chooses and, just as important, not to sell. There
are, however, restrictions on this entitlement: for
example, the government, using its power to "take"
private property (also called its eminent domain or
condemnation power), may legitimately compel
individual owners to sell all or a part of their property
to the government.
In this article I summarize an economic theory of the
governmental eminent domain or "taking" power and
use that theory to evaluate several recent court cases
on the public use of private property. The point I wish
to make is that the application of the theory would lead
to the more efficient use of real property by both private
owners and the government and that, to the extent that
the courts have not been applying the theory, real
property is being less efficiently used.
An Economic Theory of Governmental Taking
Let me develop the economic theory of takings by
dealing with four related questions. First, what
inefficiencies might this power impose and are there
any potential offsetting efficiencies? Second, what
restrictions might be imposed on the government's
taking power in order to confine its use to cir-
cumstances in which the benefits exceed the costs?
Specifically, consider the restrictions imposed on the
federal government by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution and on state governments by the
Fourteenth Amendment: the government may take
private property only if the taking is for a public use
and the private owner is justly compensated (that is,
he is given the objective or fair market value of his
property). Third, what is the relationship between the
taking power and the governmental power to regulate
the use of private property? And finally, what
incentives does compensation for taking create for
private investment in and governmental use of real
property?
Question 1: What Are The Potential Inefficiencies of
TakingI
One of the largest potential inefficiencies of allowing
the government to compel a sale of private property is
that the forced sale may move the property from a
higher-valued to a lower-valued use. This almost never
happens in a voluntary sale of property: people
exchange property only when it is worth more to the
buyer than to the seller at the agreed-upon price.
Suppose that Samson owns real property that his
ancestors have occupied for longer than anyone can
remember. He has, naturally, a great sentimental
attachment to the land and, therefore, places a very
high valuation on it, say, $1,000,000. But suppose
further that the objective or fair market value of the
property is much less, say, $500,000, based, perhaps, on
the land's prospects as a commercial or residential
development. Finally, suppose that the government
desires to put Samson's property to a public use and
can compel Samson to sell his property to it at fair
market value. Presumably, the government has
determined that the public use of the property is worth
more than its fair market value, so from its point of
view the transaction with Samson is value-enhancing.
But from Samson's point of view, the compulsory sale
is a disaster: he loses $500,000 of value. The
compulsory sale has moved the property to a
lower-valued use.
The inefficiency of the example is, of course, due to
the interpretation of "just compensation" as being fair
market value and to the discrepancy between objective
or fair market value and subjective or idiosyncratic
value. This possibility for an inefficient taking could
be minimized by interpreting "just compensation" to
mean the minimum price the owner is willing to accept
for his property. In essence, this would make
governmental purchases of private property
indistinguishable from any other voluntary transaction.
But there is an additional difficulty. If the government
must pay a private owner's minimally acceptable
selling price, then once the government has announced
an intent to take, the private owner has a strong
incentive to exaggerate the amount she will accept.
Question 2: Are There Potential Efficiencies from
Governmental Taking^
These considerations lead to the question of whether
there might be some potential social efficiencies or
benefits from allowing the government to take private
property for public use at fair market value. These
efficiencies are most likely to arise if the government
is engaged in purchasing private property in order to
supply what economists call a "public good." Those are
goods, such as fireworks displays and national defense,
that private firms are not likely to provide because of
the difficulties in getting those who consume public
goods to reveal their willingness to pay for them.
Typically, the government provides these goods or
subsidizes private suppliers and forces consumers to
pay for them through compulsory taxation. There are
some public goods that are so large and complex, for
example, interstate highways and a superconducting
supercollider that is 53 miles in circumference, that
they simply must be provided by the government. For
these large and complex public goods, the social
efficiencies from providing them might be so great that
society should incur the potential inefficiencies of
allowing the government to take private property at fair
market value in order to provide them.
Question 3: Do the Public Use and Just Compensation
Constraints on Taking Lead to Efficiency^
This brings us to the question of whether the
imposition of the pubUc use and just compensation
restrictions confines the government's taking power to
those circumstances in which the efficiencies or
benefits of the taking exceed the inefficiencies or costs.
The answer is that they do if those restrictions are
interpreted as follows: "just compensation" must be
interpreted to mean objective or fair market value, and
"public use" or "public purpose" must be interpreted
to mean governmental provision of a large, complex
public good.
Question 4: What Incentives Does Compensation for
Taking Create for Private Ovimers and Governmental
Officials^
Frequently the government undertakes to affect the
use of real property not by taking possession but rather
by regulating its use. Why? Because the government is
not obligated to compensate loss in value that occurs
through legitimate regulation of public health, welfare,
and morals. Whatever their social benefits, these
regulations typically lead to a reduction in the value of
the regulated property, prompting the private owners
to contend that the regulation has gone so far as to
amount to a taking of their property. The private
owners sue the government (in what is called an
"inverse condemnation" action) to have the regulation
declared a taking so that the government will have to
pay them the fair market value of their property. For
its part, the government contends, first, that the
regulation is an attempt to pursue a legitimate
government regulatory aim and, second, that the
reduction in value is not substantial enough to
constitute a taking.
Whether regulations are usually or rarely interpreted
as takings has important effects on the actions of both
private owners and government officials. If the courts
routinely treat regulations that lower property values,
by however little, as takings requiring compensation of
the private owner, then the government becomes, in
essence, an insurer against loss in private property
values arising from government action. This may
induce private owners to make excessive investment
in real property and its improvements and government
officials to become wary of issuing regulations, thereby
lessening the public good they might do. On the other
hand, if the courts routinely interpret loss in private
property values, however large, due to governmental
action as noncompensable regulation, then private
owners may become reluctant to invest in real property
and improvements, and governmental officials may
become overzealous regulators of private property
rights.
The solution to this paradox of compensation for
governmental taking and regulation is a taxation or
option-purchase scheme between the government and
private owners that is too complex to cover here and
that has little chance of being implemented. (For a fuller
discussion of these option and taxation plans, see
Robert D. Cooter and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Economics Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1988.
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Instead, as we shall see, the courts seek a balance
between the inefficient extremes noted above,
sometimes veering more toward one extreme,
sometimes towards the other.
Theory in Practice: Recent Developments in Takings
The tension between the rights of the private
property owner and the public use of his property
regularly appears in actions before state supreme courts
and the United States Supreme Court. One important
recent trend has been a weakening of the public-use
constraint on the governmental taking power. While
the courts never enunciated the efficient definition of
public use suggested above, there was nonetheless a
widespread consensus that taking should be confined
to such clearly public goods as irrigation, drainage,
reclamation of wetlands, highways, and the like. But
the broad trend recently in the taking field has been
judicial deference toward legislative judgment as to
public use. Consider, for example, Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, a case that
came to the Michigan Supreme Court in 1 98 1 . In 1 980
the General Motors Corporation informed the City of
Detroit that it intended to close its Cadillac plant and
to move to the Sunbelt unless the City provided
extensive improvements to the freeways, streets, and
sewers around the plant. Fearing the loss of 6,000 jobs
and much corporate income tax revenue, the city took
private property around the site and turned it over to
CM at a price far below its market value. The property
taken was in a closely knit ethnic community for many
of whose residents there was a subjective valuation on
residence far above the fair market value of their homes.
A majority of the court held that the retention of the
jobs and of the corporate income tax revenues was a
valid public use. The court should have considered
whether it might not have been better to void the taking
in order to induce the city to find some other method
of helpingCM that would have spread the costs over a
broader base.
In Hawaii v. Midkiff {19S4] the United States
Supreme Court also undertook to broaden the notion
of public use. The issue turned on an action by the
Hawaii state legislature to distribute land ownership
rights more broadly. Because of Hawaii's early
monarchy and feudal land tenure, land ownership rights
in the state were concentrated in a few hands: the state
and federal government owned 49 percent of the land
in Hawaii, and another 47 percent was in the hands of
72 private landowners. In the Hawaii Land Reform Act
of 1 967, the legislature allowed current lessees of land
to employ the Hawaii Housing Authority to take the
land they rented in exchange for paying fair market
value to the owners. Midkiff protested that this
amounted to compelling the sale of private property
not for public use but for private use. The Court held
that the Hawaii state legislature's purpose of more
broadly distributing land ownership was a valid public
purpose for compelling the sale of private property.
The cumulative impact of these decisions is that it
is now difficult to imagine a government-mandated
purchase of private property, including those for resale
to another private individual, that does not satisfy the
puhlic use restriction. This is bound to have adverse
consequences on the efficient use of private property
and on the incentives created for the regulation and use
of private property by governmental officials.
I want to be careful to note that I am not saying that
the ends sought in the Paletawn and Midkiff cases are
not legitimate governmental ends. Indeed, they are. I
am, instead, making the claim that the compulsory sale
of private property may not have been the best or most
efficient way to accomplish those ends.
At the end of its last term, the United States Supreme
Court handed down three important decisions having
to do with whether certain governmental regulations
amounted to the taking of private property. The cases
are important because they signal a turn away from the
broadening trend of the public use cases and a move
toward the more efficient balance between public and
private use of property suggested by the economic
theory.
The issue in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
V. DeBenedictis was whether a Pennsylvania act
prohibiting coal mining that might cause subsidence
damage to preexisting buildings, dwellings, and
cemeteries effected a taking of private property of coal
mine owners. The owners contended that by requiring
them to leave 50 percent of the coal beneath threatened
structures, the regulation so lowered the value of their
subsurface rights as to amount to a taking. The Court
held that the Act was a legitimate regulation of public
safety and that the loss of property value was not large
enough to convert the regulation into a taking,
principally because the Act affected only 2 percent of
the total holdings of the coal mine owners' association.
A different issue was at the heart of First Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Clendale v. County of Los Angeles.
The church had purchased land outside the City of Los
Angeles in 1957 to operate as a camp for handicapped
children and as a church retreat. In 1978 a flood
destroyed the camp's buildings, and in response the
County of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance
prohibiting the construction or repair of any building
in a flood protection area, which included the church's
property. The Church contended that this regulation
denied it any use of its property and, therefore,
amounted to a compensable taking. In the meantime
the County rescinded the ordinance so that the issue
became whether the church was entitled to
compensation for temporary loss of its property caused
by a regulation. The Supreme Court held for the first
time that the ordinance, though temporary, had been a
compensable taking.
Finally, NoUan v. California Coastal Commission
delivered one of the most important recent statements
on the relationship between private and public use of
property. The Nollans owned property along the coast,
including the beachfront. On either side of their land
was a public beach. Because the Nollans owned the
beachfront, no one could pass between the public
beaches without trespassing on their private property.
The Nollans applied to the California Coastal
Commission for permission to build a much larger
house on their property. The Commission granted the
permit on the condition that the Nollans allow the
public an easement across their beachfront. The
Nollans brought an action contending that the
easement in exchange for the building permit was a
regulation that amounted to a compensable taking. The
Supreme Court held that if the condition, the easement,
had furthered the same legitimate regulatory purpose
advanced by the building permit, then it, too, would
have been legitimate. Thus, for example, if the Nollans'
new home would have blocked the public's view of the
beach from the public highway, then the Commission
might legitimately have extracted from the Nollans an
easement from the highway to the beach in order to
allow the public to view the Nollans' beach. But the
easement was not for that purpose; rather it was to
allow easier access across the Nollans' property for
users of the public beaches, something completely
independent of the building permit. In the Court's view
this was not closely enough related to the detriment
caused by the new home. The Commission still
remained free to advance its program of public use of
the California coast by exercising its eminent domain
power and paying for access easements.
Conclusion
The economic analysis of governmental taking offers
a justification and an interpretation of the public use
and just compensation restrictions on the public use of
private property that preserves an efficient balance
between the private and public use of property. Until
recently, state and federal courts had defined public use
and just compensation in ways that could be defended
using the efficiency analysis. But lately courts have
allowed virtually anything to count as a legitimate
public use and have begun to broaden the notion of
noncompensable regulation. These trends inevitably
lead to the less efficient use of real property.
However, in the three key cases I discussed
above
—
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis, First Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, and NoUan v.
California Coastal Commission—the United States
Supreme Court has begun to redraw the line between
noncompensable regulation and compensable taking
much more favorably to the private owner and much
less favorably to the government. The result should be
a more efficient balance between the private and public
use of property.
Thomas S. Ulen is an associate professor ofeconomics
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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MARY COVENY
Improving the Odds: Effective Salesperson
Selection via Profiling
I s the high attrition rate among real estate salespeople
a fact of life or are there ways to refine the selection
process? Can we lock or at least slow the "revolving
door"? Losses of 30 to 50 percent of new salespeople
during their first two years are the norm.
This article reports my study on the use of personality
profiles to develop information that would help the
broker choosing salespeople. I found that top producers
among a group of suburban Chicagoland residential
salespeople are easily identified, through personality
profiling, by the extent to which they are self-starters,
self-motivated, and self-sufficient. One profile
performed three times more effectively than the
estimated current industry practices. At the same time,
background factors fail to give any clues to which
salesperson would be a high-volume producer or to
what group a broker might target career marketing
efforts.
The Costs of Turnover
It is relatively easy to underestimate the expense to
brokers of sales personnel attrition in recruiting
expenses (ads, printing, postage), career seminars,
prelicensing rebates, training, and staff time. More
difficult to measure is business opportunity lost when
a new or unproductive Realtor-Associate fails to
convert incoming responses to signs or ads into sales.
The salesperson who might have chosen another career
has lost the salary from that job and has experienced
ego damage and feelings of failure. Morale within the
sales office drops as well.
Respect for brokerage services, the perceived status
and desirability of a real estate career, and the image
of professionalism are indirect casualties of high
turnover. These factors are likely contributors to real
estate companies' inability to attract strong candidates.
Klimosky and Childs (1981) found that, of individuals
enrolling in an Ohio real estate prelicensing class, those
with a high sales drive most often chose other careers.
They suggest that the real estate industry competes
with blue collar and clerical positions for available job
seekers. It may be that the best candidates are selecting
themselves out because of the problems mentioned
previously.
Factors in the Use of Profiling
In deciding whether or not to make a profile part of
the sales selection process, one needs to know whether
It offers an effectiveness rate higher than current
procedures. A profile should not be judged against a
standard of error-free prediction, accordmg to Klimoski
(1978), "but against the error-rate currently found in
the organization. To say that a test is not useful because
it is wrong 35 percent of the time is not a fair criticism
if current selection procedures are wrong 50 percent of
the time."
Klimosky and Sackett (1978) suggest determining a
"base rate" for a firm—that "percent of the work force
which at present is viewed by management as
successful." This rate is determined by the attrition
rate for new salespeople and on the number of
salespeople remaining who earn a living wage. For
example, in 1984, 41.8 percent of this country's licensed
salespeople who responded to a National Association
of Realtors", survey earned a $20,000 annual income,
which might be considered the minimum necessary to
retain a career-minded individual. One third or more
of all new salespeople leave in the first 1 2 months. Of
the remaining 67 percent, 41.8 percent earn $20,000 or
more per year. The base rate is 28 percent (.67 x .418
=
.28). This is a conservative (optimistic) estimate of
an National Association of Realtors " base rate because
a third of the total membership turns over each year,
and attrition is likely to be higher for first year people.
How does the broker evaluate the effectiveness of a
given profile ? Comparisons are difficult because not all
profiles are validated on a sample of sufficient size, or
that sample was not exclusively from real estate sales.
There is a reluctance on the part of those marketing
profiles to provide what they consider proprietary
confirmation. When information is available, it is often
couched in highly technical terms; and the broker may
be at a loss to know how to evaluate it. In addition,
some have had experiences with bad profiles, clumsy
interpretations, or have personally been the victims of
predication errors. The user manual for a profile
commonly used in the insurance industry only claims
to be 35 percent effective. A coin toss may be preferable
to a bad profile.
Data and Methodology
The purpose here is to study the ability of profiling,
either through personality profiling or by sketching an
image of the successful associate's background, to
predict performance. In addition, the study would offer
data on the effectiveness of personality profiling from
a source independent of the test publishers.
The approach was one of concurrent, not predictive,
validation to eliminate the wait for a new salesperson
to become established. For that reason, these results
should not be read as a recommendation for or against
either as a selection tool. This sample included only
those with at least 12 months' experience. Profiles are
designed to be used on a predictive basis, at the initial
interview. The effectiveness of each of the profiles used
with this group may differ when that same profile is
used, as intended, at the selection interview.
Only those profiles costing less than $100 were
considered because the likelihood of widespread use of
more expensive ones by brokers was doubtful. The first
personality measure, the Personal Orientation Profile
(P.O. P.) has been validated by its developer on Canadian
real estate salespersons.' Specific validity and
reliability information was not available from the
publisher, who did report that the P.O. P. was able to
predict production levels with KO to 88 percent accuracy
when used at the initial interview. The P.O. P. was also
recommended by the brokers who use it for is ability
to identify specific training and development as well as
supervisory needs. Also, potential problem areas are
identified and questions are suggested for use in a
second interview. Finally, the P.O. P. outlines the
retention considerations specific and unique to each
individual.
The second profile, the Personal Evaluation Program
(P.E.P.),- reduced turnover of management trainees 56
percent in another industry. Both instruments showed
considerable promise and have received good references
from brokers who have used them.
In addition, a questionnaire was developed based on
previous Ohio research. It was intended to determine
whether or not those factors that predicted the
establishment of real estate career were also related to
production levels. No attempt was made to include
those factors, like age and gender, that had not been
shown to be highly significant by previous research and
would not be helpful in making certain types of
selection decisions. For example, FoUain, Lutes, and
Meier (1986) said that 52 percent of Illinois
Realtor-Associates are female and their average age is
47. This kind of information is important in that it tells
us that men and women can earn equally and that
individuals of ages 22 or 82 are statistically
under-represented compared to those in their thirties,
forties, and fifties; it does not guide the broker who is
interviewing two men, one aged 39 and the other aged
56. Should both, either, or neither be selected?
Because training, management philosophy,
commission split, bonus incentive programs, and
working atmosphere all influence productivity, the
impact of these factors should be relatively consistent
within a single firm. The subjects in the study were all
residential real estate salespersons affiliated with First
United Realtors as independent contractors during the
calendar year 1984. They came from a variety of
socioeconomic areas in the western and northwest
suburban Chicago area with average 1984 sales prices
in the communities ranging from $54, 100 to $ 1 49,600.
Attrition due to a lack of training was expected to be
minimal because the firm provided 50-60 hours
training by branch managers and 100 hours of
classroom training. After the study began, Follain,
Lutes, and Meier (1986) identified firm size and firm
type as determinants of sales volume: an individual's
income increased approximately one percent for each
person in the firm's work force, and those salespersons
who worked for a financial conglomerate or franchise
tended to earn slightly less. An independent firm such
as First United Realtors, which then had 400
salespersons, should maximize opportunities for
earnings and the potential handicap imposed by the
negative aspects of firm size and type should be
minimal in this group of subjects.
All salespersons were ranked by production and the
entire group divided into four equal parts. Thirty
salespersons were randomly drawn from the
top-producing 25 percent or quartile, 30 from the
lowest-producing quartile, and 1 5 each from the second
and third quartiles. Personal data was kept strictly
confidential, and participation was voluntary. Using
volunteers always introduces a certain amount of bias
because there is no way to determine if the people who
agreed to participate were in some way different from
those who declined.
The typical salesperson worked 43.5 hours a week,
had seven years experience, owned only one property
when their real estate sales career began, and had a net
worth of over $186,000.
The conventional wisdom is that 20 percent of the
Realtor-Associates sell 80 percent of all property. The
findings here are that about one third, instead of 20
percent, were the truly productive; the distribution of
units sold in 1 984 is quite positively skewed with about
two-thirds of the subjects selling 20 or fewer units and
one-third selling from 20 to 50 plus. A unit was defined
as either a listing or a sale. It became apparent that a
far clearer picture emerges using the top and bottom
thirds instead of the originally planned 25 percent or
quartile groups.
The entire distribution of scores was examined via a
regression analysis to determine which of the many
factors were related to performance. Because two-thirds
of the scores fell between one and twenty units, a
discriminant analysis was also used to compare only
the upper and lower thirds. The discriminate analysis
is less sensitive to distortion from the skewed or uneven
distribution of sales.
Results of the Analysis
We expected to find a connection between production
and initiation as demonstrated by community
involvement, part-time work, or extracurricular
activities in school, and perhaps a history of
self-supporting at an early age. It also seemed likely
that the factors, like net worth and realistic
expectations, which were related to establishing a
career, also predisposed a salesperson to a higher
production levels.
In fact, much of what we expected to find was not
evident in this sample. Items that failed to predict sales
success included experience, prior type and hours of
work, number of moves and transfers, present
community organization involvement, part-time work
and/or extracurricular activities in high school and
college, other family members in real estate sales, age
first self-supporting, work missed due to illness, and
household income. There was no apparent correlation
with financial expectations or realistic information at
the time the sales career began, importance of the first
sales manager, or financial versus family, social, and
personal priorities. The importance of career choice
factors such as low entry costs, increased income,
autonomy, and minimal preparation were evenly
distributed across the production groups and also failed
to predict income or sales.
The report from top producers that they experience
less fatigue than others is consistent with the long work
10
week reported by those same top producers. They also
saw a "flexible schedule" as less important in choosing
a real estate career than others saw it. The pressures of
working long hours may have caused them to abandon
the notion of a flexible schedule or it may genuinely
have been of less importance from the beginning.
We sought factors evident at the beginning of sales
career that might show a connection with a longer work
week in real estate, but found more. Hours worked in
a previous job were unrelated to hours worked in real
estate. Perhaps someone whose personality and
temperament are well suited to sales may be quite
willing to put in the hours necessary for top production.
The Personal Orientation Profile proved remarkably
effective in predicting each salesperson's performance
level at the time of the study. Both the P.O.P.'s predictor
score and the predicted performance level show an
extremely strong correlation with productivity.
A correlation or relationship was also shown between
productivity and five individual P.O. P. scales. The
strongest of these is a highly significant correlation
between productivity and enterprising potential,
defined as "the degree to which an individual is a
self-starter, self-sufficient, and self-motivated as these
qualities pertain to accomplishing job goals. This scale
identifies the type of training and development required
by new hires."
A significant negative correlation is shown between
commissions earned and people orientation; top
producers were less likely than others to find "personal
satisfaction in polite chit-chat." The first of two
potential explanations is that, by the end of a long day
filled with many hours of conversation and
problem-solving, top producers are simply "peopled
out." A second possibility is that top producers are more
intensively task-oriented than others. They may enjoy
conversation on a topic of personal interest or one that
will result in a new prospect, but care little for small
talk.
A slight negative correlation is shown between top
production levels and the P.O.P.'s investigation scale,
defined as "the degree of personal satisfaction derived
from facts, figures, details and analytic activities." Top
salespeople may be very competent in these areas, but
may tend to lack interest in detail-intensive activities.
This confirms the conventional wisdom, but the
correlation here is only a slight one.
With this particular group of existing salespersons,
the total score of the second profile, the Personal
Evaluation Program, did not perform at a statistically
significant level—although three scales showed slight
correlations.
Error Frequencies Predicted Group
Low High
Actual Group Low
High
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7
24
5
22
27
22
29
51
sales with the same degree of accuracy. Profiling
appears to be a route worth further exploration.
Personality profiling is intended to supplement, not
replace, the manager's experience and judgment; no
profile should be more than 30—35 percent of the
selection decision. It is not intended to substitute for
in-depth interviewing and careful reference-checking.
It offers no assessment of communication skills nor
indication of presentable grooming. In one way, this
makes a 76 percent accuracy level all the more
remarkable.
The question "do you get more or less tired than
others performing the same activity?" cannot be asked
directly without the applicant guessing the desired
answer. A possible alternative might to "tell me about
a typical day." The response must then be ranked by
the interviewer.
Conclusions
The most important findings are that ( 1 ) high
producers are clearly identifiable via personality
profiling; (2) top producers are self-starters, self-suffi-
cient, and self-motivated and are less easily fatigued
than others; and (3) interview questions about
background items may not predict production. Because
a formula based on one particular profile was about
three times more effective than industry procedures
now in use, we may wish to continue to gather and
share data on turnover costs and selection effectiveness.
The result of such a national dialogue may be enormous
short-term savings plus increased per-person
production for years to come.
'The Personal Orientation Profile is marketed at $50 each by
Cambridge Human Resources, Two North Riverside Plaza, Suite
2200, Chicago, IL 60606.
"The Personal Evaluation Program is marketed by Leadership
Profiles, Inc., 3701 Taylorsville-Route #5, Louisville, KY 40220.
Cost of the P.E.P. decreased as the number of profiles were
increased. At the time of purchase, the average cost per profile
when 90 were used was $21.85.
Mary Covenyis President of CareerMatch Consultants,
Inc., in Naperville, Illinois. A longer version of this
paper is available from the Office of Real Estate
Research, 304 David Kinky Hall, 1407 West Gregory
Drive, Urbana, IL 61801. The research underlying the
paper was partially supported by the Office of Real
Estate Research.
Average accuracy of classification = 76 percent
From the data a formula was devised that allowed
the rank ordering of this group of salespeople according
to their sales volume. The formula was 76 percent
accurate and could be used to predict the number of
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Real Estate Tax Assessment Uniformity in
Illinois
R.kcal property tax receipts of local government in
Illinois are the largest single revenue source for both
the state and for local governments. Property tax
extensions amount to over $6 billion annually. This is
about twice the amount generated by the state's
individual income tax, only slightly less than twice the
state's sales tax receipts. The property tax is the most
important independent revenue source for about 6,000
Illinois local governments and is the single most
important revenue funding primary and secondary
education.
Fundamental to the operation of the real estate tax
is the valuation or assessment of property for tax
purposes. The accuracy of property assessments is
critical to the fairness of property taxation. At issue is
how property taxes are apportioned among properties,
according to the standards of equity contained in
property tax law. Often-heard criticism of the real
property tax is that inaccurate and nonuniform
assessments are intrinsic to the tax and not easily
corrected either through administrative actions or
policy reforms.
We recently completed a major study of the structure
and performance of the Illinois property tax assessment
system, and we present highlights of this study here.
A survey of all local and county assessing officials and
records from the files of the Illinois Department of
Revenue were the source of data for the study. The
purpose of the study was to describe the property
assessment system in Illinois and to analyze factors
influencing assessment uniformity. Because of the
unique features of property assessment in Cook and St.
Clair counties and the differential method of assessing
farm property, the study focuses on assessment of
nonfarm property in the other 100 Illinois counties.
Tax Fairness and Assessment Uniformity
The property tax has always been controversial, but
it has real staying power, and there seems little
likelihood that it will be removed from the Illinois
public finance system in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, fairness in the administration of the property
tax is critical. Assessment equity or fairness deals with
the uniformity of assessments, particularly within
taxing jurisdictions. Uniform assessments in a
jurisdiction mean all properties are valued for tax
purposes at the same percentage of market value.
Nonuniformity of assessments within a jurisdiction
means that property tax burdens will not be distributed
in the manner legally defined as fair.
Departure from the standard of uniformity in
assessments represents a violation of the principle of
assessment equity. This violation means some
taxpayers pay more tax than they should while others
pay less than they should. For example, 3 1 counties in
Illinois in 1983 had an average property tax bill either
50 percent more or 50 percent less than the correct
amount because of assessment deficiencies.
Assessment uniformity is measured with the use of
assessment/sales ratio studies. In Illinois these studies
are conducted annually by the Illinois Department of
Revenue for all counties and all local assessing districts
with sufficient real estate market activity. The
coefficient of inter-area dispersion (CD) is the most
widely used measure of assessment uniformity and is
calculated as part of assessment/sales ratio studies. The
CD can be thought of as the average percentage (for
example, 15, 20, or 25 percent) by which assessment
levels on individual parcels in a jurisdiction vary from
the median assessment level. The CD increases in value
with a lower quality of assessment (that is, less
assessment uniformity among parcels). A CD of zero
would indicate every parcel included in the
assessment/sales ratio study was assessed at precisely
the same percentage of its selling price as every other
parcel. A CD of 50, on the other hand, means that
parcels included in the study had an assessment level
that deviated from the median level (either above or
below) by 50 percent. The average property owner in
such a jurisdiction is paying either one-half or one and
one-half times the amount of tax that should be paid
if assessments were uniform.
There is no absolute level of uniformity that
constitutes good or poor assessment quality. However,
a standard between 1 5 and 20 is often considered a mark
of good assessing and acceptable assessment
uniformity. The variation in CDs among Illinois
counties is substantial. Presented in the first column
of the table are the CDs for 1983. Data for 1984, the
most recent available, are similar to the 1983
information. The range in 1 983 is from I5.6inDuPage
to 1 29. 1 in Pulaski County. In 1 983, six counties were
under 21, II between 21 and 30, 34 counties between
31 and 40, and 50 counties over 40.
Since the difficulty of achieving uniform assessments
varies from place to place, direct comparison of CDs as
an indication of relative performance of assessing
officials must be done with care. However, there is clear
evidence that some areas in Illinois are assessed very
poorly.
The estimated effects of nonuniform assessments on
real estate tax payments of homeowners are presented
in the second column in the table. The average over or
underpayments were calculated using the average tax
bill on single-family homes and the CD. For example,
in Adams County nonuniform assessments resulted in
an estimated over or underpayment of $ 1 88 in property
taxes in 1 983. The range is from $ 1 56 in Jasper County
to $548 in St. Clair County. The average over or
underpayment is inversely related to the CD, but
directly related to the average tax bill. Thus, payment
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discrepancies in the more populous counties were high,
even though CDs were low, because of larger average
tax bills on single-family homes.
It should be noted that assessment uniformity has
little to do with whether average property tax payments
are high or low. Assessment equity deals with the
distribution of total tax collections among property
owners. The real benefit of assessment uniformity is
that it provides for an equitable distribution of the tax
burden according to the legally defined tax base. Thus,
improving assessment equity implies savings by those
overassessed and offsetting tax increases for those
underassessed. Costs of improving uniformity will
include higher public spending on assessing operations
and political resistance by taxpayers with underassessed
property.
The Illinois Assessment System
The assessment of real property in Illinois is
primarily a local government function with state
involvement. In 85 Illinois counties, elected local
(township or multi-township) assessors have primary
responsibility for initial assessments. Each county has
a Supervisor of Assessments who oversees and, if
necessary, revises the assessments set by local
assessors. In Cook and the 1 7 commission counties, the
elected Cook County Assessor and the Supervisor of
Assessments are the responsible officials, respectively.
The Illinois Department of Revenue carries out the
equalization process among counties, and property
owners who believe their property has been assessed
improperly have access to an appeals process.
Local assessing districts in township counties are
dominated by very small jurisdictions (49 percent of
the 917 downstate districts have populations of 2,000
or less). It is common in smaller districts for all property
other than single-family homes to be centrally assessed
by county supervisors. A frequently advocated reform
is the organization of assessing operations into larger
units. The objective is to reduce costs and improve the
quality of assessing and assessment uniformity.
Determinants of Assessment Uniformity
A statistical analysis was conducted to determine
factors (both those under the control of assessors and
those external to the assessment process) that are
associated with assessment uniformity in Illinois
counties and local assessing districts. One of the uses
of the results is to evaluate the performance of the
assessment system in counties in relation to the
difficulty of the assessment task. Information on what
determines assessment uniformity is the first step
toward formulating recommendations that might
improve the quality of assessments in Illinois and, thus,
the fairness of the distribution of property taxes.
Assessment uniformity, as measured by the CD, can
be thought of as being determined by a combination of
the quality of the assessor (as well as resources available
to the assessor) and the environment in which
assessments are made. Expectations are that more
highly skilled assessors in larger, more centralized
assessing organizations will perform better than
less-skilled individuals in smaller, less well-endowed
organizations. Likewise, the more difficult the
assessment environment, the less uniform assessments
are expected to be, all things considered. Because
Illinois has centralized assessing in commission
counties and decentralized assessing in township
counties, the impact of assessing district size and
organization on uniformity can be analyzed. Important
to the analysis is distinguishing the influence of
environmental factors from the influence of assessor
characteristics and assessment organization.
Using data from the survey of assessing officials and
the files of the Department of Revenue, variation in the
coefficient of dispersion among counties and among
local assessing districts was investigated with multiple
regression analysis. Similar factors were found to
improve assessment uniformity in local assessing
districts and in counties. Environmental factors that
improved assessment uniformity were the percentage
change in the number of housing units, the average tax
bill for a home owner, and educational level of the
population. Assessors need information to set
assessments accurately, and an active housing market
with new construction increases available information
and, thus, improves uniformity of assessments. The
average tax bill indicates the advantage of assessment
appeals, and a more educated citizenry is more able to
take advantage of the rather complex appeals process.
Environmental factors associated with lower levels
of uniformity included the percentage change in
housing values and the nonuniformity of the housing
stock. Housing markets with substantial changes in
value and with different types and ages of homes
complicate the assessment task and reduce assessment
uniformity.
Chart 1 illustrates the impact of the change in the
number of housing units on assessment uniformity for
Illinois counties. There are two relationships presented
because assessment uniformity was found to be
significantly better in township counties compared to
commission counties when other factors were
considered. These results certainly do not support
consolidating property assessment responsibilities
with county government. On the other hand, the
number of assessing districts in a county was inversely
related to uniformity, indicating possible advantages of
Chart 1. Number of Assessing Jurisdictions
(township counties)
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consolidating the smallest local districts (Chart 2|. The
analysis ot uniformity among local districts supported
this finding. Larger districts had more uniform
assessments, but the advantage of size was not
important beyond 4,000 population (70 percent of the
local assessing districts are under 4,000).
Higher levels of professional training for county
supervisors and local assessors were found to improve
assessment uniformity. Well-trained assessors, at the
local and county level, are very important in achieving
property tax fairness.
The results of the analysis of assessment uniformity
were used to adjust actual county-level CDs for the
difficulty of the assessment environment. Such
adjustments allow for more meaningful comparisons of
the performance of assessors across counties and help
distinguish between good assessing and good
assessments. The environmentally adjusted CD for
each county is presented in the last column of the table.
The adiusted CD for each county is the average or
expected level of performance for that county, given its
assessment environment. This column can be
Assessment Uniformity and Effects of Nonuniformity and Assessing Environment, 1983
County
Average
Coefficient
of
Dispersion
Adiusted
Over or
Underpayment
of Taxes
Coefficient
of
Dispersion County
Adams
Alexander
Bond
Boone
Brown
Bureau
Calhoun
Carroll
Cass
Champaign
Christian
Clark
Clay
Clinton
Coles
Cook
Crawford
Cumberland
DeKalb
DeWitt
Douglas
DuPage
Edgar
Edwards
Efhngham
Fayette
Ford
Franklin
Fulton
Gallatm
Greene
Grundy
Hamilton
Hancock
Hardm
Henderson
Henry
Iroquois
lackson
lasper
lefferson
lerscy
loDaviess
lohnson
Kane
Kankakee
Kendall
Knox
Lake
LaSalle
27.5
103.4
35.1
33.0
48.7
46.3
56.8
73.5
52.8
22.3
40.3
45.8
41,4
35.5
28.3
25.1
43.0
58.0
21.1
36.2
45.0
15.6
35.1
50.7
30.8
50.1
42.5
63.2
57.9
69.7
56.4
35.4
52.8
58.3
52.0
35.4
47.9
74.4
37.8
35.4
45.0
47.7
60.9
66.4
18.5
28.6
19.2
37,9
18.9
41,1
$188
448
209
275
250
382
252
490
351
237
257
227
220
232
208
225
210
314
252
226
290
278
177
214
199
270
286
395
441
289
243
265
291
320
180
190
369
534
318
156
304
296
379
365
247
238
218
279
314
328
41.0
70.4
41.6
26.9
60.3
45.5
64.0
55.1
42.2
25.8
49.6
41.5
51.5
41.7
34.9
32.7
45.2
44.2
27.6
42.5
43.6
11.4
45.9
64.7
37.8
52.6
38.6
49.0
48.7
62.5
50.4
38.3
55.7
46.2
57.9
45.8
43.0
45.1
25.2
44.9
39.6
38.3
42.3
50.3
27.8
33.4
16.7
37.3
21.0
50,0
Lawrence
Lee
Livingston
Logan
McDonough
McHenry
McLean
Macon
Macoupin
Madison
Marion
Marshall
Mason
Massac
Menard
Mercer
Monroe
Montgomery
Morgan
Moultrie
Ogle
Peoria
Perry
Piatt
Pike
Pope
Pulaski
Putnam
Randolf
Richland
Rock Island
St, Clair
Saline
Sangamon
Schuyler
Scott
Shelby
Stark
Stephenson
Tazewell
Union
Vermilion
Wabash
Warren
Washington
Wayne
White
Whiteside
Will
Williamson
Winnebago
Woodford
Average
chart 2. Change in Housing Units (county data)
Township Counties
Commission Counties
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% Change In Number of Housing Units
compared with the "raw" CDs in the first column. An
actual CD in a county that is less than the adjusted CD
indicates the assessment system is performing at a
higher level than would be expected, given the degree
of difficulty of the assessment task. Similarly, an actual
CD that exceeds the adjusted CD indicates the system
is not performing as well as might be expected given
the assessing environment.
Conclusions
Improving the fairness of the property tax in Illinois
will require significantly improved assessment
uniformity in many parts of the state. The results of
this study demonstrated the impact of environmental,
organizational, and assessor characteristics on
assessment uniformity and suggest that serious
consideration should be given to raising the minimum
population of local districts to at least 4,000 or requiring
small districts to contract for assessing services.
Because environmental factors seem especially
important in determining assessment uniformity, the
use of a single uniformity standard to judge the
performance of assessing officials and as a benchmark
in incentive programs aimed at improving assessment
uniformity is questionable. Universal standards are
arbitrary, inflexible, and do not consider the various
difficulties facing assessors in different locations.
Measures of assessing quality should reflect the
difficulty of the assessing environment if they are to
measure the performance of county and local assessing
officials accurately and distinguish poor assessing from
good assessing.
David L. Chicoine is Professor of Agricultural
Economics and J. Fred Giertzis Professor of Economics.
Both are in the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs at the University of Illinois. Research reported
here was supported in part by the Office of Real Estate
Research. Copies of the complete study, Property Tax
Assessment in Illinois: Structure and Performance, are
available from the sponsor of the study, the Illinois
Tax Foundation (201 East Adams St.. Springfield, IL
62701) or the authors.
Patterns in Construction Activity in
Illinois 1972-1987
C./onstruction activity has fluctuated greatly in
Illinois over the past 18 years. These fluctuations are
examined here by following the values of building
permits in the state as a whole and in the five
Metropolitan Statistical Areas of Chicago, Rockford,
Decatur, Peoria, and Kankakee.
While there are stark differences among the five
areas, there are also similarities. They have the same
overall pattern for the time period; All areas show
strong cyclical movements; all have peaks around
I977-I978 and 1985-1987; and almost all are expected
to do better in 1987 than 1986 (based on the first seven
months of data for 1987).
The State
Even though it appears that 1986 had the highest
nominal residential construction activity, this is
probably not the case. Chart 1 shows three peaks in
single-family permits over the past 1 7 years. The first
was a minor one in about 1972. The second was
substantially greater for 1977 and 1978. The third
occurred in 1 986. However, 1 987 includes only data for
the first seven months. Hence, if we compare this
number with the first seven months of 1986, we would
find that there was an increase in permits for
single-family homes. Permits for multifamily buildings
show four peaks: the first in 1971-1972, the second in
1978-1979, a smaller one in 1983, and a larger one in
1986. Again, 1987 is larger when comparing the first
Chart 1. Building Permits, Illinois
-SINGLE FAMILY
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seven months of data for both years (1986 and 1987).
The nonresidential activity shows three peaks like
single family permits; the first in 1972, the second in
1979, and the third in 1985. Also as in the case of
single-family permits, the first peak was relatively
small. The timing of nonresidential peaks is a little
different, however. It might be that the earlier lag
represents local service following the suburbanization
of residences while the more recent lead represents the
expansion of regional export activity.
In the state as a whole, there are parallels in the
cyclical movements of different building permit types.
All three permit types seem to move somewhat
together. Single-family permits is the largest of the
components, with nonresidential permits a close
second and multifamily a distant third. Nonresidential
building permits seem to lag behind single-family
permits until 1982 and to lead thereafter.
Rockford
Instead of having its biggest peak in 1986, Rockford 's
single-family permits experienced the largest peaks in
the 1977-1978 period (see Chart 2). However, the
recoveries in the building permits in 1987 are
predictable and, most likely, the values of building
permits are going to be larger than in the 1977-1978
period. In the face of the shutdown of Quaker Oats, the
recent issuance of building permits in Rockford is
spectacular and may bode well for the future.
Cyclical patterns are observed in the Rockford data.
Multifamily and nonresidential permits seem to lag one
year behind single-family permits. This is as expected
because when population grows or relocates (which is
reflected in residential building permits), local service
activities grow or relocate as well: Residential growth
brings about the need for nonresidential buildings such
as shops, schools, churches, and so on.
Chicago
Chicago building permit patterns are similar to those
of the state as a whole. This is not surprising since it
is the biggest urban area in Illinois and, therefore,
contributes more than the other areas to the state totals.
Chicago experienced a lag in the nonresidential
market vis a vis the single-family market from 1 970 to
1984 (see Chart 3). However, the lag has become a lead
for the most recent three years. This reversal is
experienced elsewhere in the state as well.
The value of Chicago permits in 1 987 for single- and
multifamily permits will probably exceed that in 1 986.
This will not be the case for nonresidential permits.
Nevertheless, the pace of nonresidential building in
1987 should still prove to be very rapid.
Decatur
Chart 4 shows two significant spikes in Decatur
permits, one in 1973 and one in 1980. Both were in
nonresidential permits. Otherwise, there has been
relatively little activity for a number of years. The 1 980
spike reflects construction of Hickory Point Mall,
hotels, and office buildings. The slight recovery in
nonresidential permits in 1986 relates to a number of
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Chart 6. Kankakee Building Permits
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Illinois Business Indexes
w.cakness in residential construction continued to
retard the Illinois economy. The current indicator re-
mained below the trend indicator in October and
November (Chart 1). The primary cause of the down-
ward movement has been the marked decrease in resi-
dential housing. Seasonally adjusted housing permits
fell horn a high of 4, HOI issued in February, to 2,626 in
November, a decline of 45.3 percent (Chart 2). As Chart
3 shows, the real value per building increased substan-
tially between August and September. This increase in
per building value of construction appears to be due to
an increase in the construction of high-value residential
housing, coupled with a decrease in the construction
of low- and middle-value residential housing.
The real value of industrial construction increased
by 60 percent in November, but on balance has re-
mained fairly constant since early last year (Chart 4|.
The real value of stores and other mercantile construc-
tion rose in November to its highest monthly level
since 1984 (Chart 5|.
Although the help wanted advertising index has re-
mained strong in Chicago and has increased in St. Louis,
the Illinois unemployment rate remains above the na-
tional rate. Since September the Illinois monthly un-
employment rate has increased. In contrast, the na-
tional average has continued its downward drift (Chart
6). Employment in Illinois fell by 124,000 in November,
the steepest month-to-month drop in the history of
labor force record-keeping in the state.
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
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Illinois Economic Outlook
T h^e Illinois Econometric Model predicts slow
growth in total employment in 1988. The industries
expected to experience the fastest growth are wholesale
and retail trade (2.57 percent), services (2.50 percent),
and the financial sector (1.90 percent). Due to their
relative size, as illustrated by the accompanying chart,
these sectors are an important factor in overall job
growth. Positive contributions in services and trade are
especially important, considering the sluggish growth
rates expected in other industries. The only
manufacturing sectors expected to grow over the
forecast period are the chemical and primary metals
industries as indicated by the table. It appears that the
state's manufacturing base will continue to stagnate
much as it did in 1987.
Private nonfarm employment in Illinois increased by
approximately 1.7 percent in 1987, representing an
additional 70,000 jobs, with most of the gain in
wholesale and retail trade (3.52 percent), utilities and
transportation (1.63 percent), and the financial sector
(1.59 percent). With the exceptions of mining and
durable goods manufacturing, all sectors experienced
some increase in employment.
Illinois Employment (relative share by sector)
Manufacturtng (22.5%)
Services (27.7%)
Construction (4.3%)
Transportation (6.8%)
Wholesale/Retail (29.6%)
Illinois Seasonally Adjusted Employment
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T,here has been, with good cause, much ado regarding
tlic phenomena of the Sunbelt and Rustbelt, the rural
turnabout, and the decline of the cities during the
1970s. The data indicate substantial changes in the
distribution of jobs and people within the United States
between 1970 and 1980 (Table 1).
One issue of concern regarding regional economic
trends is the effect of state and local taxes. Statistics
indicate either no systematic relationship between
state and local taxes and industrial development or a
negative relationship. In any case, state and local taxes
support investments in schooling that may have
positive effects on state and local business climates.
Several studies, as well, indicate that this is the case.
In this article, we examine the effects of state and
local taxes and schooling attainment on state employ-
ment changes between 1970 and 1980. We provide
modest evidence for the hypothesis that state and local
investments in schooling enhance a state's business
climate.
The Theory
Education is an investment in human capital:
Schooling provides a foundation for the acquisition of
effective job skills. Although we recognize that
preparing students for their working lives is not the
only purpose of education, it is this aspect that is related
to the economic performance of a region or state.
Schooling improves the productivity of workers. For
example, the ability to follow written instructions or
to perform arithmetic operations is of value in many
occupations.
For the purpose of our discussion, we assume that
workers engaged in a given production process all have
the same productive potential. Differences among
workers can be attributed only to the capital stock that
they have available to work with and to differences in
their schooling.
Consider now a firm that produces something
(output|. The production process requires two inputs,
labor and capital. In order to compare this firm's
demand for labor to that of a competitor in another
region, we have to take into account possible skill
differences among workers in the two regions. It is
assumed that education increases the skills of workers.
The firm is assumed to charge a price determined by
the market (to be a price taker) and to maximize profit.
Under these assumptions, the firm will hire workers
until the value of labor is equal to the wage rate. The
economic value of a worker depends on schooling. An
increase in the level of education has a positive impact
on output. The firm, therefore, is willing to pay for
education. Thus, taxes do not necessarily have a
negative effect on location decisions and regional
employment growth.
Although it is not possible to separate the effects of
education on production from its consumer value, it is
possible that high education locations are attractive to
industry because of consumption value. Workers may
prefer to live in locations that provide better quality
schooling for their children. Thus, high education
locations may contribute to employment growth for
both Its relationship to production and consumption.
We have analyzed the determinants of the demand
for labor for a particular industry. Total demand for
labor in a state is the sum of the demand over all
industries. It is clear, therefore, that the aggregate
demand, and the growth of the aggregate demand,
depend on the state's mix of industries. The specifica-
tion of a model of state employment growth and
schooling must, therefore, control for the effect of
industry mix on employment growth.
Table 1. Employment and Population Growth Rates
by Region, 1970-1980
Region
Population
Growth Rate
Employment
Growth Rate
New England
MiddlesAtlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
4.2%
for the median years of schooling attained hy the state's
population age 25 years and older in 1970. We believe
that educational attainment may enhance the economic
attractiveness of a state and, thus, contribute to
employment growth.
Finally, we adjust for the rate of employment growth
between 1950 and 1970 (called trend). The most
important reason for doing this is that changes between
1970 and 1980 are partly the product of long-term
changes in the regional economic structure of the
United States. Thus, long-term changes in the location
of markets between 1 950 and 1 970 may have important
effects on employment growth between 1970 and 1 980.
Results
Statistical procedures are first used to estimate the
rate of growth in state-level employment between 1970
and 1980 (Table 2). The results indicate that the percent
union, taxes, and the percent dependents (age) have
negative effects on employment. Schooling, the
industry mix, and employment trends have positive
effects.
Although it is not shown, the negative effect of taxes
increases substantially if a schooling adjustment is
made. This implies that the contribution of states and
local taxes to schooling may enhance its business
climate.
In general, the results of estimating relative differen-
tial shifts in employment (Table 3) are similar to the
above results. One slight difference in these estimates
is that the level of significance of the schooling
variables is higher, thus adding more support for the
positive contribution of schooling to state employment
growth.
We calculated elasticities at mean values (Table 4)
based on the coefficients we estimated in Table 3. The
most striking result from this exercise regards the
magnitude of the schooling elasticity. A 10 percent
increase in schooling attainment increases the rate of
state employment growth by 17 percent.
Table 4. Elasticities at Point Means
Variable Sign Elasticity
Table 2. Estimates of State-Level Employment
Growth, 1970-1980
Union -.005'
Industry mix .02S*
Age -.024"
Taxes -.0008"
Trend .171*
Schooling attainment .057*
Union
Industry mix
Age
Taxes
Trend
Schooling attainment
.3
.1
1.1
.8
.3
1.7
Conclusions
State employment changes during the 1970s were
affected positively by the level of schooling in states in
1970. If an adjustment is made for schooling, the effect
of taxes on employment is negative. As is noted, the
magnitude of the tax effect declines substantially if an
adjustment is not made for schooling. The most
plausible reason for this is that state and local taxes
that are invested in schooling have increased the stock
of human capital in a state and, subsequently, the
state's attractiveness to industry.
Employment trends in a state before 1970 were
shown to be positively correlated with changes between
1970 and 1980. One plausible reason for this is the
relocation of markets within the United States over
time.
The industry mix in a state in 1970 had some bearing
on employment changes during the 1 970s as would be
expected. States with a higher share of low-growth
industries did not do as well as states with a higher
share of high-growth industries.
Increases in unionization tended to adversely affect
employment growth. In addition, relatively fewer jobs
were created in states with a very young and/or very
old population.
In closing, we would note that our results do not
necessarily imply that additional spending on schooling
in the future will necessarily improve a state's business
climate. We believe this to be the case if, and only if,
the additional expenditures result in better schools.
William Sander and Peter V. Schaeffer are associate
professors in the Department of Economics, DePauI
University, and School of Architecture and Planning,
University of Colorado at Denver, respectively, The
authors would like to thank /. Fred Giertz for his
comments, and the Institute of Government and
Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign for providing financial support.
'Statistically significant at the 10% level.
Table 3. Estimates of Differential Shifts in State-Level
Employment, 1970-1980
Union
Age
Taxes
Trend
Schooling attainment
-.58-
-2.95-
-.10-
19.59-
14.30-
-Statistically significant at the 10% level.
Marvin J. Barloon
The Diversion of Great Lakes Water to
the Arid West
J. he United States ... is running out of its most
indispensable commodity. That commodity is clear,
usable water." So warned Congressman Jim Wright of
Texas in his 1966 book, The Coming Water Famine.
For the nation as a whole, there is no present cause for
alarm. But, for some regions, the alarm is already
sounding. The "water famine" has been troubling the
Colorado River Basin for a long time. By the end of the
century, the famine will also be felt with rising severity
in sections of the High Plains, that is, in the north-south
column of states east of the Rockies, from Montana
down into western Texas.
The abundant waters of Illinois are directly involved
m this prospect. The dwellers of the Colorado Basin
and the High Plains are beginning to eye the Great
Lakes for relief. William Busten, Director of the Center
for the Great Lakes, told the meeting of Great Lakes
governors in 1 983 that little doubt remains but that, as
water supplies tighten in the coming years, the western
states will look to the Great Lakes as a potential new
source.
The Great Lakes constitute the largest body of usable
fresh water in the world. They contain an estimated
5,473 cubic miles of good water, enough to inundate
the entire United States to a depth of eight feet
(including Alaska and Hawaii). Probably the most
feasible outlet for channeling lake water westward is
the connection at Chicago between Lake Michigan and
the Illinois River, which in turn connects with the
Mississippi at Alton.
Proposals for such diversion have not yet jelled, but
the matrices are in place. In 1976, Congress enacted
Public Law 94-586, providing for a comprehensive
survey to include possible importation of water in the
West. The 1982 report of the "High Plains Study
Council," representing the governors of six western
states, contemplates transfers from other basins. In its
1984 report, the "Texas 2000 Commission" recom-
mended development of a plan for options for interstate
and even international transfers of water.
In 1985, the governors of the Great Lakes states and
Canadian provinces formalized the Great Lakes
Charter, in which each pledges to consult the others
and to seek joint action before authorizing any further
diversion of lake water. But this is not enough.
Developments in the arid sections of the West may well
proceed without explicit reference to the Great Lakes
until a culmination is reached under which diversion
form the lakes would become almost irresistible. It is,
therefore, important that Great Lakes interest give
close attention western water problems and programs
and to their long-term implications, even though in
their initial stages such programs may seem irrelevant
to the lakes, and that lake interests be heard long before
the emergence of any direct threat to their waters.
The Ogallala Aquifer
Depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer, at present a major
reserve of High Plains water, may well precipitate the
issue. This aquifer consists of ground water lodged in
subsurface porous rock and sandstone, feeding wells
drilled mainly for irrigation. The Ogallala Aquifer
extends all the way from Wyoming down into western
Texas, underlying an area over three times the size of
Oklahoma.
The High Plains are literally mining this deposit. The
US Water Resources Council reports that the amount
of water pumped from the Ogallala in 1975 exceeded
replenishment by nearly one-third. The Council adds,
"In some of these (High Plains) areas ground-water
levels are declining from seven to ten feet per year."
As this continues unabated, the ever-deeper wells
will gradually become prohibitively costly. Ground
water moves slowly. It would take centuries to
replenish the Ogallala.
High Water on the Lakes
By contrast, the Great Lakes now have too much
water—at least for many lakeside dwellers. Wave action
IS washing away beaches and undermining shore
properties. A survey of erosion and inundation damages
by the Army Corps of Engineers for the period,
1972-1976, revealed losses of over $73 million on the
southshoreof Lake Erie alone. In 1987, the losses were
greater. At first sight, it might appear logical to transfer
some of this excess water to the West, to the mutual
benefit of the two regions.
But, the benefits would be temporary at best. Lake
levels vary unpredictably over periods lasting from
three to ten years. For example, from 1 960 to 1 964, the
surface of Lake Michigan fell about three feet. The next
nine years it rose five feet. These fluctuations are a
normal response to changing precipitation in the lakes
basin. For this reason, periodic high water on the lakes
cannot provide dependable help in the High Plains or
the Colorado Basin. Excessive lake levels do not
synchronize with western needs. The most severe
drought in the West occurred during the Dust Bowl
years of the 1930s when lake levels were the lowest in
the 20th century. Clearly, the West could not turn its
water use on and off in response to changing lake levels,
unpredictable both in occurrence and duration.
Great Lakes Vessels in Shallow Channels
Unhappily, therefore, we shall almost certainly be
confronted with an interregional conflict of interest.
Indeed, the conflict will be international. All the lakes
except Lake Michigan are boundary waters, and our
Canadian neighbors would bear a share of the cost while
reaping little or nothing of the benefits.
Diversion would add to the cost of lake shipping in
both countries. The tonnage of freight carried on the
Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway annually is
about equal to that of the two ports of New York and
Philadelphia, combined. The Chicago area moves more
of this freight than any other US lake port. Great Lakes
traffic underlies much economic activity all the way
from the Missouri River to Montreal.
what difference would a few inches make tt) ships
breasting 25-foot biUows on the stormy lakes? Lake
Superior is over 1,300 feet deep. The answer is: little
or none on the open lakes. But, the inches count in the
channels leadrng from one lake to another and in the
ports. Durmg hij;h-water years, the lake-to-lake
channels are normally limited to a draft of about 27
feet, equivalent to that of the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Dozensof smaller lake ports are limited to lesser drafts,
even in their main channels. Monroe, Michigan, for
example, is Hmited to vessels of a 20-foot draft, and
Rochester, New York, to 24 feet. By way of comparison,
the limited drafts in the main channels of the Port of
New York lie in the range of 35 to 45 feet, of New
Orleans, of 36 to 40 feet.
In 1977, the water level in the Great Lakes connecting
waters had fallen about 12 inches from that of 1976. N.
Terry Burton, fleet manager for the Inland Steel Co. of
Chicago, said that, in consequence, some of the ore
vessels of his firm were loading 2,000 tons less at a cost
of some $8,000 per trip. For a heavy commodity, such
as iron ore, every one-inch drop in the water level means
that a vessel's cargo is reduced in the range of 100 to
200 tons. At 1977 carrier rates, a mere two-inch
diversion of lake water to western lands would have
increased the $8,000 cost cited by Mr. Burton to nearly
$9,500 per trip.
Although shrunken in recent years, the steel industry
reliant on Great Lakes ore shipments remains very
large. In 1986, steel works in the Great Lakes states,
dependent principally on lake and Seaway ores,
produced about as much steel as all of France and West
Germany combined and employed some 130,000
workers.
Extensive coal mining communities, farm regions,
and railroad systems would also feel the impact. The
coal shipped on the Great Lakes in 1986 was equivalent
to the output of about 1 1 ,000 Appalachian miners, and
the low cost of lake coal held electric bills in check all
the way from Montreal to Duluth. Lake-borne grains
and soybeans represent yearly farm revenues of about
$2.0 billion—mostly Canadian. Shallower lake
channels would also shrink railroad revenues. Most of
what moves on the lakes originates or terminates by
rail—coal from Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania,
and Montana
—
grain from farm regions as distant as
Manitoba, Nebraska, and the Dakotas.
Although dominated by a few bulk movements such
as these, lake commerce is quite diverse. The Army
Corps of Engineers reports 50 different commodities
carried on the Great Lakes in yearly quantities
exceeding 100,000 tons each. Many of these also
traverse the St. Lawrence Seaway. The Seaway is
already contending with a problem of reduced traffic.
Seaway transits peaked at 63.3 million tons in 1977,
but, in the mid-1980s, had fallen back to around 50
million tons yearly, with a corresponding impairment
of toll revenues.
Hydropower on the Laurentic Rivers
Nor would the impact of diversion be confined to
shipping. Great Lakes water pours through the
Turbines of three great hydroelectric centers, one near
Niagara Falls and the other two on the St. Lawrence
Seaway. These three, combined, have a capacity
equivalent to one-quarter of the New York State total.
The Niagara Power Project, alone, provides about 14
percent of all the electric energy consumed in that state.
These stations have a dedicated constituency. They
are all operated by public power authorities, that of
New York State and those of Ontario an Quebec. They
withdraw no water; they consume no fuel; they
discharge no air pollutants; and they involve no nuclear
hazard. Diversion would significantly reduce the flow
The Ogallala Aquifer, the Western Rivers, and the Great Lakes
of the waters powering these stations and would have
the same economic effect as an uncompensated
dismantHng of some of the installed capacity. Such a
levy would not he received in silence by the millions
of households m the service areas.
Diversions Accomplished
Piecemeal diversions of lake water have been m effect
for a long time. In 1848, the busy canal diggers of the
era mitiated the diversion at Chicago from Lake
Michigan into the Mississippi Basin via the Illinois
River. This seepage continues at irregular rates, by order
of the US Supreme court not to exceed an annual
average of 3,200 cubic feet per second (cfs|. This and
other punctures in the system represent a net outflow
of about 5,000 cfs, equal to roughly one gallon out of
every 40 that pour over Niagara Falls. Not much, but
the precedent is there.
Water Use versus Water Consumption
Diversion to the High Plains would add substantially
to the nation's water consumption. The principal uses
of lake water—shippmg, hydropower, and recreation
—
do not even involve withdrawals, and most withdrawals
from the lakes for such uses as manufacturmg, power
generation, and municipalities, are offset by discharges.
What comes out the faucet goes down the drain and
back to whence it came. Manufacturing, on the average,
returns to the lakes and streams about 89 percent of
what it withdraws. The water is, thus, available for
reuse by lower-lakes communities, and its use is a
problem, not of sufficiency, but of pollution control.
But, water use on the High Plains is mostly agricul-
tural, and farming is not only a water user, it is a hugh
water consumer. What comes out the faucet goes, not
down the drain, but into animals and plants and off
into the atmosphere. Virtually 100 percent of animal
ingestion is totally lost. In the Missouri Basin, 85
percent of all water withdrawn is for irrigation, and, of
this, about 45 percent is lost.
Nationwide, the rising consumption of water is a
matter of growing concern. The supply is fixed by the
yearly precipitation of rain, hail, and snow. It is no
greater now than when the Constitution was adopted
in 1 789. The country was then home to only 3.9 million
people. Now, 241.5 millionaredrawmgon that supply.
And every year we are consuming more water per
person. Diversion from the lakes to western irrigation
would advance the day of nationwide reckoning.
Paradoxically, relative to their population, the arid
High Plains are much bigger consumers of water than
the rest of the country. In 1980, the daily withdrawals
from all sources in the four states of Nebraska, Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Colorado averaged 3,685 gallons per
person. The national average per capita was only 1,953
gallons, and that of the Great Lakes states only 1,368.
The Mirage of Pipelines to the Colorado Basin
Possible transfer from the lakes to the Colorado River
Basin (centered on Arizona and Utah) presents
difficulties so extreme as to be hardly credible. Not only
is the Colorado Basin too far away. (The overland
distance from Chicago to Phoenix is about 1 ,500 miles.)
The Basin is also much too high. From the Mississippi
River Westward, the land slopes upward to a high
plateau. The level of Lake Michigan at Chicago averages
about 579 feet above sea level. Much of eastern Arizona
exceeds 5,000 feet; the average elevation of New
Mexico is 5,700 feet and of Utah 6, 1 00 feet. Water from
Lake Michigan for the Colorado Basin would thus
require an enormous system of pipelines carrying
pumped water under pressure.
The largest oil pipeline in the United States is the
40-inch diameter Capline, running from southern
Louisiana to central Illinois. Capline's capacity is about
1 .2 million barrels per day. Daily water withdrawals in
the Colorado Basin now approximate 376 million
barrels. To provide just 5 percent of the Basin's
withdrawals would clearly require about 16 Caplines.
Such an undertaking would be comparable to
pumping the entire Chicago River a vertical height of
about a mile while transporting it horizontally some
1,500 miles. On the way, the water would have to be
bridged over the Mississippi, the Missouri, and a
number of lesser rivers, all flowing downward beneath
the unbound water from the lakes. In addition to the
capital outlay running into double-digit billions,
interminable operating and maintenance costs,
including huge energy expenditure, would be beyond
precedent in a peacetime undertaking.
Pipelines to the High Plains
Neither, in all probability, could any project for direct
transfer from the lakes to the nearer High Plains east
of the Rockies be economically justified. Elevations in
the High Plains fall generally in the range of 2,000 to
3,500 feet, representing a lift from Chicago of some
1 ,500 feet or more, comparable to the height of the Sears
Tower. Volumes would approximate those cited for the
Colorado Basin.
With respect to most of the existing federal reservoir
projects in the West, the Bureau of Reclamation
established justification by merging the prospective and
abundant hydroelectric benefits with those of irrigation
in a general project account, so that irrigation received
a largely free ride as a species of by-product. By contrast,
hydroelectric credits could not help a prospective
transfer from the Great Lakes. Whatever hydroelectric
potentials might be found m the project, the offsetting
hemorrhage of energy in pumping Great Lakes water
upgrade would grossly outweigh the credit. Further-
more, any valid benefits-cost analysis of direct transfer
would require inclusion of the costs to the economy of
the Great Lakes region, a handicap absent from the
earlier evaluations of existing western works.
Proposals for direct pumping from the lakes, either
to the Colorado Basin or the High Plains, will probably
be advanced. But, if so, they will be irresponsible and
should not receive much of a hearing. Dr. Allen V.
Kneesc, Senior Fellow of the Quality of the Environ-
ment Division of Resources for the Future, comments:
Even a cursory look at the economics of
imported water starkly reveals what an
outlandish idea it is . . . water importation is a
thoroughly bad idea, even if just the economics
are considered; imagine an environmental
impact statement for such a project.
Replenishing the Mississippi
There are, however, other and more plausible
scenarios. Forthcoming proposals, of course, cannot be
forecast in their particulars. Therefore, let us select one
with as favorable an outlook for economic and political
feasibility as is likely to be devised. If this scheme
cannot qualify, it is hard to imagine any that can.
First, we may as well dismiss the Colorado Basin as
a candidate for Great Lakes water. Plans have already
been hatched there for drawing further on the waters
of northern California and the Pacific Northwest.
Instead, let the lake waters play an indirect role in
serving the less-distant High Plains east of the Rockies,
there to compensate for the decline of the Ogallala
Aquifer.
The direct source of new waters for the High Plains
might well be their own rivers, that is, the western
tributaries of the Mississippi, principally the Missouri
and the Arkansas. But, too large a demand on these
tributaries would leave a deficiency in the main stream
of the Mississippi. Enter, the Great Lakes. Any
deficiency in the Mississippi could be corrected by
increased releases from Lake Michigan at Chicago via
the Illinois River.
A plan of this kind would appear less "outlandish"
and would, therefore, have a better chance of adoption.
New dams on western tributaries, such as the Platte or
the Upper Missouri would be at elevations approximat-
ing those of the fields their impoundments would water
and so would require only limited pumping. Distances
would be short. The existing Garrison Reservoir in
North Dakota, for example, is at an elevation 1 ,264 feet
higher than Chicago. Nature has already done the
pumping.
But, do the Missouri and its tributaries have any
water to spare? The western basins are afflicted with
alternating drought and devastating floods. Flows are,
thus, wildly variable. If these rivers have water to spare,
it Will have to be captured behind dams during the flood
seasons and gradually released when the flow subsides.
The Missouri, the Arkansas, and their tributaries are
already among the most dammed rivers in the world.
Yet, the presumption is very strong that they still have
dam sites with water to spare. In 1985, the Missouri
discharged 59.9 usable acre-feet into the Mississippi
near St. Louis, nearly three-fold the total water
withdrawals on the High Plains. Airline travelers from
the east, flying over the Mississippi on their approach
to the St. Louis airport, may note the wide band of
muddy water hugging the west bank. They are looking
at Iowa and Nebraska real estate brought downstream
by the Missouri. There are now no dams on the
Missouri below Yankton, South Dakota, 8 1 1 river miles
above the mouth, and most of the discharge at St. Louis
is precipitation from this reach.
Additional dams and other works on the Missouri
River and its tributaries, upstream from Yankton, are
already under consideration. The proposed Fort Benton
Dam, High Cow Creek, and the O'Neill projects are
illustrative. The Garrison Diversion project in North
Dakota would provide more water for irrigation. The
construction of a new dam at The Narrows on the South
Platte, a major tributary of the Missouri, or at the
confluence of the South Platte and the North Platte
remains under evaluation. Others might be cited.
Admittedly, dam building in the West has been
slackened in recent years. This is largely because of
western resistance to the higher charges for water use
and to increased local financing urged by the Reagan
administration. But, the growing shortage of water may
weaken this resistance, especially with the possible
return for a few years of Dust Bowl conditions. Indeed,
the project at the confluence of the South Platte and
the North Platte Rivers would be built by the Denver
Water Board, a financing somewhat harmonious with
the Reagan policy.
It appears, therefore, that the Missouri and its
tributaries still have water to spare to be caught by
more dams in high-water seasons, either in the reach
below Yankton or in the higher elevations where such
projects are already on the drawing board.
The Middle Mississippi
The potential adverse impact on waterborne
commerce on the Mississippi is substantial. The muddy
band from the Missouri helps the Mississippi carry an
enormous tonnage of freight. The Middle Mississippi
extends southward from the Missouri's mouth 195
miles to Cairo, Illinois, where the huge Ohio River
pours into the Mississippi a mass of water large enough
to correct most deficiency from there to the Gulf. The
metropolitan area of St. Louis, with a 1984 population
of 2.4 million, fronts on the Middle Mississippi,
including, on the Illinois bank, one of the nation's major
oil refining centers. The governing channel draft in this
reach in nine feet, and any substantial shortfall would
be a matter of national concern.
The Middle Mississippi is one of the most densely
used waterways in the world. Moving traffic 12 months
of the year, in 1 985 it carried 1 8,42 1 flotillas of barges,
averaging 5,031 tons of cargo each—mostly long
halls—and connecting such cities as Minneapolis,
Pittsburgh, Kansas City, Chicago, New Orleans, and
Houston in a continuous flow, including in its cargo
export grain, coal, petroleum fuels, chemicals,
fertilizers, building materials, steel, and a wide variety
of processed and fabricated products. The total tonnage
carried was more than twice that on the St. Lawrence
Seaway and growing.
The flow of the Mississippi is also a bulwark against
excessive salinity in Gulf coastal waters. The low-lying
city of New Orleans is especially vulnerable, and it is
reported that releases from as far away as the Fort Peck
Dam on the Misso\m in Montana have served to repel
costly salt water intrusion in the New Orleans water
supply.
Small diversions from the Missouri to the High Plains
would not significantly affect the navigable draft in the
Mississippi. But, large ones would be very serious,
especially in years of low water. As depletion of the
Ogallala Aquifer continues, compensating diversions
would become progressively greater and could well pose
a crisis not long after the turn of the century. If
diversions from the Missouri River had replaced the
Ogallala withdrawals in 1963 (a low-water year), the
Missouri's discharge at St. Louis would have been
reduced by about 38 percent. Even in 1 985, a high-water
year, this reduction would have been 18 percent. The
effect on shipping draft of such reductions, or of even
larger ones in years of unpredictably low water, would
impose shipping costs on most of the Mississippi Basin
and the Gulf Coast running into many millions of
dollars.
This is the damage which might be averted by
additional releases from the Great Lakes. An attendant
problem would be that of flood control on the Illinois
River. In low-water seasons on the Middle Mississippi,
the withdrawal from Lake Michigan at Chicago could
well reach 15,000 to 20,000 cfs, in comparison to the
present yearly average of 3,200 cfs, posing a flood hazard
for downstream communities and farm lands. There-
fore, a sound evaluation of diversion from the lakes
should take into account, not only the higher lake
shipping costs and the impairment of hydropower we
have noted, but also the cost of additional flood control
on the Illinois.
Alternatives to Diversion
We appear, then, to be confronted by a dilemma.
Diversion from the lakes would impose severe costs on
the lakes region. But, with depletion of the Ogallala,
western farmers are facing progressive aridity of their
lands. Water is a necessity of life. Congressman Wright
says; "Pure water, when and where you need it, is worth
whatever it costs to get it there." Should not the lakes
be required to accept the costs in order to avert disaster
in the West?
But, in the West, the alternative to diversion is not
actually disaster. The sinking water table of the High
Plains is a slow process; Ogallala depletion is widely
recognized; and ample time is thus available for
adjustment. Other sources of water remain. The
average yearly precipitation in eastern Colorado, for
example, is 16 inches—about one-half the national
average. The numerous reservoirs built by the Bureau
of Reclamation and other agencies since World War II
now capture and distribute more of this runoff for farm
use than ever before.
Irrigators on the High Plains can use water more
sparingly without equivalent loss of production.
Present federal subsidization rewards profligacy. The
National Water Commission observes, "The water
users on some modern Federal Reclamation projects,
for example, repay no more than 10 percent of the
construction costs attributable to irrigation."
With water virtually free, irrigation management
concentrating on the "bottom line" has little incentive
for thrifty application. Present spraying systems entail
large losses to evaporation and, applied to row crops,
feed water unproductively onto muddy ground. Crops
requiring large quantities of water per dollar of value
are cultivated where more water-thrifty crops could
grow. In some areas, irrigation could be reduced to a
supplemental role. Admittedly, over the long run, some
acreage would have to return to less-rewarding dry
farming and some reassigned to grazing. The adjustment
would not be costless, but it need not be disastrous.
In a national perspective, no future shortage of
foodstuffs or fibers presently discernable can justify
transfers from the lakes. The crops flourishing on
Ogallala waters include cotton, alfalfa, wheat, sugar
beets, corn, and sorghum, some of these overflowing
the nation's storage bins and subject to price supports
and output controls. Indeed, subsidized reclamation
projects on the High Plains are damaging to farm
interests in the better-watered regions of the country,
such as the Corn Belt, depressing farm prices with
excess supply.
Monitoring Western Developments
Spokesmen for lake interests may fail to perceive the
implications with respect to the Great Lakes of a
program along the lines of the one we have sketched.
The program would proceed over many years. In its
initial and mtermediate stages, it would bear no
ostensible relationship to the Great Lakes. Proposed
new dams on the Missouri and its tributaries are in the
distant West and in another drainage basin. Even the
prospective threat to navigation drafts in the Middle
Mississippi would not be readily evident, concealed in
the uncertainties of flow variation. At the extreme,
flows on the Missouri vary as much as 200-fold,
whereas both official project evaluation and public
discussion tend to focus on normal, recent, or average
discharges.
But, at a later date, after completion of a number of
the Missouri River works, the inevitable arrival of a
season or a series of seasons of western drought and
consequent low water on the Middle Mississippi, with
its attendant damage to the river's commerce, would
at last engender pressures for increased releases at
Chicago. By this time it would be too late for opposition
to the High Plains dam-building program. The dams
would already be in place, and the conflict would have
moved downstream, pitting the interests of Mississippi
shipping directly against those of the Great Lakes. The
western irrigators could stand aside as uninvolved.
They would have their water.
Water resource issues are no longer local—nor even
regional. Impacts reach for thousands of miles. Releases
from the Fort Peck Reservoir in Montana freshen the
drinking water in New Orleans. Water originating from
a summer shower in Duluth pours through penstocks
in Quebec. The massive tonnages of freight transiting
the lock-and-dam structures on the Ohio near Cairo,
Illinois, weave the distant industrial complexes of
Pittsburgh and Houston into an integral logistical
system.
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Whatever concepts of relief may emerge, no matter
how modest their scale, the Great Lakes communities
cannot afford to disregard developments on the western
plains. In association with increased interbasin
connections, the water resources of North America
progressively merge towards a single lode of continental
dimensions. The High Plains farmers are beginning to
eye the Great Lakes, and the people of the Great Lakes
region would do well to return their scrutiny.
Martin f. Barloon is Carlton Professor Emeritus of
Economics, Case Western Reserve University.
Kalman Goldberg and Robert C. Scott
The Effect of Property Taxes, Public
Benefits, and Amenities on Neighborhood
Housing Prices
J. his article summarizes a study done to estimate the
impact of property taxes, selected public services, and
amenities on the price of single-family residential
housing in a city.
A common observation, formalized in economic
theory, suggests that gains from differences in property
taxes and benefits associated with particular
municipalities are short-lived. Careful searchers among
potential buyers of single-family residences note these
disparities. The high demand for the bargain properties,
in those municipalities in which taxes are low relative
to benefits, raise their prices. The saving in tax
payments are offset by the loss of future income from
the capital invested in the higher priced property. The
obverse occurs in the high tax/low benefit
municipalities. This market process of capitalization
has the long-run consequence of eliminating disparities.
In brief, you get what you pay for as people "vote with
their feet" and, thus, alter housing prices.
Economists have conducted numerous tests of this
process to determine whether some of the differentials
in housing values among cities can be explained by
differentials in property taxes and the level of local
government expenditure. With virtually no exceptions,
these studies took municipalities as their subject. They
compared tax rates and benefits in each during a given
year or in some cases in two years. They estimated
"coefficients of capitalization," the price differential
resulting from differences in a dollar of property tax per
standard unit of housing or from a dollar difference in
expenditures for provision of public services.
Our study differs in important respects. It poses some
different tiuestions, offers some different conclusions,
and uses a somewhat improved methodology. We do
not take the municipality as the unit of our observation.
Instead, our interest is in determining how housing
prices in different neighborhoods are affected by the
same tax and benefit actions of their common political
jurisdiction. Does capitalization remove the fiscal
disparities within a city, or are high- and low-income
neighborhood housing prices affected differently? If so,
are there revenue sources other than the property tax
that might narrow the differences that offer more equal
treatment?
The jurisdiction selected for the study is the city of
Peoria, Illinois. Its population during the study year was
approximately 1 24,000. It is comprised of a wide range
of income classes and diverse neighborhoods. Blacks
make up about 19 percent of the population and hold
about 8.5 percent of the owner-occupied dwellings.
Socioeconomic segregation by neighborhoods was, and
remains, marked. The data base is comprised of all the
817 individual single-family residences sold during
10
1979 within the city. Each house is assigned its own
structural characteristics, the characteristics of the
census tract neighborhood, and high school attendance
area in which it is located.
The Capitalization Relationships
The study tested the following relationship. The
percentage change in the selling price of a single-family
residence depends on changes in effective property tax
rate, net of shifting (an increase in the tax rates reduces
price); the average score on the college entrance
examination (higher scores raise price); the average use
of the main and branch libraries (higher use raises
price); the percentage of nonwhite residents in the
census tract (higher percentages lower price); the crime
rate in the neighborhood (high crime rates lower price);
and the bundle of housing characteristics of each
single-family residence in the sample. Amount or
quantity of housing is measured as multiples of the
structural characteristics of each residence. This
permits the isolation of the differences in the structure
or quantity of house from other variables that influence
its prices, such as location.
The sale price of the house in 1979 is its market
value. Data on selling prices and individual housing
characteristics were provided by the Multiple Listing
Service (MLS). The study uses a micro data base, the
sample including every single-family residence sold in
the city in 1979.
The effective tax rate is the actual dollar amount of
tax levied, adjusted for shifting as a federal personal
income tax deduction, as dollars of tax per $1,000 of
market value of the house. The dollar amount of taxes
were taken from the MLS records for each house sold
in the area. The Internal Revenue Service provides data
on marginal tax rates by adjusted gross income classes.
It also provides data on the percentage of each income
class that itemizes property taxes as a deduction. The
income of each household was assumed to be that of
the average income of its census tract of residence. The
appropriate marginal tax rates were assigned to
residences in the study in all the tracts. This marginal
rate was adjusted by the percentage in that income class
that actually itemized the property tax. The effective
tax rate, then, is derived with the dollar tax levy reduced
by the amount shifted. Failure to make this adjustment,
increasingly important as income and housing values
rise, would exaggerate the true tax cost and bias the
capitalization rate.
All else equal, a higher property tax rate reduces
value. The actual dollar effect on price depends on the
size of the coefficient and the individual characteristics
of the house and its neighborhood.
The average ACT score for each of the city's four high
schools was provided by the school district. The high
school attendance area of each residence is part of the
MLS data, thus high school ACTs were associated with
each house. The school boundaries are much larger than
census tracts and are, therefore, less homogeneous.
Nevertheless, the quality differences are significant and
are so perceived by residents. The expected sign on ACT
is positive—higher quality high schools attract buyers
to their attendance areas, raising housing values.
Data for library use were collected by a survey of all
users during four weeks at separate times of the year.
Addresses of users were sorted by census tract and the
tract average library use was assigned to each house
within the tract. The coefficient is expected to have a
positive sign. It is a desirable service for higher income
families who can be expected to pay more for a house
where library services are available. On the other hand,
low income families, infrequent users of the service,
are not expected to be willing to bid up the price of a
house because there is a good library service.
Data on racial composition are those reported in the
1980 Census of Population. Each house was assigned
the nonwhite percentage of its census tract. The
neighborhoods with high concentrations of black
residents are also the older and poorer residential areas.
The residences of higher income blacks are distributed
in the community at large, and whatever racial
prejudice exists is diluted. It is expected that a higher
percentage of nonwhite residents would have a negative
effect on price.
Data on crime were provided by the Peoria Police
Department from their computer records of police calls.
These were sorted by census tract. Each house is
assigned the crime rate value of the census tract in
which it is located. It is expected that the coefficient
measuring the effect of neighborhood crime on housing
prices would be negative. One would not expect
families to be willing to pay more for a house because
their taxes are going to support a high level of police
activity in response to a high crime rate in the
neighborhood. On the contrary, the disamenity would
be capitalized as well as the tax to pay for the police.
The specific structural characteristics of each house
are included in the regressions as 3 1 separate variables.
The data were part of the MLS information on each
house sold. The inclusion of this rich store of data
avoids bias errors in the estimation of capitalization
effects of the variables identified earlier.
As the explanation of these variables suggests, their
effect on housing prices is more complicated than prior
aggregate tests indicate. Some publicly provided
services (for example, libraries) are clearly superior
goods but the demand for them and their influence on
housing demand is positively correlated with income.
In contrast, some services are inferior goods (for
example, police services that are positively correlated
with high crime) and their use, not through choice, is
inversely related to income. Based on these considera-
tions, one would expect the empirical analysis to
demonstrate that the net effect of capitalization of taxes
and public services is to lower the price of a unit of
housing more in the poor neighborhoods than in the
higher income ones.
In summary for poor neighborhoods: (I) Crime
(greater use of police services) lowers price. Tax cost
for police services lowers price. There will be a larger
relative effect in poor neighborhoods with low income
because of their lower marginal tax rate for property
tax deduction; (2) Library; little used and, therefore,
little positive effect on price. Tax cost lowers price,
same as 1; and (.M High school; poor quality school with
little or no positive effect on price. Tax cost lowers
price, same as I and 2.
For high-income neighhorhoods: ( 1 ) Crime (little use
of police services), little positive effect on price. Tax
cost lowers price, but tax cost dollar-for-doUar
relatively less due to more shifting; (2) Library: higher
use raises price. Tax cost lowers price, same as 1.
However, tax cost is further reduced by cross subsidy
from lower income households who are taxpayers but
nonusers; and (.?) High school: high quality, raises price.
Tax cost lowers price
,
same as 1.
Empirical Test of Neighborhood Capitalization
The results of the testing are presented in Table 1.
They confirm the anticipated results of the effect of
each of the independent variables on the price of a
standard unit of housing. Also confirmed is the
differential impact of these variables depending on
neighborhood location of the house. As expected, the
effective tax rate had a negative effect on price and was
statistically highly significant.
The coefficients of benefits, high school quality, and
racial composition estimate changes in housing value
associated with percentage changes in each of these
variables. The actual net capitalization effect of tax
payments and the use of publicly provided services
(inferior and superior) varies within the city iurisdic-
tion. Prices for a standard unit (a standard quantity
isolated from other than structural influences) of
housing are higher in the higher income neighborhoods
and lower in the poorer ones. This is, in part, due to
the cross subsidy that exists due to the fiscal disparity
between the after-shifting tax payments (negative
capitalization) and the net benefits from superior
(positive capitalization) and inferior (negative capitali-
zation) characteristics.
Table 2 contains data for hypothetical low-, middle-,
and high-income households and estimates of the net
capitalization for each computed as the offsetting
effects of tax capitalization and benefits capitalization.
Income, the effective tax rate, and other data for
household number 1 are based on averages for census
tract 2. Household number 1 has $13,984 of income.
Its effective tax rate is 15.60. This rate was computed
as the average dollar amount of property tax paid per
$1,000 of selling price for homes sold in tract 2.'
Household 1 shifts .043 of its property tax to the federal
government as a federal income tax deduction, leaving
a net effective tax rate of 14.93. The capitalization effect
of net taxes paid is based on the city-wide capitalization
regression coefficient, which was then applied to
household 1. Relatively minor assessment imperfec-
tions aside, the capitalization effects among the
households are due to the differences in their ability to
shift part of their tax burden to the federal government.
As shown in Table 1, each dollar of net effective tax
rate reduces the natural logarithm of the house price
by .0303. Alternatively, a $1 increase in the property
tax rate from $14 to $15 (per $1,000 of value) reduces
the property value by almost 3 percent. The impact of
the full 14.93 net tax rate reduces the price of the house
by 36.4 percent. The net capitalization rates of taxes
for all three household types are shown on line (3), Table
2.
For household 1, the average ACT score, percent
nonwhite population, police calls, and library usage are
those of tract 2. Households 2 and 3 were constructed
similarly with usage data from census tracts 20 and 29."
Capitalization percents for each variable were found by
multiplying the values of these variables by their
respective capitalization rate coefficients (as estimated
in the city-wide capitalization regression, shown in
Table 1). The net capitalization of taxes and benefits
together is the sum shown on line (8), Table 2. The
calculation of the figure is shown at the end of Table 2.
Table 1. Impact of Property Taxes, Local Government
Services, and Neighborhood Traits on Housing Values
Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of House Price
Independent Variables Coefficient Estimates
Net Property Tax Rate
High School ACT
Percent Nonwhite in Census Tract
Police Calls (serves as a proxy for crime ratel
Library Usage
.0303
.0164
.0040
.0001
.0013
Each coefficient indicates the percentage change in the value of a house brought about
by a one unit change in the independent vanable. For example, if the net property tax
rate increased from $ 1 4 to $ 1 5 per $ 100 of value, the value of the house would decrease
by 3 03 percent.
The estimates are all statistically sigmficanl at the 5 percent significance level and the
full regression explains over 75 percent of the variation in the house values in the sample.
Table 2. Examples of Net Capitalization Results
The results show dramatically different capitaliza-
tion effects of the local fiscal system. All effects (other
than specific characteristics of the house itself), taken
together, cause the value of household 1 's house to be
reduced by 32.3 percent. Household 2 has higher
income, shifts more of the tax and has better neighbor-
hood amenities. It loses only 13.8 percent of the value
of its home. Household number 3 actually gains house
value because potential home buyers in its neighbor-
hood can shift a large portion of property taxes, and
because neighborhood amenities are beneficial. In fact,
the results for high income households may be even
better in some cases where shift rates reach the 50
percent marginal federal income tax rate.
Conclusions
In the world of Tiebout economic theory, each
municipality is homogeneous, and differences in
tax/benefit bundles are capitalized away. This study
addressed the assumption of intrajurisdictional
homogeneity and finds, at least for the city examined,
that significant disparities exist. Households do indeed
move to locations in an attempt to maximize their net
tax/benefit interests. However, the consequences do
not equalize but rather exacerbate neighborhood
differences.
Differences in net tax/benefit capitalization rates are
rooted in socioeconomic differences and concentrated
into neighborhood disparities by housing segregation.
High income households (and, therefore, neighbor-
hoods) enjoy a lower effective tax rate and a smaller
negative capitalization dollar-for-dollar of levy because
of the federal tax deduction. Similarly, good schools
and low crime rates raise housing prices in their
neighborhoods. In low income neighborhoods the
opposite occurs.
As suggested in previous studies, there are impedi-
ments to mobility and socioeconomic desegregation.
Zoning barriers exist to prevent housing that is low
enough in cost to accommodate low income house-
holds. Racial discrimination and overlapping taxing
jurisdictions such as park districts and airport au-
thorities preclude an escape from burdensome fiscal
disparities anywhere in the larger area, reducing
incentives for the poor to move. Technically, one might
expect that high income families would move to low
income neighborhoods, bring their lower effective tax
rate with them, and pick up housing bargains. However,
even if suitable housing stock were available, the
negative capitalization effects of the disamenities
would outweigh the gain. We do, nevertheless, see some
reverse mobility when neighborhoods have deteriorated
in the extreme. Housing bargains due to capitalization
result in gentrification.
An obvious remedy to the differential capitalization
rates by socioeconomic class is a reduction in the
property tax itself and the substitution of other revenue
sources. ' One possibility is the imposition of user fees
for publicly provided services that are not pure public
goods. Low income households who do not choose to
use the service need not pay for it. The property tax
relief would be capitalized into all housing prices, and
the cost for higher income households would be shifted
to a direct consumption expenditure. Each dollar of
property tax reduction would be more beneficial to
lower income households since they enjoy lower tax
shifting rates.
An estimate of the total impact on housing prices of
the combined effects of property taxes and all publicly
provided services, both superior and inferior, requires
a study more exhaustive than this one. The results here
are merely suggestive and indicative. The further
influence on housing prices of private and not-for-profit
institutions (for example, shops, noxious drive-ins,
churches, YMCA) might also be revealed by this type
of study and would offer practical uses for such purposes
as zoning decisions.
Notes
'Since the tax levy on all houses in the city is identical, the
effective tax rate for the three households would be the same if
assessed valuations perfectly mirrored sale prices.
"These three tracts were used as representative of low-, middle-,
and high-income groups in a previous study by the authors ( 1 986).
'of course, the elimination of the property tax deduction from
federal income taxes would serve a similar purpose.
Kalman Goldberg and Robert C. Scott are professors
of economics at Bradley University. Peoria. Support for
this project was provided by the Office of Real Estate
Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The authors wish to thank fames R. FoUain for his
helpful comments and Phillip Inslee, research
assistant, for his help with data processing and
programming. A full description of the research for this
article is available as ORER Working Paper No. 45
from the Office of Real Estate Research, 304 David
Kinley Hall, 1407 West Gregory Drive, Urbana, 11
61801.
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Illinois Business Indexes
R.recessionary pressures have eased. As Chart 1
illustrates, the current indicator rose above the trend
indicator in both December 1987 and January 1988. As
a rule ot thumb, the movement of the current indicator
above the trend indicator for four consecutive months
presages a period of future economic growth.
The current upswing has been fueled by a continuing
expansion of Illinois nonagricultural employment
(Chart 2) and an increase in the state's personal income
tax receipts (Chart ?>]. Though residential housing
permits have experienced a general downward drift
since December 1986, the 66 percent increase in
December 1987 was a major factor in the rise of the
current indicator (Chart 4). Residential housing permits
fell in lanuary 1988, and the Illinois building industry
indexes remain below their January 1987 levels (table
of Illinois Business Indexes).
Inflationary pressures also decreased. Since October
1 987, the percent change in the north central Consumer
Price Index (CPI) has fallen (Chart .S). This decline was
present in both the Chicago and the St. Louis CPI
indexes. In January, the St. Louis index change was
greater than the Chicago change, thereby reversing an
earlier trend where the St Louis inflation rate was below
the Chicago rate (Chart 6).
As of January 1988, the United States Department
of Commerce revised the base year for the Con-
sumer Price Indexes to 1 982-84, and we have adjusted
the relevant series in the table of Illinois Business
Indexes accordingly.
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
Percent
Change
Ian 1987
Ian 1988
Ian
1988
Dec
1987
Nov
1987
Oct
1987
Ian
1987
Dec
1986
Leading Indicator (Current Indicator)
Leading Indicator (Trend Indicator)
Employment-manufacturing |in thousands)''
Average weekly hours-manuiacturing
Weekly earnings-manufacturing''
Help wanted advertising-Chicago (1969 = 100)'
Help wanted advertising-St. Louis (1969 = 100)''
Retail sales (in millions)''
Coal production (in thousands of tons)
Petroleum products (in thousands of barrels)''
Vendor performance'
Building permits (in thousands)
Residential housing units
Value of residential housing
Value of nonresidential construction
Industrial buildings
Office, banks, and professional buildings
Stores and other mercantile buildings
Other
Consumer price index(1982-84= 100)
North Central US
North Central/population more than 1,200,000
North Central/population 360,000 to 1 ,200,000
North Central/population 50,000 to 360,000
North Central/population less than 50,000
Chicago
St. Louis
Personal income (in millions)'''''*
Per capita personal income'''''*
-0.74"
0.45"
Chart 1. Composite Leading Indicators (average percent
change in base indexes)
Chart 2. Illinois Nonagricultural Employment
(seasonally adjusted)
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Chart 3. Illinois State Personal Income Tax Receipts
(seasonally adjusted)
Chart 4. Illinois Residential Housing Units (seasonally
adjusted)
Chart 5. Year-to-Year Change in North Central CPI-U
Index
Chart 6. Year-to-Year Change in Chicago and St. Louis
CPI-U
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Illinois Economic Outlook
Tvhe Illinois Econometric Model forecasts growth in
average hourly wages during 1988 similar to the
increases that occurred in 1987. During 1988, hourly
compensation is expected to increase by 2. 1 percent in
mining, 1.5 percent in construction, 1.3 percent in
durable manufacturing, and 1.2 percent in nondurable
manufacturing. Actual changes in 1987 were 1.4
percent, 1.8 percent, 1.8 percent, and 2.8 percent,
respectively. As the table indicates, wage increases can
be expected over the forecast period in both durable and
nondurable manufacturing sectors. The chart shows
quarterly percentage changes in wages for 1 987 and the
expected changes forecast for 1988. Wage increases in
the last three quarters of 1 988 are expected to dominate
the slow growth in the first quarter resulting in
continued growth in hourly compensation for the
economy as a whole.
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HARVEY J. MILLER AND RANDALL W. JACKSON
The Impact of the Professional Football
Strike on the Chicagoland Area
T,he recent flurry of activity stimulated by the move
of the St. Louis Football Cardinals emphasizes the basic
role of a professional sports franchise in regional
industry. Judging from the various administrators and
pov/er brokers from various regions that actively court
these franchises, this view is widely accepted. In
addition to their value as civic icons, professional sports
represent a major industry, and the cities that are
fortunate enough to possess one of its few points of
production can expect to enjoy significant economic
benefits.
Like any other industry, a professional sports
franchise will develop production linkages with other
entities in the regional system. Each franchise requires
inputs for which it must pay, thus injecting money into
the regional economy. Similarly, its output will have a
beneficial effect on other activities that provide
complementary goods and services.
Also like any other industry, disturbances can and
do occur in professional sports. Professional football
recently experienced a labor strike, resulting in a
distinct fluctuation in professional sports output. The
strike provides an opportunity to examine the regional
economic impact of these franchises. The objective of
this article is to assess the impact of the recent
pro-football strike on the Chicago area in particular and,
more generally, on regional economies. Chicago was
chosen for a number of reasons, not the least of which
was access to a regional input-output model for the area.
In the next section, the particular situation of
Chicago and the football strike will be discussed briefly,
followed by a description of the input data estimation
procedure. An explanation of the particular application
of the input-output framework used in this analysis is
followed by a final section presenting the impact-
assessment results.
Chicago and the 1987 Football Strike
The Chicago Bears play home games in central
Chicago's Soldier Field, which seats 66,030; and
because each home game the Bears play is "sold out,"
this patronage figure is the normal production level
from which football strike deviations can be measured.
The 1987 strike lasted 24 days, from 22 September
through 15 October, and affected games from 27
September through 19 October. The games of 27 and
28 September were cancelled outright, while the games
of 4 through 19 October were conducted with
nonleague member "replacement players." Attendance
for these games was substantially down from normal.
The Chicagoland area itself was spared much of the
brunt of the strike, because the Bears were scheduled
to play away from St)ldier Field for the first two
weekends of the strike, when games were cancelled and
attendance was at its lowest. The Bears did play at
Soldier Field the second two weekends of the strike,
and attendance was indeed markedly off the usual level
(Table 1 ). Although the impact of the strike was not as
severe in Chicago as in areas with a less fortunate game
schedule, it was still substantial.
Table 1. Soldier Field Attendance,
27 September to 18 October
Date Game
Expected
Attendance
Actual
Attendance Difference
9/27 (away)
10/4 laway 1
10/11 Minnesota
10/18 NewOrleans
However, since the Chicago Department of Planning
report noted an oversupply of 6.02 percent of parking
spaces on game-days, the two-day figure was reduced
to $ 1 53,9 1 1 .05. Lastly, since patronage at Soldier Field
was down on 1 1 and 1 8 October by only 40.24 percent
(in the aggregate), the final estimated loss of parking
revenues due to the strike is $61,933.81.
Player Salaries
The final economic impact of the strike is the loss
of football player salaries. The average football player
is paid $230,000 annually, and there are 45 players on
a team. Hence, aggregate consumption expenditures of
these players is a significant component of economic
impact. Although their weekly salaries for four weeks
were forfeited, the National Football League did pay the
replacement players for their services, albeit at a much
lower rate. The replacement players were paid for a full
four weeks, which partially offsets the regular player
salaries. With the average regular football player paid
$15,000 per week, and the average replacement player
paid $4,250 per week, the loss in salaries due to the
strike can be computed as:
(15,000-4,250) X 4 weeks x 45 players = $1,935,500.
This aggregate loss in salaries does not entirely feed
into the regional economy as consumption:
adjustments must be made for taxes and other
nonconsumption expenditures. With regard to income
tax (the largest and most easily quantified drain on
salaries), a typical married taxpayer with the salary of
the average professional football player pays an
estimated tax bill of $78,489, or 34.13 percent of the
gross salary. Deflating the lost salaries by this
proportion, yields a total disposable income effect of
$1,274,633.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer
expenditure survey data, the top quintile of consumers
spend 39.83 percent of their after-tax income on
relevant consumer items. This proportion factors out
expenditures for items such as housing, which would
not be affected by a temporary loss of income, as well
as expenditures for insurance, pensions, and other
personal taxes. This final adjustment provides the
estimated loss in players' income expenditures of:
$1,274,663.84 x .398314 = $507,704.50
Methodology
The estimated direct impact does not provide a
complete and accurate portrayal of the total economic
impact of the 1987 football strike on the Chicago
regional economy. Most notably, the data estimated
represent only the initial impact of the strike and ignore
the fact that money injected into a regional economy
will "multiply" as it changes hands over and over again.
In addition, the estimated data do not specify whether
the particular initial impact stays within the region or
is muted by "leaking" out of the region through a given
sector's use of imported inputs. A more accurate
depiction of the economic effects of the 1987 football
strike on the Chicago regional economy was achieved
by using the estimated direct impact as input to a single
region input-output model; more specifically, the
Multi-Scale Regional Input-Output Model housed at
and operated by the Center for Governmental Studies
at Northern Illinois University.
The study region for this analysis is the Chicago
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) region, a 23-county
region centered on the Chicago metropolitan area that
encompasses the northeastern quadrant of the state of
Illinois and some contiguous counties in Wisconsin and
Indiana. This definition of the Chicagoland area was
chosen to provide the maximum degree of closure for
the input-output model, which is best applied in
relatively closed regions. In addition, since professional
football franchises are relatively dispersed across the
country, the "hinterland" of a particular franchise is
more likely to be regional in scope than urban or even
metropolitan, despite the city-specific team label.
Table 3 provides a summary of the direct impact data.
In-facility expenditures were captured using a final
demand translator specific to the operation of
commercial sports facilities. This translator distributes
the disturbances across a pattern of industrial sectors
that are known to be structurally linked to commercial
sports facilities and apportions demand changes to
regional and external sources using regional purchase
coefficients for each industry sector. In contrast, the
out-of-facility expenditures and salaries are fed into the
model as direct output changes, since they are known
to occur within the region. Also note that only 54
percent of the parking expenditures are used as input
to the model, because as an industry, parking per se
does not have as well-defined a structure of inputs and
outputs as other industries. Land and labor and built
capital are the only real input, and it was assumed that
parking revenues would feed directly into household
income adjusted for relevant consumption using the
Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer expenditure data
in a manner similar to the adjustment of player's
salaries. However, in this case the income was treated
as before-tax income and was adjusted using the average
expenditure patterns of all consumers.
Table 3. Input Data Summary
In-Facihty Expenditures
Tickets
Concessions
Total
Out-of-Facility Expenditures
Food/Entertainment
Lodging
Shopping
Parking
($61,933.81 X .5394661
Public Transit
Player's Salaries
(after tax and consumption!
$ 959,068.70
167,903.44
$1,126,972.14
$669,488.40
265,670.00
98,297.90
33,411.18
25,813.20
$507,704.50
The strike effects are short. The input-output
framework, however, is better suited to longer term
effects or permanent changes. Thus, some of the wage
and employment sectors estimated by the model may
be overstated, since one would not expect salaried or
contracted workers to lose income or employment after
only a four-week downturn. This will also effect the
model's estimated total impact, which includes direct,
indirect, and income-induced effects. In contrast,
certain wage and employment effects are not
overstated, since many affected workers do rely upon
commissions directly related to the sporting event.
Hence, it is suggested that the total impact estimated
is only slightly higher than a medium-strength effect.
Results
From an initial impact estimate of $2,727,400,
$2,337,100 were estimated by the model to be region
specific. Therefore, $390,300 of the initial loss due to
the strike occurred outside the defined region. This
leakage was accounted for by the in-facility
expenditures, only 65.37 percent of which remained
within the region.
A summary of these effects is presented in Table 4.
The (direct, indirect, and induced) impact of the strike
on the Chicago regional economy was over $2.9 million
in output and more than $1 million in wages. The
regional economy suffered a corresponding loss in value
added of nearly $1.7 million with value added defined
as employee compensation, profit, interest, capital
consumption allowance, and indirect business taxes.
Table 4. Total Effect of the 1987 Football Strike
The substantial effect of even a moderate fluctuation
in pro-football activity indicates not only the beneficial
impact that these franchises normally have on a given
region, but also the regional economic vulnerability to
these activities. While franchise owfners receive the
majority of their revenues from network television
contracts, much of the rest of the regional economy is
less able to ride out a strike. The $1,697,477 loss in
value added to the Chicago regional economy, while
small in percentage terms, indicates a certain
vulnerability, since these monies have the most direct
human impact in employee compensation. This human
impact is accentuated by the fact that the most affected
sectors are among the more labor intensive activities
in the economy (services, wholesaling, and retailing,
for example). Hence, although these professional sports
franchises can have very real benefits to a regional
economy, they also can have very real human costs
when interrupted or lost. This is especially relevant in
light of the all too frequent departure of franchises from
given localities, even after substantial public-sector
investments to lure or keep the activities within their
borders.
Harvey f. Miller and Randall W. Jackson, are Ph.D.
candidate and assistant professor, respectively, of the
Department of Geography at The Ohio State
University. Information on the sources used in this
article are available from the authors upon request.
Illinois Economic Update
Tihe contents of the Bureau of Economic and Business
Research's annual publication, the Illinois Economic
Outlook are completed a few months before the booklet
emerges from the printing process. Partly as a
consequence of publication lag, but chiefly as a
consequence of delays in data availability, it is
frequently the case that the analyses underlying the
Outlook are based on information remote in time for
the year for which predictions are relevant. Moreover,
from time-to-time there are important, but unantici-
pated, changes in the external environment. Such
changes often make prior forecasts obsolete.
In an effort to keep our readers abreast of important
changes, the Illinois Business Review presents this
brief update of 1988 Illinois Economic Outlook.
State Taxes and Expenditures by J. Fred Giertz
State tax revenues have been slightly stronger than
expected, yet they are insufficient to meet the many
expenditure demands of the state. Indicative of the
state's cash flow problems, tax refunds and various
other state payments have been extremely slow (most
notably Medicaid reimbursements to health care
providers).
Prospects for the remainder of the year hinge on the
passage of a tax increase. Without an increase, state
fiscal conditions are likely to become even more
austere.
Elementary and Secondary Education by James Cordon
Ward
The governor's budget provided no funding increase
for elementary and secondary education. This carries
adverse long-term implications for the state's economic
development.
Investment in Infrastructure by J. Fred Giertz
Even though the road fund balance continues to be
substantial, the governor has proposed a 5-cents-per-
gallon gasoline tax to be used for maintenance and new
construction.
The highway congestion problem in suburban
Chicago, especially DuPage County, has become an
important issue of concern.
Exchange Rates by Morgan (. Lynge, Jr.
Following a peak in early 1985, the US dollar has
fallen against most foreign currencies. Having
approached Its 1980 level by the end of 1987, the decline
in the value of the dollar has slowed. Hence, the benefits
flowingfrom the devaluation—declining relative prices
of Illinois' agricultural products and Caterpillar
tractors—have stopped increasing. If the price of the
dollar remains stable, any further gains in foreign
demand for Illinois products must reflect other factors.
Agriculture by Darrel Good
Farm income growth is more favorable than
anticipated in the 1988 Outlook. The improved income
picture reflects higher prices and improved demand for
soybeans along with strengthened livestock prices.
Export demand for soybeans and soybean oil has been
stronger than anticipated. The increased demand has
emerged from unanticipated Soviet purchases of
soybeans, ongoing weather problems in India (which
have reduced oilseed production), and late season dry
weather in Brazil (which has reduced the size of the
1988 soybean harvest). Increased exports have resulted
in a more rapid reduction in the US soybean surplus
than expected. As a consequence, average prices over
the next 18 months will probably be at the highest
levels in four years.
Because of a low rate of expansion in US pork
production, livestock prices are likely to continue to
be higher than previously anticipated
Employment by Gregory A. Gilbert
Since the publication of the 1988 Outlook,
employment growth statistics for 1987 have been
released. Illinois employment rose 1 .4 percent last year,
compared with an increase of 2.6 percent in the nation
as a whole. Even so, the state unemployment rate
declined to 7.4 percent, a 0.75 percent decline. The US
unemployment rate drifted to 6.2 percent in 1 98 7, only
0.12 percent lower than during the preceding year.
Commercial Banking by Morgan J. Lynge, Jr.
Illinois remains an attractive market for out-of- state
bank holding companies, and the acquisition of Illinois
banks continues. Most of the acquired banks are located
in the suburbs of Chicago. Such acquisitions provide
out-of-state banks with important footholds in
lucrative consumer and middle-sized business markets.
Illinois' two largest banks, along with most large US
banks, reported huge losses for 1987 as they wrote down
the value of their loans to borrowers in less developed
countries. Both Illinois banks appear to be posed for
improved profitability in 1988.
Chicago Financial Markets by Joseph E. Finnerty
The October 1987 stock market crash raised
important questions relating to the role of the financial
futures and options markets. The chief question in the
continuing debate is whether these markets
contributed to the severity of the decline. If, at length,
the trading and use of futures and options is restricted
by regulation, the Chicago markets will receive a
damaging blow, for such regulation may drive the
markets offshore beyond government control.
Outlook by Marvin Frankel
In the 1988 Outlook we took note of the October
1987 precipitate stock market slide, with its potential
for adverse economic impact. Our concern was that the
substantial decline in a major category of financial
assets could cause restraint in consumer and business
spending, leading in turn to below-forecast perform-
ances in both the nation and the state. In the months
following the slide, most business economists cut their
forecasts for growth in 1988 significantly, and some
anticipated a recession as early as the second quarter
of this year.
Fortunately the logic of forecasts is not always, if
often, the logic of the economy. As events have had it,
both the national and state economies have held up
quite well, with output, employment, consumption,
and investment all continuing to expand. Economists
have been revising their forecasts toward their original
levels. The predominant current concern for the near
term is for tightening product markets and accelerated
price increases. An examination of the economic record
for the past six months does not reveal even a hint of
the major disturbance in financial markets that took
place in 1987.
As of this writing, the outlook for the Illinois
economy remains reasonably satisfactory. For 1988, as
compared with 1987, the Illinois econometric model
indicates that employment will be up 2 percent,
nominal personal income 6.4 percent, and manufactur-
ing value added 4.5 percent. Income generation in both
retail trade and in services should also rise by 7 percent
and 9 percent, respectively. However, much of the gain
in these categories will be realized in the first half of
the year. Thus, it is expected that employment will be
flat in the July-December period and that manufactur-
ing value added will rise only about 1 percent.
RICHARD KOLHAUSER
The Growth in State Taxes: A Review of
the 1971-1987 Period
O,' ne of the most important characteristics of a state's
tax structure relates to how much new revenue is
generated each year. One way state tax revenue can
increase is as a consequence of legislative action. For
example, revenues will rise if the legislature increases
tax rates or approves a new tax. But tax revenues also
increase routinely without legislative action. In this
latter case, the increase in revenue is generally referred
to as the "natural growth" or "automatic increase."
Natural growth occurs because state tax revenues
tend to expand along with growth in the economy. In
Illinois, from 1 97 1 to 1 987, state tax receipts deposited
into the state's general funds increased from $2.6 billion
to $8.6 billion, with most of the $6 billion increase
resulting from natural growth.
In general, the broader the tax base the more revenues
tend to reflect general economic growth. Accordingly,
broadly based taxes generally constitute a reliable
source of revenue growth. For example, the Illinois
income and sales taxes are broadly based, tending to
grow along with the state economy. In contrast, the
cigarette and liquor taxes do not conform closely to
shifts in the Illinois economy.
The natural growth in revenues plays a vital role in
public finance. It has been common to expect that the
natural growth in state revenues will finance routine
increases in the cost of state programs due to such
causes as inflation and the growth in service levels
(caseloads). If the tax structure is quite responsive to
economic growth, the natural growth in revenues
might also be enough to finance limited expansions in
state programs. However, the legislature must
generally enact a tax mcrease to finance a major new
program or to expand existing programs significantly.
There is no optimum rate at which taxes should
increase, but problems develop if revenue growth is out
of balance with economic growth. If taxes grow faster
than the state economy, the state tax burden begins to
climb, taxpayers may start to complain, and businesses
may threaten to relocate. On the other hand, if the rate
of natural increase in revenues lags behind the rate of
economic growth, the level and quality of state services
may decline, programs may be cut, and/or frequent tax
increases may be needed. For these reasons, a stable
system of public finance is generally thought to depend
upon a tax structure that yields increases in revenues
at roughly the same rate as the growth in the state
economy.
The purpose of this article is to review the growth in
state tax revenues from fiscal year 1971, the first full
year of the state income tax, to 1987, the last completed
fiscal year. State fiscal years begin in July and end the
following June. For example, state fiscal year 1988
began July 1987 and finishes June 1988 (unless
otherwise noted, dates refer to state fiscal years). The
analysis relates the growth in state revenues to the
growth in the Illinois economy. It identifies and
describes some of the economic, demographic, and
legislative influences that helped determine revenue
performance in the 1970s and the 1980s.
General Fund Revenues and Tax Sources
The analysis centers upon the state's general revenue
funds (GRF). Revenue growth from the fund is of
interest because the state's two largest tax sources, the
income and sales taxes, are deposited chiefly into it.
Furthermore, the general revenue fund supports many
of the largest and most prominent state programs,
including elementary and secondary education, higher
education, community colleges, the state prison
system, care for neglected children, help for the elderly,
care for the mentally ill, and enforcement of public
health standards.
In 1987, total GRF revenues were just over $11
billion. Of this amount, state taxes yielded about $8.6
billion, 78 percent of the total revenues. Other GRF
receipts consisted of federal reimbursements for public
aid spending, $ 1 .6 billion (13 percent); the lottery, $553
million (5 percent); and miscellaneous sources, $300
million (3 percent).
The $8.6 billion yield from GRF taxes was derived
from the sources shown in Table 1 . The income tax,
sales tax, and public utility taxes produced about 91
percent. Over the years, most of the natural increases
in GRF taxes have derived from these three sources.
Other taxes contribute only marginally to the annual
increase in revenues. For most of the 1980s, however,
the state lottery has significantly enhanced the growth
in GRF receipts. For this reason, the analysis of GRF
revenue growth frequently includes the lottery even
though it is not really a state tax.
Table 1. General Funds Tax Sources-
Tax Growth 1971-1987
In the last 1 6 years, the yield of GRF taxes increased
$6 billion, from $2.6 billion in 1971 to $8.6 billion in
1987. During this period, there were only a few
legislatively approved tax increases. It can be argued
that one significant exception is the increase in the
state sales tax rate from 4 percent to 5 percent in 1984.
This action generated substantial new GRF revenues.
Even so, the revenues gained from this rate increase
served to offset revenues lost to preceding tax relief. In
fact, considering the 1971-1987periodasa whole, the
cumulative revenues lost through tax relief are not
materially different from the new revenues generated
through legislatively approved tax increases.
The state income tax rate was also increased in 1984,
but the rate increase was temporary. An initial gain in
revenues prompted by the higher rate was offset after
the rate expired. Therefore, cumulative revenue growth
over the 197 1-1 987 period was not affected. Other tax
increases enacted during the period were of
comparatively minor magnitudes and did not
significantly affect revenue growth. For these reasons,
the $6 billion increase in the GRF tax yield from
1971-1987 can be viewed as resulting primarily from
"natural growth."
In percentage terms, the increase in GRF annual tax
revenues from 1971 to 1987 was 230 percent without
the lottery and 252 percent with the lottery included.
Over this period, the average annual rate of increase for
GRF revenues was 7.8 percent (8.2 percent including
the lottery).
How do these increases compare to the growth in the
Illinois economy for the same period? The change in
the annual flow of Illinois personal income is a useful
and common method to measure growth in the state's
economy. The growth in Illinois personal income is
shown in Table 2.
Table 2. The Growth in General Fund Revenues
Percent change Average Annual
from 1971-1987 Percent Change
Taxes
Taxes and Lottery
Inflation (CPIl
Illinois Personal Income
230
252
180
252
7.8
8.2
6.6
8.2
There is a view that if the natural growth in state
revenues does not match the rate of inflation, the state's
ability to provide services will decline. For this reason,
the growth in inflation is also shown in Table 2.
Since the first full year of the state income tax in
1971, the average rate of increase in GRF revenues plus
the lottery has exceeded the rate of inflation and been
equal to the growth in Illinois personal income. This
is a very important result. It is a principle reason why
Illinois has been able to maintain a reasonably stable
tax structure since 1971.
For the period as a whole, the increase in GRF
revenues was sufficient to finance the inflation-induced
increases in state spending, provide for modest
expansion in existing programs, and even to allow for
the addition of a few new programs.
Revenue Growth: Two Decades Compared
It is important, however, not to read more into the
1971-1987 experience than it contains. Discussion of
the period as a whole is somewhat misleading. There
are, in fact, two important different trends within the
overall period. One trend dominated the 1970s; the
other has characterized the 1980s.
From 1971-1979 GRF revenues grew more rapidly
than both inflation and Illinois personal income (Table
3). Revenues grew at an average rate of 10.3 percent per
annum. By comparison, the rate of inflation averaged
only 7 percent, and Illinois personal income 9.7 percent.
As a result, for each 1 percent increase in inflation and
personal income, GRF revenues increased 1 .47 percent
and 1.06 percent, respectively.
For the 1980s, the average increases in GRF revenues
has been only about one-half the rate for the 1970s (5.3
percent versus 10.3 percent). The slower rate of increase
can be partially attributed to a reduced rate of inflation.
But the growth in GRF revenues was even slower than
the growth in inflation and state personal income.'
From 1979 to 1987 GRF revenues increased an
average of 5.3 percent per year compared to an inflation
rate of 6.3 percent and a 6.7 percent growth rate in
Illinois personal income. In the 1980s, for each 1
percent increase in state income, the increase in GRF
revenues has been only 0. 79 percent. If personal income
were to increase by 5.5 percent, revenue growth would
be about $125 million less each year than would have
been the case with the preceding decade's 1 .06 percent
factor.
For most of the 1 980s revenues from the state lottery
have helped to supplement the growth in GRF
revenues. The lottery grew at an especially rapid pace
from 1980-1986, with increases averaging nearly 61
percent ($87 million) a year. Even though the lottery
was and remains but a small proportion of total GRF
revenues (about 5 percent), it was a major source of new
revenues during this period. In 1 983, the trough of the
recession, the lottery increased more than all other GRF
taxes combined.
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If growth in the lottery is combined with the growth
in taxes, the overall increase in GRF revenues averages
6 percent a year. Such an increase is stronger than the
5.3 percent average rate of growth for taxes alone, but
falls short of the 6.3 percent inflation rate and the 6.7
percent growth in state income (Table 3).
Table 3. The Growth in General Fund Revenues:
Comparison of 1970s and 1980s (% increase)
1971-1979
Average Annual
Percent
1979-1987
Average Annual
Percent
Taxes
Taxes and Lottery
Inflation
Illinois Personal Income
10.3
10.4
7.0
9.7
5.3
6.0
6.3
6.7
The reason GRF taxes grew at a slower rate than the
state economy is simple in terms of arithmetic. Each
of the three largest GRF revenue sources grew more
slowly than state personal income. Just the opposite
was true in the 1970s, when the average rate of growth
for the public utility, sales, and income taxes, surpassed
the growth in personal income (Table 4|.
Table 4. The Growth in General Fund Revenue Sources:
Two Periods Compared
1971-1979
Average Annual
Percent
1979-1987
Average Annua!
Percent
Public Utility
In the 1980s, revenues from the state income tax
(corporate and individual) nearly kept pace with growth
in the state economy, increasing annually at an average
rate of 6.5 percent, just below the 6.7 percent growth
in personal income. In the 1970s, income tax revenues
increased faster than personal income (Table 4).
The individual income tax has been a consistent and
reliable source of revenue growth, increasing at a
somewhat faster rate than the Illinois economy in both
the 1970s and 1980s. The corporate tax, after
performing well in the 1970s, has not been a consistent
source of revenue growth in the 1980s.
The individual income tax was a strong performer
during the 1970s because the economy fell into
recession just once, in 1975. Throughout the remainder
of the decade, there was rapid growth in both
employment and income, boosted by unusually
favorable demographic trends. Employment gains in
the 1970s were driven, in part, by the entry of the baby
boom generation into the workforce. Women also began
to participate in the labor force in unprecedented
numbers.
These demographic trends have moderated in recent
years. The baby-boom generation no longer fuels
increases in the labor force. Also, growth in the labor
force participation rate for women has slowed as the
rate for women has approached the rate for men.
Consequently, future increases in the individual
income tax revenues will depend more heavily upon
increases in wage levels and less upon the growth in
employment.
Another factor contributing to growth in individual
income tax revenues in the 1970s was the increase in
the "effective income tax rate" for individuals.^ But
this factor will contribute only marginally to
accelerated growth in the 1980s.
For the state as a whole, the effective income tax rate
was less than 1.9 percent in the early 1970s but has
increased over the years to about 2.2 percent. The
effective tax rate has increased because the value of the
personal exemption has remained fixed at $1,000 and
because there has been a decline in nontaxable income
from the sale of capital assets purchased before the
income tax was enacted.
The effective rate for the individual income tax
increased quite rapidly in the early years, enhancing
the annual rate of increase. Now, however, the effective
rate is increasing more slowly, and the fiscal bonus each
year is small.
Revisions to federal tax laws have twice had a
significant effect on individual income tax yields in the
1980s. Early in the decade, Illinois tax yields were
reduced when changes in federal tax laws served also
to reduce the state tax liability. However, the federal
tax reform act of 1986 reversed many of the earlier
changes, resulting in higher Illinois tax yields. A
windfall gain from federal tax reform boosted the
individual income tax yield in 1987 by about $100
million.
Both the individual and corporate Illinois income tax
rates were increased in 1984. The increase was required
to liquidate unpaid obligations carrying over from the
recession years. The higher rate was effective for only
one fiscal year, and state income tax rates dropped back
tathe original level (enacted in 1969).
A tax deduction enacted in 1984 continues, however.
The individual income tax was used as a vehicle to
provide property tax relief to Illinois homeowners. But
since there are few such deductions (or other
exemptions and credits), the individual income tax
remains the GRF's most responsive tax source. It is the
GRF source most likely to grow at the same rate as the
Illinois economy.
The Illinois corporate income tax has not been a
strong source of new revenues in the 1980s, with
increases averaging less than 2 percent a year. In the
previous decade, the corporate income tax outper-
formed the Illinois economy. In the early 1980s, there
were few increases in corporate tax revenues because
of the recession. For four years there was essentially no
real growth in the national economy, and the recession
jarred midwestem economies even more than the
nation as a whole. Since 1980 state corporate income
tax revenues declined each year until the tax rate was
increased temporarily in 1984. Thereafter, corporate
yields have been adjusted for so many events that it is
not easy to determine how well the corporate income
tax is performing. Some of these events included a
change in the method of corporate reporting, certain
one-time gains from audits and federal tax reform, and
very high refund levels. At best, growth in the corporate
tax has been inconsistent in the 1980s. The legislature
has also recently revised the formula apportioning
corporate income to Illinois, adding still more
uncertainty as to how the corporate tax will grow in
the future.
While the public utility, sales, and income taxes have
been the most significant sources of GRF revenue
growth since 1971, other tax changes have affected
revenue growth from time to time. In recent years, for
example, the state inheritance tax has been eliminated,
a messages tax has been enacted, and the cigarette tax
rate has been increased. Such changes affect revenue
growth at the time of enactment, but do not critically
affect revenue growth over the long term.
Will GRF Revenue Growth Match Economic Growth
in Coming Years?
This analysis has shown that the rate of GRF revenue
growth has fallen behind the rate of growth in the
Illinois economy in the 1980s. Estimates of the increase
in state taxes for 1988 and 1989 continue below the
projected rate of increase in Illinois personal income.
Because tax revenues are lagging behind the Illinois
economy, GRF revenue growth is reduced by about
$125 million per year.
There is no solid evidence to indicate how the gap in
growth rates will change in the coming years, but it
seems unlikely that the current tax structure can
generate natural revenue growth at a rate equaling the
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growth in the Illinois economy. This issue is of
particular importance because future increases in the
state lottery are not likely to be quite so robust as in
years past, placing the burden of maintaining state
services solely upon the growth in GRF revenues.
The future performance of the three largest GRF
revenue sources will largely determine whether the rate
gap can be narrowed. The outlook for the public utility
tax as a future source of revenue growth, is not
especially good. This source, once the strongest GRF
revenue performer, appears effectively constrained by
legislation limiting future increases. The Illinois
corporate tax is an unreliable source of revenue growth
for the future, due to legislative changes and changes
in federal tax laws. There is, however, at least one
reason to be optimistic. The outlook for US and Illinois
exports has improved in recent months. A higher level
of Illinois exports, which results in higher corporate
profits, could help revitalize the Illinois corporate
income tax. It is also possible that federal tax reform
could benefit Illinois more than is currently expected.
The individual income tax is the most reliable GRF
revenue source. In the 1980s the tax revenues increased
at a pace faster than the Illinois economy. There have
been few reductions to the tax base, and there is every
reason to believe that the individual income tax will
continue to be a principle source of GRF revenue
growth.
If in coming years the gap between the growth in
GRF taxes and the growth in the Illinois economy is to
narrow, it will probably be because the sales tax is more
"responsive to the economy" than it now appears. The
sales tax base without food, drugs, and business
equipment is still comparatively new. Even so, the first
evidence suggests that the new base is not as responsive
to economic growth as it once was. If the performance
of the sales tax does not show marked improvement,
the gap in growth rates between GRF revenues and the
Illinois economy is not likely to decline.
NOTES
'Transfer payments, a nontaxable component of personal
income, has increased faster tfian personal income as a whole.
However, even with the exclusion of transfer payments from
personal income, the comparisons in Tables 3 and 4 remain
valid.
-The sales tax exemptions included sales of business
equipment and machinery, food and drugs, farm equipment,
gasohol, graphic arts equipment, oil field equipment, coal and
mining equipment, and certain materials used in enterprise
zones.
^The effective rate is defined as tax collections/adjusted gross
income. The effective tax rate is always less than the statutory
tax rate of 2.5 percent. For an individual taxpayer, the effective
tax rate varies with income and the number of personal
exemptions claimed.
Richard Kolhauser is the deputy director of the Bureau
of the Budget, State of lUinois.
Gregory A. Gilbert
Forecasting Model Updated
In a continuing effort to make available the most
accurate forecasts, the Bureau of Economic and
Business Research has updated the Illinois retail
forecasting model. Since July 1981, BEBR has published
the most recent month forecast estimate in the
Business Index section of the IlUnois Business Review.
The historical Illmois retail sales series is furnished by
the United States Commerce Department and is
updated in each issue of the Review.
Advances in econometrics and statistical analysis
have allowed for the development of improved
forecasting procedures. Both the current and old
procedures base forecasts on past trends. Forecasts
"
based on historical data do not take into account
current changes in the economy. Even so, they provide
bench marks for the near-term future, assuming
changes in the economy affect retail sales gradually
rather than in sudden shifts.
As the chart illustrates, the estimates from the
updated procedure are markedly more accurate than the
old procedure. For the illustrated sample period, the
new estimates are in error by an average of 1 .08 percent,
with a standard deviation of 3.32 percent. The old
estimates had a average error of - 5. 12 percent, with a
standard deviation of 5.4 percent. The new estimating
method continues to show relatively large errors. For
example, in May 1987, the model overestimated retail
sales by 1 2 percent. But the frequency of these relatively
large errors has been reduced. There were four errors
greater than 10 percent with retail sales estimated by
the old method. There was only one error term of this
magnitude with the new method.
Bimonthly Retail Sales Forecast
6.6 -
Illinois Business Indexes
J. he economic outlook for Illinois continues to
improve. As Chart 1 illustrates, the current indicator
has exceeded the trend indicator for the last four
months. This movement indicates a continuation of
the economic expansion.
The February and March levels of nonagricultural
employment reached all time month highs. Seasonally
adjusted nonagricultural employment increased
steadily during the first quarter of 1988 (Chart 2). The
March level of nonagricultural employment was by 2.0
percent (or 95,000 jobs) higher than a year earlier.
Manufacturing employment has risen 1.5 percent
reflecting an increase in lOof the last 12 months (Chart
3). Durable employment has increased slightly more
than seasonally since August of 1986 (Chart 4).
The state's unemployment rate continues to exceed
the national average (Chart 5). In March, the national
average dipped to its lowest level for this decade (5.6
percent). Although the Illinois rate dropped to 7.3
percent, the Illinois unemployment rate remains higher
than its September 1987 low of 6.4 percent.
Unemployment had increased sharply in February
(from 6.7 percent to 7.5 percent). The Illinois
Department of Employment Security attributes much
of the February increase to the weather. February was
colder than normal, resulting in layoffs in the
construction, transportation, and mining industries. In
addition, there were employment losses in retail trade.
Inflation in Chicago has drifted lower since August
1987. Even so, rates of price level increase over the past
year are markedly greater than during the preceding
year (Chart 6).
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0„7 October 1985 the Chrysler Corporation and
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation of Japan announced a
joint venture to assemble automobiles in Bloomington,
Illinois. The Diamond-Star Motors Corporation was
thus established to produce 240,000 subcompact cars
per year beginning in September 1 988. Construction of
the two million square foot plant began in April 1986
on 636 acres in western Bloomington and was
completed in March 1988.
The announcement of Diamond-Star's decision to
locate in Illinois came after the Illinois Department of
Commerce and Community Affairs extended $88.2
million of incentives in the form of training ($40
million), site acquisition ($11 million), highway
improvements ($2.S.8 million), and water and sewer
improvements ($11 million). Such incentive programs
have become more commonplace in the United States;
the Chicago Tribune has coined the phrase "Japan's
auto alley" to describe the recent emergence of Japanese
auto manufacturing stretching from Ontario, Canada,
to Smyrna, Tennessee.
While an auto assembly plant provides a textbook
example of the possible impact that a major employer
can have on a state or local economy, no comprehensive
study of the potential economic effects of Diamond-Star
has been published. This article provides an analysis of
the impact in three stages. First, the construction phase
of Diamond-Star will be analyzed at the regional level,
followed by an examination of the statewide effects of
Diamond-Star's operations phase. Finally, a multi-
regional analysis is conducted to demonstrate the
spatial distribution of economic impact.
Method of Assessment
The method used for this economic assessment was
the Conjoined Input-Output and Econometric Forecast
Model developed at Regional Economic Models, Inc.
(REMI). This model has been used in several states to
provide forecasts of economic activity. While there are
certain weaknesses associated with both input-output
and econometric techniques, their conjoined use helps
to overcome some of the inherent deficiencies of each.
For example, the national input-output table (which
simultaneously describes the interaction of industries,
governments, and households at the national level) is
adjusted to reflect the industrial structure of Illinois
through the application of industry-specific regional
purchase coefficients. After the initial impact is
estimated by the input-output model, each year's
forecast is simulated through supply and demand
values generated by the econometric model.
An attractive feature of the REMI model is its reliance
on established theory. Unlike some econometric
models, the embedded structural relationships reflect
specific economic theory rather than purely statistical
relationships or mere data availability. The methodol-
ogy is internally consistent with neoclassical behavior
and production theory. Therefore, firms are assumed to
compete for scarce resources, and labor is assumed to
move between industries and regions according to wage
conditions.
Flexibility is built into the model in two ways. First,
over 800 "policy " variables can be altered by the user.
When appropriate information exists, industry-specific
variables such as corporate tax rates, employment,
export costs, unemployment compensation, and so on
can be adjusted to coincide with prior information or
the analyst's judgment. Second, the model allows the
exogenous shock to be time-phased according to an
expected production schedule. These factors suggest
that the REMI model is well suited for studies of
economic impact. However, REMI is a "black box"
model; that is, it is an interactive computer model with
its equations embedded in the program. While results
of any simulation are dependent on parameters that
reflect economic relationships, many of these para-
meters are inaccessible to the user. For example, recall
that regional purchase coefficients are applied to
"regionalize" the national input-output model. REMI
estimated the regional purchase coefficients for the
Passenger Motor Vehicles sector as .03, meaning that
3 percent of the inputs necessary to assemble a car are
available in Illinois. Users do not have access to these
values, however, and thus cannot change them to
reflect changes in the state's ability to supply Illinois
firms. This is unfortunate since many secondary effects
are shown to occur in supplying industries.
Using the REMI model
When using any input-output model to conduct an
impact study, the exogenous economic shock is
modeled as a change in final demand for the output of
the industrial sector of interest. Most input-output
models are constructed using monetary values of input
and output for the industries in the region, but
employment or income values can be used similarly.
For this study, employment data for the passenger
motor vehicles sector were used to "drive" the model.
While employment estimates for the operation phase
were regularly published, similar data were needed for
the construction phase if it was to be modeled
separately. These data were estimated using the Illinois
average construction expenditure split between labor
and material expenditures (34 percent for labor, 66
percent for materials) to the total value of construction.
The site estimator at Diamond-Star reported that
construction laborers received approximately $15 per
hour. This figure was then used with total labor costs
to yield an estimate of total construction employees.
The operations of Diamond-Star are reported to begin
at half capacity in 1988 and move to full capacity in
1989. Table 1 presents these employment figures as
they were entered into the model. It was assumed that
the transitional nature of the construction phase would
not induce a migratory response. Accordingly, the wage
response variable that reflects changes in the labor
supply due to migration was "turned off." Thus, the
supply/demand relationships do not change, and
extraregional labor will not respond. During the
operations phase, however, this variable was not
altered, and wages and labor will respond according to
their relative supply and demand in each industry.
Table 1.
Illinois's Seven Commuting Regions
DeportmenI of Geogrophy, Univerjity of lllinoti
Wage and salary disbursements during the period are
approximately $ 1 6.5 million in 1 986 and $ 1 7.3 million
in 1987, and fall to $3.3 million in 1988. As expected,
this impact occurs primarily in the same sectors as
employment (construction, durables, retail). By 1989
there is virtually no income impact visible, and the
consumer price index is estimated to fall from a peak
change in 1988 of .015 percent to less than .010 percent
from 1990 to 1995.
In general, the bulk of the construction-related
impact is contained within 1986-1988. This is to be
expected in light of the date of operations at Diamond-
Star. The transitional nature of construction projects
implies that we should not expect employment induced
by the construction project alone to be permanent.
Slcitewide Operations
An examination of employment effects by major
sector reveals that the larger exogenous shock has a
broader sectoral impact (see Table 2). In particular, the
finance, insurance, and real estate, and wholesale
sectors are now major sources of employment. State j
and local government impact is lagged by one year. f
There are also lagged structures in the finance,
insurance, and real estate and service sectors where
employment peaks at 493 and 1,895, respectively, in
1992, while total employment peaks in 1989. This may
be due, in part, to the lagged nature of firms' behavior
in expanding capacity. Firms with excess capacity may
purchase few of these services while they move toward
full capacity. Additions to capacity may involve more
use of financial and business-oriented services in the
form of employee compensation, insurance, manage-
ment and information systems, and so on. It is also not
too surprising that both the durable manufacturing and
wholesale sectors peak in the same year as total
employment as much of their initial increases in output
are probably met by additions to labor rather than
capital. Roughly 60 percent of the impact shown in
Table 3 is attributable to intermediate and consumer
demand.
The REMI model also generated employment
demand by occupation through a link with the national
Occupations by Industry Matrix. Of the 94 occupations
generated, miscellaneous administrators and clerical
workers are among the occupations experiencing
demand in excess of 100 in 1987. Other occupations in
high demand, such as secretaries and repair service
persons, are vocational and semi-skilled. Professional
occupations such as various engineering, health,
technical, and research positions are in surprisingly low
demand. For example, the demand for electrical
engineers peaks at 17 in 1989 and falls to 7 in 1995.
Multiregional Impact
The multiregional impact of Diamond-Star is
summarized in Table 3. The bulk of all the impact will
occur in Regions 3 and 5. Together, they account for
94 percent of all employment and income and 96
percent of output generated. Of this, 30 percent, or
roughly 2,500 jobs, are generated through induced
consumer spending. Most of the effects of employment,
income, and output are found in the durables, services,
retail, and wholesale sectors.
The effects on the relative costs of production,
however, are much more pronounced in Region 5. For
example, in 1 990 the cost of production in Region 3 is
estimated to have increased by $260,000, where the
same figure in Region 5 is over $4 million. Export
employment will fall in all sectors except durable
manufacturing in Region 5. The decline in export
employment can be attributed to two factors. First,
because the model assumes that firms are sensitive to
factor costs, some firms may have left the region due
to increases in production costs. However, because
industrial output has also increased, it is possible that
firms once producing for export have penetrated local
markets and are now supplying other local firms. Thus,
the fall in export employment does not necessarily
imply a proportional loss of jobs.
Table 2. Statewide Employment Impact by Major Industry from Diamond-Star Production Phase*
Total Durables
Finance/
Insurance'
Real Estate Retail Wholesale Service Government
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
3,526
policies and strategies designed both to enhance the
total impact of Diamond-Star and to lessen regional
disparities in the state. The encouragement and
marketing of firms to supply Diamond-Star located in
other regions of Illinois will contribute to a more equal
geographical distribution of wealth and employment
opportunity. Considering the expectation of imported
inputs, the figures presented in this report should be
considered upper bounds to the ultimate impact.
The study illustrates the relationship between
employment and income and the importance of
household spending in generating employment. The
spending of wages and salaries has been shown to
account for approximately 30 percent of the employ-
ment impact. The only policy implication is that the
location of suppliers as well as the potential for income
generation of major employers should be considered as
important criteria as are employment estimates when
directing state monies to attract big business.
Harrison S. Campbell. Jr. is a program and policy
analyst with the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. The research for this report was conducted
while he as a graduate student in the Department of
Geography at the university.
The REMI model used in this study is maintained
at the Illinois Department of Energy and Natural
Resources. A list of references is available from the
author upon request.
BARBARA J. THOMAS and BARBARA F. RESKIN
Change and Sex Integration in
Real Estate Sales
Tehe tield of residential real estate sales has been open
to women for years. In fact, in 1 933 the Virginia State
Board of Education characterized residential sales as
"an appropriate occupation for women." However,
women have always been a minority of real estate sales
people. Labor shortages during World War II first
brought significant numbers of women into the
occupation, and after 19.50 one in every seven brokers
and sales people was female. Women's representation
among brokers and salespersons grew steadily over the
next 20 years and then increased sharply during the
1 970s (see Table I ). By 1 980, over half of all agents and
brokers were women. Why did the sex composition of
real estate sales people change so dramatically- To
answer this question, we examine changes in the
industry and occupation, using recent survey data from
the National Association of Realtors" and the Illinois
Association of Realtors, government publications and
other documentary sources, and interviews with
Illinois real estate sales people.
Table 1. Employment in Real Estate Sales, by
Table 2. Total Employment in the Real Estate
Industry and Employment of Brokers and Salespersons,
1960-1982
conglomerates, transformation of the employment
status of sales people, stiffer licensing requirements,
and new paths into the occupation. All these events
affected the sex compositu)n of real estate sales
personnel: some made real estate sales less attractive
to men, thereby crcatmg a demand for women; others
made it more accessible to women.
Responses to Economic Uncertciinty and Shifting
Competitive Conditions
The residential brokerage industry has always been
vulnerable to economic fluctuations. The growth of
nationally franchised firms such as Century 21 and
national conglomerates such as Coldwell Banker and
Merrill Lynch in the 1 970s contributed to the shifting
sex composition by creating a large number of new sales
positions. In 1972, Century 21 was founded, and by
198 1 there were seven national chains and 48 regional
operations. Profit-sharing agreements give these chains
an incentive to acquire a large sales force without any
countervailing economic disincentives. To do this, they
developed recruitment programs with features likely to
attract women.
Education. Licensing, and Entry into Real Estate Sales
All states require real estate agents to be licensed. To
qualify, an applicant must be a high school graduate,
and most states require 30 hours of classroom
instruction to take the licensing examination. High
schools, vocational schools, colleges, universities, and
real estate firms offer courses in real estate. Applicants
must pass a written test; and before a license is issued,
they must submit the name of the broker with whom
they will be associated. Employers emphasize personal-
ity traits as "fully as important as academic back-
ground." Compared to many comparable white-collar
occupations, these entry requirements are not demand-
ing and make real estate relatively accessible to persons
who do not have a college degree or the opportunity to
undertake extensive training before embarking on a
new career. These characteristics describe many older
women who entered or reentered the labor force during
the 1970s.
The increased educational requirements for the
license that most states imposed in the early 1970s may
have attracted women to real estate sales, because they
gave rise to community college courses widely
advertised in college catalogs. Before such courses were
available, prospective sales people who needed help in
their studies had to turn to a licensed salesperson—who
was usually male. To the extent that sex discrimination
existed, this system put women at a disadvantage. The
development of college classes created a formal channel
into the occupation. As one male broker we interviewed
put it, "We set up a mechanism for people to get into
this business that worked for men and women, and
there were a lot more women out there at the time who
wanted to get in ... if they knew how to." Increased
educational requirements and high-visibility advertis-
ing campaigns also improved the image of real estate
sales, and this more professional image attracted
several of the women we interviewed.
Employee versus Independent Status
Sales people are associated with brokerage firms
cither as employees or as independent contractors. If
the arrangement with the broker permits the sales
people to work when they please, and if they are
permitted to find their own prospects and generally
work on their own, their status is that of an independent
contractor. As independent contractors, sales people
must pay their own withholding taxes and secure their
own health insurance and retirement plans. They must
also assume the transportation costs incurred in
showing property. In the 1970s the federal government
increased its regulation of brokerages, and in 1 982 the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)
imposed requirements for independent-contractor
status to ensure that sales people would not be treated
as employees for federal tax purposes. This act
encouraged brokers to shift employees to independent-
contractor status. Such a change was in firms' interest
because it saved them the expense of social security,
unemployment insurance coverage, pension plans, and
fringe benefits. Subsequently, this simplified bookkeep-
ing and the costs associated with it. Now over 90
percent of brokerages use independent contractors
exclusively.
The shift of sales people from employees to indepen-
dent contractors, who received neither salary nor
benefits, made real estate sales less attractive to
primary wage earners who are predominantly male.
Since women in the social classes from which real
estate sales people are drawn are less likely than men
to be primary wage earners, and married women can
usually rely on their husbands' regular income and are
covered by their health insurance, independent-
contractor status appears to be less of a deterrent to
women than to men. In addition, by reducing firms'
personnel costs, the independent-contractor system
reduced firms' economic disincentives associated with
hiring workers whose productivity sex stereotypes
might have prompted brokers to question. An Il-year
female sales veteran, who began selling residential real
estate when other industries were reluctant to hire a
woman with a baby for a sales position, illustrates this
point, "Real estate people didn't inquire into my
personal life or question my ability to put in enough
time because |I didn't] get a salary."
The economic fluctuations of the late 1970s
exacerbated the negative effect that shifting employees
to independent-contractor status had on attracting men
since they made commission-based earnings less
popular with prime wage earners. After 1974 real
median income declined more in residential sales than
in commercial and most other specialties (see Table 3).
Thus, new and more highly rewarded real estate
specialties, such as condominiums, cooperative
management, and syndication, attracted men away
from residential sales, leaving vacancies that women
filled.
Cultural Attitudes. Occupational Sex Labelling and
Discrimination
Industry informants reported that in the past many
firms refused to hire women and that some residential
customers preferred male sales people. In addition,
until the 1960s employment outside the home was not
generally acceptable for middle class married women,
especially mothers, and firms discriminated against
such women. One interviewee told us, "If they had a
grade school kid, even a high school kid, we wouldn't
let them in real estate in those days." The increasing
need for two incomes in a household and the women's
liberation movement jointly eroded such attitudes and,
along with the economic downturn of the 1970s,
prompted public acceptance of the employment of
married women with children.
Those forces and the pressure they engendered for
equal opportunity led firms that had previously barred
women to hire one or two in residential sales.
According to agents we spoke with, the success of these
pioneers weakened any remaining resistance. In fact,
several brokers we interviewed described the ideal
residential salesperson as female—a young married
women with children and a successful husband—be-
cause they assumed she would be energetic, well
organized, have contacts, and be used to nice posses-
sions. Thus, residential sales is being relabelled as
"women's work."
Explaining the Increased Supply of Women Available
for Residential Sales
At the same time that the demand for women
salespersons was growing, so too was the supply of
women interested in selling residential real estate. The
number of women in the labor force grew dramatically
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, producing
thousands of new workers on which occupations could
draw. A variety of factors channeled significant
numbers of this group into residential sales.
Sex-role Socialization. Traditional sex-role
stereotypes are important in relegating women to
residential sales. Personality traits thought to be related
to success in residential sales are consistent with
traditional female sex roles. In its 1933 edition of
Vocations for Women, the Virginia State Board of
Education listed as qualifications for real estate sales:
tact, a pleasing personality, confidence, initiative, good
judgment, and the ability to work harmoniously with
various classes of people, all characteristics stereotypi-
cally associated with women. One commentator
claimed that women know how to sell houses because
they understand "feminine psychology" better than
men and can point out a home's advantages from a
woman's point of view. He contended that this is
important because ultimately most wives decide which
house to buy. Other stereotypically female traits that
are useful in residential sales include diplomacy, a
desire to please, and nurturance. In many respects,
residential sales involves "emotional work," the
production of emotions in oneself and others, which is
a traditionally female form of work. Salespersons we
interviewed illustrated this idea, pointing out that
women are more patient when buyers are trying to
reach a decision. In one's words, "They're willing to
wait while someone discusses their ambivalence about
a yellow bathroom." Moreover, the traditional sexual
division of labor that assigns to women the primary
responsibility for home care ensures women's interest
in houses, and hence their expertise and legitimacy in
the minds of buyers. A successful woman broker
pointed out, "Women come into real estate knowing
how many cupboards a kitchen should have in order to
store a respectable number of pots, pans, and
staples.
.
. . They know a lot about houses—more than
most men. That's why they do so well."
Knowledge of the Occupation. Women have several
ways in which they can learn about career possibilities
in residential sales: when they buy or sell a home; from
working in a nonsales job in a real estate firm; from
seeing women realtors in television commercials or
magazine advertisements; from recruitment efforts by
firms; through friends and relatives; and from junior
college and university course catalogs. As more women
sold real estate in the 1950s and 1960s, more female
role models were available to women looking for an
occupation. To the millions of American women who
buy or sell homes every year, real estate sales appears
to be a lucrative occupation that does not require
specialized training. After 1971, even women who had
never personally come into contact with a female
realtor saw women selling houses in television
commercials for national franchises or in photographs
of real estate sales personnel in newspaper home-buyer
guides.
Flexible Working Hours. As independent contractors,
salespersons are free to make their own schedules and
do not need to ask permission to take time off. A job
that does not require a 9-to-5 workday, 50 weeks a year
is attractive to women with family responsibilities. For
example, in 1960 a commentator characterized
residential real estate as a "natural field for women,"
since it provides the flexibility many occupations lack
to schedule appointments to accommodate domestic
responsibilities. When asked what attracted them to
the field, more women we interviewed mentioned
flexibility and independence than any other factor. For
example, a broker who had been a teacher said she
wanted to return to work when her youngest child
entered kindergarten, "and real estate had more flexible
hours than teaching." Another summarized the typical
woman's reasoning as, "I'll go out and sell houses while
Susie and Johnny are in school. I can be home when
they get home so it won't disrupt my family life."
Thus, newcomers are attracted by the perception that
real estate sales will accummodatc their family roles.
This image IS not totally well tountled. Customers call
agents in the evenings and on weekends, and agents
spoke of long work weeks spilling over into weekends.
However, even if residential sales is less flexible than
many newcomers believe, independent-contractor
status does let women take off blocks of time to
schedule family events if they can get a colleague to
cover for them. Thus, both perceived and actual
flexibility contribute to the occupation's attraction for
women with families.
Income Acivantci};es. Real estate sales offers three
potential income advantages to women. First, many
women mentioned the attraction of a job in which their
income is not depressed by their sex. As a recent college
graduate said, "We don't have to battle for equal pay
for equal work in this business. There's no rule, thank
God, that if a sale is made by a man the commission
will be 6 percent, if by a women, 3 percent." Although
payment based on commissions precludes wage
discrimination, it does mean an irregular income.
However, this problem is less serious for persons who
are not the sole support for themselves and their
families. Thus, real estate may be particularly
attractive to married women whose husbands earn
enough to sustain their families.
Second, as independent contractors, real estate agents
work on a commission basis, receiving a percentage of
the sale price of their listings and sales. Thus, only time
and energy restrict their earnings. Several saleswomen
indicated that their overall earnings are higher than
they had been in their previous jobs or other jobs for
which they felt qualified. One said, "If I had stayed in
elementary teaching, I probably wouldn't make [even]
50 percent of what I do." Indeed, real estate sales
provides above average wages for women. In 1980 the
mean hourly earning of women in real estate sales was
$7.19, while experienced female members of the civil
labor force averaged $6.10 an hour. The potential gain
is even greater for secretaries and bookkeepers, the
most common occupational origin for real estate
salespeople. In 1980 female secretaries and bookkeepers
made $5.14 and $4.98 an hour, respectively.
A third attraction is the popular belief that real estate
sales is a very lucrative occupation, fostered by books
such as How Any Woman Can Get Rich Fast in Real
Estate.
Explaining Women's UndenepTeseniation in
Nonresiclentidl Real Estate
Because it is easy to enter, residential sales is the
"port of entry" into real estate sales. Many men tend
to move on into nonresidential sales and management,
but most women remain in residential. Women's
underrepresentation in commercial sales occurs both
because the field is still sex-typed as a male field and
because it is more difficult to enter. A commercial
license requires more classroom hours as well as
business and mathematical training. Because custom
has discouraged women from pursuing business and
mathematics in school, these requirements are more
likely to deter women than men.
Cultural Attitudes, Occupational Preferences, and
Sex-Role Socialization. Industry insiders still see
commercial sales as a male specialty. For example, one
interviewee remarked, "I think a good number of men
would feel that (commercial) is a man's field and that
they can do a better job." Commercial sales has the
reputation as a tough, risky business where deals are
made in smoke-filled rooms. Some informants
characterized men in commercial sales as "high rollers"
who are attracted by the risk that commercial real
estate involves.
Explaining women's underrepresentation in nonresi-
dential sales and their gains in residential real estate in
terms of sex-role socialization is appealing because it
fits popular notions of how people behave, but
structural aspects of the occupation are also important
in producing sex segregation within real estate sales.
For example, just as many women learned about
opportunities in residential real estate through buying
and selling houses, the commercial sales people whom
we interviewed learned about their occupation through
buying a selling investment property or managing
property. Because these are not typically female
activities, women have fewer chances to learn of the
opportunities commercial real estate sales offer. In
addition, most people we interviewed agreed that some
brokers refused to hire women for commercial sales,
and others would only allow a small percentage of
women in their branches. Some saleswomen told us
that brokers did not want women on their staffs because
they did not think women could handle commercial.
For example, one saleswoman experienced opposition
when she tried to move from residential to commercial
sales, after she had a chance opportunity to handle a
commercial sale. "The men in the office didn't let me
do it. My boss said, 'If you want to do that, go someplace
else, because that's no place for a woman.' " Another
saleswomen said her firm's executive committee had
to approve her when she was hired in 1973; "All the
men went in (easily) . . . with me it was five months."
Several brokers we interviewed confirmed these
accounts of sex discrimination in commercial real
estate; a male broker indicated that many commercial
firms that appear open to women are just paying "lip
service" to equal opportunities for women.
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Most agents we interviewed believed that commer-
cial customers, who are predominantly male, are
indifferent to a salesperson's sex as long as she or he is
competent, although a few claimed that customers still
prefer to deal with men and that women in commercial
must prove themselves by being more professional than
their male counterparts. Some of the barriers women
described to us were subtle. Some commented that
female agents must act differently from male agents
—
they cannot be "buddy-buddy" with their customers,
conducting business at the golf course or bar. Thus,
according to our sources, would-be commercial
saleswomen have to overcome more resistance from
employers than from customers.
Barbara Reskin is a professor in the Department of
Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. Barbara Thomas is a graduate student in
the department. Support for this study came from the
Office of Real Estate Research and the National
Science Foundation.
TIMOTHY I. GALLAGHER
Mutual Fund Size and Risk-Adjusted
Performance
Thhe Wall Street journal described the ongoing debate
over the relationship between mutual fund size and
performance in the 5 June 1986 edition. Laura Berger
of the No Load Mutual Fund Association was quoted
as saying, "The smaller the fund the better the perform-
ance." A study conducted by Lipper Analytical Services
was quoted, and it found that larger funds outperformed
smaller funds in four of five categories tested.
There are many people, such as Berger, who have a
gut feeling that small mutual funds should outperform
large mutual funds. The flexibility of smaller funds is
often referred to as a big advantage. The manager of a
small fund can get in and out of the market quickly
without disrupting it. He can also move from one stock
to another easily. Buy and sell orders are not likely to
move the market adversely, resulting in better "fills"
for the small fund.
Large funds have more resources and can afford to
buy the services of the highest priced (best?) portfolio
managers. They can negotiate lower commission
charges and can take advantage of economies of scale.
The Lipper study suggests that these advantages of large
funds outweigh the relative advantage of which small
funds have in certain areas.
The Lipper study has one serious limitation. It does
not adjust for risk when measuring performance. Funds
that take bigger risks should perform better than funds
that take smaller risks. Rather than making subjective
judgments about the relationship between size and
performance or doing a study using simple returns to
measure performance, this study examines the relation-
ship between size and risk-adjusted returns.
Risk-Adjusted Returns of Mutual Funds
Performance figures were gathered quarterly for 45
mutual funds and the Standard & Poor's 500 Index from
Barron's/Lipper Gauge of mutual fund performance.
The Lipper Gauge reports the performance of a
hypothetical $ 10,000 investment during a given holding
period (quarter, year, and 5-year periods). The ending
value of this $10,000-beginning-value investment is
reported. Sales charges and redemption fees, if any, are
ignored. All distributions are assumed reinvested on
the ex-dividend date. Holding-period returns (Ending
Value - $10,000/$10,000) were calculated for mutual
funds for each quarter from I lanuary 1982 through 31
March 1987 (22 quarters). The first quarter of 1982 is
when Barrons began publishing the Lipper Gauge.
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The 22 holding-period returns were obtained, and the
geometric mean of these returns was calculated for each
mutual tund m the sample. Maximizinj; the geometric
mean return tor a given risk level is widely accepted as
a good investment goal.
The geometric mean returns were then used to
calculate two different risk-adjusted return measures
for each mutual fund. In both cases, the risk premium
for each mutual fund is computed. It is defined as the
geometric mean rate of return minus the riskless rate
of interest. On 1 January 1982 an investor could have
purchased a Treasury bond scheduled to mature in
March 1987 with a yield to maturity of 14 percent. This
yield, converted to a quarterly return of .^.3 percent,
becomes the riskless rate.
The Sharpe Index takes the risk premium and divides
by the standard deviation of the holding-period returns.
The Sharpe Index gives us the amount of return above
the riskless rate paid to induce investors to assume risk
per unit of total risk. In the ex-post world we live in,
this risk premium can be positive or negative. Ex ante,
the expected risk premium is always positive.
Treynor uses the same numerator in his performance
index. However, instead of dividing by the total risk
measure he uses beta in the denominator. The Treynor
Index gives the risk premium per unit of systematic
risk. Beta was calculated by regressing the holding-
period returns of each mutual fund against the holding-
period returns of the Standard &. Poor's 500 Index with
dividends fully reinvested.
The size variable used in this study reflects the dollar
amount of total assets of each mutual fund at the
beginning of the observation period (31 December
1 98 1 ). Although the sizes of these sample mutual funds
changed over the observation period, a potential inves-
tor could not predict these changes; so the beginning
size figures were used.
The 45 funds are ranked according to asset size from
largest (rank 1 ) to smallest (rank 45). Each fund (includ-
ing Standard & Poor's 500 Index) is then ranked accord-
ing to performance from best (rank 1) to poorest (rank
46) Performance is measured in three different ways:
the geometric mean holding-period return, the Sharpe
Index, and the Treynor Index. The Pearson correlation
coefficient is calculated to test for a possible relation-
ship between mutual fund size and performance.
Results
Table 1 shows the geometric mean returns, betas, the
Sharpe Index, and the Treynor Index for each of the 46
funds. The best performer, without adjustment for risk,
was Sentinal with an 8.37 percent geometric mean
quarterly return. 44 Wall Street fund was the poorest
performer with a - 2.32 percent geometric mean quar-
terly return. The geometric mean quarterly return of
the Standard ik Poor's 500 Index (with dividends rein-
vested) was 5.36 percent. Of the 45 sample mutual
funds, 31 beat this benchmark buy-and-hold portfolio
on an unadjusted basis.
Sequoia, not Sentinal, gets the number one ranking
when the Sharpe and Treynor risk-adjusted performance
measures are examined. Sentinal drops to number three
according to the Sharpe Index and to number six accord-
ing to the Treynor Index. Sequoia had a value of .78 for
the Sharpe Index and 13.30 for the Treynor Index. 44
Wall Street had a -2.32 percent quarterly geometric
mean, a -.28 for the Sharpe Index, and -3.36 for the
Treynor Index coming in at last place however perform-
ance is measured. The Standard & Poor's 500 Index
reinvested was 2.06. The Standard & Poor's Index
reinvested beat 31 of 45 mutual funds in this random
sample according to the geometric mean, 34 of 45
according to the Sharpe Index, and 39 of 45 according
to the Treynor Index. The mutual fund managers seem
to be doing very well, especially on a risk-adjusted basis,
according to these data. Next the evidence on the
relationship between mutual fund size and performance
will be examined.
The results of the correlation coefficient calculations
are summarized in Table 2. The null hypothesis is that
there is no relationship between size and performance.
Only the .3 1 1 correlation coefficient of geometric mean
and size is significant at the .05 level suggesting that
there is significant difference between the performance
of small and large funds (large funds do better). The
results from the risk-adjusted performance measures
suggest that the null hypothesis (no relationship be-
tween mutual fund size and performance) cannot be
rejected at the .05 level of confidence.
The Sharpe and Treynor Indexes are both widely used
as measures of risk-adjusted performance. They tend to
rank portfolios similarly, and the results of this study
support that observation strongly. The rank correlation
coefficient between the Sharpe Index and the Treynor
Index is .869. The probability that this correlation
coefficient is in fact zero is .0001.
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Table 1. Quarterly Performance of 46 Funds 1982:1 to
Illinois Business Indexes
J. he composite leading indicator continues to project
growth in the Illinois economy over the next several
quarters. In April, the current indicator hriefly declined
below the trend indicator but rebounded by May (see
Chart 1), suggesting that the decline represents a
fluctuation around the general upward trend rather
than a change in the trend itself.
Although real weekly earnings in the manufacturing
sector remained almost constant at $400 over the past
two years (see Chart 2|, growth in the Illinois economy
is reflected by the recent improvement in real retail
sales as illustrated in Chart 3. Since lanuary 1988,
monthly sales have generally increased over the
previous year's amounts.
The help wanted indexes used to construct Chart 4
measure the volume of classified advertising in the
respective cities' major newspapers, and are sensitive
to changes in the demand for labor and general business
conditions. Although the Chicago help wanted
advertising index is absolutely higher than the St. Louis
index, Chart 4 indicates that the two indexes follow
the same general trend. The Chicago index fell by .87
percent in May while the St. Louis index increased by
.S.6.3 percent.
As expected, residential housing permits were lower
in the winter months during the past two years due to
seasonal patterns (see Chart 5). Despite growth in
housing permits during the spring months, however,
the current year is showing a weak performance relative
to the previous year. Chart 6 shows that area inflation
rates have held steady at approximately three to four
percent during 1988. Chicago's rate of inflation fell
throughout March, April, and May of this year, and the
May rate of 3.29 percent was lower than that of the
North Central United States (3.94 percent).
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
Percent
Change
May 1987-
May 1988
Chart 1. Composite Leading Indicators (ijver^ge percent Chart 2. Real Weekly Earnings—Manufacturing
change in base indexes)
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Chart 3. Real Retail Sales {in millions) Chart 4. Help Wanted Advertising Indexes (percent
change from previous month, seasonally adjusted)
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WILLIAM R. BRYAN AND CHARLES M. LINKE
Value of a College Education
C/olleges and universities throughout the nation have
announced tuition increases for the coming year. These
increases continue a trend that has characterized the
past several decades, and longer. In part, increases in
the cost of higher education are an aspect of generalized
inflation. Beyond that, however, there have been
increases in the relative price of higher education.
In understanding why it is that we are willing to
make the major expenditures associated with education
and in accounting for some of the reasons that relative
costs continue to increase, it is useful to review some
of the returns to education. One way of thinking about
returns is to identify the gains to society that accrue
by virtue of advances associated with education in
general or higher education in particular. An alternative
way of thinking about the returns to education, the
approach taken here, is to concentrate on the gains to
the individual. In this article, we identify the extent to
which an individual's earnings are enhanced by the
education process, or factors associated with that
process.
A person with four years of college earned in excess
of $ 1 1 ,000 more per year in 1 988, on average, than one
whose formal education stopped with high school. Over
an entire work life the average earnings of a college
graduate are substantially in excess of those of a high
school graduate.
Education is not the only determinant of earnings.
Other important general factors include age, race and
sex, occupation, considered individually and in
combination. Moreover, data presented here cannot
really show that the increased earnings result from a
college education, rather than from some other set of
factors. The fact that a person has completed college
and enjoys high earnings may be a reflection of a host
of other considerations—family income, race, personal
intelligence and energy, motivation, social status,
political power, and so forth.
Data
The eamings data are from Money Income of
Households. Families, and Persons in the United
States: 1985, a 1987 pubhcation of the Bureau of the
Census. We give the 1985 data in 1988 dollars by an
adjustment formed from the 1985 to 1988 change in
the level of consumer prices. The data are limited to
eamings, that is, money received for performing work,
either as an employee or self-employed.
Data relating to the length of work life are from Work
Life Estimates: Ef'ects of Race and Education, a 1986
publication of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. An
individual's work life consists of the period during
which there is participation in the work force.
Accordingly, a work life is the sum of periods of time
an individual is employed and periods unemployed.
Age-Earnings Life Cycle
Money earnings of workers in general have shown
persistent increases over the past half century. In part,
the increases have been an aspect of inflation. The
earnings statistics discussed here are presented in 1988
dollars, thereby removing the effects of general
inflation. Other important sources of gains in earnings
include productivity gains—that is, increased output
reflecting improvements in technology and other
factors. Over the past three decades, increases in real
earnings of year-round workers have averaged just
under 1.5 percent per annum.
If we shift our focus from workers in general toward
the earnings of individuals, there are changes associated
with movement through the life cycle. It is generally
the case that an individual's real earnings tend to rise
over an extended portion of life, then drift lower as he
or she nears retirement. The life-cycle pattern is
illustrated in Chart 1 . The line moving toward the top
of the chart shows a college graduate's life cycle of real
income assuming an annual increase in productivity of
1.5 percent spread evenly across age categories. The
center line depicts the present value of real income
across age categories. For a discussion of present value
see the accompanying inset. In that discussion we reach
the conclusion that factors affecting the growth in
earnings are approximately offset by factors affecting
the appropriate discount rate. Hence, the present value
of an individual's life cycle of earnings is approximated
by the sum of constant dollar earnings over the life
cycle.
The Concept of Present Value
Choice is one of the most pervasive ofhuman
activities. Some of the most difficult, yet
common, decision-making involves choice
among unlike objects, events, or activities.
Other decisions relate to similar, even
identical, objects, events, or activities, but
involve choice along a time dimension. Shall
we do it now? Or shall we do it later? Time
emerges as an important economic variable by
virtue of the human condition that something
received now is inherently more desirable than
something to be received later. That human
condition probably relates to the fact that each
of us ages and, at length, dies. Hence, time is
finite to the individual. If an individual forgoes
something now, he may never again have the
opportunity to experience it.
To compare unlike flows of benefits (or,
alternatively, of costs), economists employ the
concept of present value. Occasions arise when
it is important to compare the desirability of
receiving one amount of money now, say
$1,000, with the desirability of receiving an
alternative amount, say $2,500, at some
specified time in the future. Or, we may need
to compare the value of the receipt of $1,000
now with the value of receiving a monthly
amount of, say, $25 spread over a specified
number of months. It is that type of problem
that is posed in evaluating a college education.
The differentials in earnings between college
graduates and high school graduates are spread
over a lifetime. In determining whether the
expenses of college are worthwhile, it is
necessary to determine how much that
differential is worth.
The dominant approach to thinking about
the meaning of present value is to pose the
following question: What amount, if invested
today, would exactly produce the future
year-by-year series of payments? In the matter
at hand, we are interested in knowing how
much would need to be invested to make up
for the earnings difference between a high
school graduate, variously defined, and a
college graduate.
The answer to this present value question
depends upon four factors. One ingredient to
an answer involves knowing the size of the
initial earnings differential between the college
graduate and the high school graduate; a second
ingredient involves identifying the rate (or
rates) of growth in that differential; a third
factor involves identifying the discount rate,
the yield that would accrue to the invested
principal; and the final ingredient involves
determining the length of the period over
which the differentials are to be experienced.
For the matter at hand, it is probably
sufficient to assume that the growth rate in
earnings and the rate of return on the principal
investment are approximately equal. For a
discussion see W. R. Bryan and C. M. Linke,
"Estimating the Present Value of a Future
Earnings Stream: Some Evidence from
Experience with Dedicated Portfolios, "/ouraai
of Risk and Insurance (June 1988).
Chart 1 also shows present value data for high school
graduates. Two points are noteworthy. First, the life
cycle of annual real earnings for college graduates is
markedly higher than for high school graduates.
Second, the growth of earnings persists longer for
college graduates than for high school graduates.
Chart 1. Life Cycle of Earnings (Year-Round Workers.
Males and Females, 1988 Dollars)
Annual Earnings
(Thousands)
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Lifetime Earnings
The college graduate works to an older age, on
average, than does a high school graduate. A male
college graduate who enters the work force at age 22
has a work life expectancy of 37. 1 years, implying work
to age 59. 1 . In contrast, a high school graduate entering
the work force at age 1 8 has a work life expectancy of
37.9 years, or to age 55.9.
The work life of females, on average, is substantially
shorter than that of males. For a variety of reasons,
women are apparently more likely than men to
withdraw from the work force for extended periods of
time. For example, a female may withdraw from the
labor force in order to raise a family. But work life
expectancies are derived from cross-sectional data.
Thus, the expected work life for females caimot fully
reflect the significant changes that have occurred
during the past two decades in the roles of women in
the labor force.
Factors associated with a college education tend to
lengthen a female's expected work life. A female high
school graduate entering the work force at age 18 has
an expected work life of 27.9 years, or an average work
life extending to age 45.9. By comparison, a female
college graduate entering the work force at age 22 has
a work life expectancy of 28.6 years, implying work
until 50.6. As a consequence of the differences in timing
of work life patterns, the lifetime earnings of college
graduates in general, and female graduates in particular,
are further enhanced.
Having set forth data relating to earnings and work
life, we are in a position to discuss lifetime earnings.
For illustrative purposes, suppose that the average work
life is 32.9 years for both an 18-year old high school
graduate and a 22-year old college graduate. With this
assumption, average lifetime earnings in 1988 dollars
for a high school graduate are $596,944 (see Table 1 1.
Average lifetime earnings for a college graduate are
$965,633, 61.8 percent greater than for a high school
graduate.
Table 1. Lifetime Earnings of High School and College
Graduates (Males and Females Combined, Present
Values in 1988 Dollars)^
Annual
addition, it is frequently the case that such occupations
are not physically demanding. Hence, youth may not
be an important advantage. Indeed, youth may be a
disadvantage. Thus, within these occupations an
individual can look forward to a relatively long work
life with undmiinished earnings.
Because professionals, executives, and managers are
substantially insulated from the business cycle, a
college graduate may be employed for virtually the
entire work life. It is not unusual to encounter
professionals who have never experienced unemploy-
ment. The data are consistent with this generalization.
The sample data include 45,094 men and women who
Table 2. Lifetime Earnings of High School Graduates
(Year-Round FuU-Time Workers, Present Values in
1988 Dollars)"
Annual
Age Categories Earnings Work Life
Lifetime
Earnings
Male High School Graduates
18-24 years
25-29"
30-34"
35-39"
40-44"
45-49"
50-54"
55-59"
$10,271
18,883
21,099
24,522
26,519
27,821
26,386
26,498
7.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
0.9
37.9
$ 71,897
94,415
105,495
122,610
132,595
136,930
131,930
23,848
819,720
Female High School Graduates
18-24 years
25-29"
30-34"
35-39"
40-44"
45-49"
i 7,014
11,130
12,325
12,507
12,601
12,897
7.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
0.9
27.9
$ 49,098
55,650
61,625
62,535
63,005
11,607
$303,520
'See note to Table I
.
Table 3. Lifetime Earnings of College Graduates
(Year-Round Full-Time Workers, Present Values in
1988 Dollars)"
dollars. A female college graduate can expect average
lifetime earnings of $681,687, less than one-half the
lifetime earnings of a male college graduate (see Table
3). If the female's expected work life were the same as
a male's, lifetime earnings would reach $894,448, still
only about two-thirds the earnings of a comparably
educated male.
Concluding Remarks
Notwithstanding the increased out-of-pocket costs
associated with attending college, it is reasonably clear
that costs fall far short of the future benefits. The
present values of the increased earnings associated with
graduation from college are substantial. Even if one
were to include the earnings foregone while attending
college, about $50,000 for a male high school graduate
and $30,000 for a female high school graduate, the
returns from a college education are well in excess of
the costs.
Beyond that, it can be argued that college involves
nonpecuniary returns. For many students, life on
campus is an immensely pleasurable social experience.
Moveover, many people are able to continue aspects of
their campus experience throughout the remainder of
their lives. Those who attend college may reap other
nonpecuniary benefits from their education. In subtle
ways, they may move toward insights and skills that
improve their ability to interpret the world in which
they live. Ideally, an education can contribute to an
individual's ability to grow in many dimensions of life.
William R. Bryan and Charles M. Linke are both
professors of finance at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. Professor Bryan is also the
department chairman and the editor of the Illinois
Business Review.
MARVIN FRANKEL
The Impact of Aircraft Noise on Residential
Property Markets
xVmong the environmental problems receiving
increasing attention over the past 1 5 to 20 years is that
of aircraft noise. In Illinois, concern over this issue led
in 1977 to a proposal by the Attorney General to the
Pollution Control Board for the regulation of noise
emissions from the state's public airports. Although the
proposal affected a number of airports in some degree,
its main thrust v^as toward the twfo Chicago airports,
O'Hare and Midway, both of which are sited in or near
densely populated areas. A large number of public
hearings, stretching over several years, were held on
the proposed regulation. But ultimately in 1987,
following litigation and a court decision that suggested
federal preemption in this policy area, the Board
suspended its consideration of the matter, and the
proposed regulation is now dormant or dead.
Meanwhile, expressions of organized concern continue,
mainly from groups in the suburban O'Hare area, with
remedies sought through the legislature and the courts.
An interesting and important question with regard
to any environmental disamenity is, how great a burden
does it impose on the affected parties? Both urban
economists and home buyers have long recognized that
certain neighborhood characteristics such as good
(poor) schools, proximity to (remoteness from) shopping
facilities, good (poor) municipal services, and quiet
(noisy) surroundings tend to be capitalized into
residential property values. Thus, a home in a quiet
neighborhood with good schools will be worth more
than a similar home in a neighborhood lacking those
attributes. This circumstance has been utilized by
researchers in studies that seek to place a monetary
value upon particular amenities and disamenities. In
the case of aircraft noise, studies that utilize multiple
regression techniques to estimate how residential
property values are affected by different noise levels
have been conducted at a number of airports in this
country and abroad—though not at any Illinois airports.
The present study takes a different approach, relying
upon the survey method to determine the impact of
aircraft noise upon property markets. Subjects of the
study are two groups. Realtors® and appraisers,
generally recognized to be specialists experienced in
and knowledgeable about real estate markets and
property values. The respondents were asked about
certain characteristics of markets for noisy properties
and about the behavior of buyers and sellers in those
markets. They were also asked to provide estimates of
the effects on property values of various levels of
aircraft noise. The survey explored other issues as well,
but space does not allow for a discussion of them in
this article.'
The populations of Realtors® and appraisers surveyed
are located in some 40 suburban communities
surrounding O'Hare Airport. In the sample drawn for
each of the two groups, greater emphasis was given to
individuals located in the 20 communities closest to
the airport. All of the communities within or astride
the 65 Ldn contour"—the noise level recognized by the
Federal Aviation Administration as a threshold at
which significant burdens arise for the residential
environment—and many communities proximate to
but outside it, were covered in the survey. Completed
questionnaires were received from 200 Realtors® and
70 appraisers, representing a response rate for each
group of about 50 percent. The total populations of
these groups is not fully known. The Realtor*'s sample
was drawn from a membership list of the Illinois
Association of Realtors® containing in excess of 5,000
names. The appraiser sample was drawn from the
consolidated lists of seven appraiser organizations—all
that the author could identify—containing a total of
approximately 140 names.
Both respondent groups report considerable
experience in their respective activities. Median years
of practice for Realtors® is 8, while the corresponding
figure for appraisers is 10. A significant fraction of each
group, but particularly the appraisers, report experience
in both brokerage and appraising. Most of the
Realtors®—85 percent—and over two-thirds of the
appraisers practice their specialty at least 30 hours a
week. Real estate activities appear to bring substantially
more frequent contact with noisy properties than do
appraisal activities. However, the actual difference
between Realtors® and appraisers in this regard may be
more modest, since half the appraisers also have
experience as Realtors* and, through that activity,
presumably have gained fuller exposure to properties
affected by noise.
The Relative Importance of Factors Affecting Property
Values
Notwithstanding the distinctive and disturbing
impact that aircraft noise can have on those regularly
subject to it, it is but one of a number of factors
influencing residential property values in the suburban
O'Hare area. How important is its influence as
compared to various other location-related variables?
Appraiser respondents were asked to rate on a
four-point scale—large jl], moderate (2), small (3), and
negligible (4)—and the influence of each of a dozen
factors on the property value of a "typical" single-family
dwelling located within a seven- or eight-mile radius
of the airport. The area within this boundary is
blanketed by irregularly shaped noise contours ranging
from 80 Ldn close to the airport down to 60-65 Ldn
and below at the outer edges. Virtually all of the
communities within this area are sources of complaints
by residents to the O'Hare Noise Abatement Office,
though the number of complaints from some of the
more distant communities is small.
The results are summarized in Table 1, which ranks
the several factors from most important to least
important. Two numbers are shown by each factor. The
first gives the mean score on the four-point scale, while
the second shows the percent of respondents scoring a
factor as having small or negligible importance.
Differences in mean scores of less than 0.10-0.15 are
not significant. Quality of neighborhood, proximity to
schools, and amount of property taxes are ranked at the
top of the list in importance. Somewhat surprisingly,
moderate aircraft noise ranks relatively low on the list,
in ninth place, below traffic noise. The mean score of
2.13 for aircraft noise indicates an influence slightly
below moderate, and 30 percent of respondents regarded
this factor's importance as negligible or small. The low
rank might possibly be explained by the widespread
presence in the survey area of moderate noise levels,
with a consequent tendency to downplay this factor in
a comparative assessment. Presumably, a noise level
described as substantial or severe would have been
accorded a higher ranking.
Table 1. Importance of Factors Affecting Residential
Property Values (in rank oider)
Percent of Respondents
Mean Indicating Small or
Score" Negligible Importance
1. Quality of other dwellings
differentiated product and variable product quality,
unrealistic expectations of buyers and sellers, and
adjustment lags. But most of us might agree that when
transactions take place, buyers and sellers are, on the
whole, reasonably well matched and that prices settle
within a plausible range.
Does the presence of aircraft noise, through its effects
on the information needs and the attitudes of buyers
and sellers, inject novel or distorting elements into this
market process? A few of the survey questions bear on
this issue. One such equation, put to both Realtors*
and appraisers, asked the following:
Consider a homebuyer who agrees to purchase a
dwelling in an area significantly affected by
aircraft noise. From your experience, how
well-informed would you say such a homebuyer
is about the noise environment of the property?
The question is important because, among other
reasons, a knowledgeable buyer engaged in a voluntary
transaction may be presumed to be compensated
through a lower purchase price for any negative
attributes that the property may possess.
The answers to the question, summarized in Table
2, show a diversity of views. Two-thirds of the Realtors*
and almost half of the appraisers considered buyers to
be either moderately or very well informed. At the same
time, while few respondents regarded buyers as simply
uninformed, one-third of the Realtors* and the other
half of the appraiser group thought of them as being, at
best, not very well informed. The results suggest that,
judged by the experience of many Realtors* and
appraisers, a significant segment of buyers lacks
adequate information about the noise environment.
Accordingly, their bid prices for properties will tend to
be too high, and their expectations for the amenity
levels of their dwellings will, following purchase, tend
to be disappointed.
Table 2. How Well Informed Are the Buyers of Noise-
Impacted Properties? (Figures show percent of
respondents choosing each response category.)
Responses Realtors" Appraisers
Very well informed 22.2%
Moderately well informed 43.7%
Not very well informed 30.5%
Uninformed 3.6%
7.3%
41.8%
45.4%
5.4%
Aircraft noise is not unique as a factor about which
buyers have imperfect knowledge. Residential
dwellings are complex products and home buyers will
sometimes lack sufficient information on certain of
their attributes. Hence, they will encounter
disappointments over faulty plumbing, leaky roofs, or
quality of schools. But faulty plumbing and leaky roofs
are sporadic events, and school quality may turn out to
be better, about as often as it turns out to be worse,
than expected. Aircraft noise, on the other hand.
blankets whole neighborhoods, and it typically carries
unfavorable surprise for the uninformed. More
important, it would not seem difficult to improve the
state of information on this location attribute.
Other Characteristics of the Market for Noise-Affected
Properties
Three questions were asked of Realtors* concerning
the behavior of sellers and buyers toward noise-affected
residential properties and, implicitly, the pressures on
the demand and supply sides that might result. The
questions and the responses are summarized in Table
2. As in other questions, a considerable diversity of
experience among respondents is indicated.
Only about 9 percent of Realtor* respondents
thought it a frequent occurrence for sellers to put their
homes on the market wholly or primarily because of
disturbance from aircraft noise. But some 47 percent of
respondents judged that this occurred at least
occasionally, suggesting a higher incidence of
dissatisfaction by the occupants of noisy residences and
the possibility of a higher turnover rate for those
properties. Interestingly, such seller behavior was, at
most, a rare occurrence for over 50 percent of the
respondents. In the second of the three questions,
Realtor® experience indicates a fairly common concern
by buyers to avoid dwellings subject to aircraft noise.
Some 49 percent of respondents reported encountering
this concern frequently, and a further 42 percent
reported encountering it occasionally. These results
point to a thinner market on the buying side for noisy
properties and, taken together with the results of the
preceding question, indicate a generally weaker market
for that category of residential real estate.
A third question, shown also in Table 2, asked about
the frequency with which buyers used the noise factor
as a bargaining chip in negotiations with sellers. Some
1 7 percent of Realtor®-respondents found this to occur
frequently, and an additional 42 percent reported it as
occurring occasionally. Those who thought it rarely or
never happened were in a minority. These responses,
along with those to the preceding question, indicate
that many buyers are quite aware of the noise problem
and give it explicit consideration in their purchase-price
calculations. The responses confirm also what
economists have long thought to be the case: home
buyers are quite prepared to be compensated through a
lower purchase price for a property-affecting
disamenity such as aircraft noise. The responses further
give evidence of the downward pressure on residential
property prices that the noise disamenity generates.
A fourth question (not shown in Table 3) asked
specifically about property turnover:
Of the residential areas you are familiar with that
are exposed to significant amounts of aircraft
noise, would you say that the turnover of
properties is . . .
Much below average, 1.3% ( 1.8%)
Below average, 20.5% (14.0%)
About average, 53.8% (68.4%)
Above average, or 19.9% (15.8%)
Much above average? 4.5%
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Table 3. Buyer and Seller Behavior toward Noise-
Affected Properties (Figures show percent of
respondents choosing each answer category)^
Question
a. In your experience with
the listing or sale of dwellings
affected by aircraft noise, how
often have the owners
indicated they put their
homes on the market wholly
oi primarily because of
the noise?
b. In your experience as a
broker, how often have you
encoimtered prospective
home buyers who indicated a
clear desire to avoid dwellings
that were subject to aircraft
noise?
c. In your experience with
dwellings affected by aircraft
noise, how often have
prospective buyers sought a
lower-than-listed price
specifically because of the
noise?
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently
25.3%
(32.2%)
27.6%
(37.3%
I
38.2%
(25.4%!
8.8%
|5.1%|
3.5% 5.2% 42.2% 49.1%
15.3% 25.3% 42.3% 17.1%
'Figures in parentheses show responses of appraisers, who also were asked
question (a|.
The answers show the percentage of respondents
choosing each of the alternatives, with the figures in
parentheses giving the responses of appraisers. Both
distributions are similar and near-symmetrical, with a
heavy concentration of responses in the middle. While
some respondents indicate above-average turnover for
noisy properties, their view is counterbalanced by those
judging turnover to be below average. One can marshall
arguments for why, a priori, it might be in either
direction. But these data rather solidly support the
proposition that taken overall, residential property
turnover is not affected by aircraft noise.
A final question, asked only of Realtors®, concerned
the time required to sell a noise-affected property. The
question and responses are shown below:
Consider the time that elapses from the listing of
a residential property to its sale. For properties
that are subject to a significant amount of aircraft
noise, as compared to similar properties that are
relatively free of noise, is this time, on the average
Appreciably greater 22.5%
Somewhat greater 53.2%
About the same 20.7%
Somewhat less, or 3.0%
Appreciably less? 0.6%
Over 75 percent of Realtor®-respondents indicated that
the market required more time to move a noisy property
than a quiet one, and 22 percent of them thought an
appreciably greater amount of time was needed. This
may, at least in part, reflect a thinner market for a noisy
property, and it may reflect a tendency by the sellers
of noisy properties to set unrealistic initial asking prices
(perhaps encouraging buyers to seek price concessions).
Noisy properties are not, of course, unique in requiring
longer-than-average times to sell. One might expect
that a property that was handicapped in some way,
whether through an awkward design feature or a
limiting location, would be slower than other
properties in attracting buyers.
To summarize, the set of questions and responses
discussed in this section point to a market for
noise-affected residential properties that has the
following characteristics: pressure on the supply side
from some homeowners concemed about noise;
weakness on the demand side as some prospective
buyers avoid noisy properties while others seek price
concessions; and sluggishness in moving noisy
properties. AH of these features militate toward price
weakness and price discounts for noise-affected
properties.
The Effects of Aircraft Noise on Property Values
Estimates Based on Respondents' General Experience
(Survey 1)
Two of the survey questions directly addressed the
issue of valuation. The first of these is shown in Table
4, along with the median values of the responses for
both Realtors® and appraisers (in parentheses). The
underlying data display considerable variation in
judgment by respondents. This is well illustrated by
responses for the "Moderate" noise category. Just under
one-third of the Realtors® thought this noise level
would reduce dwelling values by between 1 and 4
percent. But 29.5 percent thought the reduction would
be in the 5-10 percent range, and 23.5 percent put it in
excess of 10 percent, while 14.8 percent indicated that
dwelling values would not decline at all. Whereas 48.9
percent of Realtors® judged that a "Low" noise level
would have no effect on property values, 41.0 percent
indicated that a "Severe" noise level would cause
values to decline by over 25 percent.
Table 4. Effect of Various Aircraft Noise Levels on
Residential Property Values (Survey 1)
A property's market value can be affected by many factors. In the opinion
of some people, a single-family residential property will be reduced in value
if, with all else unchanged, it is more-or-Iess regularly subiected to
significant amounts of aircraft noise. Based on your professional experience,
please indicate in the table below by how much, if at all, each specified
noise level, occurrmg on a more-or-less regular basis, reduces a property's
market value.
Summary of Responses:
The individual responses are doubtless affected by
subjective factors. Respondents may differ somewhat
in their interpretations of the noise levels specified in
the question; they may err in relating those noise levels
to the particular properties they have dealt with; and
they may make implicitly faulty comparisons of those
properties with the norm of an otherwise equivalent
but quiet property. Further, some of the respondents
may have limited and atypical experience with noisy
properties. Yet one expects—and hopes—that the errors
are largely offsetting and that an average of the
responses will approximate the underlying value that
is sought.
The results of Survey 1 in Table 4 show that for
Realtors* the median values range from a low of a 1 .6
percent reduction in property value for the low noise
category to a high of 21.6 percent for the severe noise
category. The corresponding figures for appraisers are
1.2 percent and 16.5 percent. Note that the median
estimates for appraisers are consistently below those
for Realtors® by 25—45 percent. Because the "Over 25
percent" category is open-ended, arithmetic means of
the responses cannot be calculated.
Estimates Based on Neighborhood-Specific Knowledge
(Survey 2)
The second, more demanding, question on valuation
was posed in the following two steps:
Please specify in the table below, for each
noise category, the names of up to three of
the noise-affected areas or locations that you
serve. Identify them, if possible, by name of
community and geographic sector thereof
(e.g., southwest Franklin Park, northwest
Arlington Heights, Villa Estates in west Des
Plaines). Now enter in the table, for each of
the locations you have identified, your
estimate(s) of the (average) percent by
which, with all else unchanged, the market
value of a residential property is diminished
by aircraft noise. (If the value is unaffected,
enter 0%.
I
The table provided entries for three noise categories
moderate, substantial, and severe—and as indicated
above, up to three entries could be made under each
category.
The results of Survey 2, in the form of mean percent
reductions in property values, for both Realtors® and
appraisers and for single- and multi-family dwellings,
are shown in Table 5. There are three noteworthy
features of these results. First, the discount percentages
for the appraiser group are, like the corresponding
percentages in Table 4 (or Survey 1 1, consistently below
those of the Realtor® group. There is no obvious
explanation for this outcome, and its rationale remains
a source of speculation.
Table 5. Effect of Aircraft Noise Levels on the Values
of Single- and Multi-Family Properties (Survey 2)
(Figures show the mean percent reductions for each
noise category)''
Concluding Note
The juxtaposition of a major airport with large and
numerous residential communities generates a classic
kind of environmental conflict. On the one hand are
the beneficiaries of air travel—the air lines and their
passengers—whose rapid and convenient movement is
facilitated by the airport. On the other are the property
owners located proximate to the airport and subject to
the burdens of noisy overflights. Measures to moderate
this conflict call for a comparison of the costs of any
proposed method of mitigation with the consequent
reduction in the burden on affected property owners.
Within this context, the estimates of property value
discounts presented above are of more than casual
interest, for they can be used to indicate the
approximate benefit to be gained from a proposed
mitigation measure. Thus, a preferential runway
procedure or the addition of a new runway that would
reduce aircraft noise over a designated residential area
from (say) 77-78 Ldn to 72-73 Ldn could be expected
(from Table 4) to raise property values, with
corresponding benefits to residents, by 6.5 percent
(appraisers) to 8.6 percent (Realtors®). Should the
airport authority consider the alternative of purchasing
avigation easements on a group of affected properties,
the data in Tables 4 and 5 might be used in estimating
the market worth of those easements.
The impact of aircraft noise on residential areas is a
complex phenomenon that affects the behavior of home
buyers and sellers and that, in particular situations, is
capable of generating intense controversy among the
interested parties. It helps to keep the problem in proper
perspective by recognizing that, as noted early in this
article, noise is but one of many factors affecting
housing values, that even where severe, its impact is
bounded and approximately measurable, and that its
effects often are susceptible to mitigation. However,
the more built up is the area around the airport, the
more limited will be the opportunities for mitigation.
In this respect, O'Hare and Midway airports are difficult
cases.
Notes
'The full report on the survey is titled, "The Impact of Aircraft Noise
and Aircraft Activity on Residential Property Values: A Survey Study."
Interested readers may obtain a copy by writing to the Office of Real Estate
Research, University of Illinois, 304 David Kinley Hall, 1 407 West Gregory
Drive, Urbana, Illinois 61801.
^Ldn IS a measure of the average sound energy emitted over a defined
period of time, m this case one year. It includes a penalty weighting for
noise emissions during the hours of 10 p.m. to 7 a.m., since they are judged
to be more disturbing.
Marvin Frankel is a professor of economics at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is
currently the Acting Director of the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research. This study was
fundedinpart by the Office ofRealEstate Research.
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Illinois Business Indexes
X he economic outlook for Illinois continues to show
strong improvement. Interpretation of leading indicator
data results in a different forecast from the projection
of the Illinois Econometric Model (see page 16). As
Chart 1 illustrates, the current indicator has been above
the trend indicator for most of 1988. This movement
in the Composite Leading Indexes points to a
continuation of the economic expansion over the next
several quarters.
Although state unemployment has remained above
the national rate during the past few years, growth in
the Illinois economy is reflected by the general uptrend
in manufacturing employment (see Chart 2) in the
northwestern region and the greater Chicago area. At
the same time, retail sales show clear growth during
the same period in 1987.
Chart 3 illustrates the help wanted indexes. These
numbers measure the volume of classified advertising
in major newspapers, and they also show great
sensitivity to changes in the demand for labor. In July,
Chart 3 indicates that Chicago and St. Louis follow the
same general trend. The Chicago index increased by
1.70 percent and the St. Louis index increased by 4.22
percent, reflecting an improvement in general business
conditions.
The change in the number of building permits
constitutes a good indicator of general economic
conditions. Due to seasonal factors, the growth in
residential housing permits remains below average
during the winter months (see Chart 4). In spring, as
expected, the number of new permits grew, but the
current year still shows a weak performance as
compared with 1987.
Inflationary pressures started to emerge in the US
economy and also in its North Central region. Chart 5
shows that inflation has increased in the Chicago area
for the past two months, but this increase in the price
level has remained markedly below the levels reached
in the past year.
ILLINOIS BUSINESS INDEXES
Chart 1. Composite Leading Indicators (average
percent change in base indexes)
Chart 2. Employment—Manufacturing (in thousands)
Current Indicalor Trend Indicator
Chart 3. Help Wanted Advertising Indexes (percent
change from previous month, seasonally adjusted)
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Chart 4. Residential Housing Units
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Chart 5. Year-to-Year Change in Selected CPI Chart 6. Coal Production (in thousands of tons)
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Illinois Economic Outlook
J. he Ilhnois Econometric Model predicts a slowdown
in the growth in personal income. The projection
generated by the model is markedly at variance with
the forecast obtained from the leading indicator data
(seepage 14). A predicted growth of 4.8 percent in 1988
is down slightly from the 5.5 percent growth in 1987.
However, the increases are almost totally offset by
increases in the price level. As a consequence, the
growth in real income will average about 0.7 percent
in 1988, less than one-half the 1.8 percent growth in
1987. Looking ahead, the forecast for 1989 indicates
that nominal income growth will not keep pace with
the rising price level, resulting in a decrease in real
income. A breakdown of personal income by sector is
given in the table.
The chart shows the quarterly changes in nominal
income for the largest sectors of the state's economy.
Small increases are expected in manufacturing and
wholesale and retail trade. The service sector will
continue to perform better than the other sectors of the
economy after recovering from a slight decline in the
first quarter of 1988. Overall, the forecasted
performance of the Illinois economy, as measured by
personal income changes, is not encouraging.
Illinois Personal Income (peicentage change from
previous quarter)
I wholGsaJe/retail
Illinois Seasonally Adjus
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WILLIAM R. BRYAN
1989: More of the Same, or the
Onset of Recession?
Chart 1. Gross National Product
i_/conomic activity has improved markedly in 1988,
the sixth consecutive year of expansion. Evidence of
improvement has been widespread, extending through
markets for goods and services, markets for labor and
other productive factors, and markets for credit and
financial services.
Strength in sectors of the economy other than the
federal government has been sufficient to overcome the
restrictive effects of economic policy measures. Both
monetary and fiscal developments in the past year have
tended to limit economic growth. It can be argued that
the monetary base has expanded more slowly than the
trend. The growth in balanced- budget GNP, a summary
measure of fiscal actions, has fallen substantially below
trends of earlier years.
This article presents an overview of development in
1988, laying the basis for projections into 1989. The
discussion follows a sequence driven by a circular logic;
namely, that output leads to employment; that
employment begets income,- that income leads to
spending; then, to complete the circle, that spending
calls forth production. To the extent that production
and spending on final product proceed at different rates,
adjustments in inventories and prices are triggered. Of
course, what we treat as a sequence is, in reality, a
simultaneous process. But a presentation must begin
and, happily, end somewhere.
Output
Physical output has risen rapidly in 1988. The
increase in real gross national product (GNP), a measure
of the dollar value of goods and services sold in markets
but with prices held at levels prevailing in an arbitrary
year (1982), has proceeded at just over a 4 percent annual
rate. In the preceding year, real GNP expanded about
3.4 percent (Chart I).
Tmilora or DoflaiB
Growth during 1988 has been most pronounced in
the production of additional plants, equipment,
inventories, and other elements of investment. Output
of consumption goods purchased by households has
expanded more slowly than output in the economy as
a whole, an annual rate of just 2.5 percent; the
production of government goods and services along
with those acquired by government have risen at a scant
1.5 percent rate.
Another measure of physical production is provided
by the Federal Reserve System's Index of Industrial
Production. Published monthly, the index is a measure
of the output of the nation's mines, factories, and
utilities. Industrial output has risen at just under a 6
percent rate in 1988, continuing the expansion
begirming in early 1987.
Labor Markets and Income
The expansion in physical production has been
accompanied by a growth in employment. Total
employment has risen at more than a 2 percent rate in
1988, roughly in line with experience in the past two
years (Chart 2). An alternative measure of the strength
of labor demand is provided by payroll employment
data. These statistics, which exclude agricultural
employment, consist of a count of jobs at work sites.
As a consequence, they can include the same person
twice. Even so, the measure is responsive to changes
in the demand for workers. Payroll employment has
expanded at more than a 3.6 percent annual rate in
1988, up somewhat more sharply than in other years
since the beginning of the economic recovery.
Chart 2. Labor Market Statistics
The growth in employment in 1988 has been
sufficiently strong to bring about a further reduction in
unemployment. During the first half of 1988 unemploy-
ment as a percent of the labor force declined more or
less steadily. But after mid-year the unemployment rate
has tended to stabilize.
Partly by virtue of the expansion in employment,
there has been a strong increase in total income during
the year. Personal income, which also includes transfer
payments, has risen at a 7.5 percent rate in 1988.
After-tax income has increased at just under an 8
percent rate. Speaking in rough terms, the 8 percent
rise in income has exceeded the 3 percent growth in
employment, implying an increase in wage rates of just
under 5 percent. In fact, hourly compensation in the
business sector has risen at a 4.7 percent rate in 1988.
Spending
There has been a strong increase in aggregate
spending during 1988. Gross national product, a
measure of spending on currently produced goods and
services valued at current prices, has risen at a 7.5
percent annual rate. Within this total, consumer
spending has increased at a 7 percent rate; investment
spending by business has expanded at a 1 percent rate,-
and total government spending (federal government
plus state and local government) has risen at a 4.8
percent rate.
The fact that imports exceeded exports means that
the diversion of household consumption, business
investment, and government spending away from
domestic production exceeded foreign spending here.
Hence, there was a net diversion of effective demand
away from domestic producers. Such developments
tend to reduce pressures for price increases. In contrast,
but for some of the same reasons, a negative balance
on current account vis a vis foreigners has an adverse
short-term impact on domestic labor markets. As 1 988
unfolded, however, exports rose markedly relative to
imports. Exports had eroded to the point where they
accounted for only 77 percent of imports (Chart 3).
Chart 3. International Statistics
Billtons o1 Dollars
^^
Inventories and Prices
There is a view that inventory developments play a
vital causal role in the economic process. Indeed, there
are those who characterize recessions and expansions
in terms of dynamic shifts in business inventories.
According to this view, for whatever reason, businesses
may wish to expand their inventories. Such actions
place other inventories under pressure. Firms experienc-
ing inventory pressure may scramble to mamtain them.
From their suppliers they make increasingly frequent
or expanded orders and seek earlier deliveries. If they
can do so, they delay deliveries to their customers. But
the upshot of these adjustments is to stimulate overall
economic activity. In contrast, for one reason or
another, firms may regard their inventories as excessive.
Adjustments to excessive inventories involve reduc-
tions in orders from suppliers and improved deliveries.
As a consequence, suppliers experience inventory
increases and, in turn, may find it necessary to cut
production. Such adjustments serve both to initiate and
to exacerbate weakness in the economy.
Inventories have drifted lower in recent months and
over the past several years. Near the end of the recession
ending in late 1982, manufacturing and trade inven-
tories reached a level that would have accommodated
sales of more than one and two-thirds months. By late
1987, the inventory-to-sales ratio had fallen to 1 .46, but
by mid- 1 988 it had edged upward to a level that would
satisfy sales for nearly one and one-half months (Chart
4). In short, part of the adjustment to excessive spending
growth has taken the form of a downward adjustment
in inventories.
Chart 4. Inventories and Sales, Manufacturing
and Trade
Chart 5. Price Level Indicators
The remaining adjustments to the excess of demand
over supply have taken the form of price level increases.
Even so, the overall rate of inflation during 1988 has
been roughly in line with experience during 1987.
Consumer prices have risen at about a 4 percent annual
rate in 1988, up somewhat from the 3.6 percent increase
in the preceding year (Chart 5). Producer prices have
risen at a 2.3 percent rate, little changed from the
increase of 2.1 percent in 1987.
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reduced down-payments, and lenient bankruptcy
practices lead to reduced interest rate sensitivity. That
is, they reduce the limiting impact of any given interest
rate. Cyclical changes leading to reduced interest rate
sensitivity include improved economic prospects,
heightened inflationary expectations, tax deductions
for interest expenses, an expansion in actual money
balances relative to desired balances, and the like.
The second major category of factors leading to
short-run shifts in interest rates relates to changes in
the disparity between anticipated and actual levels of
income. If businessmen, households, and others
become surprised and disappointed at what is actually
happening to their incomes, two things are likely to
happen. Interest rates are likely to have been moving
higher as the surprise was in preparation. Then,
adjustments to the surprise serve to promote interest
rate declines. In contrast, if businesses and households
are surprised and pleased with unfolding experience,
they are likely to make adjustments leading to interest
rate increases.
Interest rates declined in early 1988, then moved
irregularly higher through the late fail and early winter
(Chart 6). Rising interest rates probably have reflected
a combination of heightened inflationary expectations,
happy surprises relating to ongoing developments in
the economy, and an improved economic outlook.
Chart 6. Interest Rates
10-YEAR TREASURY SECURITIES
1-YEAR TREASURY SECURITIES
The vigorous growth in the economy early in 1988
was regarded as surprising. There had been a great deal
of consternation and talk regarding an imminent
slowdown in the US economy. Much of the concern
was focused on matters that have turned out to be
unimportant. Many were concerned by the fact that the
economy had already expanded for five years; there was
concern about the large and persistent federal deficit,
along with the similarly large and equally persistent
foreign deficit on current account. But as the early
months of 1988 passed, the economy did not weaken;
there were periods when the nation's net exports
showed improvement; there were periods during which
the federal deficit appeared to be narrowing; the
nation's prospective presidential leadership became
increasingly clarified as the year moved on. The
combination of these salutary developments appears to
have resulted in an improved outlook.
Working counter to these considerations, economic
growth stalled in the third quarter. As indicated,
income shortfalls can trigger adjustments leading to
declines in interest rates.
Economic Policy
Economic policy appears to have grown increasingly
restrictive in recent years. Restrictive measures are in
evidence within both monetary and fiscal spheres.
It is meaningful to regard the monetary base as an
instrument encompassing the essence of monetary
policy. The monetary base defines the limits within
which financial institutions can expand their liabilities
(checking deposits, time and savings deposits, and so
forth|. Accordingly, the monetary base effectively
limits the growth of various measures of the money
supply and of loans and investments of financial
institutions. Thus, the growth of the base is meaningful
either in terms of its impact on the money supply or
other monetary aggregates, or in terms of its impact on
credit markets.
It is fairly clear that growth in the monetary base has
fallen below its trend. If the trend growth in the adjusted
base is related to data since 1955 (as in Chart 7), it can
be argued that the shortfalls in monetary growth have
lasted for about four years. If we focus on a somewhat
shortened period, the shortfalls become less dramatic.
The heightened inflationary expectations can have
resulted from several months of accelerated, albeit
reasonably moderate, price increases. Consumer prices
rose at a 5.2 percent rate in July and August; producer
prices on finished consumer foods jumped upward at a
10.2 percent rate in May and June; and prices on
finished goods, excluding food, rose at a 7 percent rate
in September.
Chart 7. Monetary Base
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The base expanded at less than a 7 percent rate in 1 988,
down moderately from 9.1 percent rates of expansion
in the two preceding years. In any event, whether
viewed against the recent past or over an extended
period, it is clear that growth in the monetary base has
not been robust.
Changes in balanced-budget GNP may be viewed as
summary measures of the impact of fiscal policy. The
greater the increase in the level of GNP at which the
federal budget would be in balance, the greater would
be the change in actual GNP associated with any surge
of spending by households, businesses, state and local
governments, or foreigners. Some observers regard the
federal deficit itself, or changes m the deficit, as a
measure of the stance of fiscal policy. The problem with
focusing on the actual deficit as a measure of policy is
that both its level and its changes emerge from the
actions of the whole economy, not just the federal
government.
The growth in balanced-budget GNP has fallen well
below its long-term trend in recent years (Chart 8|. In
the 1983-1986 period there was a downward drift in
average net tax rate (the average tax rate less transfers);
such changes serve to expand balanced budget GNP.
Over the same period there was a decline in the growth
in federal expenditures; such changes serve to moderate
the growth in balanced-budget GNP. As it turned out,
the net impact of these conflicting forces was to
maintain an expansive fiscal stance. But since 1986,
fiscal developments have moved toward restriction.
Chart 8. Fiscal Policy Indicators
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The assertion that fiscal developments are restrictive
may be surprising m light of the persistent and deep
federal deficits. As indicated, the actual federal deficit
provides a flawed measure of fiscal policy. But even this
measure hints at the restrictive fiscal situation. There
has been a $68.4 billion movement towards surplus
since 1986, notwithstanding a minuscule $2 billion
growth in the deficit in the fiscal year just ended. The
Office of Management and Budget has estimated a $30
billion movement toward surplus for the fiscal year
ending in September 1989. Recall, however, that these
developments and estimates depend to an important
extent on the performance of those parts of the
economy outside the control of the federal government.
Prospects for 1989
There is no hard evidence suggesting that the
economy will weaken in the year just ahead. In the
absence of such evidence, the most likely scenario for
next year is that the economy will continue into its
seventh consecutive year of expansion. That expansion
will be marked by moderate real economic growth,
further increases in employment accompanied by
relative stability in the unemployment rate, a modest
acceleration in the rate of inflation, and some further
upward movement in interest rates. In short, I am
suggesting that 1989 will provide us with more of the
same, such a forecast is sometimes referred to as a naive
forecast.
Even though the naive forecast remains in place, I
have a growing hunch that the economy will weaken.
I fear that the private and nonfederal elements of the
economy will no longer be able to overcome the
accumulated restrictive impact of monetary and fiscal
measures. If so, the economy will weaken as a
consequence of its struggle against, and adjustments to,
a constrictive web of monetary and fiscal restraint.
From the perspective of those who pay attention to
forecasts of this nature, it will be tough to tell the
difference between these two scenarios. It is difficult
to distinguish between a slowly expanding economy
and one that is weakening. For one thing, by its very
nature an economy moves in fits and starts; second, we
can nearly always count on minor or major unexpected
events (for example, the stock market collapse in 1 987,
the drought in summer 1988); and, third, there are
delays, often important ones, in the availability of data.
Even so, it is sometimes possible to identify warning
signs of a weakening economy. For example, look for
erratic movements in economic statistics. If the
economy is weakening, frequently released data such
as retail sales, industrial production, or employment
often begin to show abrupt, single-month, downward
movements in current releases, or downward revisions
in data released earlier. But the movements do not
persist, changes in trends are not readily identifiable.
The principle difference between developments
consistent with the naive forecast and those betraying
weakness is that interest rates will fall like a rock if
the economy weakens. Here again, however, the
decline will not be unambiguous. The rock will bounce
upward from time to time.
I have often said that I would prefer to be precisely
wrong, rather than vaguely correct. Unfortunately, a
well-honed prediction at this juncture has not been
forthcoming, nor is it appropriate to the underlying set
of facts.
A, JAMES HEINS
State and Local Taxes and
Economic Growth in Illinois
T,he purpose of this article is to establish a perspective
on the issue of the impact of taxes on economic growth.
There has been a lot of controversy on this subject over
the years, ranging from the view that taxes have
virtually no impact on growth to the view that any tax
increase would drive business out of the levying
jurisdiction. My task here is not to resolve this
controversy, but simply to lay out its dimensions in a
manner that facilitates intelligent discussion of the
issues involved.
Let me begin by dividing the larger tax issue into
three separate issues. First, there is the question of the
"total tax burden. " How many dollars and what percent
of our personal income in Illinois are taxed by state and
local governments to pay for the variety of public
services offered? A second issue surrounds the
distribution of this total burden among the various
classes of citizens, business or nonbusiness, rich or
poor. This is the "tax structure" issue. The third is the
"tax efficiency" issue. Can we tie the tax burden of any
group, say business, to the benefits that group gets from
the government services provided out of the taxes paid?
Total Tax Burden
The most recent complete figures available (1986)
show Illinois, state and local governments combined,
to have raised taxes averaging $1,546 per person for a
total of about $ 1 7.9 billion. That $ 1 ,546 put Illinois in
1 7th place among the 50 states. If we relate the $ 1 ,546
to the income of the average Illinoisan (about $15,187
in fiscal 1986|, the Illinois tax burden can be stated as
being 10.2 percent of income. By this measure—since
Illinois incomes are high—Illinois ranked about 32nd
among the 50 states. (This ranking is subject to
revisions in personal income estimates.) It is this
combination of figures that leads many economists to
say that Illinois is an average tax state, not high, not
low. The tax burden in Illinois has fallen slightly in the
past ten years, relative to other states. In 1 976, Illinois
ranked 14th and 31st by the same measures respec-
tively.
Having provided these facts, the question is: how
does a state's ranking in "total tax burden" affect its
economic growth? Simple economic common sense
tells us that it depends on how government spends the
tax dollars. If taxes were raised, Illinois would move up
in the total tax burden rankings. But, if those dollars
were used to pay for a successful program of educational
reform, manpower retraining, and refurbishment of
infrastructure supportive of business, the economy of
Illinois might actually grow faster. That is why theory
and common sense tells us that economic growth
cannot simply be tied to the total tax burden.
This apparently conflicts with a variety of studies
that purport to show that states with increasing total
tax burdens have experienced slower rates of economic
growth. Indeed, I have numbers that relate growth and
tax change between 1967 and 1986 that show these
same results. It turns out also to be true that economic
growth is less clearly related to "levels" of taxation
than it is to "increases" in taxes.
Regardless, some explanation is required to put the
theory in line with apparent experience. First, we might
have reverse causation in the face of political in-
flexibilities. Economic slowdown requires greater
relative spending to support social programs, given
fixed requirements. Put thus, lagging growth causes
increased government. Here, the problem could be
attributed to political inflexibilities that might well
exacerbate problems with lagging growth.
It could be true that states that increase taxes too
rapidly have difficulty spending it wisely. As an
economist, I tend to be repelled by the notion that the
political wherewithal would be there to finance
foolishness. On the other hand, I also see with the eyes
of a citizen who finds the idea crudely attractive.
In any event, it is clear that our emphasis should be
on government programs as well as total tax dollars.
We must fight for the reform of poor programs, like
elementary and secondary education in Illinois and
medical care delivery, because then any savings of taxes
would be good for our economy. Similarly, we might
well fight for good programs—like better roads and
meritorious education—even though taxes would be
higher as a result.
Tax Structure
Another interesting tax question involves the
structure of taxes that are used to allocate costs of
government among the people of Illinois. On this issue
there is wider divergence of opinion among economists,
and a subdivision of the issues would be helpful.
Rich and Poor
Here, the issue is how much does the tax burden
increase as people get richer? Illinois is widely believed
to have a proportional tax system, that is, one featuring
a flat-rate income tax, a fairly broad sales tax, and a
uniform property tax (outside of Chicago). This
compares with states like New York, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, and California that feature highly progres-
sive income taxes. People who have lived in Wisconsin
know how burdensome their income tax can be when
family income is over $50,000.
Again, the question is: what effect does tax "progres-
sion" have on economic growth in a state ? And, again
the common sense of economics leaves us without the
dignity of a decent answer. Since we hve in a democratic
society, the people's "will" is roughly reflected in the
tax structure, and the people's will may differ from state
to state. If the tax structure were to be "too" progressive
and drive the rich away, presumably the "people"
would change the law. In other words, our federal
structure permits states to have taxes different in
structure without necessarily experiencing differences
in economic growth.
This common sense is also borne out (at least
roughly) by the numbers. Most studies, including my
work, do not show states with progressive tax
structures to have suffered relative to other states. By
general agreement, Wisconsin and Minnesota—states
with progressive taxes—have both done better than
Illinois, which has essentially a proportional tax
structure.
Having said this, I think there is a spreading belief,
not readily demonstrable, that progression hurts
growth. Wisconsin has reduced its high marginal
income tax rates, and other states have too. Illinois has
little to do here since its income tax has a flat rate of
2.5 percent, and few have expressed the concern that
Illinois' lack of tax progressivity has harmed growth.
Business and Nonbusiness
Here the issue involves the proportion of taxes
collected from business relative to taxes collected
directly from individuals. Of course, in the end people
actually pay the taxes, even though business firms write
out the checks to government; business has to get the
money from people to cover those checks. So, the issue
could be restated in terms of the percentage of taxes
collected indirectly from the people through business
taxation relative to taxes collected directly from people
through individual taxation.
The latest figures we have (1980) show Illinois to
have collected 33.9 percent of its taxes from business,
compared to a national average of 3 1 .4 percent. Illinois
has the highest percentage in the midwest. Perhaps
more significant than the rate of business taxation in
Illinois is the increase in this rate over the last 20 years.
In 1957, Illinois was eight percent below the national
average; in 1980 Illinois' business tax ratio was eight
percent above the average. My earlier work on
economic growth in Illinois suggests that this change
in tax policy relative to the nation might have harmed
economic growth in Illinois.
Here the theory that business taxes—indirect taxes
on people—might harm growth has some foundation.
Perhaps the most important reason is that little is
known about the real impact that indirect business
taxes have on people. Hence, people in a state may
misperceive their tax bill to the extent that they rely
more heavily on business taxation.
In some cases, states can export their tax burden to
people in other states through taxes on special
advantages held by business firms in the exporting
states. Severance taxes on oil and coal are cases in point.
While Illinois would seem not to try to export any of
its tax burden—we have no severance taxes—a close
look at Chicago's local property tax suggests otherwise.
Chicago practices classified assessment; business
property is assessed at 40 percent of market, residential
at 1 6 percent of market. This practice has contributed
to Illinois' position of leading the nation (save South
Carolina where the property tax is not really important)
in the percentage of taxable property owned by
industrial firms, and therefore, presumably in the
percentage of property taxes paid by industry. Illinois
is also second only to New York in the percentage of
taxable property held by industrial and commercial
firms combined.
I think the reason for this situation lies in the ability
Chicago had to export its property taxes in distant years
gone by. Its unique location in the center of the world's
richest market area with an unrivaled transportation
system enabled Chicago to attract business even as the
city was socking it to them with high property taxes.
Business was willing to pay to locate in this privileged
city.
But now that privilege has been eroded, and Chicago
is not so special anymore. The interstate highway
system, among other things, has taken away some of
the locational advantage that allowed Chicago to export
its taxes. Business is less willing to locate there in the
face of high property and other taxes. Of course,
Chicago has a variety of other visible problems that
have contributed to its decline.
It is clear that Chicago has to face up to major reform
in its property tax. But, that reform will be difficult, to
say the least. After all, can you imagine the city council
lowering the assessment ratio of business and increas-
ing taxes on houses by 50 percent to make up the
difference? More likely, Chicago will work on this
through a practice of abating property taxes to new and
expanding firms. This is not a wholly desirable solution
since it offers nothing to current business that drives
the city. But politics may require this ad hoc policy
rather than the preferred policy of across-the-board tax
reform.
Tax Efficiency
Taxes are most efficient when they are levied against
recipients of the benefits of government programs
financed by the taxes. This notion is a well-received
doctrine in economics, and it is just good common
sense. And, it follows that efficient taxation—efficient
use of our resources—can only stimulate economic
growth.
Unfortunately, we have not progressed very far in
designing tax systems that do an effective job of putting
the cost of government on beneficiaries. At the national
level this connection can be blurred with less difficulty,
because while humanity requires some social safety
net, and the direct beneficiaries of government cannot
pay the cost, taxpayers are not apt to migrate. While
states must also be in the safety net business, greater
care must be exercised. When costs get out of line, and
taxes are levied indiscriminately on people or business
with little stake in that safety net, the economy of the
offending state will suffer because people can and will
migrate to other states, taking their capital with them.
Road taxes and fees are cases where the costs and
benefits of government are tolerably well related. And,
studies (mine included) show that financing roads with
taxes on road users contributes to economic growth.
And, when states with poor highways—like Illinois's
have been—spend more for highways, even though
taxes are raised to pay the costs, the economy may well
benefit because costs are mainly borne by beneficiaries
of the improvements.
But that is where tax efficiency pretty much ends.
Taxes that pay for education, especially broad-based
state taxes, have little relationship to the benefits of
education. So too for medical care for the disadvantaged.
I do not suggest the sick and poor pay their hospital
bills; that is impossible. Of course, we might do a better
job of sorting out the really poor and paying only their
bills.
I have long advocated a program of levying state taxes
on income much like the "levy" system used by local
government. Under this system, states would not get
added tax revenues simply because their economies
grow. State legislators, just as members of city councils
do, would have to enact a tax levy every year, instead
of just sitting on their hands. I believe this would
improve the efficiency of our tax structure and the
accountability of our politicians.
Summary
My purpose here has been to help organize discussion
of the issues surrounding the impact of taxes on
economic growth. I think it is useful to distinguish
between the "total tax burden" and "structure" of the
tax system that generates the money. It is possible to
do economic harm with an average total tax burden if
the tax structure is out of tune with the wishes of not
only the electorate, but those they would invite to
immigrate from other states and countries.
Contentiousness over proposed increases in state
taxes in the last two legislative sessions has featured
arguments about the total tax burden. Opponents have
contended that an increase in state taxes could harm
economic growth in Illinois. Proponents have mainly
urged that, since Illinois is not a high tax state already,
even a tax increase of 1 5 to 20 percent would not harm
growth. Proponents would do better to drop that line
and focus on the merits of the public functions financed
should a tax increase be proposed again in 1989.
In the end, the efficiency issue dominates. If a
majority of the electorate comes to believe that it will
receive benefits from government in excess of any
increased dollars paid in, a tax increase can pass the
legislature. On the other hand, if people widely believe
that the benefits come up short, or that money can be
freed up from areas of the budget where overspending
already occurs, the outlook for higher taxes is bleak.
A. James Heins is a professor of economics at the
University of Illinois.
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lOHN F. DUE
Some Questionable Provisions of the
1986 United States Tax Reform
J. he 1986 tax reform legislation brought major
improvements to the United States federal income tax
structure, particularly in greatly reducing the ease of
creating tax shelters. But the changes are by no means
generally acceptable. It is the purpose of this article to
call attention to various features relating to the
individual income tax that diverge from generally
accepted standards of federal tax legislation and that
are either already or certain to become controversial. It
is not the intent to discuss the major, v^fell-known
issues, such as the effects of the elimination of the
investment credit, curtailment of IRAs, continued
double taxation of dividend income, sharp reduction in
rate progressivity, or the tax rate on capital gains.
Changes made by the technical and miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988 with regard to the issues discussed
are noted.
Phase Out of Exemption
The system for phasing out the personal exemptions
and the lower rate for persons in the higher income
groups is, as labeled by Joseph Pechman, "bizarre. " The
effect is to create four tax rates instead of the promised
two, thought this is concealed, with a marginal rate of
33 percent for persons in the income range in which
the two items are being phased out, compared to the
28 percent marginal rate affecting other persons above
the level at which the lower rate ends. Not only is this
an unnecessary source of confusion, but it is contrary
to the objective of holding marginal rates down for
incentive reasons. There are other simpler ways of
accomplishing the same objective.
Capital Gains and Losses by Mutual Funds
Net capital gains realized by mutual funds are taxable
to the holders of the funds even though, unlike other
capital gains, the holders have no control over the
timing of the gains, whereas net capital losses made by
mutual funds cannot be transmitted to the holders. The
situation was particularly bad for 1987; some of the
funds made large gains prior to the October fall in stock
prices. These were taxable to the holders of the funds,
as of the record date, even though the shares had fallen
in sales value after the stock market fall. Even some
stockholders who had acquired the mutual funds after
the fall were taxed on gains from which they had not
benefitted. The provision that requires the funds to
distribute 98 percent of the realized capital gains
aggravates the problem.
Payment of Annuities
In 1986 Congress altered the treatment of payouts
from various retirement systems retroactively. Prior to
the legislation, amounts paid t)ut during the first three
years following retirement were not taxed if they did
not exceed the previous contributions, on the grounds
that these amounts were merely return of sums already
paid in by the employee. But the 1986 legislation
changed this, to allow exclusion beginning the first year
of only a portion of the annuity, based on life expec-
tancy, for persons retiring after 1 July 1 986. Thus, many
persons found themselves confronted in December
1986 with thousands of dollars of unexpected income
taxable for 1 986. Regardless of the merits of the change,
it was unconscionable for Congress to make this
retroactive to July 1986.
Income Averaging
The 1986 act eliminated the income averaging
provision. One of the long-standing defects of the
income tax had been its discrimination against persons
with fluctuating incomes; only in the last decade did
the law provide a limited but reasonable approach.
Eliminating this restores the earlier inequity against
such persons, less severe because of the lower rate
progression, but nevertheless significant.
Authors
The 1986 Act introduced changes in tax treatment
of authors that can most appropriately be described as
idiotic. Under the 1986 legislation, expenses involved
in writing a book would not be deductible in the period
in which they were incurred but had to be capitalized
and deducted on a depreciation basis against the
subsequent royalty income. A writer could not lump
his writing together and deduct expenses made
currently against income from other writing, but could
deduct them only from the income from the specific
book. This would involve a tremendous amount of
nuisance activity for writers of books that yield
relatively little income, and potentially serious
liquidity problems for authors having heavy outlay
during writing. The rule that even postage charges must
be capitalized violated all the usual rules relating to
expensing. But the main objection is the silly nuisance
created. This provision was eliminated by the 1988 Act
for freelance authors, photographers, and artists.
Capitalization and Inclusion in Inventory Costs
Major problems have been created by the require-
ments for capitalization and inclusion in inventory
costs of various expenses of manufacturers previously
deductible on a current basis.
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Scholarships
Another change that may have merit in prmciple but
not in implementation relates to scholarships. As the
Wall Street journal recently commented, a student
going to college on a scholarship needs to be accom-
panied by a cost accountant. The rule of the previous
law that scholarships were not taxable, while consonant
with the rule that gifts received are not income, did
result in some inequity and unnecessary leakage of
revenue, since students were responsible for tax on
income for which they worked but not for that received
on a scholarship or fellowship. To make all scholarship
income taxable would have sabotaged the intent of
scholarship programs and made it necessary to tax all
tuition waivers—taxing a sum that the person did not
receive and could not receive in money. Thus, only the
portion of scholarships that cover tuition, fees, and
books was left exempt, any amounts above this are
taxable, and the total must be segregated. But some
schools give lump sum scholarships that cover tuition,
fees, board and room, that is, without the segregation
that must be done for tax purposes. While many
students will, in fact, pay little or no tax because their
total incomes are too low, others, who are able to attend
college only because of scholarships that cover living
expenses to supplement outside taxable income will be
squeezed financially. The whole effort is petty
—
scrambling for a relatively few dollars of revenue—and
contrary to the principle that gifts are not taxable. A
much simpler approach would have been to allow
exclusion of scholarships only up to a specified
maximum per year—if they are to be taxable at all.
Changes were also made with regard to employer-pro-
vided educational benefits. These were made taxable to
the recipient by the 1986 legislation. This provision
was repealed by the 1988 act, effective through 1990,
but only for assistance provided for undergraduate, not
graduate, education, and the total was limited to
$1,500. Also in the 1986 legislation, tuition waivers
provided by educational institutions to graduate
students were made taxable if they were a portion of
the payment for work, as for example, as a teaching
assistant. The 1988 act, however, repealed this
provision; tuition and fee waivers provided by
universities to research and teaching assistants are
agam excluded from taxable income, but those provided
to graduate students who are not assistants are still
taxable, an absurd rule. These 1988 changes eliminated
some of the worst features in this area of the 1986 act,
but anomalies remain.
Two-Earner Families
The elimination of the special deduction for
two-earner families restores the marriage penalty,
despite the reduced progression in rates. There appears
to be no optimal solution to the relative treatment of
different family arrangements—single, married couple
with one salary earned, one with two persons earning
comparable amounts. But the inequity is aggravated by
ending the two-earner credit.
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Unreimbursed Employee and Investment Expenses
The restriction on unreimbursed employee and
various investment expenditures to amounts in excess
of 2 percent of adjusted gross income is not logical.
Either these are expenses of earning the income and,
thus, should be fully deductible without regard to a 2
percent figure, or they are not appropriately regarded as
expenses of earning the income and should not be
deductible at all. It makes no sense to restrict them as
has been done, thus taxing persons on amounts that are
not net income. By contrast, a 2 percent rule on
contributions would make a great deal of sense; there
is no need, either in terms of equity or encouraging
contributions, to allow deduction of small amounts.
The Additional Standard Deduction for the Elderly and
the Blind
The additional personal exemption for persons over
65 and for the blind was eliminated and replaced by an
additional standard deduction of $750 for a single
person, $600 for a married person, and the same figure
for a qualifying spouse but not dependents. But no
equivalent deduction is available for a person who
itemizes. This rule makes little sense. The elderly
and/or the blind may have substantial medical or other
deductible items that make itemization desirable
—
yet
doing so causes them to lose any additional standard
deduction.
Complexities
All in all, the tasks of the taxpayer, and thus of the
IRS, have been made more difficult by many changes.
Reducing the number of rates does not simplify the
operation. While a few changes have lessened the
compliance tasks, such as elimination of the deductibil-
ity of sales taxes, many have aggravated it. The
limitation of the interest deduction to those on home
mortgages is a source of serious complications and
interpretative problems—so serious that change in the
provision is imperative. Quite apart from complica-
tions, the restrictions will result in substantial change
in forms of borrowing, as borrowing for nonhome
purposes takes the form of real estate mortgages.
The reporting by stock and real estate brokers of gross
proceeds from sales of assets adds materially to the
tasks of many taxpayers, and the complex handling on
form 1040 of capital gains distributions is seriously
confusing. The new rule relating to income of children,
although justifiable, adds to complexity for many
taxpayers; this rule was simplified somewhat by the
1988 legislation, which makes it unnecessary for
children under 14 to file returns if the income is
between $500 and $5,000, and solely from interest or
dividends; the income is included in the parent's
income.
Some Policy Issues
Serious questions can be raised about one policy
issue: the elimination of the deduction for state sales
taxes. If no other taxes were deductible, it would make
little sense to allow deductibility of sales taxes. But
with income and property taxes deductible, the
nondeductibility of sales taxes involves drastic
interference by the federal government with state-local
tax structures. Whether the states are likely to shift
from sales to income taxes to any degree is doubtful,
but such change is encouraged. To the extent that it
occurs, one of the chief objectives of the 1986 reform
wfill, in part, be sabotaged—because state marginal
income tax rates Vkfill be higher.
One peculiarity is the continued deductibility of
taxes on personal property. In some states, such as
Indiana, most of the annual registration charge for
motor vehicles is designated as personal property tax
and is deductible, whereas in other states in which the
overall charge is comparable but all is designated as
motor vehicle registration fee, nothing is deductible. In
general, all major state-local general taxes should be
deductible or none of them; the present treatment is
very difficult to defend.
A few more general policy issues warrant mention.
The continued. use—and strengthening—of the
alternative minimum tax demonstrates the inadequacy
of the overall reform; if the basic tax were satisfactory
and all shelters eliminated, no minimum tax system
would be required. There are major aspects of the tax
that are very difficult to justify under any rational
policy: deductibility of interest on a second home,
failure to tax capital gains realized at death, the
continued very lenient treatment of homeowners
compared to tenants, and the various features that give
rise to liability under the alternative minimum tax but
not the regular tax. But one serious deficiency in the
opposite direction remains: the failure to index capital
gains, with resultant taxation of gains that are not truly
income.
In general, the tax reform involved a number of
permy-grabbing actions, while leaving major avenues
of escape untouched. Much as it accomplished, the tax
reform contains many aspects that can be questioned
—
provisions that will lead to increasing pressure to make
further changes, some already made in the 1988 Act.
Once Pandora's box is opened, some of the major
desirable features of the change may be lost. But failure
to make some changes is intolerable.
Summary
While the legislation of 1986 improved the tax
structure m many ways, it created or perpetuated a
number of anomalies and features that violate accepted
standards of income taxation. These can be avoided by
following several criteria:
• Complex provisions should be avoided when simpler
methods will serve. Violations of this rule include
the system for phasing out the personal exemptions
and initial bracket rate as income rises above
specified levels; the treatment of scholarships, and
others.
• Capital losses should receive the same general
treatment as capital gains—which they do not with
mutual fund holders.
• Items that are not income by usual standards should
not be taxed: Certain mutual-fund-holder capital
gains, gifts such as scholarships, amounts that cover
unreimbursed employee and investor expenses.
• Tax changes involving significant amounts of tax
should never be made retroactive, in the interests of
rational financial planning and taxpayer morale.
• The tax should not discriminate against certain
forms of income: irregular incomes; those of families
involving different patterns of receipt of income, for
example.
• The tax should not distort selection of tax structures
by the states and local governments; the chief
violation is the nondeductibility of sales taxes while
income and property taxes are deductible.
lobn Due is Professor Emeritus at the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. The author is indebted
to several major sources: the Summer 1987 issue of
Economic Prospectives (Vol. 1), and particularly the
article by Joseph Pechman, pp. 11-28; the September
issue of the National Tax Journal (Vol. 40), entitled
"Tax Reform: Now You See It." and many brief articles
in the Wall Street Journal. / also should like to express
appreciation to Professor Karen Hreha of the Depart-
ment of Accountancy for her assistance.
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Illinois Business Indexes
RI o foreseeable economic contraction is likely to
develop over the next two quarters in the state of
Illinois according to leading economic indicators. As
Chart 1 shows, both the current and trend indicators
have increased throughout most of 1988. Moreover, the
current indicator remained above the trend indicator
during virtually all of 1988 and part of 1987. The
isolated one-month drop in the indexes during Sep-
tember provides insufficient evidence to predict a
downturn in economic growth during the next few
quarters.
Growth in the Illinois economy is also reflected in
the general uptrend in manufacturing employment in
the northwestern region and the greater Chicago area
(Chart 2). At the same time, retail sales continue to
show a strong growth compared to the same period in
1987.
Personal income in Illinois has grown in the past four
years, registering marked improvement over experience
during the 1980-1982 period (Chart 3). As it is clear
from the chart, Illinois trails the nation in personal
income growth.
State unemployment has remained above the na-
tional average during the past few years, but the season-
ally adjusted monthly unemployment rates for Illinois,
shown in Chart 4, keep showing a healthy trend.
The national and Chicago help wanted indexes
measure the volume of classified advertising in major
newspapers throughout the country and the Chicago
area, respectively. These indexes also show great
sensitivity to changes in the demand for labor. In
September, Chart 5 indicates that Chicago and the US
are following the same general constant trend. But
during the same month, the Chicago index has suffered
a 5.98 percent drop compared with the same period in
1987, while the St. Louis index keeps growing at a
moderate pace.
Finally, inflationary pressures continue to emerge in
the US and Illinois economies. Chart 6 shows that
inflation, measured through the Consumer Price Index,
has been increasing for the past few months while the
Illinois average remains above the national rate.
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Illinois Economic Outlook
iZ/mployment growth in Illinois is expected to be
modest for most of 1989. While growth is anticipated
in services and trade, both wholesale and retail, declines
are likely to occur in manufacturing employment. This
is similar to the changes in employment at the national
level.
After increasing in the early part of 1 989, employment
in US manufacturing is predicted to decline over the
next several quarters. Other sectors, such as finance
and services, are expected to show employment in-
creases. US employment is projected to increase by
about 2 percent in 1 989, but slower growth is forecast
for Illinois.
The chart shows quarterly changes in Illinois employ-
ment for the largest sectors of the economy. The chief
impression emerging from an inspection of the chart is
that there is a marked divergence in growth rates.
Declines in manufacturing employment are offset by
growth in other sectors.
Chart. Illinois Employment (percentage change from
previous quarter)
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